Studia Artistarum
Études sur la Faculté des arts dans les Universités médiévales

35

HERVAEUS NATALIS O.P.

DE QUATTUOR MATERIIS
SIVE
DETERMINATIONES CONTRA MAGISTRUM HENRICUM DE GANDAVO

Studia Artistarum
Études sur la Faculté des arts dans les Universités médiévales

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Hervaeus Natalis O.P.

De quattuor materiis

sive

Determinationes contra magistrum Henricum de Gandavo

Vol. II: De esse et essentia

De materia et forma

A Critical Edition from Selected Manuscripts

Edited by
L.M. de Rijk

BREPOLS

HERVAEUS NATALIS O.P.

DE QUATTUOR MATERIIS

SIVE

DETERMINATIONES CONTRA MAGISTRUM HENRICUM DE GANDAVO

Vol. I: DE FORMIS

Vol. II: DE ESSE ET ESSENTIA

Vol. III: DE INTELLECTU ET SPECIE

Vol. IV: DE VOLUNTATE ET INTELLECTU

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Preface

This second volume of the edition of Herveaus' *De quattuor materiis* had been finished by the editor, L.M. de Rijk, just before his sudden death on June 30. He had sent me the final version to read before forwarding it to the printer. Some minor corrections were necessary in the introduction, which has also been read by Joke Spruyt, and I checked the manuscripts in order to correct some evident mistakes in the critical apparatus. In some places I have hesitated to change the proposed reading of the Latin text – the editor being rather easily inclined to make conjectures -, but I decided not to intervene in dubious cases because I could not any more discuss the matter with De Rijk.

Lambertus M. de Rijk was an old and dear friend as well as a fascinating teacher. I feel lucky to have known him for such a long time and to have collaborated with him until the end of his life. For me, it was a work of loving remembrance to see this volume to the definitive printed edition.

The third and last volume of the edition of Hervaeus' work, already well advanced by the editor, will be finished by two of his main disciples: Henk Braakhuis and Onno Kneepkens. Thus we will have kept our promise, in respect and friendship for our master.

Olga Weijers
Paris, September 2012

Foreword

This second volume of Hervaeus Natalis's polemical work, *De quattuor materiis* contains his *De esse et essentia*. In this work the author criticizes the rival systems of the metaphysics of creation that were upheld by Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent, and presents an exposition of his own notion of being. To explain Harvey's antagonistic attitude to Henry of Ghent and his simultaneous rejection of Giles's positions (the rigid Aegidian real distinction between essence and existence in particular) it was necessary to provide a thorough investigation of the ontological positions of both Henry and Giles. Hence the lion's part of my *Introduction* will be devoted to these two rivals of Harvey's.

For the selection of the manuscripts used for the present edition of *De esse et essentia* as well as the ratio edendi, orthography, punctuation and headings employed, the reader should consult the *General Introduction* to volume one, *De formis*.

I wish to express my gratitude to all those who, each in their own way, have contributed to the publication of this volume, particularly Dr. Olga Weijers and Dr. Louis Holtz (Paris), Dr. Russell Friedman (Louvain), and Dr. Joke Spruyt (Maastricht). Professor *** was kind enough to draw my attention to the unpublished typescript edition of *De esse et essentia* added by Father Elliott B. Allen to his Toronto dissertation entitled *Hervaeus Natalis' Notion of Being* (Toronto 1958). Sincere thanks are once again due to Mr. Christophe Lebbe, who as usual has supported the publication in a professional and competent way.

Mheer, June 2012 L.M. DE RIJK

PS I have not been able to identify the person who is meant here, but he will easily recognize himself when reading this Foreword. O.W.

Introduction

1. *A first assessment of Harvey's tract* De esse et essentia

In the second tract of *De quattuor materiis* Harvey continues to combat Henry of Ghent's ontology, particularly the latter's views of the relationships between essence and existence. Their dispute takes place in the context of a much larger philosophic development, in which the progressive discovery of Aristotle and ongoing altercations about the Philosopher's true doctrines in particular dominated the academic scene. The situation was so complicated in that any Christian scholar had to uncover the authentic purport of Aristotelian thought by consulting what Aristotle's various mouthpieces made him say. Not only Arab thinkers like Avicenna and Averroes presented their own Aristotle. Influential thinkers of the Latin West, such as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas also left their marks upon thirteenth-century Aristotelianism and thus enhanced disagreement about the correct interpretation of the Philosopher. In addition, an extrinsic touchstone for finding the right way to adopt Aristotelian lore was at stake, its compatibility, that is, with Catholic Faith and the current ecclesiastical doctrines.

1.1 Harvey's position in the ontological debates after 1276

It is in this complex doctrinal and ecclesiastical setting that Harvey too had to find his own approach to the problems. In order to follow him amidst the perplexing doctrinal and political embarrassments that were bound to affect any participant of the scholarly debates in their attempts to arrive at a sound and tenable stand, the modern historian should be aware of the relevant ins and outs of the proper ontological issues of the period of Harvey's academic career. As to Harvey's dispute against Henry of Ghent, not all aspects of the common controversy about essence and existence elicited the same degree of contention. More than once, Harvey did not completely side with Giles of Rome in his criticism of Henry.

Anyhow, let us begin with the common features of the thirteenth-century discussions concerning the proper meaning of 'to be', including their roots in ancient thought.

1.2 On the ancient roots of medieval metaphysics and ontology

From as early as Plato and Aristotle 'to be' (*to einai*, *esse*) was considered the first principle of anything existent in the outside world. For the medieval thinkers too the basic philosophic (and theological) question was how to assess the relationship between the essence (or 'beingness') and existence of anything (whether material or immaterial) that presents itself to man's apprehension. Any attempt to unravel this central problem of ontology had to focus upon the proper nature of the correlations (and their possibility) between the sublime First ontic Principle, 'Being(ness)' and the particular entities ('beings') of the perceptible world. From the very start of Western philosophy, the puzzling thing has been the unmistakable fact that, in Plato's words (*Sophist*, 249C-D): "What is and the All consists of what is changeless *and* what is in change, *both together*".[1] The core of the ontological problem is how to come to terms with the fact that our experience of the particulars' existence is naturally stronger than our awareness of the need for a First Principle. In other words, how should we manage the notion of ontological priority?

The two chief options for coming to grips with this tantalizing problem are well-known. Plato advocates the ontological priority (as well as the epistemological and moral priority, for that matter) of the transcendent Domain of Being(ness), which is to be shared ('participated in') by the physical particulars of the outside world. Aristotle, on the other hand, sticks to man's basic intuition that particular being unquestionably has ontic priority, which he expressed in his adage that there is no being other than what is particular. Hence *the* fundamental problem of Platonism has always been to explain the precise nature of participation and how transcendence is compatible with the unmistakably perceived immanence. For Aristotle and his followers, in their turn, the inescapable question has

1. In *Sophist*, 249C10-D4 the enigmatic character of participation as bearing on both transcendence and immanence (or, in other words on the immutable Forms and mutable Matter) at the same time, is pregnantly expressed: " It seems that the philosopher who holds such things as knowledge and so on in high respect, is therefore obliged to refuse to accept from the advocates either of the One or of the many Forms that All is static, while, at the same time, he must not for a moment listen to those who make 'what is' change in every respect. Like a child begging for: "both!" he must say that 'what is' and the All consists of what is changeless *and* what is in change, both together". See for the 'novel metaphysics' Plato advocates in his mature period De Rijk (1986), 13-14; 103ff.; 164ff.; 327ff.

always been: 'How can you guarantee the possibility of firm knowledge about the transient, ever-changing world of immanent beings without appealing to some kind of universal ontic principle, which is bound to go beyond the level of the strict individuality of the *hic et nunc*?'.

The development of medieval metaphysics and ontology testifies to the various, often ingenious endeavours made by medieval scholars in the Western as well as in the Eastern tradition to master the vital problems of ontology, all of which focussed on the proper nature of the Principle of Being. From Late Antiquity onwards Platonism was in continuous progress. Whoever wants to investigate Plato's influence upon medieval should realize that it is not Plato himself they will encounter, but some important representatives of Neoplatonism, including such an influential thinker as St. Augustine. This surely holds good for the main ontological issues, the notion of participation in particular, which was subject to a far-reaching evolution.

In his mature period Plato struggled with the core metaphysical problem of 'Beingness'. In the light of the chief problems of Platonism regarding transcendence/im-manence, the One and many, and the other participation issues, the evolution of Platonism to Neoplatonism has been a legitimate one, as will be argued for in our section 4.[2] It will appear soon enough that Neoplatonic views have been part and parcel of the thirteenth-century ontological picture.

1.3 A sketch of the various 13th-century positions concerning being and existence

This much seems to be certain, creation is the key-notion in any system of Christian ontology, creation being not only its fixed (and obligate) starting-point but its truth-standard as well. It need not come as a surprise then that a number of scholars' decisive arguments against opposite views were always taken from their supposed incompatibility with the Catholic doctrine of creation. God created the world 'from nothing' ('ex nichilo)', which is to say that, apart from the Creator himself and his free creative activity, creation presupposes absolutely nothing. This suggests that God virtually has within himself the beingness and perfections of all creatures, including the possible ones that so far have not come into being (and possibly never will). Moreover, the act of creation being a free act means that to a Christian, the Neoplatonic necessary emanation of lower being from the unique Source of Beingness is definitely out of the question.

2. The present author has discussed these two complementary problem areas in his studies of Platonic ontology (De Rijk 1986) and of the impact and the strategy of Aristotle's ontology (De Rijk 2002).

However, the notion of creation is not entirely transparent. The radical freedom of the divine act of creation implies the radical contingency and a certain lack of transparency of creatural existence (which, by the way, is happily missing in the straightforward notion of 'necessary emanation'). For one thing, there is no real relationship between the Creator and his creatures, but only the other way round. When God communicates his being to creatures (or 'makes them participate'), the divine essence is not changed at all, not even in a relational way regarding the creatures. Such a unilateral relationship is not easily understood. The proper nature of participation is not entirely clear either, as long as the interrelation between Creator and creatures remains in the dark. On the one hand there is the Source of Beingness, the immutable, unaffected God-Creator, on the other the world of changeable creatures, which were virtually pre-existent in God before creation.

An influential adherent of (Neo)platonism, St. Augustine solved the problem by making creatural being pre-exist in God's Intelligence from eternity: the future forms immanent in things are already existent in the Creator's thought (transcendent essences as 'ideae in mente divina') as the objects of divine knowledge that will serve as the models of things to be created. In this way Augustine could both reject Neoplatonic necessary emanation, and at the same time hold that a plurality of things can be produced from the unique Source of Being without diminishing the divine unity.[3]

2. *On the 'being vs. existence' issue in Christian ontology*

Coming now to the specific issue of the relationship between being and existence, we have to assess the position of divine Being in the various systems of Christian ontology. Unlike the metaphysics of simple Perfect Being, any ontological system concerning creatural beings should assess the position of God by *a contrario* investigating the compositional structure found in the finite beings, the interrelationship between being and existence in particular.

The compositional structure of any finite being is a key notion of Christian ontology. It is rooted in what since the end of the nineteenth century was baptized (and misspelled)[4] 'hylemorphism' by some Neo-

3. See e.g. *In Joh. Evangelium* I, 17; *De vera religione* XXI, 42; *De Genesi contra Manicheos* I 8, 13; *De Trinitate* IV 1, 3. See de Rijk (1975).
4. In fact these historians incorrectly coined the neologism 'hyl*e*morphism' from Greek *hulê* ('matter') and *morphê* ('form'), apparently being unfamiliar with the rules governing the formation of compounds practiced in ancient Greek morphol-

scholastic historians of medieval philosophy to designate any version of the Aristotelian ontological doctrine of matter and form as the basic components of any material being. An extreme version of hylomorphism holding that any finite (or created) substance, including the immaterial (or spiritual) ones, consists of form and 'matter' is called 'universal hylomorphism'. Bonaventura (1217/18-1274), for example, can be regarded as a representant of universal hylomorphism. To him, all created beings are made up of matter and form, that is, of potency and act. Matter in itself is neither corporeal nor spiritual, but becomes one or the other in accordance with the form it receives. Spiritual beings such as angels and the human soul are substances composed of spiritual matter and the form that determines it.[5] Hocédez (1930, 22) rightly refers to the *Summa Philosophiae* wrongly attributed to Robert Grosseteste, which likewise testifies to universal hylomorphism and the explicit denial of a real distinction between being and existence. In the chapter entitled "Quod compositio ex *quo est* et *quod est* non est realis, sed per viam considerationis" the author criticizes the idea of the real composition (and, consequently, the corresponding real diversity of the components) put forward by his opponents ('quidam moderni'):

> ps.-Grosseteste, *Summa Philosophiae*, cap. 5 [52], p. 328,12-21 ed. Baur: Iam vero occasione verbi Boetii [*De hebdomadibus*, axiom I] quo asserit in omni quod est citra Primum, inveniri necessario *quod est* et *quo est*, idest *ens* et *esse* quod de rebus in actu completo constitutis solummodo verificari potest — alioquin in ipso *quod est* vel in ipso *quo est* hoc verificabitur, et ibitur in infinitum; quod est inconveniens — quidam moderni compositionem realem ex *quod est* et *quo est* introduxerunt (…) obscure tamen quod intendebant declaraverunt.

The ways in which the authors judged and evaluated the nature of the ontological function of the act of compounding form and matter were different and, consequently, the role of the Principle of Being, God was discussed in different ways as well. The salient point of any attempt to solve this problem is the need to somehow determine the decisive difference between the notions of being and existence; every answer to this question has its impact upon the doctrine of creation, the possibility of creation in particular. The importance of this issue was acknowledged by every theologian and philosopher participating in the debate. However, many things still remained in the dark. Giles of Rome was of the opinion

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ogy. They must also have ignored the origin of terms like 'morph*o*logy' and 'psych*o*logy' (from the feminine words *morphê* and *psychê*), as well as overlooked the correct seventeenth-century formation of the neologism 'hyl*o*zoïsm'.

5. "Habet enim omnis creata substantia materiam, formam, compositionem"; see his *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, collatio II, 23-25, Quaracchi edition.

that any uncertainty in this regard could threaten our understanding of the ins and outs of creation. He intended to do something about it.

2.1 Giles of Rome and the 'being vs. existence' issue

As early as in his *Theoremata de corpore Christi* (before Christmas 1276), Giles of Rome complains that his fellow colleagues failed to unequivocally explain the mode of being belonging to finite, created things. Instead they were satisfied with vague locutions on this score, so that it was left up to their students to rack their brains over this important question about creation. He promises to clear up the situation.[6] Giles lost no time in doing so: he carried out his promise in the *Theoremata de esse et essentia* written during his exile from Paris University (1278-1286). Between Easter 1285 and Christmas 1286 he wrote his extensive *Quaestiones disputatae de esse et essentia* in which the same subject matter is dealt with in a more polemical way.

2.2 Giles's novel view of the issue as expounded in Theorem XIX

In order to throw light upon his own novel view of the relationship between being and existence, Giles presents (in his *Theorem* XIX, which is rightly regarded by Hocédez and others as the central one of the whole work) three different attempts to establish this relationship. Notice the Neoplatonic flavour of the opening lines ('Omne esse quod fluit') and the implicit rejection of the incorrect views of the matter, preceding the solemn declaration about the state of affairs concerning the ontology of any entity other than the First Cause, God:

> *Theor. De esse et essentia* XIX, p. 125, 1-7 (ed. Hocédez): Omne esse quod fluit in compositis a forma totius vel quod in simplicibus causatur a quidditate, non est coniunctio essentialium partium, nec respectus ad Agens, nec determinatio materiae vel subiecti. Sed est actualitas quedam realiter differens et superaddita quidditati ex quo esse et essentia componitur quodlibet citra Primum.

To begin with, no disputant will completely identify being and existence, and straightfor-wardly claim that there is no difference between them whatsoever, like in God. But how should this unmistakable difference be evaluated? Is it strictly real, or is it somehow based upon our manner of considering things? Starting from his own opinion that being and exist-

6. *Theoremata de corpore Christi*, prop. 29: "Quia ut plurimum circa esse creaturarum fatigantur addiscentes et multi cum loquuntur de esse et essentia, in solis verbis sustentantur, cum locus occurrerit, Domino concedente, intendimus hoc diffusius declarare".

ence are two really different things (*res*) Giles divides his opponents into three groups. Firstly, some maintain that existence is caused by the mere conjunction of the essential components, matter and form. So by the conjunction of *this* form to *this* parcel of matter with which this form was not combined earlier, *this* material thing comes into being. It goes without saying that the Creator is the ultimate cause of this process (*ibid*,. p. 125,15-126, 9). In this line of thought there is no good reason to assume that there is a real difference (one, that is, *inter rem et rem*) between the quiddity and the being the case (or existence) of any finite entity.

Another group of opponents opine that one and the same thing is both essence and being, so the difference in question is only a matter of focal attention. A thing is essence when taken in itself or regarded as an item of the predicamental order (*res predicamenti*) having its exemplar in the First Being, whereas it is 'being' (or 'what is being the case', or '*esse*') in its capacity of being the effect of the Agens, so the fact of its being created adds nothing to its essence but a certain relationship (*respectus*) to the Agens. So if one asks why a creature now has existence and did not have it before, the answer is that it now has an actual relationship to its Creator, which it did not have before (*ibid*., p. 126,10-21). Hocédez (*op. cit*. p. 22) may well be right in joining James of Viterbo who in his first *Quodlibet* — when he opposes the (Aegidian) real distinction view to the (Ghentian) rival one — traces the latter back to Robert Grosseteste, saying that Grosseteste's original opinion was later on developed by modern doctors:

> *Quodlibet* I, q. 9, in cod. Erlangensi 368, f. 130r-v [from Grabmann (1924), 164ff.]: (…) videndum est quid de differentia essentie et esse diversi doctores opinati sunt. (…). Quidam enim dicunt quod 'esse' non dicit aliam rem quam 'essentia'. Si autem aliquo modo ab essentia differre videatur, hoc erit solum secundum rationem. Alii vero dicunt quod 'esse' dicit rem aliam ab 'essentia'. Nam (ut dicunt) licet essentia sit actualitas quedam, ista tamen actualitas non sufficit ad hoc quod res dicatur actu existere, sed oportet quod superaddatur ei quedam alia actualitas; et hec vocatur 'esse actuale; quod quidem non est accidens tamquam ad genus accidentis pertinens, magis autem pertinet ad predicamentum Substantie. Non tamen est forma neque materia neque compositum ex eis, sed est actus quidam superadditus per quem compositum ipsum et omnia que sunt in composito, dicuntur existere. Et ita est res alia ab essentia. Alii vero ponunt quod 'esse' non dicit aliam rem ab essentia, cum differt ab essentia intentione; quod quidem est differre minus quam re et plus quam ratione. Nam (ut dicunt) 'esse' dicit essentiam cum respectu ad Agens; 'essentia' autem cum huius respectu non videtur aliam dicere rem a seipsa sine huius respectu, sed dicit aliam intentionem. Hunc autem modum dicendi videtur aliqualiter tangere Lincolniensis circa principium secundi Posteriorum, ubi dicit quod 'esse' dictum de Causa Prima

> indicat ipsam essentiam omnino simplicem Cause Prime. Deinde vero de aliis non predicat nisi ordinationem et dependentiam eorum ab Ente Primo, quod est per se. Et hec ordinatio vel dependentia nichil multiplicat in essentia dependente. Sed alii posteriores hunc modum dicendi magis expresserunt et declaraverunt et ad ipsum aliqua addiderunt.

In fact, Grosseteste regards the difference between a thing's quiddity and existence as a matter of focal attention, as appears from his commentary on *Posterior Analytics*:

> *In Anal. Post*. II, 1 ed. Rossi, p. 291,80-84: 'Esse' dictum de Causa Prima non predicat nisi ipsam essentiam omnino simplicem Cause Prime. Dictum vero de aliis non predicat nisi ordinationem et dependentiam eorum ab Ente Primo, quod secundum se est. Et hec ordinatio et dependentia nichil multiplicat in essentia dependente. Propter hoc sive queratur de Ente Primo sive de re dependente ab Ente Primo an sit, hec questio non ponit in numerum.
> 'To be' said of the Prime Cause only indicates its entirely simple nature. Said of others, however, it only indicates their order and dependence with regard to First Being which *is* by itself. This order and dependence does not multiply anything in the essence dependent. Therefore no matter whether about the First Being or a thing dependent of it it is asked if it *is*, this question takes the *an sit* as two different things.[7]

This statement of Grosseteste's (*sententia Lincolniensis*) is frequently quoted, among others by William Ockham. In his *Summa logicae* III-2, cap. 27, the author discusses the question whether *esse rei* and *essentia rei* are two distinct things outside the mind. In order to answer this question Ockham proceeds to analyse how existence (*esse existere*) is related to the thing in question. He concludes that 'entitas' and 'existentia' are not two really different things: the words 'res' and 'esse' signify one and the same, be it that one does so *nominaliter*, the other *verbaliter*. Thus the verb 'to be' signifies the very thing, but said of the First Cause it signifies it in its ontological simplicity, without any connotation of dependence, whereas said of other things it signifies them in their depend-

7. Taking Latin *numerus* (like Greek *arithmos*) as originally meaning 'series', 'sequence' of 'countable' (hence 'similar' or 'kindred' to some extent) things, rather than just 'number', expressions such as 'ponere aliquid in numero cum' stand for something like 'to rank something with' or 'to put something on a par with'. Likewise 'non ponere in numerum cum' (as found in the present case) means 'be something different from', and expressions such as 'facere numerum cum' and 'ponit in numerum (ut res tertia dici possit)' when said of two things mean something like 'constitute a duality' or 'are not just one thing'. As a matter of consequence, our 'number' *one* is frequently said not to properly be an *arithmos* or *numerus*: 'unum non est numerus, sed principium numerandi'. See De Rijk (2002 I, 406f.; 435, n. 97; 654, n. 273; II, 92, n. 112, and passim (see the *Index*, p. 479a). Cfr. e.g. Giraldus Odonis, *Logica* II A 52 (p. 310 ed. De Rijk, 1997): "Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non ponunt in numerum cum Patre in ratione cognoscentis". See also the texts quoted in notes 13 and 15 below.

ence and order to the Prime Cause. Next he presents the common quotation from Grosseteste. Meanwhile we should notice that it was not before about 1275 that Henry of Ghent had come out as an adherent of Grosseteste's opinion.

A third group of people reject the real difference between being and existence as explained by Giles because they are convinced that being is nothing but a certain determination of the material substrate (*determinatio materie vel subiecti*). They also assume that matter and its extension are not two different things either: matter's extension is a mode of being determining it, and this mode is founded upon matter as its substrate (*ibid.,* p. 126,22-127,9).

Then Giles goes on to discuss the three incorrect views. The 'mere conjunction' view is rejected because, Giles thinks, it cannot explain creation in a satisfactory way and is insensitive to the fact an essence's actual existence requires not only its composition with matter but also the addition of actuality. Now this actuality is something really different from the thing's essence and is added to it as a third thing (*ibid*., pp. 128,2-131,3).[8]

The 'respectus ad Agens' view is likewise cast aside, mainly because to Giles's mind, A's relationship to B is not constitutive of A's being the case.[9] An actual relationship fails to do the job, because to actually come into being requires something more, to wit actuality supervening on the quiddity in which the actual relationship is founded (*ibid.,* pp. 131,4-132,12). It must strike the reader that Giles does not pay much attention to this view, which is in fact the way in which his later chief opponent, Henry of Ghent came to see the kernel of the creation problem.

Finally Giles sets out to extensively refute the third incorrect view. His chief argument is taken from the twofold sense of the phrase 'extensio materie', which is easily ignored by his opponents, particularly by his colleagues who are satisfied with a vague phraseology. Saying that matter is extended through quantity can be taken in two different ways. Firstly it can mean that the parts of matter are not the same as those of quantity, so matter's extension and its quantity are two really different things. On the other hand, the mode of being (*modus essendi*) falling to matter as a

8. *Theoremata de corpore Christi*, p. 130,23-131,3: "Intelligemus ergo primo in his corporalibus quod materia coniungitur formae et faciunt quandam essentiam compositam, quae essentia non potest actu existere nisi ei superaddatur actualitas quaedam, quae dicitur 'esse'. Patet ergo quod *esse* (…) est quaedam actualitas realiter differens ab essentia et superaddita quidditati".
9. *Ibid*., p. 131,6-8: "Non enim dicere possumus quod ideo haec res de novo incipit esse quia de novo habet actualem respectum ad Agens, quia in *Ad aliquid* non est motus nec mutatio".

result of its conjunction with quantity can equally be called 'matter's extension', and consequently matter and its extension are not 'due res realiter differentes', but instead matter's extension should be called merely 'a certain determination of matter'. Likewise it is important to tell apart the two different senses of the phrase 'determinatio materie vel subiecti'. In one sense the determination really differs from what it determines, in another the difference is not a real one.[10] Now, like in the case of quantity and extension, if we seriously observe the dissimilarity between the two modes of considering the relationship between essence and being the case (*esse*), we can only reject the view that *esse* is merely the essence's *modus se habendi* (*ibid.,* pp. 133,20-134,23).

Giles's conspicuously extensive way of dealing with the third opinion has rightly drawn the attention of modern interpreters.[11] His opinion, which focusses upon the constitutive role of the determination of the finite being's material substrate, explains existence in terms of the well-known formula 'forma dat esse'. This adage goes back to Dominic Gundisalvi's short tract *De unitate* (a compilation from Boethius and frequently attributed to the master), in which the aphorism is found 'All being comes from form' ('Omne esse ex forma est'), sometimes alternatively worded 'esse fluit a forma', or 'forma causat (*or* dat) esse'.

Giles had at least two good reasons to deal with this version of hylomorphism. The aphorism was widely used but was also open to a broad scala of interpretations. As has been made patently clear by Cornelio Fabro (1961, 335-362), the 'forma dat esse' theme plays an important role in Thomas Aquinas's influential doctrine of the causality operating in the predicamental order of being. As a faithful adherent to Aquinas, Giles was quite familiar with the role of the *actus essendi* in his master's ontology. Considering his own underlining of the constitutive role of *actualitas* in matters of existence, it must matter very much to Giles to corroborate the originality of his own approach to the matter. However, his very attempt to save the doctrine of creation seems to get mixed up with a certain Neoplatonic flavour. As is clear enough, Aquinas joins Augustine in departing from any touch of Neoplatonic emanation. This is not to say that Aquinas was insensitive to any Neoplatonic inspiration. More than many of his contemporaries, Thomas was familiar with the Neoplatonist Proclus. The latter's *Elements of Theology* and the anonymous *Book of Causes* (*Liber de causis*, of which Thomas found out that

10. *Ibid*., p. 132, 19-23: " (…) determinatio materiae vel subiecti dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo ut est realiter differens et ponit in numerum cum eo quod determinat, alio vero modo ut non ponit in numerum cum ipso, sicut et extensio materiae hiis duobus modis accipi potest".
11. Hocédez (1930), 23-26.

it was excerpted from Proclus's *Elements*), elaborates a system of causes intended to account for the structure and coming into existence of the Universe. These very facts forced authors to keep the 'forma dat esse' version (which was as such not hostile to a (Neo)platonic system) at a distance and to show that it could not properly account for the causality of Being.

The predominant role assigned to form with respect to a thing's being need not come as a surprise, but the decisive question is whether 'being' is taken to stand for quidditative being, such as in 'being a man', 'being an animal', or is said of a thing's *esse existentie*. Giles is well aware of this difference, which in fact is crucial for his own ontological doctrine and his view of creation in particular.

2.3 The impact of the 'forma totius vs. forma partis' item in Giles's ontology

In some other Theorems Giles tries hard enough to show that it is vital to distinguish between *forma partis* and *forma totius*. In Theorem VIII (pp. 45,12-46,15) he argues that the *esse* flowing from the *forma partis* does not really differ from matter and form because it is only a mode of being, whereas the *esse* flowing from the *forma totius* really differs from the thing's essence. Although there is a difference between these forms in immaterial beings, neverthe-less angels have a twofold actuality, one coming from their form and making them an intelligible being, the other coming from *esse*, which causes them to actually exist. Likewise in material beings the *forma partis* makes the matter intelligible, whereas the *forma totius* affords the *esse* of the compositum made up of form and matter, so they can be conceived of, but cannot exist without *esse* (Theorems X-XII).

In Theorem XVI Giles thinks it useful to dot the i's and cross the t's in order to rule out any misunderstanding about his intentions. He wants to prevent people from thinking that, like the *forma totius*, the *forma partis* affords existence to matter and form. It definitely does not, as is explicitly avered by this theorem. It runs "Of all being that is caused in substances by the *forma partis* it does *not* hold that it differs from matter and form in such a way as to be entitled to the name 'third thing really different from them'".[12] The extensive exposition of the theorem (*ibid.,* pp. 100,14-111,16) clearly reveals its intention to prove that although the views held by Giles's opponents with regard to the *forma partis* are

12. *Ibid.,* p. 100, 10-13: "Omne esse quod in substantiis causatur a forma partis, cum materia et forma non ponit in numerum ut ab eis res tertia realiter differens valeat nuncupari.

plausible enough, they all fail to recognize that they do not apply to the problem of existence of finite being as a whole, because the opponents do not discern the specific role of the *forma totius* as constitutive of existence.[13] The opponents all fail to realise that existence is an actuality supervening on the finite being's quiddity as something really different. The quiddity qua existent a 'third thing' must be well distinguished from matter and form and their conjunction. To put it briefly, none of Giles's opponents see the disparity between a thing's *modus essendi* and its being really the case in the outside world.

3. *The novelties of Giles's approach to the ontological problems*

Whatever can be regarded as Giles's doctrinal innovations (or at least divergences from common doctrine) should be judged in the light of the core business of Giles's ontology, culminating in the thesis that the coming to be of finite beings requires two diverse *actualitates*: one affording intelligibility to matter, the other affording existence or 'actually (or rather 'factually'; see our section 3.1.2 below) being the case' to the compound made up of matter and form. Other innovations are merely sequels to this basic position, his peculiar 'distinctio realis' in particular. These two additional (but utmost substantial, as will appear) items will be discussed later on.

3.1 The twofold 'actualitas'

The introduction of these two different actualities is the kernel of Giles's ontology of finite, material being. These two types are the main subject of the tenth Theorem. One stems from the thing's formal component and provides its material component with intelligibility, the other causes the compound of matter and form to actually exist (or 'be the case') in the outside world. The different roles of these ontic principles are underlined right from the start. Material substances owe their intelligibility to the

13. *Ibid.,* p. 110,13-17: "(…) dicendum est quod perfectio illa materiae est solum quidam modus essendi vel quidam modus se habendi vel est quaedam determinatio materiae per formam; non est autem quaedam res tertia realiter differens ab utrisque"; p. 111, 9-16: "Bene ergo dictum est quod esse et perfectio causata in materia a forma partis non est aliud esse de quo dicimus rem componi ex essentia et esse. Nec huiusmodi perfectio sive esse ponit in numerum cum ipsa essentia vel cum materia et forma ut ab eis res realiter differens dici possit. Sed est solum quaedam determinatio materiae, quae communi nomine quidam modus essendi vel quidam modus se habendi poterit nuncupari".

actuality provided by their forms but their actual existence to the factor *esse*. Hence they cannot be conceived of without their existence:

> *Theorem* X, p. 52, 1-5: Omnes materiales substantie per actualitatem quam habent a forma, sunt intelligibiles, sed per actualitatem quam habent ab esse, dicuntur existere. Possunt ergo intelligi sed non existere sine esse, attamen nec intelligi possunt nec existere sine forma.

The twofold compositional structure of material things is explained in terms of the Aristotelian doctrine of act and potency, so a twofold potentiality as well as a twofold actuality can be assigned to them. In their composition of matter and form, matter behaves as potency and form as act, whereas in their composition out of essence and *esse*, the complete essence ('tota essentia')[14] functions as potency and *esse* as act (*ibid.,* 6-15).

Giles deems it extremely important to show that two stages are in order. First we perceive (*primo intelligimus*) that matter is united with a form, the result of which union is a compound nature, called 'essence of material things'; further (*ulterius*) we perceive that this essence is perfected by *esse* and so is in potency with respect to *esse*, in a similar manner as (in the first stage, that is) matter was perfected by the form and was in potency with respect to the form.[15]

The enumeration of the two stages of actualization is remarkable, at first glance at least. It will not come as a surprise that some people have taken exception to these two stages, taking them in chronological order (and thus jeopardizing the unique act of creation). However, the future tenses (*imaginabimur* and *intelligemus*) should be taken, I think, as referring to the two stages of the investigator's awareness,[16] who will first

14. Notice Giles's use of the phrase *tota essentia*, because, say, the essence of 'man' is taken, not as manhood (*humanitas*), but qua including the material component which is involved in the first actualization.
15. *Ibid*., p. 52,16-24: "Sic itaque imaginabimur compositionem istam quia primo intelligemus [*AEO*; intelligimus *ed*.] materiam uniri forme, ex qua unione resultat quedam natura composita, que dicitur 'essentia rerum materialium', ulterius vero intelligemus [*AEO*; intelligimus *ed*.] hanc essentiam perfici per *esse* et esse in potentia respectu *esse*, sicut materia perficiebatur per formam et erat in potentia respectu forme. Habebit ergo res materialis duplicem actualitatem, unam a forma et aliam ab *esse*". Notice that the mutually cognate Mss. *AEO* are regarded by Hocédez (*Introd.,* p. 123f.) as the most reliable text witnesses (despite some obvious omissions in *EO* resulting from homoioteleuta). — Incidentally, as early as in the first decades of the first century A.D. Philo the Jew taught that Jahwe first created the Intelligile World of the transcendent Ideas as a perfect and godlike pattern for the creation of the material world, and then created the sensible world (*De opificio mundi*, 4, 16. See de Rijk (1975), 206f.
16. A similar pregnant use of the future tense is found at p. 52,22: 'habebit ergo res' = 'therefore it will appear that) the thing *has*', rather than 'therefore the thing *will have'*.

observe the actualization coming from the form, and then the second perfection proceeding from the principle of *esse*.

3.1.1 On the primary actualization

Next the occurrence of the twofold *actualitas*[17] is elucidated. First (*ibid.,* pp. 53,6-57,9) the author adduces three arguments to shed light upon the actualization by which material things obtain intelligibility. One is taken from matter's potentiality, which by nature implies a lack of intelligibility (p. 53, 11-23). Secondly (pp. 53,24-55,4), because a thing has by matter alone merely a potential relationship to its *quod quid est* (or quiddity), which qua complete quiddity can afford intelligibility to matter, and the form is completive of quiddity, it is owing to the actualization effected by the form (*per actualitatem ipsius forme*) that things are intelligible. One should know, Giles adds (*ibid.,* p. 54,17ff. in anticipating the discussion about the second actualization), that *esse* (which is the performer of the second actualization) is beyond the notion of 'quiddity' and is something supervening on essence (quiddity), so it must be really different from it. This precisely justifies the strictly real distinction between essence and existence.

A third argument, finally, is taken from the notion of abstraction (pp. 55,5-56,11). Giles explains abstraction in terms of focal attention. When a thing is considered according to its individual being and its being subject to sensation, its form remains included in our view of the material conditions of the complete substance. On the other hand, when it is formally considered qua possessing universal being, matter is not out of consideration either, rather it is part of a thing's formal condition. Therefore abstraction takes a thing's form apart from its being this particular form (*hic et nunc*), but still considers the complete thing and the entire quiddity including its formal being, which as ever produces its intelligibility.

3.1.2 On the secondary actualization

The other *actualitas* coming forth from *esse* is briefly (p. 57,15-20) argued for: the first actuality as such does not imply actual being to such an extent that it can exist by itself, without the factor *esse* supervening on it. Giles refers to the twelfth Theorem in which he elucidates the second actuality by extensively appealing (pp. 66,13-77,21) to the chief thesis of Christian ontology: unlike Perfect Being, God, who is His Being

17. The technical term 'actualitas' is indiscriminately used to stand for both 'the state of being actual' and 'the act of actualization causing this state'.

(*suum esse*), all created being has an essence really distinct from *esse*, so it is being owing to some one thing and existent owing to some other thing.[18]

First, he deals with the theorem as applied to sensible, material beings (pp. 67,1-72,26). Giles argues that these sensible things can be conceived of without being conceived as existent, irrespectively of their being or not being the case. When I have acquired by sensation or communication some knowledge about a rose, he claims, the knowledge about the rose or its existence does not contribute anything to my knowledge (p. 67, 10-17). In the way, then, in which we find some things to be kept apart one from another, in this same way they are diverse. If they are kept apart only according to intellective apprehension (*secundum intellectum tantum*), they differ conceptually (*differunt ratione*), but if the separation is real they can only be really diverse. Now if an essence can be without existence, it may be argued that it is only in potency to existence (*esse*) and that sensible things possess an essence that really differs from existence (*esse*). However, the potentiality in question differs from the manner in which a genus has a certain potency to its species, because the composition of a species out of genus and *differentia* is only conceptual, so genus is not something really different from any of its species, as the *differentia* qua implying the whole thing is not different from the genus either. If a genus is kept apart from its species or differentia, the separation is only by intellection (i.e. conceptual), rather than *secundum rem*, because I can conceive of the quiddity of a genus apart from its species or *differentia*, but these are not really different *things* (pp. 67,19-70,2).[19]

Another argument (70,17-71,16, taken from the common doctrine of the universals) has the same purport of underlining the two different kinds of *esse* falling to universals and sensible things. Giles's third argument (71,17-72,26) is based upon the real difference between sensible beings and their Agent by whom they are brought into existence. This argument is of great importance as it explicitly refers to creation. He unfolds the twofold operation concerning the two different actualizations by describing how the Creator makes what is potentially so and so, actually so. That is to say, matter obtains actuality owing to the form impressed upon it,

18. *Ibid.,* p. 66,13-15: "Omne quod est citra Primum, non est suum esse sed habet essentiam realiter differentem ab esse; et per aliud est ens et per aliud existens".
19. The same opinion about genus, species and differentia is found elsewhere (e.g. *In I Sent*, dist. 25, part 1, q. 3, Fol. 136; *De gradibus formarum* II, cap. 11, Fol. 104R). However, in his discussion of the matter in *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 9 and q. 12, Giles leaves the question undecided, driven into a corner as he has been by Henry of Ghent. See Hocédez (1930), p. 69, n. 1, and our next section 2.5.

whereas the existence of the compound made up of matter and form is brought about by *esse*.[20]

Properly speaking, the second *actualitas* produced by *esse* is the thing's factual being. Whereas the first actualization makes matter the constitutive component of a complete quiddity (e.g. *hominem esse*, which is the materialized form *humanitas* and boils down to a quiddity's concretization), the second one provides this concrete essence with factual existence in the outside world. Generally speaking, the Medievals commonly oppose two distinct types of actualization (or realization), which I have told apart[21] as 'actuality' against 'factualness'(or 'facticity'). By 'actuality' I mean the materialization of a formal nature (or quiddity) quite apart from whether or not it exists in the outside world; 'factualness' or 'facticity' refers to a formal nature or quiddity's factual existence in the outside world. Obviously, just as actualization is not necessarily associated with factual existence, nor should the notion 'concreteness'.

This being so, Giles's contrasting the two actualities is surely not surprising, yet it deserves special attention in the framework of his ontology of finite, created being. Let me explain. In Theorem VIII Giles asseverates that the *esse* flowing from the *forma partis* does not really differ from matter and form because it is only a mode of being, whereas the *esse* flowing from the *forma totius* really differs from the thing's essence. Two things about this statement are clearly in order. Firstly, the twofold actualization we are dealing with in this section; secondly, Giles's use — quite in line with the influence the reading of *De causis* exerted on many thinkers of the period, for that matter — of the 'flowing' metaphor ('fluit *esse*') for the operation of the *forma partis* as well as the *forma totius*. Small wonder that particularly Giles, who was subject to suspicions of heresy because of his favoured treatment of Proclean ontology, thinks it is so important to stay away from any association with Neoplatonic emanation. This also throws extra light on his eagerness to save creation. No better way to do so than by making a strict opposition between the two ways of actualization, the second one of which requires a divine interference with respect to each and every individual being.

20. *Ibid*., pp. 71,17-72,3: "Tertia via ad hoc declarandum sumitur ex eo quod huiusmodi nature comparantur ad suum Agens. Semper enim Agens facit potentia tale actu tale. Ab Agente enim semper tribuitur aliquis actus ipsi potentie. Et hoc modo fit ab Agente potentia tale actu tale prout in ipsa potentia imprimitur aliquis actus et aliqua perfectio. Ut si esse est a forma, forma autem materialis est perfectio materie, hoc modo res materiales producuntur in esse quod [*scripsi*; quia *ed*.] ab Agente fit materia actu per impressionem forme, et materia et forma existunt actu per *esse*".
21. De Rijk (1981), 38-40; (1985), 154f.; (2002), I, 345, n. 418; II, 400.

It is true, Giles's position that existence supervenes on the quiddity perfected by the *forma partis* in the first stage of actualization could easily make people think that this position should ignore creation occurring 'from nothing'. In fact it did. Not only Henry of Ghent blames Giles for doing so; some adherents of the real distinction also disqualify Giles's position. Thomas of Sutton, for example, vividly criticizes Giles's opinion of the quiddity's previous ontic state which seems to precede the act of God's bringing it into factual existence; he joins Henry of Ghent's claim that in this line of thought the 'creatio ex nichilo' is jeopardized. In his *Disputed Questions* Giles had described the second act of actualization ('factualization') as the divine interference by which God impresses not Himself (*qua* highest Actuality, that is), but some other actuality upon a possible being (a quiddity), so that it obtains actual being:

> *Qq. disp. de esse et essentia*, q. 12, Fol. 27v: Si ergo Deus istud quod est possibile esse, vult facere actu esse, vel oportet quod ipse imprimat Seipsum ei ad hoc quod id quod est in potentia ad esse, habeat actu esse; vel oportet quod ei imprimat actualitatem aliquam aliam per quam illud possibile esse actu sit. Sed constat quod ipse Seipsum non potest imprimere ipsi essentie creature. Oportet igitur quod ei imprimat actualitatem aliquam aliam per quam ipsa essentia que est quoddam possibile esse, accipiat quod actu sit.

Of course, one does not have to explain the succession of the two stages in terms of a chronological order, in order to maintain the real difference between the thing qua quidditative nature and the thing qua existing in the outside world. However, Thomas Sutton rejects Giles's way of arguing for the real distinction as being *inter rem et rem* and judges it inadequate to save creation, because creation is out of nothing:

> Thomas Sutton, *Qq. de reali distinctione inter essentian et esse*, p. 56 ed. Pelster: Sed iste modus ponendi composicionem realem *esse* et essencie non est conveniens ad salvandam creacionem; imo iste modus destruit creacionem. In creacione enim nichil presupponitur tamquam potenciale quod per creacionem fiat in actu (…). Creacio enim est ex nichilo; in nichilo autem nulla est potencia. (…). Per hoc enim distinguitur creacio a generatione.

Sutton speaks of a 'falsa ymaginatio' of people holding this opinion about the two actualizations, the more so when they are going to compare this procedure to generation:

> *Ibid*., p. 56 (preceding the previous quotation): Et dicunt aliqui quod cum essencia sit possibile esse, cui possibili acquiritur esse actu per creacionem, oportet quod esse quod acquiritur per creacionem, sit aliud secundum rem ab illo possibili cui acquiritur. (…). Et ponunt exemplum de generacione, per quam acquiritur forma ipsi materie que est in potencia ad eam.[22]

22. I have to agree that in fact Giles is among those who refer to generation in the ques-

Plainly, Giles knows of no better way to tell apart the two stages of actualization than by postulating that a thing's quidditative nature is *really* ('secundum rem', that is) diverse from it when brought into outside existence. Considering his charaterization of the 'distinctio realis' as one 'inter rem et rem', we have to decode the latter formula as meaning that, qua materialized but non-existent quidditative being, say, Socrates or this particular tree, is something different from the factually existing essences, Socrates or tree. A thorough investigation into Giles's notion of the 'real distinction' seems to be appropriate.

3.2 Giles's conception of 'esse', causation and participation

Since the 'being vs. existence' issue is about the ontology of finite, created things, it naturally bears on the idea of participation. It will appear that Giles too in this respect goes his own way, inspired to a considerable extent by the Neoplatonic thinker, Proclus.

Unlike the majority of his contemporaries, Giles rejects the argument commonly advanced in support of God's simplicity ('Deus est suum esse') to the effect that being composed of the two ontic principles *quod est* and *quo est* are characteristic of any finite, created being. He insists that created being (*esse creatum*) is not made up of *quod est* and *quo est*. Whoever thinks that that the argument just presented is conclusive, he argues, fails to correctly interpret the author of *De causis*: in the first part of the fourth proposition ("Prima rerum creatarum est esse et non est ante ipsum creatum aliud"); the latter explicitly declares that *esse* is the first creature. And in his own 'commentum' to it he makes it clear that the *esse creatum* is one, because owing to its propinquity to the Pure and One, it shares its being one.[23] Giles eagerly exposes the fallacy of arguing from 'being created' to 'being composed of *quod est* and *quo est*':

> *In I Sent*., dist. 8, pars 2a, princ. 2, q. 1, Fol. 54R: Sed propter hoc non habemus omnem creaturam esse compositam, quia etiam ipsum *esse* quod existit in eo quod est vel in participante *Esse*, creatura est nec tamen est compositum ex *quod est* et *esse*.

There are two main kinds of *esse*, one God's *Esse* ('esse creans', so to speak) and the *esse creatum* in virtue of which creatures *are*. God is *Esse*

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tion at hand, *nota bene* in his discussion about the fifth Theorem, 20,15-21,2; cfr. *Qq. disp. de esse et essentia*, q. 9, Fol. 20V-21R.

23. *De causis*, prop. 4a, comm., ed. Pattin, p. 142, 39-41: "(…) factum est superius creatis rebus omnibus et vehementius unitum. Et non est factum ita nisi propter propinquitatem suam Esse Puro et Uni et Vero, in quo non est multitudo aliquorum modorum. Et esse creatum quamvis sit unum, tamen multiplicabitur, scilicet quia ipsum recipit multiplicitatem".

Ipsum ('Deus est suum esse'), whereas *esse creatum* is *esse participatum*. Participation is defined by Giles in the first Theorem p. 1, 1-3: "Omne esse vel est purum per se existens et infinitum, vel est participatum in alio receptum et limitatum") in the usual way as 'partem capere' ('take a share of'). Notice that from the start the idea of limitation and insufficient capacity are key notions in this description:

> *Theorem* I, p. 2,6-12: Et ut exsequamur seriatim membra propositionis proposite, dicamus quod esse receptum in alio necessario est esse participatum. Nam hoc est 'participare' quasi 'partem capere' secundum quod inferiora superiora participant. Nam quod est inferius et particulare, secundum suum totum ambitum comprehendere non potest id quod est superius et universale.

What follows about *recipere particulariter* also rules out any doubt in this respect:

> *Ibid.,* p. 2,10-17: "Nam quod est inferius et particulare, secundum suum totum ambitum comprehendere non potest id quod est superius et universale, Sic etiam et materia participat perfectionem forme. Nam quia forma limitatur et particulatur secundum modum materie in qua recipitur, consequens est quod materia non recipiat formam in tota sua plenitudine nec in tota sua universalitate, sed recipit eam particulariter et contracte". [24]

And again when Giles is extending this view of participation to the relationship between *esse* and *essentia*, things are completely apparent:

> *Ibid.,* pp. 3,24-4,6: "Et quod dictum est de forma respectu materie, intelligendum est de esse respectu essentie vel nature. Nam si esset esse per se existens, illud esse esset totale et purum habens in se omnem rationem essendi. Sed si esse sit receptum in alio, oportet quod contrahatur, particuletur et limitetur secundum modum eius in quo recipitur. Tale ergo esse dicitur participatum, idest secundum partem receptum. Esse itaque in alio receptum est participatum et limitatum, sed esse per se existens est purum et infinitum".[25]

When proceding to the 'esse et essentia' item, the author explains creation in line with Plato's doctrine of the separate transcendent Ideas. Creation takes place in two stages, both brought about from *Esse separatum*. "Let us apprehend", Giles concludes, "God as, say[26], *Esse sepa-*

24. Cfr. *Theorem* I, p. 3, 20-22: "Recepta autem forma in materia deficit ab hac plenitudine et ab hac totalitate. Ideo forma sic recepta dicitur 'participari', idest 'secundum partem recipi". See our section 5.4 below.
25. A similar explanation is presented in the light of causation taken in terms of being 'flowing from Pure Being' in *Theorem* IV, p. 17,1-27.
26. No doubt, Giles does not mean to loosely say that God is 'some or other separate being'. He rather wants to introduce the designation 'esse separatum'. Latin 'quidam' indicating objects in an unspecified way is sometimes prepositively used in to qualify the proper meaning of the substantive term, like in saying of somebody who does not pay back a loan: 'est quidam fur' ('he is, you may say, a <sort of> thief').

ratum existing by itself, and recognize that from him the creation of things happens in as far as from that *Esse separatum* their *esse* was participated and flowed into a creature's essence":

> *Theorem* V, pp. 22,15-23,9: Advertendum tamen quod si de esse et essentia volumus intelligentiam clariorem habere et si per generationem rerum, que presupponit compositionem materie et forme, volumus intelligere rerum creationem, que requirit compositionem essentie et esse,[27] imaginemur modum generationis rerum quem posuit Plato, dicens ideas (…) deservire ad generationem, quia ab eis fluebant forme in materiam, per quarum influxum generabilia generantur. Ipsa ergo idea secundum Platonem erat ipsa forma separata per se existens. Et ab idea fiebat generatio prout ab ipsa forma separata participabatur[28] forma in materia. Sic intelligamus Deum esse quoddam *Esse* per se existens separatum, et ab eo esse creationen rerum prout ab illo *Esse* separato participatur et fluit *esse* in essentia<m> creature.[29]

The following picture presents itself. God's separate *Esse* flows into created essences which, in accordance with their respective capacities, each receive a limited amount of beingness (*esse* participatum). So at first the material form (or 'forma partis') takes its share from the separate form; in the second stage of creation, then, the complete essence or quiddity (composed of matter and form) receives existence (or 'outside being'). That is to say that in a first act of actualization the divine *Esse* disseminates itself into different quiddities, each one of which is a finite portion of *esse*, whereas the second actualization provides the quiddity with factual being (or existence). Once again, the two actualizations should not be understood in a chronological order.

3.3 The ontological status of the transcendent Forms

As early as in Middle Platonism the ontological status of the transcendent Forms was subject to discussion. From Albinus (*Epitome*, 9, 2nd cent.) onwards they will be reinterpreted as thoughts in a supreme Divine Mind, and later on in a similar vein they are identified by St. Augustine as the creative ideas in God. ('ideae in mente divina').[30] Considering Platonism's

27. Giles seems to prelude to his view of the two stages of the act of creation and the difference between 'forma partis' and 'forma totius'; see section 2.3 above.
28. I prefer the reading *participabatur* found in the good, but solitary text witness Venice, *Marciana* 41 to the common reading *participatur*.
29. The same analogy is found in his *Super De causis*, prop. 2a (Fol. 8R) and 22a (Fol. 74R). For the theologically inoffensive character of the 'flowing' metaphor see e.g. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia, q. 45, art. 1c: "emanationem totius entis a causa universali, que est Deus (…) designamus nomine 'creationis'"; cfr. *ibid*., art. 4 *ad* 1um.
30. Since Jews believed in a transcendent personal God they had to answer the question where Plato's transcendent Forms should be located. As early as by Philo the Jew

problems with transcendence/immanence, the One and many, and participation, the evolution of Platonism into Neoplatonism has been legitimate and, to my mind, even inevitable.[31] The Platonic doctrine of the plurality of transcendent separate Forms as advanced in the classical dialogues, *Phaedo* and *Republic* in particular, is in the end untenable unless the Transcendent Domain is taken as the all-comprehensive Domain of Perfect Being, not divided into a plurality of Transcendent Forms. Untenable indeed, because the putatively distinct Forms, such as Justice, Beauty, or Man, Animal, Tree, Stone, and the like are not perfect beings *qua* limited by their determinate nature ('Omnis determinatio est negatio').

Therefore the plurality of Forms should rather be considered a *potentially* articulated One Source of being which is actually split up when Being is going to be participated in and materialized. It is true, this view of the One Form of Beingness is not found in Plato's classical exposition of the transcendent Domain of Forms. Occasionally, however, even in passages discussing the classical doctrine of the plurality of Forms — such as at *Republic* V, 478E, or *Phaedo*, 92D and 102C, where Socrates speaks of Being as the proper object of the soul's appehension — participation is addressed as a partaking in *einai* in general, rather than as taking a share of this or that individual Form. Also the well-known view of the oneness of Virtue found in classical Platonism[32] distributing itself into several virtues like justice, wisdom and so on, seems to go in the same direction. Consequently, to defend a similar opinion about the ontological status of the one *Esse separatum* that, when it is engaged in the act of creation, splits itself up into distinct quiddities, is not only reasonable in itself but also historically quite well-founded.

It should be asked now how Giles accounts for the unity of creation and its communion with the Creator as *Esse separatum*. This question should be answered by assessing the influence on Giles's thought exerted by the Neoplatonist, Proclus.

4. *Causation and participation in Proclus*

Proclus (ca. 410-485) was the last major Greek philosopher of Antiquity and as a diadochos ('Platonic successor') the administrator of the Athe-

(ca. 20 BC–ca. 50 AD) in *De opificio mundi* 6,24 the Intelligible world is located in the Divine Mind and identified with the Logos itself as engaged in the act of creation. De Rijk (1975), 206f.

31. De Rijk (1986), 353, n. 55.

32. E.g. *Protagoras*, 329Cff.; 349Aff.; *Republic* IV, 445C; *Meno* 72Cff.; 74Dff; cf. *Statesman*, 306Bff.; *Laws* XII, 963Cff. and 965Dff.

nian School of Neoplatonism. The Medievals' familiarity with Neoplatonic thought was mainly based upon their reading of one of Proclus's chief works, *Elementatio theologiae* (*The Elements of Theology*) and the *Theologia platonica* together with the anonymous *Liber De causis*, which in fact is a compilation of extracts from the *Elements*, originally composed in Arabic and translated into Latin (before 1187). Proclus's way of philosophizing is that of an idealist: he assumes that the real world is basically mental and the product of thinking and consciousness. Ultimately every entity is a thought, part of the 'objective' (or rather 'objectivated') domain of thinking. Subjectivity is ruled out by Proclus because the world's objectivity is grounded in a *universal* consciousness which is itself independent of individual thinking occurring in single human minds. The only one True Reality for Proclus is 'The One'('To Hen'). Since it is the highest thought conceivable, it is beyond all conceptual analysis and possible description.

According to Proclus, the One already contains the whole Universe, which intrinsically is an absolute Unity and Totality. The universe of a plurality of lower entities flows ('emanates') from the One, without detracting the absolute unity of the One itself. Emanation is conceived of in terms of the One radiating out of Itself innumerable lower 'less real realities', which may be regarded as independent entities, and consequently (given, that is, the universal consciousnes) *are* so. Given Proclus's objective-idealistic approach, the independent status of the lower entities is to be recognized as their existing apart from any knowing single mind.

4.1 Proclus's refined ontology

Proclus's quite sophisticated ontology still contains the basic design of Neoplatonism as modelled by Plotinus (ca. 205-270)[33]. As far as the procession from the One to the lower entities is concerned, the following features are crucial:

— The procession (production, causation) from the One is simply its overflow which is due to its superabundance and unlimited perfection;

— All and every product or effect constitutes itself in contemplatively turning back upon its immediate source. Thus the idea or consciousness of its being a product of plurification is bent back to the awareness of its being unified with the superior level;

— Everything that is the product of some cause is spontaneously disposed to revert to its cause, so there is a moving on in the upward direc-

33. De Rijk (1992), 5-9.

tion as well as in the downward direction. The law governing the entire process of procession and reversion is commonly called the 'Law of Continuity', which provides the justification for the methodological introduction of intermediate terms in the chain of participation, which, on its turn, might be called the 'Law of intermediate entities'[34];
— Throughout the entire procession oneness is *the* characteristic of what is produced at the lower level;
— The status of lower-level entities is entirely due to the amount of oneness present in them, so the higher their amount of oneness, the higher their ontic status.

Like any other ancient metaphysical (ontological) system, Proclus's system is intended to elucidate the real nature of the outside world we live in, by uncovering its ontic principle, which has to be independent, unchanging and timeless. The key question is how a sublime Principle can be the first Cause of such a trivial offspring as the outside world ultimately is. In Neoplatonism the answer is bound to deal with causation and participation.

Cause is defined by Proclus in the *Elements*, prop. 98, *exp*.: "For a cause is that which fills all entities that are naturally capable of taking a share in it, which is the principle of all secondary entities, and is present in all the fertile emanations of its irradiations". Thus 'to cause' appears to be co-ordinated with 'sharing' in as far as the cause makes its effect share in itself. Sharing is that which guarantees the communion of the effect with its cause, as appears from prop. 28, *exp*., in which Proclus declares that the shares (Greek, *metechomena*) bestow upon the participant a communion with that of which it partakes; once again the 'Law of Continuity' is applied. It should be remarked[35] that 'what is participated' (*to metechomenon*) stands for the character communicated by the cause to its effect (*to metechon*), not for the cause itself (which is designated as *to hou meteschen = that of which* <sc. the participant> *has taken a part*) qua participated in. In its capacity of participant the effect is called 'that which participates'(*to metechon*), whereas 'what is participated' (*to metechomenon*) is used to designate the share of dynamic oneness and beingness deriving from the cause, rather than the cause itself. The relationship between an effect and its cause is transitive, whereas that between causation and participation is not. This feature has frequently raised serious misunderstandings among the interpreters, including modern ones

34. See for the testimonies Dodds *Introd*., p. XXII, and transl., p. 216. I prefer 'intermediate entities' to Dodds's 'mean terms'.
35. *Ibid*., 16-21.

like Dodds.[36] The tension between causation and participation can best be clarified by clearing up this intransitivity, which centres around the notion of 'unshareable or 'unshared' (*amethektos*). Once the precise meaning of *amethektos* has been established the participle *metechomenon* will no longer give rise to such misinterpretations.

For Proclus, any principle, including the One, is *qua* transcending its productions *not* partaken of by them. Nor can it *in this capacity* be regarded as being present qua immanent share in its effect; consequently (still, in that capacity) it cannot be said 'to be participated in' (*metecheschai*); as such it even is 'unshareable' (*amethektos*).

This holds true of the whole chain of being making up the emanation picture, including the lower levels. Proclus claims that *qua unshareable* no lower principle derives from something superior as its cause; it can be considered as taken 'by itself' an independent entity and exempt from any relationship to something superior or inferior to it. In this line of thinking both causation and participation are entirely out of scope and, consequently, any sharing is ruled out both in the upward and in the downward directions.[37] On the other hand, the whole picture can also be considered *within* the perspectives of causation and participation. This twofold aspect is explained by Proclus in his exposition to prop. 99:

> *Elements*, prop. 99, *exp*. (p. 88,24-33 Dodds): "For if it is (an) unshareable it is allotted primacy in its own proper series, and does not proceed from others.(…). If it is, however, inferior to others and proceeds from them, it does not proceed inasmuch as it is (an) unshareable, but inasmuch as it is a participant. (…). Therefore, it is not *qua* unshareable that it originates from a cause. Indeed, inasmuch as it originates from a cause, it is a participant and not (an) unshareable. However, *qua* unshareable <it is> the cause of shares, yet without being itself a participant of others".

This much is certain. The notion of *amethekton* only applies within a certain perspective. The term does not refer to what is just unshareable, period, but rather what from a certain point of view is (an) unshareable. Once its relationship to its own superior cause is taken into consideration it is no longer an unshareable but a participant itself. It should be borne in mind that this is to be understood in the perspective of the Neoplatonic lore of emanation.

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36. Dodds continually takes *to metechomenon* to stand for the transcendent or next higher cause instead of the immanent share. See de Rijk (1992), 1, nn. 1-7, and 21, and 21, n. 70; see also our next section.
37. It is of utmost importance to realize that the process of procession and reversion is just *one* process, which is all the more reason to understand this process as atemporal. See Dodds (1963), 219.

Things are not different in Proclus's other major work, the *Platonic Theology*.[38] Like in the *Elements*, the participle *metechomenon* is always used to stand for the shared beingness qua immanent in the participant. This seems to be quite often ignored by modern interpreters when they mistake it for the transcendent cause of participation. For example, when summarizing (in his excellent *Introduction*, p. LXXXI) H.D. Saffrey rather equivocally has "car le participé doit être transcendant par rapport à ses participants" where Proclus has *dei* (…) *einai* (…) *presbuteron* (…) *metechomenou to exêirêmenon*.[39]

4.2 The Proclean usage of the key terms concerning participation

The following statements about Proclus's usage of the key terms for participation can now be made:
— Quite in line with the Platonic and Neoplatonic traditions Proclus uses the active verb *metechein* with a partitive genitive to mean 'to partake of' something which qua pertaining to the next higher rank transcends the participant;
— The passive forms *metechesthai* and *metechomenos* are never used to signify the transcendent source of participation occurring in the next higher level to the participant. Hence it does not mean 'be(ing) partaken of' but stands for 'be(ing) possessed as an immanent share' or 'be(ing) an immanent share';
— Accordingly, the privative *adiectivum verbale* 'amethektos' basically discards the notion of being an immanent share, so it means 'not (capable of) being an immanent share'. Its basic meaning seems to be 'exempt from any sharing'; that is to say that it disposes of participation both in the upward and in the downward directions.

In addition, in the context of the Neoplatonic doctrine of emanation annex the lore of Reversion, it should be animadverted that Proclus's capacious use of the idea of *amethektos* — which, as we have observed, connotes the exemption of any sharing and thus, as it were, occasionally interrupts the chain of participated being — has everything to do with his constant efforts to solve the old Platonic problems surrounding the interrelationship between causation and participation, and in a similar vein that between transcendence and immanence. Proclus has quite well observed that to underline the function of the Ideas as immanent causes

38. De Rijk (1992), 21-26.
39. *Theol. plat*. II, 3 ("The transcendent <Cause> must be superior to the <immanent> share possessed". Also elsewhere the unshareables are explicitly opposed to the *metechomena*, e.g. *Theol. plat.* III, 2, p. 10,15-26.

can only be at the cost of their epistrophic[40] function; we should therefore stick to their absolute, undetracted transcendence.

Two final remarks should be made. Firstly. Modern interpreters are in a constant habit, it would seem, of accusing Proclus of inconsistency and even of fully-fledged contradiction. The 'inconsistencies' in his doctrines and arguments have provoked considerable annoyance on this account among modern scholars.[41] One of their favourite witnesses against Proclus is *Elements*, prop. 98: "Every cause which is separated <from its effects> is at once everywhere and nowhere". Dodds (1963, 211) claims that such statements lay open to charges of inconsistency: the One (Proclus asserts) is unshareable (*amethekton*), yet we are told at the very beginning of the *Elements* (prop.1a) that every manifold in some way does partake of the One. Dodds also refers to Proclus's exposition to prop. 56, from which he seems to gather that what is properly *amethekton* is nevertheless indirectly *methekton* through the *metechomena* it generates.[42]

The accusation of Dodds and others against Proclus's (supposed) inconsistency is rooted in their failure to observe the meaning of the passive form *metechesthai*. Particularly Dodds's constant habit of rendering this passivum with the active verb 'participate' and his defense (p. 3, n. 1) of this grammatical move are disastrous in this respect. Kremer (382; 416ff.) unfortunately joins him by taking '(esse) participatum' to stand for the source of participation partaken of, instead of the share participated. As will be seen in the next section, however, in medieval (like in Proclean) usage 'esse participatum' always refers to the share of being(ness), definitely not to its source.

My second remark concerns the meaning of the prefix '*meta-'* in *'methexis, metechein'* etc. Notably in these Greek formations it has in addition to its primary meaning 'with', the secondary connotation 'after', the occurrence of which is corroborated by the use of such verbs as 'proüparchein' ('to pre-exist') said of the Principle (or lower principles);

40. As early as in Plotinus (e.g. *Enneads* I 2, 4; V 3, 6; cfr. Proclus, *Elements*, prop. 31) *epistrophê* is the technical term for the reversion to the source of Oneness, Goodness, Being.
41. De Rijk (1992), 1-2; 29-31. My former Leiden colleague P.A. Meijer was kind enough to call my attention to Dodds (1963), 211; A.J. Festugière, *Commentaire sur le Timée de Proclus. Traduction et notes*, Paris 1966-68, II, 52; Klaus Kremer, *Die neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin*, Leiden 1971, 212ff. See also Meijer (1992), 81-87.
42. On top of that, Dodds talks of *amethekton*, *metechonta*, *metechomena* as 'terms' and suggests (miraculous) links between their intensions and extensions. His suggestion is rightly rejected by Rosán (1949, 89, n. 80). More importantly still, sometimes Dodds's translation is wrong. E.g. *Elements*, p. 2,18-21, where he misinterprets the demonstrative pronoun *ekeino*; see de Rijk (1992), 15, n. 57.

thus *metechein* (‘to share’) has more or less the connotation of ‘to have <a feature> *after* < the principle in which this feature preeminently is present>.[43] This does not mean, however, that, philosophically speaking, the participant acts as a ‘subiectum participationis’. For Neoplatonism, there is no participant or any receiver existing before the *methexis*. Unlike Plato, who admitted the *to en hôi* as a (rather vague) subject-substrate of participation, Proclus has nothing of the kind. For him, the participant does not come into existence until the act of *metadosis* (‘transmission’ or ‘communication’).[44]

4.3 Scope distinction. Its philosophic impact in Neoplatonism

Proclus seems to have a relaxed attitude towards statements that, as they stand, are flatly contradictory as affirming thesis and antithesis at the same time. Famous examples are frequently exposed. *Elements*, prop. 2a runs: “All that partakes of the One is both one and not-one”. In the exposition added to this proposition the author softens the contradiction by saying that ‘being one’ is meant as ‘being one according to participation’, whereas ‘being not-one’ stands for ‘not being the One itself’. The exposition to prop. 24a discusses the relationships between the famous triad, the participant, the transcendent source of participation, and the immanent shared feature. The latter is described as a feature present in the many (*en tois pollois*) which at the same time is ‘one, yet not-one’ and the participant as ‘not-one, yet one’. This ‘scope distinction’ (using a modern label)[45] is always designated explicitly, e.g. in the exposition to prop. 99:

> *Elements*, prop. 99, *exp*., p. 88,20-23 ed. Dodds: Precisely *in the respect in which* an unshareable is unshareable, it does not obtain its subsistence from something else as its cause but is itself the principle and cause of all its shares. And it is *in this sense* that in every series the principle is ungenerated.

43. E.g. in *Elements*, propp. 29, 53, 90 and the expositions added to propp. 18, 23, 65 and 78. In a similar vein Greek *methexis* is sometimes rendered by the Medievals *posthabitio*, apparently meaning ‘the (act of) having the feature in question after (= ‘secondarily to’) the cause’. William of Moerbeke indiscriminately renders amethektos ‘’amethectus’, ‘imparticipabilis’, ‘imparticipatus’, ‘non posthabens’(!). Aquinas’s paraphrase in his *Super Librum de causis* is noteworthy: “secundum quandam posthabitionem, idest consecutionem, sive participationem (ed. Saffrey, p. 79, 23-24).
44. Nicholas of Cusa aptly proposes (*De docta ignorantia* II 2) the metaphor of ‘reflection without a mirror’; see de Rijk (1992), 16, n. 58.
45. The modern label should not disguise that Proclean scope distinction in fact comes to the Aristotelian heuristic/argumentative procedure I have baptized ‘focalization and categorization. See de Rijk (2002) I, 139-140; 170-179; 449ff.; II, 384ff; 403-416.

In a similar vein, however, Proclus more than once speaks of 'partaking of an unshareable', in cases in which that which is a principle of lower entities and as such is unshareable, nevertheless partakes of a superior entity. In all such passages Proclus is understandably dealing with the ontic features of entities existing below the level of the One, because the One itself is the unshareable *par excellence* and as such exempt from any partaking and self-subsistent in the proper sense. Briefly, unshareableness always obtains within a certain scope.

As I have already remarked earlier, the notion of unshareableness serves to qualify (and interrupt for a moment, so to speak) the chain of participation as opposed against the unqualified chain of causation. It is in the triangle of tension between the ontic components of the finite things that the triad of *metechon*, *amethekton*, *metechomenon* comes in. Their relationships are determined thus. The *metechomenon* mediates between the cause qua unshareable and its effect qua participant, but definitely not between them taken as two elements pre-existing the procession.[46] Rather, as the representative of the superior cause the *metechomenon* constitutes the effect and acts as the participant's immanent cause. As an immanent share it is the representative of the transcendent cause, which qua transcending its effect is unshareable; at the same time, qua being 'like to the cause' (*homoion*) the *metechomenon* links itself and the participant with the superior cause and, ultimately to the One, and thus realizes Reversion in the Universe.

Scope distinction is not only frequently applied but also outspokenly recommended by Proclus. In his extensive commentary on Plato's dialogue *Parmenides* (*In Parm*. VI, pp. 1049,37-1050,25 ed. Cousin), Proclus — apparently in the wake of his master, Syrianus ---, describes and recommends scope distinction as a technique that is deliberately and successfully applied by Plato's spokesman, Parmenides. In the second hypothesis of Plato's dialogue (142B-155E), Parmenides departs from the Parmenidean One, i.e, oneness *present in* things, and considers it once in its capacity of just being one, once qua one *and* being, and still another time qua entity that partakes of the One, whereby throughout this hypothesis (142B-155E) it is accompanied by the conditional premiss: 'if the One *is*'. Proclus concludes that it is impossible to stick to this repeated premiss unless one examines it successively in different ways. Varying the respective conclusions, then, boils down to alternately assuming different features of the One, now affirmatively, now negatively. It is in a way amusing to see that after his pertinent and well-balanced analysis of

46. See my remarks about the prefix 'meta-' in section 4.2 *ad fin*.

the main features of Proclean thought Rosán describes the supposed inconsistency in terms of a reasonable kind of scope distinction.[47]

This much is certain, scope distinction is an important interpretive design in Neoplatonic doctrine and argument.[48] However, the student of Neoplatonic thought might well ask why the statements, the axioms or propositions in particular, are formulated so provocatively by the authors. To answer the question one should analyze and evaluate Neoplatonic dialectics from the philosophic point of view. At the outset we have to be aware that the procedure of scope distinction involves more than just considering one and the same object taken from different angles, once from one of its aspects, once from another. Scope distinction is about an object *taken as a whole*. It is because of the basic deficiency of all human observation and consideration that we sometimes need scope distinction, particularly when human thought is confronted with what is impervious to straightforward rational thinking.[49]

In order for us to fully appreciate the significance of the scope distinction procedure, one final obstacle needs to be cleared away. It has to do with the relationship between logic and metaphysics in Neoplatonism, especially in Proclus. It seems to be a common observation among Proclus's interpreters that his thought is marked by a more extreme realism than seems possible to most modern readers — a realism that probably outdid any earlier Platonism.[50] This surely has to do with the ancient conviction that thought and reality run parallel.[51] On the other hand, Proclus's remarkable 'idealism' should warn us not to oversimplify such a supposed 'extreme realism' by mistaking Proclus's real world for simply something extramental. To him, every 'thing' is ultimately a thought, and every thought is somehow real, as Rosán rightly says (1967, col. 480a). His entire doctrine undeniably stems from the objective-idealistic approach which, although it treats the substance of the Universe as 'consciousness', regards the Universe as existing apart from any knowing mind. In brief, after Immanuel Kant the modern student of Neo-

47. Rosán (1967), col. 480a: "The inconsistency is this: although the One is the only Reality, Proclus describes its apparent decline into plurality with highly detailed attention, thereby *turning the focus* (italics mine) away from the One to the neatly arranged successive states of 'lesser realities' (increasing appearances, which then are carefully analyzed as if independent entities".
48. Meijer (1992), 81ff (who for the rest advances (86f.) "just one oddity which deviates from the Proclean system with regard to *metechomenos*"); de Rijk (1992), 29-34.
49. We owe to Beierwaltes (1979, 240-270) a profound inquiry into the philosophic impact of dialectical method and its consequences for triadic thought in Proclus.
50. See A.C. Lloyd in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, 307.
51. This so-called 'parallelism paradigm' will be discussed in our section 7.5 below.

platonic thought has to take seriously the difference between 'objective' and 'objectivated'.

5. *Participation and creation in Giles. Scope distinction as an interpretive device*

The chief opponent of Giles's ontology of finite being, Henry of Ghent, claimed that the latter's theory of participation is basically wrong (briefly *falsa ymaginatio*), and that his arguments in its defence are not only no good, but are not truly supported by authorities either. Giles's rejoinder is to the effect that, unlike Henry's, his own interpretation of Boethius is well-founded and the support provided by Proclus quite convincing and impressive as well, because he was an authority in matters of participation (*Qq. disp*. q. 9, Fol. 19R, 1c; Hocédez (1930), 27f.).

It is beyond doubt that Giles, too, exclusively (and quite correctly) uses the phrase 'esse participatum' to stand for the particular share of being(ness) possessed by some finite entity, never for the ontic source participated in by it. From the grammatical point of view, it is of interest to mark off the different uses of the verb 'participare' (often etymologically derived from 'partem capere'). When construed with an accusative case ('participare aliquid') the object term designates, as we have already remarked, the share possessed (the 'partem captam', so to speak) by the participant; hence the frequent use of the phrases 'esse participatum' or 'forma participata'. When accompanied by an ablative (whether or not preceded by the prepositions 'a' or 'de' or 'in'), the source of the act of participation is indicated, e.g. in *Theorem* II, p. 9, 20-21: "Omne autem esse participatum requirit essentiam a qua participetur"; *ibid.,* p. 5, 16-17: "Si ergo omnis multitudo participat aliqualiter Uno, ut vult Proclus in sua *Elementatione theologica* etc."[52]

5.1 The historical and doctrinal background

Before entering into the participation's counterpart, unity, it is important to historically assess the lore of participation as it was adhered to from Plato's days onwards. In his later years Plato was developing his 'novel metaphysics' concerning a reappraisal of Matter, the chief purport of which consisted in reevaluating the Forms' presence or immanence in the transient world of particulars. His novel view boils down to recog-

52. A nice example is found in Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3: "(…) secundum Boetium nichil participat alio quod non participat *esse*". See also note 87 to our section 6.1.4 below.

nizing the Forms's threefold status, first their transcendent status so strongly defended in the early dialogues (such as *Phaedo* and *Republic*), second, their immanent status within the particulars sharing in them, and third, their mental status, their status, that is, of their being known or conceived of by the human intellect.[53] For the time being we have to focus on the Forms' immanent status and its bearing on the lore of causation and participation.

Throughout the development of (Neo)Platonism the conceptions of causation and participation have always been counterbalanced by the idea of the Universe's ontic unity, often understood in terms of the 'Great Chain of Being'. Also beyond the circles adhering to Neoplatonic emanation this unity was conceived of in terms of the 'hierarchy of being'. It is true, unlike the One of Neoplatonism of necessity emanating into the Universe of beings, the Christian highest Principle of Being, the Creator-God, alone creates according to an order he is willing, exempt from any necessity or compulsion. All the same, no matter if creation or emanation was involved, the idea of a plurification of being was bound to come into the picture, and in the same vein the general, creative idea of the hierarchy of being came in. We owe to Edward Mahoney a fine study of the various medieval and Renaissance accounts of the hierarchy of being which at some point or other invoke God as the measure of the scale and explain an entity's place or grade in the Universe according to the amount in which it approaches to God and recedes from non-being and matter. The conceptual scheme in question was developed by the Medievals from passages of pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, and the anonymous *Liber de causis* (originally composed in Arabic and translated into Latin before 1187).[54]

5.2 Giles's position concerning causation and participation in the Universe of being

Giles of Rome, too explicitly recognizes that the Pure and Infinite Source of Being (whether the Christian God or the Neoplatonic One) cannot itself be plurified. No doubt about that (see his *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, II and III).[55] On the other hand, unlike Being Itself, forms, even

53. An extensive discussion of this doctrinal development is found in de Rijk (1986), 30-65, esp. 57-65. Also de Rijk (1985), 172ff. and (1992), 3-5 and 25, n. 81.
54. See Mahoney (1982), who pertinently describes — and with an overwhelming documentation, pp. 212-257 — this basic scheme's background and further development in the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome and Godfrey of Fontaines are discussed on pp. 174-179.
55. *Theor*. II: "Omne Esse Purum et Infinitum multiplicari non potest"; III: "(…) licet esse per se existens in alio non receptum plurificari omnino ratio contradicat".

those not received in matter, can be plurified. This at first glance rather strange statement is worded in the first half of Theorem III: "Forme per se existentes in alio non recepte plurificari possunt". To my mind, this theorem is at the basis of Giles's conception of the unity of the created Universe, say, his view of the great chain of being. Giles understandably makes every effort to uphold this paradoxal position. The bridging concept is the Aristotelian act-potency device: potentiality makes the process of being and becoming possible and at the same time regulates it. This comes to the fore *inter alia* in the fourth Theorem and its exposition:

> *Theor.* IV, p. 15,4-6: Omne esse participatum in alio receptum et limitatum ab illo Esse causatur et fluit quod est purum per se existens et infinitum.
> *Ibid.,* p. 17,1-:8: Sed ut lucidius appareat quomodo omne aliud esse causatur et fluit ab Esse puro per se existenti, diligenter est advertendum quod semper potentia participat actum (loquendo de participatione reali). Ut si materia est in potentia ad formam, dicitur materia participare formam (et non proprie econverso); et si *quod est* (vel si essentia) est in potentia ad *esse*, dicitur participare esse (et non proprie econverso).
> *Ibid*., p. 17, 21-27: "Et quod dictum est de materia respectu forme, intelligendum est de essentia respectu esse. Nullum enim esse receptum in alio est infinitum nec habet omnem rationem essendi, sed omne esse receptum participatur, idest secundum partem capitur ab eo in quo recipitur. Et omne recipiens esse participat ipsum, idest secundum partem capit.

Two aspects of the process of being and coming into being are imperative (to be sure, irrespective of the 'creation or emanation' issue), viz. the downward and the upward directions of causation and participation. The former is mentioned in the exposition added to Theorem IV. It will be a constant subject of observations throughout the whole work. The upward direction can be characterized as the direction of reversion, or at least as a finite thing's dependence upon its next higher cause, and is about the ensuing union with the other levels of the Universe of being. It is first announced in a comment upon the second Theorem. Its basic idea is that the plurification of being deriving from the highest principle of being cannot be truly understood without observing that any plurification is counterbalanced by unification:

> *Theor.* II, pp. 5,16-6.3: Si ergo omnis multitudo participat aliqualiter uno (ut vult Proclus in sua *Elementatione theologica*) et si non est multitudo non participans uno (ut vult Dionysius XIIIo *De dininis nominibus*), quecumque plurificantur oportet quod in aliquo sint unita. Ut que sunt plura numero, sunt unum specie; que sunt plura specie, unum genere; que sunt plura genere, unum analogia. Possunt itaque aliqua esse unum ita quod non sunt diversa, sed nulla ita diversa que non sunt aliquomodo unum.

Giles draws his reader's attention to the diverse junctions within the grades of being in as far as they occur in the Universe, in accordance with the well-known articulations of the predicamental domain in terms of genus, species and individuum:[56]

> *Ibid.,* p. 10,9-21: Est tamen diligenter notandum quod semper pluralitas inferior presupponit compositionem pluralitatis superioris. Nam cum species addat super genus et individuum supra speciem, tota compositio que est in genere et specie, reservatur in individuo. Que ergo sunt plura numero et unum specie, intelligimus esse composita tripliciter, videlicet ex materia et forma, ex genere et differentia, ex esse et essentia. Que vero sunt plura specie et unum genere, intelligimus esse composita dupliciter, videlicet ex genere et differentia et ex esse et essentia. Sed que sunt plura genere in unitate analogie, de necessitate in altero illorum invenitur tertius compositionis modus, videlicet ex esse et essentia.

The famous Proclean adage laid down in *Elements*, prop. 103 '*Quodlibet in quolibet'* ('All things are in all things, but in each according to its proper nature') should be understood in a similar vein. As we have remarked in the previous section with respect to Proclean ontology, the participated share of being mediates between the cause qua unshareable and its effect qua participant subject-substrate. It acts simultaneously as the representative of the next higher cause, and in that capacity (as the participant's immanent cause, that is) it causes the effect. Giles's explanation of this adage is found in his exposition added to the twelfth proposition of *De causis*, in which he discusses the ontic relationships between Vivere/Intelligere and Esse in the domain of the Intelligences:

> *Super de causis*, prop. 12a, Fol. 40v, E: Dubitaret forte aliquis quomodo Vivere et Intelligere reservantur in Esse. Hoc enim non videtur verum, quia inferiora non sunt actu in superioribus, licet superiora sint in inferioribus; in Esse enim non includitur Vivere, licet in Vivere includatur Esse. Author tamen videtur dicere quod quodlibet includatur in quolibet. (…). Vivere ergo esset perfectius in ipso Esse quam in seipso. Esset ergo Vivere in Esse per modum entis, idest modo excellentiori, et Esse esset in Vivere modo participativo. Quodlibet ergo esset in quolibet per modum cuiuslibet.

The author's conclusion is worth paying special attention to: Life is, so to speak,[57] more perfect in Being itself than it is on its own level, because

56. That the Neoplatonist Porphyry is the father of the famous 'Arbor porphyriana' should not be taken as just a historical coincidence, the 'five words' (or 'predicables') being essential to the understanding of the complicated domain of being dealt with in Aristotle's *Categories*.
57. The *coniunctivus imperfecti* is sometimes used as a *modus potentialis* to express the speaker's (would be) modesty in making an unpretentious statement (or understatement, for that matter). This modal use seems here to be the case: 'esset' = 'is, so to speak'. Cfr. French 'on dirait' for 'on pourrait dire'.

on its own level (i.e. as participated share) it is merely by participation. Everything is indeed in everything according to the measure allowed by the recipient.

Returning now to the *Theoremata*, we read that it is the things's form that intermediates between the separate, self-contained existence of things and their connection and being united in the hierarchy of being:

> *Theor.* XIII, pp. 78,14-79,6: Sciendum ergo quod quelibet forma dat rei quod sit ens et dat ei quod sit una. Nam quelibet res per formam suam est aliquid et est indistincta a se et distincta ab aliis, ut sapientia dat suo subiecto quod sit sapiens et dat ei quod sit indistinctus a se sapiente et sit distinctus ab alio. Prout ergo sapientia dat esse tale ut esse sapiens dicitur quedam entitas, sed prout dat suo subiecto quod sit indistinctum a se tali et distinctum ab alio, dicitur unitas. Et quia hoc consequitur omnem formam et omnem rem (quia omnis res habet aliquod esse tale per quod distinguitur ab omni non tali), ideo ens et unum secundum rem idem significant et predicantur de omnibus.

This is not to say, however, that there is no difference between the concepts of 'being' and 'unity'. The former notion ('ratio entis or entitatis') concerns a positive qualification which is assigned to something in as far as it possesses a determinate mode of being by which it is marked off from other things and possesses self-containedhood. It is called 'one', on the other hand, when it is its belonging to the Universe of being that is primarily focussed upon:

> *Ibid.*79,6-15: Differunt tamen secundum rationem, quia ratio entis consistit in positione quia: Ex hoc natura aliqua dicitur entitas prout dat esse tale; ex eo vero dicitur unitas prout dando esse tale dat rei quod sit indistincta a se et distincta ab alio: dare ergo esse tale dicit quid positive, sed dare esse indifferens et indistinctum a se tali dicit quid privative. Unum ergo quantum est de se, dicit quandam indistinctionem et quandam indivisionem a se ipso. Propter quod ratio eius consistit in privatione, sicut ratio entis in positione.

The other difference between the two concepts mainly concerns the semantical issue of designation and the priority of a thing's being conceived of as 'being' to its being essentially connected with the whole chain of being:

> *Ibid.,* p. 79,15-23: Secundo differt unum ab ente quia licet eandem rem nominent hoc et illud (quia quidquid est ens est unum, et econverso [e contrario *ed.*]), tamen intellectus 'entis' precedit intellectum 'unius', quia prius intelligo quod res habeat esse tale et quod sit ens quam quod sit indistincta a se tali sive quod sit una. Immo quia privatio non intelligitur nisi per affirmationem, oportet intellectum privativum qui importatur per 'unum', fundari et presupponere intellectum positivum qui importatur per 'ens'.

But despite these conceptual differences between *ens* and *unum*, the two terms designate what in fact is really the same thing. And this means that the concept of unity encompasses the entire predicamental domain:

> *Ibid*., pp. 79,24-80,15: Sed quantumcumque secundum modum intelligendi et secundum rationem multum differant *ens* et *unum*, tamen quia eandem rem dicunt, oportet esse tot modos entis quot sunt modi unius. (…). Si res ergo per se est una per essentiam suam, cum etiam per essentiam suam sit in predicamento, oportet quod ratio 'unius per se' se extendat ad omnia predicamenta et ad omnia que sunt in predicamentis, ita quod per illud idem per quod habet res quod sit in predicamento, habet etiam quod sit una.

5.3 Giles's commentary on De causis

Similar ideas are found in Giles's commentary on *Liber de causis*. Take for example his comments upon what is said in the propositions twenty-four up to the final one (thirty-two). Prop. 24 is about the different ways of 'presence in the counterpart' as found in the First Cause compared to the things caused by it. This difference turns out to be dispositional. The proposition runs: "Causa Prima existit in omnibus secundum dispositionem unam. Sed res omnes non existunt in Causa Prima secundum dispositionem unam". Giles explains that qua First Cause the God-Creator brings about unity as acting along the lines of its unifying disposition, whereas difformity is due to the unequal capabilities of the recipients for receiving their share of being:

> Aegidius Romanus, *Super De causis*, prop. 24, Fol. 81R, section C: Est ergo intentio presentis propositionis quod prout res causantur a Deo, est uniformitas ex parte Dei agentis, quia ipse est in omnibus agens secundum dispositionem unam, et difformitas est ex parte recipientium, quia non omnia sunt in ipso, idest non omnia aguntur ab ipso secundum dispositionem ipsam.

Giles's explanation is confirmed by the anonymous author of *De causis* himself in his own comment to the proposition under discussion.[58] However, there is a snake in the grass. Can the uniformity and difformity be understood in terms of a differentiation of the process of creation, in accordance with the adage that the diversity of finite beings stems from the recipients and the unity of the Universe from God? Giles's opponents (among whom Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on *De causis*, to prop. 24, pp. 120,10-123,15) condemn this idea as jeopardizing the 'creatio ex nichilo'. Giles recognizes this problem as a possible objection to this

58. Fol. 82r: "Quod est: quia quamvis Prima Causa existat in rebus omnibus, tamen unaqueque recipit eam secundum modum potentie sue".

adage (Fol. 81v). He defends it along the lines already developed in his comments on prop. 4 (see our section 5.2 above):

> *Ibid.,* Fol. 81v, sections F-H: Ultimo forte dubitaret aliquis utrum in actione prima qua Deus res instituit et causat, veritatem haberi possit aliquomodo quod diversitas fit ex parte recipientium et unitas ex parte Dei agentis. (…). Sciendum autem quod quamvis nichil sit quod non sit causatum a Deo, verumtamen est aliquomodo etiam in actione prima Dei (…) quedam diversitas ex parte recipientium. (…). Si namque quereretur quare aliqua per creationem habent plus de Esse et aliqua minus, (…), responderetur quod hoc est propter diversitatem naturarum recipientium. In potestate enim Dei est producere hanc naturam vel illam. Sed exquo producit hanc naturam, communicat ei tantum de Esse quantum potest recipere illa natura. (…) Totum ergo est a Deo, et natura et esse. Sed quod istud esse sit aliud et aliud, hoc erit quia recipitur in alia et alia natura. Est enim Deus sicut mare quod se offert cuilibet vasi. Nullum tamen vas Ipsum totum capere potest, sed secundum quod est vas maius vel minus, sic magis vel minus capit de ipso mare.[59]

A few pages further on Giles draws the reader's attention to the position of the First Being taken as the measure to evaluate the degree of beingness possessed by the diverse things participating in the First Being. The closer their level is to the Source of being, the higher their ontic value:

> *Ibid.,* Fol. 84r: Notandum autem est quod ex propinquitate ad Primum res habent esse intellectuales. Primum enim est actus purus. Appropinquare ergo Primo est habere esse separatum a materia (…) et quia separata a materia sunt de genere intelligibilium, consequens est quod habere esse propinquum Primo est habere esse intellectuale. Et quia talia sunt nature intellectualis, intelligunt et cognoscunt influentiam quam a Primo recipiunt; quam cognoscendo delectantur.

In the twenty-sixth proposition the author of *De causis* further explains the difficult matter of causation and participation in the framework of plurification and unification. The core of the difficulty is how to consider the role of the ontic forms in the things' relationship to the 'dator formarum', no matter if this is the First Cause or an intermediate one. Because of its ontic form a thing seems to be by itself the foundation of its relationship to its next higher cause.[60] The problem, Giles says, may lead to an irritating objection, to the effect that the author of *De causis* is flatly contradicting himself in making us believe that being a cause and

59. The same metaphor of the infinite *mare* or *pelagus* is found in propp. 17 and 20.
60. With respect to prop. 26a Giles remarks (Fol. 90v): "Diceret enim author ['the author seems to mean'; for this modal use of the conjunctive, see our note 57] hic quod res stans per essentiam suam est causa quare referatur ad suam causam. Nam cum talis relatio fiat per formam et huiusmodi res sit ipsa forma, consequens est quod talis res sit causa sue relationis."

being its causatum come to the same thing, which would suggest that, given that qua self-contained entity a thing caused by a higher cause is by itself constitutive of its relationship to its cause, a thing should produce itself. The author removes this objection, Giles remarks, by saying that the very relationship to the cause is the creative momentum, rather than the self-contained thing taken apart from its relationship to its cause:

> *Ibid.,* prop. 26, Fol. 92r: Removet quandam cavillationem circa pretacta. Dixerat enim quod substantia stans per essentiam suam est causa et causatum simul, et dixerat quod ipsa est causa eius, idest sibi ipsi in formatione sui. Unde posset aliquis cavillare dicens quod si sic est, tunc talis res seipsam producit et seipsam causat. Ideo ut Author hanc cavillationem removeat exponit se, declarans quomodo intelligatur quod talis res sit causa et causatum simul et quomodo sit causa sue formationis. Est enim causa sue formationis et complementi quia est causa sue relationis ad suam causam per quam formatur, perficitur et completur, ipsa tamen seipsam non producit. Ideo ait 'et non fit causa sui ipsius', idest talis res stans per essentiam suam non fit causa sui ipsius, nisi per relationem ad suam causam. Non enim est causa sui esse, nisi quia est causa sue relationis ad suam causam per quam habet esse. Et subdit quod et illa relatio (scilicet ad suam causam) est formatio eius.

In his exposition to prop. 30 of *De causis*, Giles goes on to discuss the status of the intermediate entities occurring in the hierarchy of being. Is it necessary that there should be 'intermediate substances'? He replies that from the order and connections found in the Universe we can argue for their existence. The line of argument is taken from arithmetics. The whole collection of created substances are, as it were, a sort of numbers, all of which depend on the unity.[61] Now, it is these substantial forms by which things are specified and at the same time connected with First Being:

> *Ibid*., prop. 30, commentum, Fol. 101r: Dubitaret forte aliquis quomodo oportet dare sic substantias medias. Dicendum quod ex ordine et connexione Universi possumus hoc arguere. Ex ordine quidem rerum sive Universi: nam omnes substantie create sunt quasi quidam numeri pendentes a Primo tanquam ab unitate. Unde et forme per quas res reponuntur in specie, assimilantur numeris (…). Solus enim Deus est vere unus et vere simplex (…). Omnis autem res creata ab hac et simplicitate deficit. Si ergo ab unitate procedit numerus binarius et quaternarius, procedit et ternarius, qui est numerus medius inter binarium et quaternarium, habens se secundum quendam ordinem ad utrumque, quia in unitate excedit binarium et in unitate exceditur a quaternario. Inconnexus enim esset ordo numerorum, si statim

61. The 'number' *one* is meant. In ancient and medieval usage, however, *one* is the principle of counting, rather than itself a number; see de Rijk (2002) I, 406f.; II, 260-262 and our note 7 to section 2.2 above. Notice that this makes the adduced comparison (owing to its in-built distance factor) more appropriate.

> post binarium sequeretur quaternarius, excluso ternario. Quod maxime in ordine Universi veritatem habet, scilicet quod oportet dari sic res medias, quoniam ex exclusione talium tolleretur congrua proportio Universi.

In the final proposition 32, and in the explicit of the work in particular, the circle of the to and fro observations about causation and participation is closed:

> *Ibid*., prop. 32, Fol 112r, section X: Ex unitate ergo et simplicitate Primi arguitur superfluitas, idest superabundantia eius. Et quia sic superfluit et sic abundat, consequens est quod Ipse plus se diffundat et plus influat de sua bonitate in sua causata quam aliqua alia causa (follows reference to first proposition).
> *Ibid*., Fol. 112r, section Y: Et in hoc terminatur sententia libri de causis. Et sicut iste liber incepit ab abundantia Cause Prime, dicens quod 'Causa Prima plus est influens etc.', sic terminatur in unitate et superfluitate sive in superabundantia Cause Prime, qui est Deus benedictus et sublimis. Cui est honor et gloria in secula seculorum. Amen.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding about Giles's conception of the proper nature of the process of being and becoming as occurring in the hierarchy of being, we have to constantly be aware that any idea of Neoplatonic emanation is unfamiliar to him. If in the context of the thirtieth proposition such an idea should could to mind, Giles resolutely declares that the entire hierarchy should be understood in terms of congruity, definitely not in terms of necessity.[62]

5.4 Giles's use of Proclean scope distinction. His departure from Neoplatonic lore

The foregoing discussions have made it patently clear that for Giles the key method to solve intricate questions has been to make appropriate distinctions. Quite in line with his fellow theologians and philosophers he abundantly applies the famous 'secundum rem/secundum rationem' distinction. Nothing remarkable about this. Things are different, however, when Giles deems it necessary to defend his peculiar view concerning causation and participation within the great hierarchic chain of being. When we return to this matter in our section 7.2, we will once again observe that in order to retort the opponents's attacks upon his manner of interpreting the bond and kinship between First Being and the finite things (or the Christian Creator and the entire world of creatural being), Giles continuously had to cope with a massive wall of misunderstanding to such an extent in fact that his orthodoxy was called into question.

62. *Ibid.,* prop. 30a\, Fol. 112r, section L: "Notandum autem quod hec accipienda sunt secundum congruitatem, non autem secundum necessitatem".

A remarkable passage in the first Book of his commentary on the *Sentences* illustrates the author's skilful use of Proclean scope distinction in matters of ontology. The leading idea is that to Giles, 'being created' does not imply 'being composed of *quod est* and *quo est'*; the *esse* shared by any finite entity is admittedly a creature, yet it is definitely not itself composed of *quod est* and *quo est*. To prove this, Giles remarks that it would be useful to take account of what Proclus says in *Elements*, propp. 26 and 66 about the intrinsic connection of unity, simplicity and immutability. These features also apply to the divine Trinity, whose nature is the subject matter of Peter Lombard, *Sentences* I, dist. 7 and 8. Giles will explain that there are three kinds of totality or wholeness, depending on the different roles the parts have in their whole. The wholeness exists either in a 'totum ex partibus', or in a 'totum in parte', or in a 'totum ante partes':

> *In I Sent*,. dist 8, pars 2a, princ. 2, q. 1, Fol. 54r: Sed propter hoc non habemus omnem creaturam esse compositam quia etiam ipsum esse quod existit in eo quod est (vel in participante esse) creatura est, nec tamen est compositum ex *quod est* et *esse*. Et ideo monendum est quod ista tria, unitas, simplicitas, et immutabilitas, se consequuntur (…), ut tradit Proclus 26a propositione. (…). Ut ergo possimus scire que sunt composita et que non, sciendum est quod triplex est totalitas (ut narrat Proclus 66a propositione), scilicet 'ex partibus, ' in parte', et 'ante partes'.

It is not, of course, as if there are three 'wholes' in the outside world, but the outside things can be examined according to three different kinds of wholeness. Giles sets out to distinguish them along the lines of the well-known Neoplatonic distinction between 'participant', 'what is participated', and 'unshareable' we have dealt with in our sections 4.1 and 5.2 above. Three 'things' are distinguished, that is to say, in the outside things three ontic aspects can be marked off:

> *Ibid*.: Hec autem sic distinguuntur. Nam quedam res participat esse, quedam res est ipsum esse participatum, quedam res est esse imparticipabile.

Understandably, there is no talk about three different outside things. Rather one and the same outside thing is examined from three different angles; the distributive 'quedam' is used predicatively, which makes the phrase 'quedam res' stand for 'a thing taken under one aspect' and 'under another aspect', respectively.[63] Hence my rendering:

63. For this predicative use in classical Latin see e.g. Livy, *Ab urbe condita* XXI, 1,5 (about Hamilcar's distress concerning the loss of Sicily and Sardinia): "Angebant ingentis spiritus virum Sicilia Sardiniaque amissae" [= *litt*.'S. and S. *qua being lost*' = the loss of S. and S']; Cesar, *De bello gallico* I, 1, 1: "Gallia omnis [= 'Gallia in its totality'] divisa est in tres partes".

> 'This distinction boils down to the following: according to one aspect a thing participates being, according to another it is precisely the being shared, in still another aspect it is unshareable being'.

Giles means to say that anything belonging to the hierarchic order of being is simultaneously [1] participant, [2] its share of being, and [3] itself qua unshared. In other words, any substance can be seen as [1] a subject-substrate participant of beingness, [2] a share of beingness, and [3] itself a self-contained entity, irrespective of its being participated at the next lower level. Next, the author applies the scheme 'totum ex partibus/totum in parte', particularly focussing upon the aspect of totality as found throughout the hierarchy of being. As usual he underlines that the measure of the respective shares of being corresponds to the capacity of the recipients. This is how the respective 'wholes' deviate from the one:

> *Ibid*.: Res que participat esse, est totum ex partibus, quia constat ex *quod est* et *esse*. Esse participatum est totum in parte, quia omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur secundum modum rei recipientis. Cum igitur tale esse sit receptum in alio, non recipietur secundum suam totalitatem nec secundum totum suum esse, sed recipietur secundum partem. Unde [unum *ed*.] si 'totum' dicetur, non erit totum ut totum, sed totum ut pars. (…). Totum autem in parte non effugiet esse compositum. Nam hoc totum [= the whole examined as it occurs *in parte*] divisibile est ex eo quod secundum unum modum (sive secundum aliquam partem) recipitur in uno, alio modo et secundum aliam partem in alio, ac per hoc ab unitate declinat.

The nature of the 'totum ante partes' (being the whole preceding[64] its being participated at a lower level of the hierarchic order) boils down to the whole's feature of being an unshareable in some respect. This also comes to the fore in a passage of *Super de causis*, prop. 28a, in which Giles examines a substance in its capacity of self-contained entity ('substantia per se stans'). Any such entity is a kind of whole, that is to say an unshared one, designated by the phrase 'totum ante partes'. It is marked off from 'totum ex partibus' and 'totum in parte'. Giles exemplifies what is meant by this trio using the (coincidental) *forma albedinis*: the white thing ('album') is the whole qua being composed of its parts (i.e. the subject-substrate and the accident whiteness), whereas whiteness is the whole in as far as it is present in a limited measure in the participant ('white thing').

> *Super de causis*, prop. 28, Fol. 95v, section H: Dicendum quod omnis substantia per se stans est quoddam totum. Sed non est totum ex partibus nec totum in parte, sed est totum ante partes. Hinc [hoc *ed.]* enim triplici modo

64. It is self-evident that the *ante* should be undersood metaphysically, definitely not chronologically; cfr. the use of 'meta' discussed in our section 4.2.

> distinguit totum Proclus 66 propositione sui libri. Album enim est totum ex partibus; albedo vero in materia est totum in parte; sed si esset albedo separata, esset totum ante partes. Album enim est totum ex partibus prout nomine 'albi' intelligimus aliquod aggregatum ex subiecto et accidente. Albedo vero est totum in parte, nam tota essentia albedinis non reservatur in albedine materiali, sed reservatur ibi materialiter et secundum partem. Nam forma materialis recepta in materia non potest ibi recipi secundum totam suam perfectionem sed artatur et particulatur perfectio eius secundum capacitatem recipientis. Talis ergo forma est quoddam totum, sed est totum in parte.

What is left is the third member of the trio, the separate whiteness adduced as a counterfactual example to clear up the picture. Such an entity indeed does not exist, but its supposed occurrence is good enough to serve as a specimen of an unshared whole. This whole possesses in itself the complete perfection of whiteness, owing to the absence of parts (which by definition detract perfection), in its pure and simple shape and (qua whole) representing unity. Now because any self-contained whole is, so to speak, a separate form, one can argue thus: because any separate form is an unshared whole, therefore any such whole is uncomposed because of its unifying function. And if the term 'totum' conveys a reference to parts, it still does not refer to the parts into which it is going to be divided nor to any possible parts, but it is precisely the parts it is deprived of that are referred to:

> *Ibid*.: Sed si esset albedo separata, ista albedo quoddam totum esset, quia haberet in se totam perfectionem albedinis. Sed istud totum esset totum ante partes, quia huiusmodi perfectionem [unitatem *ed*.] haberet unitive et simpliciter et per carentiam partium. Et quia omnis substantia per se stans est quedam forma separata: cum omnis forma separata sit quoddam 'totum ante partes': quia habet in se totam perfectionem sue speciei unitive et per carentiam partium, ideo omne tale totum est simplex. Et si dicit respectum ad partes, non dicit huiusmodi respectum ad partes in quas dividatur et in quas possit dividi, sed ad partes quibus privatur, quia habet carentiam partium.

Once and again Giles does his level best to drum into his readers how they should conceive of the ontological design of causation and participation in the great chain of being, including the connections and interrelationships between the constituents of the hierarchic harmony, and all this without jeopardizing the 'creatio ex nichilo'. He does not hesitate to look for support in Proclus, yet continuously takes care not to fall victim to the false opinions held by pagan philosophers.

5.5 Giles's cautious use of Platonism and Neoplatonism

In the previous section we have taken note of the skilful way in which Giles manipulates ancient doctrinal positions by utilizing their general

philosophic bearing without adhering to the proper doctrine. Thus he was able to exemplify the notion of 'self-contained whole' by referring to Plato's false idea of the Separate Forms. This procedure is carefully considered. More than once he argues that a reference to a wrong position can be helpful to understand truth. Here are some passages to that effect from Giles's commentary on the *Liber de causis*:

> *Super De causis*, prop, 2, Fol. 8r, section E: Dicamus quod, licet non sit ordo deorum secundum ordinem abstractorum, ut posuit Plato, iuvamur tamen per hec dicta Platonis ad intelligendas aliquas veritates.
> *Ibid*., prop. 18a, Fol. 60R, E: Sed licet non sit vera positio Platonis, iuvat tamen nos ad intellgenda quandam maximam veritatem quod, licet non sit dare multa talia separata, est tamen aliquod separatum quod est causa omnium aliorum. Hoc autem est esse …

Giles justifies his gathering support from Proclus along similar lines:

> *Ibid*., prop. 12, Fol. 40v, section E: Dicendum est quod liber iste [sc. *De causis*] extractus est ex libro Procli, et iste Proclus fuit totus platonicus. Propter quod multe probationes hic inducuntur modo platonico… non ergo adducuntur hic [sc. a me] ista verba quia vera sit opinio Platonis, sed ut per opinionem Platonis intelligatur hec veritas, quomodo scilicet quodlibet reservatur in quolibet. Multe enim opiniones philosophorum in se non sunt vere, que tamen iuvant intellectum nostrum ad intelligendum aliquam veritatem.

This much is certain, Giles rejection of Neoplatonic emanation is unequivocal.

6. *Henry of Ghent as the protagonist against Giles of Rome*

Henry of Ghent (ca. 1220-1293), a secular master in theology, taught at the Parisian university from 1276 up to 1292.[65] Although he was not supported by a religious order adopting his doctrines, his influence was considerable not only in his own time but in posterity as well. Up to the eighteenth century his *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum* as well as his *Quodlibeta* were printed. For our purpose it will suffice to sketch the positions he eagerly had to defend against Giles of Rome.

It is patently clear that Henry was challenged by the novel doctrines Giles had developed about created nature and its structure in the actual Universe of being. As early as in prop. XXIX of his *Theoremata de cor-*

65. For Henry's (d. 1293) life and works see Weijers (2001), 53-60; for Giles's (ca. 1243/7-1316) see Weijers (1996), 64-76. A still useful survey of his theological and philosophic positions is found in Gilson (1955), 447-452. The driving tenor of Ghentian metaphysics is thoroughly studied in Paulus (1938), 259-326; for the context of Henry's discussions with Giles see *ibid*., 273-303.

pore Christi (written shortly before Christmas 1276) and likewise in his contemporaneous first Book on the *Sentences*[66] Giles raised the problem of the relationship between essence and existence, the solution to which is vital to a good understanding of creation. His answer is to the effect that essence and existence in finite beings really differ, and in his later works he even went as far as to regard this difference as one 'inter rem et rem'. This rigid position compelled Giles to account for the precise way in which existence flows from essence, and particularly to defend the actual unity of the Universe of being. Obviously, when it comes to explaining the ontological coherence of the Universe, there is a snag: one might have to give in to Neoplatonic tendencies. To ascribe some activity (however tiny) to the recipients of existence could jeopardize the Christian idea of the 'creatio ex nichilo'.

Henry of Ghent wasted no time in offering vehement resistance to such unheard of innovations entailing perilous consequences for orthodoxy. As early as Christmas 1276 he launched an attack on Giles's innovations — with which he appears to be familiar enough from reading his opponent's *Theoremata de corpore Christi* and *In I Sent*. He continued to censure Giles's initial views as well as the further developments and additional arguments Giles advanced up to 1287. It is important to observe the chronological order of the respective works involved.

Jean Paulus presents (1938, 281) a useful time frame. In 1276 Henry launched his first assault on Giles in *Quodlibet* I, 9. Giles's counterattacks are found in the ninth and eleventh chapters of his *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, which he wrote during his exile (1278-1286 when he still was a bachelor); in fact they are an echo of the 1276 discussion. It was not until Easter 1286[67] (in his own *Quodlibet* I, 7) that Giles (then a master in theology) found an opportunity to reply to Henry's objections by resuming what he had already said in the *Theoremata*. In the same year Giles's *Quaestiones disputatae de esse et essentia* were published, the Qq. 9 and 11 of which contain extensive polemics directed against Henry's *Quodlibet* I, 9. Henry does not take this lying down and sets out to refute (in his *Quodlibet* X, 7 dating from Christmas 1286) the questions 9 and 11 of Giles's *Disputed Questions* step by step. When he resumed his work on his *Disputed Questions* after Christmas, 1286 Giles immediately proceeded to attack (in *Disp. Qq*, 12 and 13) Henry's argumentation of *Quodlibet* X, 7 with a similar precision; as early as Easter, 1287

66. *In I Sent*., dist. 8, pars 2, princ. 2, q.1 (Fol. 54r).
67. Giles had every reason to keep quiet up to 1286 (during his exile) so as not to antagonize the academic big shots, especially because Henry was among those who took an active part in the Parisian Condemnation of 1277.

Henry is acquainted with Giles's rejoinder. In his *Quodlibet* XI, 3 (Christmas 1287) Henry responds to Giles's *Qq*. 12 and 13.

We owe to Hocédez (1927 and 1928) and Paulus (1938, 273ff.) detailed analyses and evaluations of the entire debate. Despite contemporaneous and later 'testimonies' to the contrary — stating that that Henry was mainly opposing Thomas Aquinas ---, it is now beyond any doubt that Henry's one and only opponent was Giles of Rome.[68] A large range of controversies was involved: the correct views of the nature of ontic composition/genus and species, that of matter and form/potency and act and the like, but above all creation and the overall impact of the real distinction between being and existence. In the wake of all these altercations, methodology too came in, the scheme of distinctions in particular.

6.1 Giles, Disputed Questions, q. 9 (against Henry's Quodlibet I, 9)

As far as the eager polemics about the real distinction between being and existence is in order, the years 1286 and 1287 should be in the focus of our interest; both sides resumed the complete argumentation brought forward since 1276 with a pertinacity worthy, it would seem, of a better cause.

In *Disputed Questions*, q. 9 ('Utrum essentia creature sit suum esse, vel realiter differat ab esse eius') Giles declares his plan of campaign: "Primo recitabimus magnorum[69] dicta tenentia opinionem contrariam; secundo ostendemus que de dictis illis nos dubitare faciunt; tertio adducemus rationes ostendentes contrarium" (Fol. 18ra). In the first part Giles accurately reports Henry's 1276 *Quodlibet* I, 9, including the four objections advanced then against Giles's novel views. In the second part Giles launches his counterattack. Four things are assaulted in particular: [1] Henry's triple conception of being: 'esse'; 'esse essentie', and 'esse existentie'; [2] his trio: 'distinctio realis', 'distinctio rationis' and 'distinctio intentionis'; [3] Henry's notion of participation, and in this context his central thesis that there is no real difference between essence and existence, because existence does not add anything to essence but a 'respectus ad Creatorem'; [4] In the context of the participation issue the different interpretations of the ontological axioms established by Boethius in the opening lines of his *De hebdomadibus* will come up for discussion.

68. In the wake of M. Chossat, his confrater Hocédez has presented irrefutable proof for this (1927 and 1928, passim). One could be led astray by Henry's frequent use of the plural ('isti dicunt', 'magnorum dicta', 'dicunt aliqui'), but this usage is a common courtesy in academic debates. See Hocédez (1927, 359-363; 374).
69. The *magni* is a courteous reference to master Henry of Ghent; see our previous note.

6.1.1 'Esse', 'esse essentie', and 'esse existentie'

Giles has well observed that the distinction between three kinds of *esse* was adduced by Henry as depending on the three possible different ways of human consideration.[70] The general concept of *esse* can be split up into two specific kinds, viz, the essence's beingness taken as such and beingness as found in the actual existence of things. When the same term 'res' ('thing') is considered absolutely, it conveys just being(ness) in general, whereas when it is taken in its relationship to its divine exemplar, it conveys a thing's being(ness) as depending on God, and finally when it is considered qua outside existing, actual existence is conveyed. Any creature inseparably has 'esse essentie' and in that capacity it belongs to the predicamental order. Actual existence, however, only falls to it owing to extrinsic participation:

> *Disp. Qq*., q. 9, Fol. 18vb: Dicunt enim quod duplex est esse, videlicet esse essentie et actualis existentie, ut Avicenna distinguit in Metaphisica sua. In una autem et eadem re est esse [essentia *ed*.] et esse essentie et esse actualis existentie. Que omnia secundum istos realiter non differunt, sed unam et eandem rem dicunt aliter et aliter acceptam. Eadem enim res dicit esse [essentiam *ed*.] secundum suam absolutam considerationem, dicit esse essentie ut habet ideam et exemplar in Deo; dicit etiam <esse> actualis existentie ut est in effectu et ut [aut *ed*.] fit in re extra. Esse <essentie> inseparabiliter convenit ipsi, quia semper habet exemplar in Deo; per huiusmodi esse accipit [accipitur ed.] (ut dicunt) <quod> cadit creatura sub ente quod est commune ad decem predicamenta; per huiusmodi etiam esse accipit esse diffinitivum [diffinitum *ed*.] rei. Sed esse actualis existentie (ut dicunt) non est inseparabile a re, sed competit rei secundum quandam extrinsecam participationem.

To establish the difference between being (*esse*) and essence (*essentia*), we need to figure out what precisely is meant by 'esse'. In one case, Giles's opponent avers, the distinction between 'esse essentie' and 'esse

70. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* I, 9, pp. 53,64-54,80 ed. Macken: "Et est hic distinguendum de esse secundum quod distinguit Avicenna in fine quinti Metaphisice sue quod quoddam est esse rei quod habet essentialiter de se, quod appellatur 'esse essentie'; quoddam vero quod recipit ab alio, quod appellatur 'esse actualis existentie'. Primum esse habet essentia creature essentialiter, sed tantum participative inquantum habet formale exemplar in Deo. Et per hoc cadit sub ente quod est commune essentiale ad decem predicamenta, quod a tali esse in communi accepto imponitur, et est illud esse rei diffinitivum quod de ipsa ante esse actuale solum habet existere in mentis conceptu; de quo dicitur quod diffinitio est oratio indicans quid est esse. Secundum esse non habet creatura ex sua essentia, sed a Deo inquantum est effectus voluntatis divine iuxta exemplar eius in mente divina. Unde quia istud esse non habet ex sua essentia sed quadam extrinseca participatione, ideo illud esse modum accidentis habet quasi superveniens essentie". Cfr. *Quodlibet* III, 9. quoted in de Rijk (1990), 93, n. 8. For the broader doctrinal context see *ibid*., 91-96.

existentie' does not matter, in the other it really does. In the latter case, essence differs from essential being only conceptually, but from actual existence it also differs in the way that is called 'intentionally'[71]:

> *Ibid*.: (…) declara<n>t quomodo differt essentia ab esse. Dicunt ergo quod 'differre' dicitur tripliciter, videlicet re, ratione, et intentione. Essentia autem secundum eos nullo modo differt ab esse re, sive accipiatur esse essentie sive esse existentie. Attamen non eodem modo differt essentia ab utroque tali esse, sed ab esse essentie differt ratione tantum; ab esse existentie differt (ut dicunt) intentione.

Henry is in fact of the opinion that intentional difference qualifies the notion of conceptual difference in that it adds some special feature to it. To identify this additional feature Henry points out that unlike in the case of merely conceptual difference, the different items cannot be predicated of one another, meaning that you cannot say 'essence boils down to actual existence'. This is the way in which Giles's opponent explains creation:

> *Ibid*.: Videntur autem isti velle quod differre intentione sit plus quam differre ratione. Nam quando aliqua duo dicunt eandem rem aliter et aliter acceptam ita quod unum predicatur de alio, tunc illa duo differunt ratione. Sed quando unum non suscipit predicationem alterius, differunt intentione. Et quia esse actualis existentie non predicatur de essentia nec est bene dictum quod essentia sit tale esse, ideo essentia et huiusmodi esse non differunt tantum ratione sed etiam intentione. Ex hoc autem habere volunt quod quia in creatura essentia et actuale esse differunt intentione, ideo creatura deficiat a simplicitate Primi.

Giles faithfully presents the semantical explanation advanced by Henry. Just as what is running, the run, and the act of running completely coincide, in a similar way essence coincides with being. All the same, however, let us not say 'The run is (the same as) running' or 'The run is (itself) running'. Although all three concern one and the same running thing, they are different, not only conceptually but intentionally as well:[72]

> *Disp. Qq.,* q. 9, Fol. 18vb-19ra: Omnino re sunt idem currens, cursus et currere, et lux, lucere et lucens, et vita, vivens, vivere. Ergo sicut re vivere non est aliud quam vita, et [ita *ed*.] lucere non est aliud quam lux, et currere non est aliud quam cursus, sic essentia non est aliud quam esse, et tamen non

71. For this intentional (or focal) difference see our sections 6.1.2. 6.2.3, 6.3.2, 7.3.1. 7. 3.2, 7.3.3, 8.4 and 8.6.4.
72. *Quodlibet* I, 9, p. 56, 29-36: "Sufficit autem ad praesens quod non possit dici in creaturis quia essentia earum sit earum esse, quia sunt diversa intentione, licet sint idem re, ut dictum est. Quod clarius videmus in exemplis: idem enim sunt omnino re et idem significant *currens*, *cursus* et *currere*, *lucens*, *lux* et *lucere*, *vivens*, *vita* et *vivere* sicut *ens*, *essentia* et *esse*; et tamen non possum dicere 'cursus est currere'vel 'lux est lucere'. Similiter etiam neque possum dicere 'ens est suum esse', licet idem sunt in re".

> dicamus quod cursus sit currere vel quod cursus currat, quia cursus et currere, licet unam et eandem re dicant, differunt tamen intentione, non ratione solum. Sic non dicimus quod essentia esset ipsum esse, quia licet unam et eandem rem dicant 'essentia' et 'esse actu'[actum *ed*.]. Quia differunt intentione, unum non suscipit predicationem alterius.

Giles rejects the comparison adduced by Henry. He would rather refer to the analogous relationship between 'intelligentia' and 'intelligere'. That is to say, just as the substantive noun 'intelligentia' conveys a substance and the verb 'intelligere' its perfection which emanates from the intelligence to which [sc. perfection] that substance is in potency, so 'esse' conveys a certain perfection of the essence, which emanates from it, a perfection indeed to which the essence is in potency:

> *Ibid*., Fol. 19rb: Sicut 'intelligentia' dicit ipsam substantiam, 'intelligere' vero ipsam perfectionem ipsius substantie emanantem ab ea, ad quam est in potentia substantia illa, sic 'esse' dicit quandam perfectionem ipsius essentie emanantem ab ea [sc. forma essendi], ad quam perfectionem est in potentia essentia ipsa.

6.1.2 *The 'distinctio intentionis'*

Next Giles draws attention to the five arguments advanced by Henry in support of his position. He judges them to lack stringency (Fol. 19vb: 'Accipiunt autem quinque in declarando positionem suam que videntur rationi non consonantia). One of the things he dsagrees with is Henry's position concerning the putative 'intentional' difference between being and existence. Giles instead maintains that this difference consists in a thing being actualized by the Creator, and that the actualization requires the supervenience of something else he calls 'esse'. This should be compared to the similar process of the actualization of matter by the form:

> *Ibid.,* Fol. 20ra: Quod vero dicunt de esse existentie quod non differt ab essentia nisi prout ipsa est in effectu, dici debet quod essentia non potest esse effectus Agentis nisi ei superaddatur actualitas aliqua quam vocamus *esse*. (…). Materia non habet de se actualitatem ut possit actu esse, ideo requiritur quod ei superaddatur forma que sit actus eius et que sit realiter differens ab ipsa. Sic quia essentia cuiuslibet creature de se non habet quod actu sit, oportet quod ei superaddatur actualitas aliqua quam vocamus *esse*.

It will be clear enough from the foregoing that Henry's innovation of the 'distinctio intentionis' advanced as a specification of the conceptual distinction (not being 'secundum rationem tantum') is something that Giles can never accept, because if he did, he would have to give up the rigid distinction 'inter rem et rem' — a distinction advocated by Giles to avoid the position that the difference between being and existence is

merely conceptual. Giles will censure this subject matter thoroughly. As he full well realises, he needs to make clear that there is no need to differentiate between real and conceptual difference, nor should there be. The thing is, he claims, that either the words 'being' and 'essence' denote the same thing, or they do not; there is no third option. In the former case, they either denote the same thing in the same way, in which case they are synonymous (and then to really or conceptually differ is not in order). If, on the other hand, they denote the same thing but in a different way, then they only differ conceptually. If, finally, they denote diverse things, there is a real difference between their significates. Anyhow, we will never find something in between real and conceptual difference, unless we say that there is no difference at all. It seems inconceivable that there should be a kind of differring as an intermediary between the real and the conceptual:

> *Disp. Qq.,* q. 9, Fol. 20ra: Non videtur quod sit aliquod differre medium inter differre re et ratione, quia vel uno nomine significamus plura vel pluribus nominibus significamus unum, vel pluribus plura. Si uni nomini non respondet unum significatum tantum sed plura, tunc est equivocatio, et tunc nichil ad propositum. Si vero pluribus nominibus significamus idem, non potest ibi esse differentia nisi rationis. Si vero pluribus plura, oportet quod sit differentia rei. Esse enim et essentia sunt plura vocabula. Vel ergo dicunt eandem rem, vel non; constat quod non est dare medium. Si dicunt eandem rem, vel dicunt eam eodem modo, et tunc sunt sinonyma et significata [significativa *ed*.] talium vocabulorum nec re nec ratione differunt. Sed si dicant eandem rem non eodem modo, non differunt re sed ratione tantum. Si res diversas dicant, differunt re. Numquam autem invenimus medium inter differre re et ratione. Nisi negemus omnem differentiam, ut si dixerimus quod nullo modo differunt. Sed quod sit dare differre medium inter differre re et ratione non videtur intelligibile.

Henry should not try, Giles further argues, to find support with Averroes for his intentional distinction. It is true, the 'distinctio secundum intentionem' seems to have a precedent in the Commentator when he disproves Avicenna's position. However, Averroes does not advocate such a distinction as a third one in between the other two, because 'intentiones' are in fact nothing but 'rationes', and indeed mental products, which likewise denote either diverse things, or the same thing in different ways. Giles concludes that Averroes sometimes takes intentional difference (and distinction) as equivalent to conceptual difference (distinction):

> *Ibid.:* Ista tamen verba quod aliqua different re, aliqua ratione, et aliqua intentione videntur sumpsisse originem a Commentatore super IV Metaphisice ubi improbat Avicennam. Sed ipse non vult quod differre intentione sit quoddam differre tertium a differre re et ratione. Nam intendere est proprie

> ipsius anime; ad animam autem spectat formare de rebus diversas rationes et intentiones. Sed iste diverse intentiones vel dicunt diversas res, vel dicunt eandem rem aliter et aliter sumptam. Sic differre intentione est differre ratione. Unde et idem Commentator non vult quod differre intentione sit quoddam differre tertium differens a differre re et ratione, sed vult quod sit quoddam differre commune ad utrumque. Unde aliquando accipit differre intentione prout est idem quod differre ratione.

6.1.3 *The notion of participation explained as 'respectus ad Creatorem'*

Another momentous matter of controversy is the notion of participation, which is explained by Henry in terms of a creature's relationship to the Creator. Let us begin with what Henry says himself about this vital issue in his *Quodlibet* I, 9 ('Utrum ipsa essentia creature sit suum esse'). He opens the discussion with four arguments in the negative, the final of which is taken from Boethius, *De hebdomadibus*:

> *Quodlibet* I, 9, pp. 47,21-48,31: Quarto ad idem est auctoritas Boethii, qui dicit in *De hebdomadibus*, hebdomade 1a: *Diversum est esse et id quod est*. Quod non esset verum si idem re essent creatura et esse eius. Ergo etc. Item in eadem: *Quod est, accepta essendi forma, est atque consistit*. Sed quod accipit <aliquid> aliud re est ab eo quod accipit. Ergo etc. Item in hebdomade 2a: *Fit participatio cum aliquid iam est*; et in hebdomade 5a: *Omne quod est, participat eo quod est esse, ut sit*. Ergo quod est, in se iam est aliquid ante esse quod participat. Hoc autem non esset nisi essent diversa re. Ergo etc. Item hebdomade 6a: *Omni composito aliud est esse, aliud ipsum <quod> est.* Quod non esset si idem essent re.

Henry first admits that there are two ways to understand the creature's essence and *esse*. One way is to take the essence as some subject-substrate, and the *esse* participated as a 'forma essendi' received in it, like a white thing receives as a substrate the form of whiteness. He reports (48,34-49,52) the explanation of the Boethian authorities in support of the Aegidian real distinction. He rejects the first way as 'phantastica imaginatio' (later on at 49,69) and replaces (49,52ff.) it by his own view of participation: in this view essence is taken as something indifferent to being and not-being, which by itself is a non-being, but has a formal idea in God as its exemplar before it is actually created.

> *Ibid*., 49,53-67: Alius vero est modus intelligendi 'creaturam participare *esse*' intelligendo ipsam essentiam creatura ut aliquid abstractum per intellectum, indifferens ad esse et non esse, quod de se est quoddam non-ens, habens tamen formalem ideam in Deo, per quam in Deo est est ens quoddam antequam fiat ens in propria natura. […] ex hoc dicitur participare *esse* quod est eius similitudo expressa in effectu ab illo *Esse* puro quod Deus est. Quae

> quidem similitudo cadit in ipsa essentia rei. […]; non autem est ipsa similitudo rei qua *esse* participat creatura aliquod praeter essentiam ipsius creaturae, differens re ab ipsa et ei impressa.

He objects (50.1-52,51) to the Aegidian view ('essence and existence differ as two really different things') because it is at variance with philosophic authorities as well as with true reason ('ratio veridica'), and firmly concludes: "Et sic omnibus modis oportebit dare quod res quaelibet habet esse per suam essentiam, ut esse non sit res aliqua additum essentiae".

Replying then (53,52ff.) to the original question of *Quodlibet* I, 9 Henry proposes to follow Avicenna in distinguishing two kinds of *esse*, viz. 'esse essentiae' and 'esse actualis existentiae':

> *Ibid.,* 53,64-54,80: Et est hic distinguendum de *esse* secundum quod distinguit Avicenna in fine Vti Metaphysica suae quod quoddam est esse rei quod habet essentialiter de se, quod appellatur 'esse essentiae'; quoddam vero recipit al alio, quod appellatur 'esse actualis existentiae'. Primum *esse* habet essentia creature essentialiter, sed tamen participative inquantum habet formale exemplar in Deo. Et per hoc cadit sub ente quod est commune essentiale ad decem praedicamenta […] et est illud esse rei definitivum quod de ipsa ante esse actuale solum habet existere in mentis conceptu, de quo dicitur quod definitio est oratio indicans quid est esse. Secundum *esse* non habet creatura ex sua essentia sed a Deo inquantum est effectus voluntatis divinae iuxta exemplar eius in mente divina. Unde quia istud esse non habet ex sua essentia sed quadam extrinseca participatione, ideo illud esse modum accidentis habet quasi superveniens essentiae. […Unde] participatio huius *esse* non dicitur extrinseca per inhaerentiam sicut participatio veri accidentis, sed per creationis impressionem, ut dictum est.

Henry goes on to explain (55,96-12) the difference between essence and being in either case. The 'esse essentiae' differs from the creature's essence only conceptually ('sola ratione'); it always belongs to the essence, because the latter only possesses this *esse* formally, and not as something effected from outside. The 'esse actualis existentiae', on the other hand, definitely does not differ from the creature's essence really (as Giles asseverates), yet not merely conceptually either, but intentionally as well. Henry takes the opportunity to allude to his view of actual creation in terms of the creature's relationship to its efficient cause, the God-Creator ('respectus ad Deum'):

> *Ibid*., 55,96-112: Si loquamur de primo *esse* creaturae, illud sola ratione differt ab essentia creaturae, nec potest ei abesse, quia non habet illud ab alio effective sed solum formaliter. Unde propter identitatem rei et inseparabilem concomitantiam rationis utriusque, esse scilicet talis et essentiae rei, potest dici de essentia creaturae quod ipsa est suum esse participatum formaliter,

> licet non effective. […] Si vero loquamur de secundo *esse* creaturae, illud licet non differt re ab essentia creaturae, non tamen differt ab illa sola ratione (inquantum intellectus diversis conceptionibus capit de ea *quid* [*coni*.; quod *ed*.] est et quod *tale quid* est, substantia vel accidens), sed etiam differt ab illa intentione, quia quantum ad tale *esse* ipsa essentia creaturae potest esse et non esse. Esse enim habet inquantum alterius effectus quidam est, non-esse autem habet de se, et in illud non-esse cadit quando ille qui fecit quod est conservare desinit.

The lion's part of Henry's refutation of Giles's arguments in support of the latter's favourite 'distinctio realis' (56,38ff.) is about the Boethian authorities (57,67-62,61). The main controversial issues will come to the fore in Giles's rejoinder to his opponent. Giles is especially critical of Henry's claim that the phrase 'A creature participates being(ness)' is used in a twofold manner: it is used in a wrong way when one tries to say that being is something that informs a creature's essence, in the right way when essence is said to participate being because it does not possess being by itself and only because it has a share of beingness in its capacity of being God's likeness. Henry explains actual existence, then, as Giles faithfully reports, in terms of a relationship to the Creator only, which supervenes on a thing's essence:

> *Disp. Qq.,* q. 9*,* Fol. 19ra: Distinguunt etiam isti quod 'creaturam participare esse' potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo quod essentia creature sit aliquid subtractum ipsi esse et recipiat esse ita quod ipsum esse sit aliquid informans essentiam creature (et hunc intellectum dicunt contingere ex falsa ymaginatione). Sed alio modo potest intelligi 'essentia participare esse' quia de se non habet esse, sed dicitur participare esse ex eo quod est similitudo expressa in effectu a Deo. Sic<ut> si sol produceret voluntarie radium, ipse radius voluntarie productus esset similitudo solis et esset quedam participatio lucis, sic creatura producta voluntarie a Deo participare potest esse divinum. (…) Et additur in dictis istorum quod sicut creatio nichil [non nichil *ed*.] addit super essentiam creature nisi respectum tantum ita ut unum sit esse actuale, similiter existentia [essentia *ed*.] non addit rem aliquam sed respectum quendam ad Creatorem.

As we have observed, Henry opposes to Giles's rigid real distinction between being and existence ('inter rem et rem') his *respectus* doctrine, by which this adamant difference is reduced to just a relational feature supervening on an essence when it is actualized by creation. Giles asks if such an extrinsic relationship can account for a thing's actual existence in a satisfactory way. He strongly denies this and sets out to prove that relational things falling under the category 'ad aliquid' (which covers things that are brought up by the speaker in their capacity of being related

to some other thing)[73] require something absolute to found the relationship upon. In his opinion Henry's 'respectus' does not satisfy this requirement. It is actual existence that is primarily acquired by the essence as some *thing* ('res'), in which secondarily a relationship ('respectus') is founded. Hence existence is not just a 'respectus' to its provider:

> *Ibid*., Fol. 19rb: Utrum esse supra essentiam addat respectum tantum, quem respectum nominant habitudinem extrinsecam. (…). In *ad aliquid* non est motus sed semper est motus ad aliquid absolutum in quo fundatur aliquod relatum. Propter quod nichil potest acquirere novum *ad aliquid* nisi quia acquiritur novum *aliquid* (…). Sic ergo creatura ex eo quod habet esse a Primo, ex hoc non solum habet respectum tantum, sed oportet quod dicat rem aliquam in qua fundatur respectus. Ipsum ergo esse non est idem quod ipse respectus, nec est idem quod ipsa essentia, quia nichil acquirit seipsum. Quare si ipsa essentia a Primo agente acquirit <esse>, non erit <ipse> [sc. respectus] ipsum esse. (…). Sic etiam essentia creature a Primo agente acquirit esse et habet esse quod acquirendo acquirit habitudinem et respectum ad ipsum Agens. Esse igitur non est ipse respectus.

It will be clear enough that the Boethian authorities from *De hebdomadibus* form a substantial part of the foregoing discussions. Fairly speaking, these discussions are not very impressive as they are coloured by the opponents' own *parti pris* and the latter rather selectively avail themselves of the Boethian cluster of axioms. It may be useful to pay some attention to the excerpt from *De hebdomadibus* under discussion as it occurs in the medieval discussions.

6.1.4 *A collateral issue: the interpretation of Boethius's axioms in* De hebdomadibus

Parts of the seven[74] axioms about essence and being found in Boethius, *De hebdomadibus* were frequently adduced in the debates about how beingness applies to finite entities. To assess the use of the Boethian 'auctoritates' in the ontological debates it is worthwhile to say something about this work as it has been handed down to us, and its author's general ontological position.

Like Plato and St. Augustine, Boethius identifies being with good, and non-being with evil. However, while this view seems simple enough, it must come to terms with the major metaphysical problem of participation, viz. how participated essences are related to their sources. So one

73. See de Rijk (2002) I, 408ff. In have adapted my translations.
74. I follow the current medieval numerotation, taking what is regarded by others as the first one to be an introduction to the seven Axioms' (see note 77 below). Unlike Porretanus, Henry of Ghent has the correct numerotation; See Quodlibet I, 9, 47,21ff., quoted above in our section 6.1.3

has to explain that while for everything that *is*, to be and to be good are essentially one and the same thing, yet they differ from Good in itself, God. Boethius addresses this problem in his *Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint*, *cum non sint substantialia bona* ('How substances are good in virtue of their *being*, admitting that they are not substantial goods')[75]. In his prologue to the proper question concerning the adage 'Ea quae sunt, bona sunt' the author proposes to thoroughly go into this matter *more mathematico*, by stating, that is, like in works on mathematical subjects, some clear theorems or axioms, that is to say, basic rules, the rigid conceptualization of which enables him to develop his thought.[76]

This epilogue is followed by an introductory part — which, unlike most medieval interpreters,[77] their modern colleagues take as the first axiom (quite wrongly, for that matter) — in which Boethius divides 'common conceptions of the mind'[78] ("which anyone accepts as soon as he hears them") into plainly self-evident statements such as 'If you take equals from two equals, the remainders are equal' and profound axioms, which, although they derive from the simple ones, require some sharp-witted thinking:

> *De hebdomadibus*, p. 169,17-25 ed. Peiper: Communis animi conceptio est enuntiatio quam quisque probat auditam. Harum duplex modus est. Nam una ita communis est ut omnium sit hominum, veluti si hanc proponas 'Si duobus aequalibus aequalia auferas, quae relinquuntur aequalia esse', nullus id intel-

75. In the Middle Ages this work went under the title *De hebdomadibus*. Gilbertus Porretanus presents a strange explanation of the word 'hebdomas'; p. 185, 52-53: 'ebdomades', hocest conceptiones nominantur [sc. the sophisticated rules or axioms are meant]; p. 186,72-73: "Que [sc. the axioms or 'dignitates'] vero 'ebdomades' appellantur, a sensu simplicium omnino procul sunt". It must strike the reader that Boethius leaves it to the prudent reader to underpin each of the axioms with the respective arguments. After completing the enumeration of the seven axioms he writes (p. 170,49-51 ed. Peiper): "Sufficiunt igitur quae praemisimus. A prudente vero orationis interprete unumquodque aptabitur argumentis".
76. "Ut igitur in mathematica fieri solet ceterisque etiam disciplinis, praeposui terminos regulasque quibus cuncta quae sequuntur efficiam" (p. 169,13-16 ed. Peiper). Notice the hendiadys *terminos regulasque* by which the author indicates the rigidly conceptualized axioms.
77. In his commentary on *De hebdomadibus* Gilbertus Porretanus (p. 189ff.) takes this part as *prima regula* and the first axiom as *secunda regula*, and so on. This also happens in Peiper's critical edition and is taken over by modern interpreters like Stewart & Rand and Schrimpf, who throughout his work does not anything but referring to Stewart & Rand without even quoting their Latin text, let alone that he shows any familiarity with the rich critical apparatus in Peiper's edition. Oddly enough, Peiper's meritorious achievement is not even reported by Schrimpf.
78. Boethius is probably alluding to Aristotle's 'affections of the soul' (*De interpr*. 1, 16a3-4). See his comments *ad loc*. (*In Periherm*., secunda editio, pp. 8,1; 20,18 and 30, 25 (*ed*. Meiser) in which the paraphrasis 'conceptiones animi intellectusque' is found. For the basic function of the mental conceptions in Aristotelian and medieval apophantics see de Rijk (2002) I, 20-23; 192-193; II, 128.

> ligens neget. Alia vero est doctorum tantum, quae tamen ex talibus communibus animi conceptionibus venit, ut est 'Quae incorporalia sunt, in loco non esse', et caetera quae non vulgus sed docti comprobant.

The author goes on to present seven theses of the sophisticated type:

> *Ibid,* p. 169, 26-28: **I** Diversum est *esse* et *id quod est*. Ipsum enim [vero *Peiper*] *esse* nondum est; at vero *quod est*, accepta essendi forma, est atque consistit.
> *Being* and *that which is* is not the same; indeed, being taken by itself *is* not yet; but *that which is*, having received a form of *being*, *is* and is subsistent.

Some comments.[79] (1) This axiom not only states that *being* and *that which is* are not the same, but also makes clear what the difference consists in.
(2) Schrimpf and others quite erroneously take the phrase *ipsum esse* to mean 'Being Itself', 'Simple Being' or 'Absolute Being'(= God), which makes no good sense, but instead produces an awkward, even heretical (pantheist?) thesis, in claiming that God will not be until he manifests himself in concrete *be*-ings. The pronoun *ipsum* ('by itself') serves to mark off the component *being(ness)* (*esse*) from the compound substance of which it is the constitutive component.[80] A similar use of *ipsum* is found in Axioms II, III en VIII. As often Porretanus (pp. 193,51-194,85) takes the middle ground and refuses to make a clear choice between the theological and philosophical interpretation of 'esse'.
(3) The phrase *quod est* should be taken as equivalent to the previous *id quod est*, in order to obtain the same opposition as is found in the first sentence. The same holds good for the opening words of the next axiom, whereas the complete phrase is found in Axioms III, V and VI.

> *Ibid*., p. 169,29-32: **II** *Quod est* participare aliquo potest, sed ipsum *esse* nullo modo aliquo participat. Fit enim participatio cum aliquid iam *est*; *est* autem *aliquid*, cum *esse* susceperit.
> *That which is* can participate in something else, but being, when taken by itself, can in no way participate in anything else; for participation is effected when something already *is*, and this is the case when it has received *being*.

Some comment. Boethius does not intend to claim that *what is* first *is* and can then participate something else. He is talking about a metaphysical process, rather than temporal succession. In fact he tries to make clear

79. My comments upon the seven axioms are taken from the discussion in de Rijk (1988), 17-29.
80. Therefore the phrase 'ipsum esse' means 'the notion "being" by itself', rather than 'the notion "being-by-itself"'. For this use of 'ipse' in order to highlight an entity's predominant part cfr. phrases like 'exercitus et ipse dux'.

that for something to participate it needs to have being, which it owes to the factor *esse*.

> *Ibid*., p. 169,33-35: **III** *Id quod est* habere aliquid praeterquam quod ipsum est potest. Ipsum vero esse nichil aliud praeter se habet admixtum.
> *That which is* can possess something besides what it is by itself. But when taken by itself, *being* has no admixture whatsoever.

Some comments. (1) This axiom is complementary to the previous one in that it once again underlines the difference between the concrete *that which is* and its constitutive component, *being(ness)* taken by itself.
(2) Quite often (e.g. by Stewart & Rand in the Loeb edition) *id quod est* is rendered 'that which *exists*'. However, the *esse* as discussed in *De hebdomadibus* (as in similar (Neo)platonic contexts, for that matter) has, as such, nothing to do with factual existence in the outside world. What is at issue instead in contexts like these is metaphysical actuality.[81]

> *Ibid*., p. 169,36-38: **IV** Diversum est *tantum esse aliquid* et *esse aliquid in eo quod est*; illic enim accidens, hic substantia significatur.
> *To just be something* and *to be something in virtue of one's being* are two diverse things; in the former phrase indeed accidentality is in order, in the latter substantiality.

Some comments. (1) The fourth axiom, preluding as it were to Boethius' solution to the treatise's main question (about the difference between 'being good' and 'being substantially good'), further defines the position of the *aliquid* introduced in the previous axiom by clearly opposing 'to be something' (i.e. 'to be just *this* or *that*' or 'such and such') to 'being-something-in-virtue-of-its-proper-being'. While the first three axioms concern the opposition between *id quod est* and its chief constitutive element, the form being(ness) (*forma essendi*), the present axiom is about the diversity found within the *that which is*. It opposes the latter's being some particular owing to some form to its beingness owing to its proper *forma essendi*. Notice that this cluster opens with the same solemn anaphoric DIVERSUM as the previous one of Axioms I-III. The diversity issue is basic for the chief subject matter of *De hebdomadibus.*
(2) The phrase 'to just be something' ('tantum esse aliquid', in which Stewart & Rand erroneously reads 'tamen') refers to some particular form belonging to some particular, whose referent is opposed to the *forma essendi* of the particular as a whole. The phrase 'in eo quod est' is Boethius's rendering the Greek expression *hêi on* in order to avoid a barbarism like *in essendo*.[82] This phrase can as such both designate the element *esse*

81. For my opposing 'actuality' to 'factuality' or 'factualness' see our section 3.1.2 above.
82. Modern interpreters (such as Stewart & Rand, and Schrimpf, and also Macken in

present in the particular form under consideration and refer to the main *forma essendi* mentioned in the previous axioms. However, the wording of the final section of the present axiom (in which *accidens* is opposed to *substantia*) shows that the opposition is between a particular coincidental form (Giles of Rome's *forma partis*) and the particular's all-over *forma essendi* (*forma totius*). So the former phrase signifies a coincidental mode of being (e.g. *albedo*, *album esse*) inhering in some particular (say, stone), whereas the latter signifies the stone's subsistent mode of being.

(3) The *in eo quod est* formula associated with *substantia* runs nicely parallel with the *est atque consistit* of the first Axiom.

> *Ibid*, p. 169,39-42: **V** Omne quod[83] participat eo quod est '*esse'* ut *sit*, alio vero participat ut *aliquid sit*. Ac per hoc *id quod est* participat eo quod est '*esse'* ut sit, *est* vero ut participet alio quolibet.
> Everything that participates *beingness* in order to *be*, participates something else in order to be *something* [i.e. *this* or *that* thing]. That's why *that which is* participates *beingness* in order to *be*, whereas it *is* in order to participate whatever else.

Some comments. (1) This axiom contrasts two modes of participation falling to created entities, one causing its self-containedness or being subsistent, the other its being some determinate thing. Unlike Peiper, I prefer to read with the best manuscripts *T* (= Tegernsee 765, *C* (= Bernensis 618), *E* (= Einsidlensis 235) and *B* (= Bernensis 510): 'omne quod participat' rather than inserting *est* after *quod*: 'omne quod *est*, participat', which is found in the *codices deteriores*.[84] My reading makes this axiom both mutually discern the two modes of participation and state their complementary character by making it clear that the former is required for a thing to *be* (i.e. to have beingness), the latter *to be something*, (i.e. to have

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his meritorious edition of Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibeta*; see our section 6.1.5) failed to observe this. Ignoring the Latin grammar of periphrastic construction Schrimpf (1966) is even of the opinion that Boethius's use of three different expressions for *being* ('esse', 'ipsum esse', and 'id quod est esse') should betray the complexity of his notion of being. In fact, Boethius's usage betrays his skillful conceptual engeneering. See de Rijk (1988), 19ff. It is noticeable that, unlike these modern interpreters, the reduplicative formula 'in eo quod' is correctly understood by medieval commentators, such as e.g. Gilbertus Porretanus (pp. 197,55-198,90). — By the way, every student of medieval texts is familiar with the periphrastic construction frequently found in medieval Latin either to indicate the word's autonymous use (such as in '*hoc quod est* (or *hoc quod dico*) lapis', meaning *the word 'lapis'*), or (like in the present cases) to highlight the word's proper significate.

83. The *codices deteriores* wrongly inserting *est* are followed by the Medieval authors; see our comment below.

84. Noticeably in *B* the word *est* has been deleted by the same copyist; see the critical apparatus in Peiper *ad loc*.

a determinate mode of being). Obviously, the usual reading with *est* in the opening lines of the axiom — which is also found in medieval quotations, for that matter — seems to render its second part superfluous because then it only repeats what was said in the first part. In addition, it should be noted that in his *Quodlibet* XI, 3 Henry of Ghent paraphrases this axiom as a statement about participation, instead of a claim about 'things that are': "(…) secundum Boetium nichil participat alio quod non participat *esse*" ("nothing participates something else without participating *being*"). Strictly speaking, the statement 'Omne quod *est* participat' is not even true because not everything that *is* participates something else, let alone that it should do so in one of the two ways just disclosed; divine Being, in particular, does not participate at all. So from the doctrinal point of view, the correction in manuscript *B* is quite to the point.[85]

(2) The expression *participat eo quod est 'esse'* is Boethius's translation of the common Greek formula *methechei tou einai*, in order to avoid the barbarism *essendo*.[86] (Incidentally, it should be noticed that, unlike in medieval Latin, in Boethius the verb *participare* takes the ablative case, corresponding to the partitive genitive in Greek).[87] So to take (such as e.g. found in Stewart & Rand and with interpreters like Schrimpf) the merely periphrastic phrase *eo quod est* to mean 'through the fact that it exists' is, apart from being unidiomatic, also horrendous from a philo-

85. Of course, the phrase 'omne quod est' may well be charitably understood to stand for 'every *created* being'. Be this as it may, Porretanus's explanation (p. 199,7: "OMNE QUOD EST scilicet omne subsistens) is rather unfortunate in this respect. Giles of Rome's first Theorem is unequivocally clear on this account: "Omne esse vel est purum per se existens vel infinitum, vel est participatum in alio receptum et limitatum". Fiorella Magnano, 'Esse ed esistenza nell'opera di Severino Boezio' in *Dialegesthai, Revista telematica di Filosofia* 2011, axiom V(I) correctly omits *est*.
86. A similar circumlocution is found in Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, 2, 3 and VIII, 4.8. The remark in Stewart & Rand *ad loc*. that *id quod est esse* should be the rendering of Greek *to ti ên einai* is completely beside the point, not only from the grammatical point of view, but also because it seems to confound Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics.
87. Classical Latin (like Greek, for that matter) distinguishes between the use of *participare* with an accusative (meaning 'to have something as a share') from that with an ablative, or a genitive in Greek (meaning 'to have or take a share from something'). When the accusative is used, the object participated is taken qua whole, whereas expressed by the ablative (or genitive in Greek) it is taken qua part of a whole. This usage can be compared to that of some Greek verbs, such as those for eating, which take an accusative ('to eat up something') or a partitive genitive ('to eat of something', 'to take a bite of'). A nice example is found in Xenophon, *Anabasis* IV VIII, 20, where we are told that the soldiers went on to consume intoxicated honey. Those who only tasted a bit of (genitive) the combs, went quite off their heads, whilst those who ate a whole portion of it (accusative), are said to have dropped down at death's door.

sophical perspective. How on earth could a Platonist claim that something's existence is the cause (!) of its sharing beingness?

> *Ibid*., p. 169,43-44: **VI** Omne simplex *esse* suum et *id quod est* unum habet. Every simple being possesses its *beingness* and its *being what it is* as one and the same thing.

Some comments. (1) Axioms VI is concerned with God's simple *esse* (or that of the separate Substances) as compared to that possessed by a compound thing (which is the subject matter of the seventh axiom). In God and the separate Substances, beingness and metaphysical actuality coincide, because they form a necessary, indissoluble unity.
(2) The rendering of this axiom 'Every simple thing possesses as a unity its *existence* (italics mine) and its particular being' (Stewart & Rand) is unfortunate, to say the least, because not actual existence alone is in order. Hence my rendering '(…) possesses its *beingness* and its *being what it is* (or 'individuality') as one and the same thing'. Notice that the actuality involved here comprehensively stands for both actual (metaphysical) being and factual (physical) being.[88]
(3) This axiom preludes to what is later called the identity of God's Esse and Essentia. As has been rightly observed by Gilson (1955, 105), Boethius was not yet asking the general metaphysical question about the relationship between essence and existence, but rather about substance and the principle of its subsistence, to wit: "What causes a thing to be a substance?".

> *Ibid*., p. 169,45: **VII** Omni composito aliud est *esse*, aliud ipsum *est*. For every compound entity, its *being* is not the same as its *actual being*.

Some comments. This axiom concerns the later semantic distinction between material and formal significates.[89] That is to say, in the previous axioms 'that which is' denotes the thing that is, whereas in the seventh axiom the phrase connotes the property of being a 'that which is' and, consequently its individualness. Likewise, the phrase 'ipsum est' refers to a creature's 'being-itself', i.e. its actuality qua individual being.
To introduce the treatment of the treatise's proper question about the complex relationship between 'being coincidentally good' and 'being substantially good', the enumeration of the seven axioms about ontic differentiations and diversity is followed by a concluding remark about the paradoxical nature of the Good: the Substantial Good is essentially different from the particular good in things, but at the same time the

88. Compare Giles of Rome's lore of the twofold actuality; our section 3.1.2 above.
89. See for this feature of ancient and medieval semantics the treatment of the four semantic chief rules in our section 7.3.3 below.

infinite Good is attractive for things to strive after, which seems to mean that it has a certain natural likeness to the particular good.[90]

6.1.5 *Giles and Henry interpreting the Boethian authorities*

Some preliminary remarks should be made about the Latin text of the Boethian authorities as it was read by all medieval scholars, including Henry and Giles, as well as Harvey Nedellec. All the Medievals follow the text of the fifth axiom as extant in the *codices deteriores*, which all insert *est* before *participat* (see the previous section). However, their interpretation of what Boethius puts forward is not substantially affected by the corrupt reading, because no one failed to see the axiom's proper purport apropos of the twofold participation. On this score the modern editor of the texts has no reason whatsoever to correct the medieval text extant. Things are different, however, for modern translations or interpretations of the Axioms (like Stewart & Rand's and Schrimpf's). I have already censured some items, the rendering of the periphrastic use of the phrase 'eo quod est' in particular. Unfortunately enough, Macken's punctuation of Henry's text shows that the editor shares the incorrect interpretation of this vital phrase. Each time he wrongly punctuates the formulas under discussion: *Quodlibet* I, 9, pp. 48,27; 59,6-7; 61, 41-47; X, 7, pp. 150,31; 194,62: "participat, eo quod est, esse", which is bound to lead to misinterpretations such as found in Stewart & Rand and Schrimpf.

The Boethian authorities themselves are used quite creatively by Henry, Giles and other interpreters, who sometimes ignore parts of the text. As for the first axiom, Henry deduces (apparently from the phrase 'ipsum esse') that 'esse' stands for divine being, rather than creatural being, and interprets the phrase 'nondum est' as referring to the time prior to creation (see *Quodlibet* I, 9, p. 58,79ff. and X, 7, p. 185,49ff.). In Giles's report:

> *Disp. Quest,*, q. 9, Fol. 19ra: Illud quod enim [erit *ed.*] est, accepta essendi forma (idest accepta divina similitudine in effectu) est atque subsistit. Forma ergo essendi non est aliqua res accepta nec creature, sed est ipsa essentia creature ut est ineffabiliter et ut est similitudo Dei; hocest forma essendi hoc modo et non alio habet ut actualiter existat"; […] 'Omne quod est, participat esse ut sit, non quod ipsum esse adveniat ipsi essentie quasi res alia ab ea, sed ipsa essentia participat esse ut sit, idest ut participando esse existat; est enim sensus quod essentia creature participando esse divinum et existendo <ut> similitudo Primi et ut habet esse in effectu, habet quod actu existat et

90. *De hebdomadibus*, pp. 169,46-170,48: "Omnis diversitas discors, similitudo vero appetenda est. Et quod appetit aliud, tale ipsum esse naturaliter ostenditur quale est illud hoc ipsum quod appetit". Many interpreters, including Porretanus (p. 203ff.), take these sentences as the ninth axiom, as is also the case in Peiper's edition.

> quod actu sit. Ergo per 'esse' semper intelligit Boetius esse divinum, non autem esse creatum.

Henry's interpretation is (to my mind, correctly) rejected by Giles, who points to the phrase 'nondum est'. Hence he resolutely concludes that 'esse' must stand for creatural being:

> *Ibid.,* Fol. 19rb: Ista expositio stare non potest per id quod in littera sequitur. Sic enim iacet textus Boetii: 'Diversum est esse et id quod est; ipsum vero esse nondum est'. Ergo vult quod ipsum esse non proprie competat quod sit.

Regarding axiom VII Henry explains the difference found in compound (creatural) being between being and actual existence in terms of his 'distinctio intentionis'. Giles reports:

> *Ibid*.: In omni composito (idest in omni creatura) *id quod est* et *esse* est aliud non re, sed intentione.

Given Giles's abhorrence of this distinction, it need not come as a surprise that this interpretation is cast aside. So much for the core of the controversy about the authorities of *De hebdomadibus* discussed in Giles's *Disputed Questions*, q. 9 and Henry's *Quodlibet* I, 9. Henry will return to this subject matter in his *Quodlibet* XI, 3; see our section 6.3.4 below.

6.1.6 *The eleventh question of Giles's* Disputed Questions

The eleventh question deals with the special question whether God can create *esse* without an essence ('Utrum possit creari esse sine essentia'). The nucleus of this discussion is the new proof Giles puts forward for his real distinction 'inter rem et rem'. He presents (24vb) six 'inconvenientia' resulting from the rejection of this distinction. The absurdity consists in the impossibility of maintaining the following six true and commonly accepted stances:

(1) Omnis essentia cuiuslibet creature potest intelligi cum opposito ipsius *esse*;

(2) Quelibet essentia creata participat *esse*, et omne ens in creaturis est quid participatum;

(3) Essentia creature est quid per se in genere et determinata ad genus;

(4) In creaturis reperitur analogia entis;

(5) Omnis substantia creata participat aliquod accidens;

(6) Omnis creatura est aliquomodo mutabilis secundum substantiam.

Giles's definitive rejection of the proposal that God can create *esse* without an essence culminates in his refutation of the people — in fact Henry's second counter-argument (in his *Quodlibet* X, 7, p. 171,12 ff.) is

referred to — who refer to the famous fourth proposition of *De causis*: 'Prima rerum creatarum est esse et non est ante ipsum creatum aliud'. Giles disagrees with their interpretation of this proposition, arguing that in this case the term 'esse' should be taken to stand for the generic notion of 'esse' covering both essential being and being of actual existence:

> *Quaest. Disp.*, q. 11, Fol. 26rb: Non potest intelligi esse sine essentia. Et quod arguitur quia prima rerum creatarum est esse et ideo potest intelligi sine essentia, quia primum potest intelligi sine posteriori, dici debet quod ibi esse quod dicitur esse 'prima rerum creatarum', accipitur communiter (…), quia intellectus communis precedit intellectum specialem. Unde non accipitur ibi esse non prout esse distinguitur ab essentia, sed prout accipitur communiter ad esse essentie et existentie. Quod patet per probationem ibi adductam. Dicitur enim quod prima rerum creatarum est esse quia non est eo creatum aliquid prius.

6.2 Giles, Disputed Questions, qq. 12 and 13 (against Henry's Quodlibet X,7)

Henry's extensive attacks in his *Quodlibet* X, 7 on Giles's positions are the subject matter of the additional questions twelve and thirteen.[91] Q. 12 runs (Fol. 26va): 'Utrum creatura possit annichilari, si non differret in ea esse et essentia'. The core of Giles's denial is (27ra): 'Quidquid non est creabile, non est annichilabile'. He has to defend himself against Henry, who had claimed that by rejecting Giles's real distinction between being and existence one can easily explain creation, whereas if one adheres to it, creation cannot be accounted for. From both sides the tone of the discussion will be unpleasant. Giles *inter alia* makes a perceptive remark on the somewhat disorderly composition of Henry's *Quodlibet* X, 7:

> *Quaest. disp.,* q. 12, Fol. 27ra: Secundum quod magistri circa hanc materiam visi sunt velle: posito quod in rebus non esset compositio ex essentia et esse (…), res essent creabiles et annichilabiles. Immo secundum eos non bene possumus salvare creationem in rebus, ponendo talem compositionem in ipsis. (…). Quia ipsi positionem suam diffuse ponunt et intricate narrant: ut lucidius eorum intentionem narremus, non tenebimus ordinem quem ipsi tenent in questione sua.

6.2.1 Causality critically examined

The creation idea would be endangered if one had wrong opinions about causality in general. Obviously, a cause does not presuppose its own effect. God indeed creates a thing in its totality, without there being some-

91. They are extensively discussed in Hocédez (1927), 369-375.

thing pre-existent. A comparison with the matter-form state of affairs can help us understand this procedure. Supposing God were to make a stone from nothing, then there would truly be creation because he would simultaneously make the stone's form and the matter into which it was to be received. Likewise in producing a creature consisting of essence and existence, God simultaneously creates them both, rather than one from the other pre-existent:

> *Quaest. disp*., q. 12, Fol. 28rb-va: Nullum causa presupponit effectum suum. Ars enim non presupponit effectum artis sed effectum nature, et natura secundum quod huiusmodi non presupponit effectum nature sed effectum Dei. Eo ergo ipso quod <quia> Deus in producendo creaturam producit totam essentiam, scilicet et esse, in tali actione non agit, aliquo presupposito. Quod possumus declarare per simile in compositis ex materia et forma. Nam licet forma lapidis requirat materiam in qua recipiatur, et licet non possit fieri lapis nisi fieret forma in materia, tamen si Deus produceret simul formam et materiam lapidis et faceret lapidem ex nichilo, vere crearet lapidem (…), nichil erat ibi quod non esset effectus Agentis Primi, tamen productum erat compositum ex materia recipiente et forma recepta. Sic in proposito quelibet creatura est talis quod est composita ex essentia recipiente et esse recepto. Deus tamen producendo creaturam sic compositam, vere creat, quia non producit esse ex essentia preiacente, sed nichil presupponens simul producit totum compositum ex essentia et esse.

6.2.2 *The harmlessness of the act-potency scheme*

The act-potency scheme does not disturb things either, because potency does not imply temporal pre-existence to act. Nobody was ever stupid enough to think that in creation existence is brought forth from essence, by wrongly associating (or even confounding) creation with generation; in the latter indeed the act is educed from the matter's potency. In addition, the supposed potency's temporal pre-existence to matter is a wrong idea, and was never proferred by anyone before:

> *Ibid*., Fol. 28vb: Numquam ad nos pervenerunt dicta aliquorum qui essent tante dementie ut dicerent quod in creatione educatur esse de potentia essentie sicut in generatione educitur actus sive forma de potentia materie.

Concerning the well-known exordium of *De causis*, in which there is talk about a primary and a secondary cause, a temporal succession between these two might seem to be intimated.[92] However, the primary cause, *esse* is received in the essence, and not the other way round:

92. *De causis*, prop. 1a: 'Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda. (…). Quod est quia causa universalis prima agit in causatum cause secunde antequam agat in ipsum causa universalis secunda que sequitur ipsam'. All in all considered, Giles goes as far as to claim (28vb) that Pro-

> *Ibid*.: Dicendum est res creatas esse compositas ex essentia et esse et quod esse recipitur in essentia et non econverso et quod perficit et informat essentiam et non econverso.

That the author of *De causis* is of the same opinion is expatiated by Giles on Fol. 29ra-va. Next Henry's distinction between two kinds of potency of a thing is examined. An argument of Giles's was to the effect that the relationship between being and essence should be compared to the one between matter and extension, in which case too matter's potency to being extended cannot be actualized without something else supervening on it, just as an essence's potency to exist in the outside world can only be actualized if something else (viz. *esse*) is added. Henry had rejected this argument by distinguishing between two sorts of potentiality, 'potentialitas subiectiva et terminativa'.[93] Giles replies that in actual fact these two always go hand in hand, so this distinction lacks good sense:

> *Ibid*., Fol. 29rb-va: Sed dicimus quod non est potentiale [possibile *sic semper ed*.] terminative sine potentiali subiective et numquam Agens facit nisi compositum ex potentia et actu. Si enim posset fieri potentia sine actu vel econverso, possent in factione illa talia potentialia separari. Sed loquendo de cursu nature [nec *ed*.] factio unius non est sine factione alterius. Quod patet in materia et forma, que est perfectio materie, et magis patet in essentia et esse, quod est perfectio ipsius essentie. Nam facere materiam non est facere quod materia sit materia. Nam cum semper materia sit materia, non indiget materia factione, et universaliter facere potentiam est facere quod potentia sit sub actu. Sic et facere formam materialem (…) est facere quod forma illa sit in materia.

Later on, in his reply to Henry's *Quodlibet* XI, 3, Giles will return to this problem; see our section 6.3.

6.2.3 *Once again Henry's intentional distinction*

Somewhat discouraged Giles takes up, then, the intriguing discussion about Henry's intentional distinction. He did not understand this earlier,

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clus is in favour of the real distinction.

93. Henry, *Quodlibet* X 7, pp. 154,33-155,43: 'Ad tertium [sc. argumentum Aegidii] quod materia est in potentia ad extensionem, sed non sine alio adveniente etc., dicendum quod non est simile, quia materia non est in potentia ad extensionem nisi ut subiectum [= 'subject-substrate'], et ideo [sc. matter in this potency] non vadit ad actum extensionis nisi per aliud quo ut essentialiter extenso informatur. Essentia vero est in potentia ad esse, non ut subiectum vadens ad actum per alicuius informationem, sed solum ut terminus [= 'ultimate goal'] existens in actu per hoc quod terminat actum creationis et est effectus Creatoris, ut dictum est. Quod autem super essentia creature nichil absolutum reale informans ipsam apponit ipsum esse probavi sufficienter triplici medio in predicta questione'. For the 'subjective vs. objective (or terminative) potentiality' item see our sections 6.3, n. 101 and 8.6.2 below.

he admits, and he still does not. (By the way, this confession is quite to the point, as will be patently clear from what follows). In fact, Giles does not observe the difference between logical identity statements of the tautological type (such as 'Essence is essence') and informative statements like 'The (An) essence is in the outside world.[94] This was bound to lead to confusion. Giles departs from Henry's informative claim that to differ only intentionally is not the same as really differring, by which he marks off the intentional distinction from the real one, rather than from the only conceptual distinction, as is usually done ('non secundum rationem tantum, sed intentione'). Giles's argument is developed thus. If there were no real difference between 'An essence is an essence' and 'An essence is in the outside world' — meaning that it does not really matter whether or not an essence (essential form) has been actualized ---, then, once you have given your consent to 'An essence is an essence', you would have to concede that this essence (by diffinition) is actualized in the outside world. By definition indeed, because (still on Henry's supposition) there is, Giles concludes, no real difference between the two statements:

> *Ibid*., Fol. 29va: Quid sit autem differre intentione prius non intelleximus nec nunc intelligimus. Sed de hoc in hac eadem questione faciemus sermonem. Nunc sumamus verba sic opinantium dicentes quod differre sola intentione non est differre re. Quo supposito tamquam fundamentum ipsorum, arguamus sic. Si [sic *ed*.] nulla esset differentia inter 'essentiam esse essentiam' et 'essentiam esse in re extra' — sicut ipsi concedunt quod essentia semper manet essentia vel saltem (sicut oportet concedere) hanc semper esse veram quod essentia est essentia ---, sic oporteret hanc semper verificari quod essentia esset in re extra. Tota ergo causa quare semper verificatur quod essentia sit essentia et non quod sit in re extra, est propter differentiam que est inter hanc et illam. Sed ibi non est differentia secundum rem.

Next Giles proceeds to further examine Henry's 'intentional distinction'. He exemplifies his interpretation of Henry's intentional distinction by referring to the conceptual distinction between the well-known transcendent notions 'being' and 'one'. On the assumption that this distinction applies, one has to concede that what is being and what is one is really the same thing, so it is impossible to verify a thing's beingness without verifying its oneness. This is not to say, however, that whoever apprehends a thing's beingness, *eo ipso* apprehends its oneness, because these two acts of apprehending are really different. Giles seems to think that he has succeeded in showing (on his opponent's behalf, that is) that from

94. It is true, at the end of the day ('Redeamus ergo ad propositum et dicamus *etc*.') it begins to dawn on our author that God plays no role regarding the truth of an essence *really* being an essence.

there being a conceptual difference between A and B, it does not follow that they are really the same:

> *Ibid.,* Fol. 29va-vb: Et <si> secundum rei veritatem semper verificatur quod essentia sit in re extra, forte secundum intellectum vel secundum alium modum oportebit eam verificari. Nam quia sunt idem secundum rem ens et unum, impossibile est de aliquo verificari quod sit ens, quod de illo secundum rem non verificetur quod est unum. Verum<tamen>, quia hec differunt secundum intellectum, non oportet quod quisquis [quidquid *ed*.] apprehendit aliquid esse ens, quod apprendat illud esse unum, quia intellectus 'entis' precedit intellectum 'unius' secundum rem. Ergo quia non differunt realiter ens et unum, sicut semper ens est ens, ita semper est unum. Sed ens quod semper secundum rem est unum, non oportet quod per intellectum semper apprehendatur unum, quia differunt illa intellectui que secundum rem suam idem sunt.

Giles is of the opinion that all this does not justify Henry's specific 'intentional' distinction, because the foregoing discussion vaguely concerns 'some distinction made by way of conceiving things otherwise'. Turning now to Henry's 'distinctio secundum intentionem', Giles will apply it to the (Aristotelian) categories, *actio* ('doing') and *passio* ('being-affected'). No doubt, any doing (something) coincides with (something else's) being affected, so their belonging, all the same, to different categories could make them perfect candidates for illustrating the putative intentional distinction. Now let us also posit that, given that [1] 'actio' and 'passio' convey the same thing ('rem') but conceptually differ, and [2] that the intellection of action precedes that of passion, it cannot be verified that one should be the case while the other should not. Nevertheless because of a diverse animadversion one can be apprehended, as it so happens (*forte*), without the apprehension of the other:

> *Ibid*., 29vb: Ut ponamus exemplum de hiis que differunt intentione, dicamus quod actio et passio dicant eandem rem, differunt tamen intentione. Nam cum differentia secundum eos differat intentione a genere et tamen collocatur in eodem predicamento cum ipso, multo magis actio et passio differunt intentione, que faciunt diversa predicamenta. Ponamus ulterius quod cum actio et passio dicunt eandem rem, differunt intentione, intellectus tamen 'actionis' precedit intellectum 'passionis'. Hac ypothesi stante, non poterit verificari secundum rem quod sit unum et quod non sit aliud. Tamen propter diversitatem attentionis [intentionis *ed*.] potest forte per intellectum apprehendi unum <ita> quod non apprehendetur aliud.

Giles is now ready to secure the spoils: to maintain the intentional distinction comes to the absurd result that the dissimilarity between thought and fact is destroyed. If the only difference, he concludes, between an essence and its being actualized consists in the mere addition of an *inten-*

tio or conception or something else not really existent,[95] then an essential form's being is the same as its realization in the outside world:

> *Ibid*.: Sic in proposito [opposito *ed*.]. Si idem sit secundum rem 'essentiam esse essentiam' et 'essentiam esse in re extra', ita quod ipsi essentie nulla res additur ut sit [est ed.] in re extra, sed solum superadditur intentio vel ratio (vel quicquid aliud quod non sit res), oportebit quod sicut semper verificatur quod essentia sit essentia, semper secundum rem verificetur quod sit in re extra. Igitur propter differentiam potero forte intelligere essentiam esse essentiam, non intelligendo eam esse in re extra. Sed propter identitatem realem quamdiu verum erit [erat *ed*.] quod essentia sit essentia, tamdiu realiter erit [erat *ed*.] essentia in re extra. — Redeamus ergo ad propositum et dicamus quod essentia est essentia per seipsam et quantum ad hoc non indiget factore et conservatore.

Next Giles once again takes up the argument that because one and the same essence possessing *esse* can be conceived of as not possessing it or as being the case together with its opposite, essence must really differ from *esse*. He adduces an expository syllogism to make this clear. Supposing this particular thing (*hoc aliquid*; Greek *tode ti*) is a rational animal and this same thing is irrational (or can be thought to be irrational), then one and the same animal can be both rational and irrational; which is absurd. Therefore these two must be two really different things. The same goes for essence and *esse*:

> *Ibid.,*: Cum illa eadem essentia secundum rem que habet esse, possit intelligi non esse vel posset intelligi cum opposito ipsius esse: quia nichil potest intelligi cum opposito sui ipsius, oportet quod [sc. essentia] realiter differat ab esse. Possumus autem ad hanc veritatem ostendendam facere sillogismum expositorium. Ut si <*hoc*> *aliquid* sit animal rationale et illud idem sit irrationale vel possit intelligi esse irrationale [irrationalis *ed*.], idem animal erit vel poterit esse rationale et irrationale, quod est inconveniens. Bene igitur sequitur quod animal rationale realiter differat ab irrationali vel ab eo quod potest intelligi esse irrationale [ut rationale *ed*.]. (…). Essentia ergo realiter differt ab esse, quia potest intelligi cum opposito ipsius esse.

Finally, Giles attempts to show that to assume intentional difference ('differre intentione') along with conceptual difference ('differe ratione') is superfluous. In fact, he argues, it suffices to tell apart two grades within the notion of differring conceptually, viz. a more and a less. This is exemplified thus. Taking the phrase 'animal indisciplinabile' as the definiens of ass, this animal differs from 'not disciplinable animal' conceptually and from 'fly' really. But since 'ass' differs from 'mule' less than from 'not-disciplinable animal' and more from 'fly', therefore 'ass' still differs

95. Notice once again the vague formula Giles uses for the Ghentian intentional distinction.

from 'mule' only conceptually, and not in some way in between really and conceptually:

> *Ibid.,* Fol. 30va: Distinguunt enim triplex differre: re, ratione et intentione. Nam (ut aiunt) accidens a subiecto differt re, diffinitum a diffinitione differt ratione. Cum ergo differentia a genere differat plus quam diffinitum a diffinitione et minus quam subiectum ab accidente, ergo est dare medium inter differre re et ratione; istud autem differre medium vocetur differre intentione. (…). Sed in ipso differre ratione est dare magis et minus. Nam posito quod diffinitio asini sit animal indisciplinabile; hoc posito dicemus quod asinus differt ab animali disciplinabili et differt a musca et a mulo. Sed ab animali indisciplinabili differt asinus ratione, a musca autem differt re. Sed cum asinus minus [plus *ed*.] differat a mulo quam a sua diffinitione et plus [minus *ed*.] quam a musca, ergo asinus differt a mulo sola ratione [intentione *ed*.] et non [vel *ed*.] differt ab eo modo medio inter rem et rationem'.

I am afraid, our author never misses an opportunity to betray his inability to comprehend Henry's 'distinctio intentionis'.[96]

6.2.4 *The Ghentian 'respectus' doctrine once again criticized*

By analyzing the concept of 'respectus' Henry had attempted to counter Giles's objections against his view of actual existence as merely consisting in the creature's special relationship to its Creator. By doing so he thought he had saved the idea of creation as God's free act. Before answering his opponent, Giles gives an account of Henry's solution to the free creation problem:

> *Ibid.,* Fol. 31ra: Sed quidam conati sunt hoc infringere dicentes quod quidam sunt respectus qui fundant in extremis ex natura propia, quidam vero ex mera libertate agentis. Respectus autem ad deum (ut dicunt) fundantur in essentia creature, non ex natura ipsius essentie sed ex libera actione Primi, quia potest Deus suam actionem subtrahere a re sive ab essentia creature sive ab existentia creature. Ideo potest ei talis respectus deficere et potest creatura non esse.

However, Henry's move is not to the point, Giles avers, because he continues to see this *respectus* in terms of accidentality and extraneity, instead of an absolute entity. Giles tries to clarify his own point clear by a making a comparison. The 'respectus ad Deum' cannot be regarded as constitutive of something absolute such as an essence's actual outside existence really is, but it is nothing but a coincidental feature of absolute entities. Therefore even God cannot remove the *respectus* without taking away the absolute entities that possess this relationship, *in casu* Himself or the creature in question:

96. See also our sections 6.3.2, 7.3.3 and 8.6.8 below.

> *Ibid.,* Fol. 31ra-rb: Ponamus quidem quod Deus ex libera actione sua faceret parietem album et ex eadem libera actione faceret hominem album qui per albedinem assimilaretur parieti. Hoc autem ponendo, Deus ex libera actione fecit quod esset hec relatio et hic respectus qui est inter hominem et parietem. Sed quantumcumque ex libera actione Primi habeat esse ista relatio, numquam tamen Deus posset istam relationem tollere nisi vel destruendo parietem vel separando ab homine albedinem, que erat immediatum fundamentum illius relationis. Sed quamdiu paries albus manet immobilis et ab homine albo non separatur albedo, oportet talem similitudinem esse inter hominem et parietem. Sic in proposito. Creatura est producta ex libera actione Primi; ipsa autem sic producta habet quandam actualem similitudinem et quandam actualem imitationem ad ipsum Deum. Si ergo Deus vellet istam actualem similitudinem et istam relationem tollere ab essentia creature, vel oporteret quod Seipsum destrueret vel aliquam rem removeret ab essentia creature que est immediatum fundamentum huiusmodi relationis.

As if this were not absurd enough, Giles winds up by villainously suggesting that Henry's conception of 'respectus ad Deum' could be sustained if we cancelled the idea of creation as God's voluntary act. Henry must have been furious about this recommendation of Neoplatonic emanation:

> *Ibid*., Fol. 31rb: Sed si res procederet a Deo non ex libera actione nec ex mera voluntate sed ex quadam necessitate nature ita quod huiusmodi respectus ad Deum de necessitate consequeretur essentias rerum, forte possemus sustinere quod creaturam non oporteret esse compositam ex re et re, sed sufficiat ea<m> componi ex re et respectu. (…). Nam si procederet (sc. creatura) ex naturali origine et non ex libera actione nec ex libera voluntate, magis possemus salvare quod dicitur (sc. ab Henrico).

6.2.5 *Free creation jeopardized by the opponents to the real distinction*

In Q. 13 Giles once again deals with the important question whether people who reject the 'distinctio realis' between being and actual existence can save God's free creation instead of having to fall victim to Neoplatonic emanation (Fol. 32va: 'Utrum possemus salvare quod creatura procederet a Deo ex mera libertate arbitrii, vel cogeremur ponere quod procederet ex quadam necessitate nature, si non differret in ea realiter essentia et esse'). After the usual scholastic introduction of the opposite answers and their arguments (32va-33ra), Giles in his *Respondeo dicendum* (33raff.) firstly argues that even if there were necessity, God's creation would as such not be ruled out. However, given that the actual 'creatio in tempore' is a matter of fact, one can prove with four arguments that the idea of voluntary creation cannot be saved without assuming the

real distinction.[97] Summing up he claims that, whichever way you look at this problem, his own position will turn out to be the correct one; the perilous consequence of the opposite position will also emerge, because it bluntly leads to Neoplatonic emanation. If indeed (as is claimed by Henry) the created essence were to have its actual relationship to its producer just by itself because of its being an actual substrate (susceptive of *esse*), and not (as is claimed by Giles) owing to something supervening on it from outside (viz. *esse*), then this relationship would fall to any essence without exception; and unless you posit a defect in the producer, it will be actually produced. Thus the people who defend the position that the creature's composition of 'res' and its 'respectus' should suffice, and that there is no need for a composition of 'res' and 'res', are in fact positing emanation and that things do not proceed from God's free will:

> *Ibid.,* Q. 13, Fol. 35ra: Hiis autem prelibatis, quacumque via incedatur, habetur intentum. Nam si essentia creature seipsa subiective et per nichil superadditum habe<re>t actualem respectum ad suum productorem, semper communic<ar>et ei talis respectus et semper erit producta nisi ponatur defectus in producente, (…). Et ideo quantum est de se semper esset actualiter producta. (…) Ponentes [poneres *ed*.] itaque sufficienter quod res creata sit composita ex re et respectu et quod non oporteat eam esse compositam ex re et re, ponunt quod essentie rerum de se semper sint producte et quod res non procedant a Deo ex mera libertate arbitrii, sed magis ex quadam necessitate nature.

In order to escape this conclusion, let us say, Giles proposes, that any creature is composed of two really different things, viz. potency and act. Their relationship ('respectus') to God is not founded in the potency or in itself, but in the conjunction of these two, or (saying it otherwise) in either of them in as far as it is connected with the other (the *esse* with the essence, that is):

> *Ibid*.: Quod ut fugiamus dicamus omnem creaturam de necessitate esse compositam ex re et re quarum una se habet ut potentia, reliqua vero ut actus. Et respectus iste actualis ad suum productorem secundum quem res dicuntur esse producte, funda[n]tur nec in potentia nec secundum se, quia tunc potentia illa semper esset producta nec in actu secundum se, quia tunc actus ille semper esset productus. Sed fundatur in coniunctione utrorumque vel fundatur in quolibet horum ut coniungitur alteri.

Anyway, that these two are not just matter and form will be made clear, Giles promises, in *De mensura angelorum*; this much is certain, he

97. See for an analysis of question 13 and its position in the context of Qq, 12-13 Hocédez (1927), 375f. For the general theme of 'existence and essence' as intimately related to the problem of creation see Paulus (1938), 105-135 and Gilson (1955), 420-426.

claims, that they act as two things, not as 'res et respectus'. He rounds off his argument by shedding some more light upon the collaboration of nature and *suppositum* in creatural being. This cooperation should be seen in terms of the factors, essence and *esse*. Reminding us of the foregoing exposition, Giles once again makes clear that if you fail to recognize that the supervenience from outside of the factor *esse* is really distinct from its co-factor, essence, you will end up in the (pagan) philosophers' position: creatures proceed from the First Principle by the necessity of nature and are not the result of the Principle's free will:

> *Ibid*., Fol. 35ra-rb: Si consideratur natura et suppositum in creaturis, satis habetur via ad investigandum quod oporteat creaturas esse compositas ex essentia et esse. Si ergo creatura seipsa refertur subiective ita quod sit composita ex re et respectu vel (quod idem est) si seipsa referretur formaliter quod non per aliam rem sibi superadditam, sed seipsa formaliter referretur: non obstante quod haberet alio quo referretur, non posset esse defectus ex parte sui (…), ita quod non possit intelligi cum opposito eius (…). Quod redit in philosophorum opinionem qui ponunt quod non ex mera voluntate et libertate arbitrii, sed ex quadam necessitate nature <creature> procedant a Primo principio.

6.3 Henry's rejoinder to Disputed Questions, qq. 12-13

Henry's reply to what is put forward by Giles in *Disputed Questions*, qq. 12 and 13 is found in the third question of his *Quodlibet* XI. He proceeds by following his opponent's expositions step by step. I shall confine myself to some chief items of their polemics.[98] The discussion is introduced by an explicit reference to the six parts of Giles's interventions made in the Qq. 12 and 13.[99] Henry proposes to present a reply to all this, viz. the objections made to his positions, and to the three arguments newly adduced by Giles to prove that by casting aside the real distinction you cannot maintain that new creatures can be created by God or proceed

98. For the general design see Hocédez (1927), 376-380.
99. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* XI, 3, Fol. CCCCXLverso: "Sciendum quod aliqui sunt qui primo dicunt esse sex que non possunt salvari nisi in creaturis realiter differat esse ab essentia [= Giles, *Disp. Qq.,* q. 12, 24vff.]. Qui etiam secundo solvunt tres rationes quibus probatur non posse salvari creationem ponendo essentiam et esse realiter differre [= *ibid*., 28rff.]. Tertio improbant tres distinctiones quibus alii respondent difficultatibus sibi obviantibus [= *ibid*., 29rff.]. Et quarto respondent tribus rationibus quas alii inducunt ad probandum quod esse et essentia significant eandem rem; et similiter improbant confirmationes illarum trium rationum inductas contra solutiones datas ad illas [= *ibid*., 30vb]. Quinto ostendunt eosdem male exponere quandam auctoritatem Boetii [= *ibid*., 31ra]. Sexto ipsi adducunt tres rationes quibus ostendunt quod non posset creatura in nichilum redigi nisi differrent in ea realiter essentia et esse" [= *ibid.,* 31rbff.].

from him as a result of free will.[100] In fact, it is the real difference between being and actual existence that forms background of the entire discussion. In this framework, the proper nature of creation from nothing, causation, and participation are discussed, including the position of potential being,[101] the intentional distinction, Henry's 'respectus' doctrine, and creation as God's free act.

6.3.1 *Henry's rejection of existence as a different 'res' supervening on essence*

Henry's logical skill is enough to enervate the peculiar argument Giles advanced against his claim that there is no real difference between being and existence. Giles maintained that whoever rejects that existential being is added to essence as something different from outside, will be committed to the absurd consequence that there is no real difference between saying 'The (An) essence is an essence' and 'The (An) essence actually exists in the outside world'. Henry rightly points out that from his premiss that there is no real difference between the two items, being and existence, it does not follow at all that 'The (An) essence is an essence' is really the same as 'The (An) essence exists in the outside world', because truth-in-reality is not founded upon a thing's being such or such, but basically concerns our *assertions* about a state of affairs.[102]

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100. *Ibid.*: "Quibus intendimus respondere et similiter aliis inductis ab illis. Et etiam tribus aliis rationibus quibus nituntur ostendere quod tollentes talem differentiam non possunt salvare quod creature de novo possint creari a Deo sive procedere ab ipso ex arbitrio libertate" [= *Giles, Disp. Qq.,* q. 13, 33rff.].
101. For the distinction between 'potentiale subiectivum' and 'potentiale obiectivum vel terminativum' see Henry, *Quodlibet* X, 7, p. 152, 76-81: "Dicendum quod 'aliquid ex se est potentiale esse' <dicitur> dupliciter. Uno modo ut solum per se subiectum transmutationis a non-esse in esse, et non ut per se terminus; alio modo ut terminus eius. Primo modo in naturalibus sola materia est potentiale esse. Secundo vero modo sola forma educta de potentia materiae vel ipsum compositum ex materia et forma est potentiale esse". Giles had cast aside this distinction by claiming that 'potentiale terminative' always goes with 'potentiale subiective', so their being different does not affect the role of potency in creation. Henry replies that their difference should be understood in terms of the intentional distinction. It is true, act need not always be really different from potency as if act were something absolute, but it has to be intentionally different in its capacity of relational being. And this precisely holds good of the act that is the one of actual existence.
102. Henry presumably has Aristotle's well-known definition of truth in mind (without referring to it): "For it is because the state of affairs (*to pragma*) is the case or is not that a statement is said to be true or false". (*Categ*., 5 4b8-10; 12, 14b21-22; in the Medieval version: "Ab eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa dicitur"). The usual misinterpretations (shared also by Giles) of the definition go back to the common mistaking 'res' ('pragma') for 'thing of the outside world' instead of 'asserted state of affairs concerning it'. See de Rijk (2002) I, 104-115; 248-250; cfr. 257-260; 461-464.

As for ‘ens’ and ‘unum’, although they signify one and the same outside thing, they do so under (intentionally) different ontic aspects. Now, likewise ‘essence’ and ‘existence’ signify quite the same thing, but what is said of one need not therefore be true of the other. Briefly, what matters is the way of bringing up things: essence taken as self-identical intentionally differs from essence in the outside world, and this difference is sufficient to block off the aforesaid wrong inference. So there is no need for agreeing with Giles’s real distinction:

> *Quodlibet* XI, 3, p. CCCCXIIIv-CCCCXLIIII*recto*: Quod addunt illi arguendo: “Tota causa quare semper verificatur hec ‘Essentia est essentia’, non autem hec ‘Essentia est existentia’, est propter realem differentiam inter essentiam et existentiam; quare cum inter illa sit nulla differentia secundum rem: sicut semper secundum illos verificatur ista ‘Essentia est essentia’, sic et illa ‘Essentia est existentia’, — dico ego quod non sequitur ‘Si aliqua sunt eadem secundum rem, ergo de quo unum eorum verificatur secundum rem, verificatur et reliquum’, quoniam veritas secundum rem non dicitur a sola re, sed ab ipsa secundum quod exprimitur per sermonem. Unde licet idem secundum rem significant ‘ens’ et ‘unum’: quia tamen sub alio modo illa [illud *ed*.] significatur nomine ‘entis’ quam significatur nomine ‘unius’, propter hoc quiddam semper verificatur de uno quod tamen numquam verificatur de altero, quia licet hec semper sit vera “‘Unum’ significat indivisionem”, hec tamen semper est falsa: “’Ens’ significat indivisionem”. Consimiliter econtrario ex parte subiecti: licet idem significant secundum rem ‘essentia’ et ‘existentia’ quia scilicet essentia nullam rem absolutam addit super essentiam, non tamen idcirco de quo semper verificatur unum eorum, de eodem semper verificatur alterum. Et [ut *ed*.] ideo non sequitur [sequatur *ed*.] quod si essentia semper sit essentia, quod essentia semper sit existentia, licet existentia nullam rem aliam addat supra essentiam.

6.3.2 *Henry’s defence of the intentional or focal distinction*

With regard to Giles’s opinion that the ‘distinctio secundum intentionem’ is superfluous and not to the point and that it suffices to distinguish within the conceptual distinction between a ‘more or less’ grade (see our section 6.2.3 above), Henry claims that to reduce the difference to a gradual one would ignore the specific difference involved in his marking off ‘intentional’ from ‘conceptual’. There is a stronger difference, he ascertains, between genus and *differentia* than between *definiens* and *definitum*. In fact Giles is mistaken about the conceptual distinction, because he fails to observe that it represents another difference that exists in the nature of things. In other words, it is natural things that differ more or less, and some things only differ more or less, but others differ in this manner and, in addition, to a higher extent:

> *Quodlibet* XI, 3, Fol. CCCCXLIIII*verso*: Sed dico ego quod verum esset illud, si illa differentia inter differre intentione et ratione esset solummodo secundum magis et minus. Sed intelligimus quod etiam implicat modum diversum differendi secundum speciem. Quemadmodum, etsi differre re differt a differre ratione secundum maius et minus, non tamen solummodo differunt sic sed etiam differunt secundum speciem differendi quemadmodum genus et differentia differunt in specie, propter quod faciunt compositionem quam nullomodo facerent si sola ratione differrent (ut patet de divinis attributis in Deo). Sed arguunt contra hoc dicentes quod alius et alius modus differendi est ubi unitas rei solam differentiam rationis facit quia postquam res quelibet secundum se est una, sola ratio hos modos diversitatis invenit. Sed dico ego quod non dicitur modus differendi 'rationis' quia inventus est a ratione que est potentia anime. Sed dicitur 'rationis' quia cum hoc quod perceptus est — non dico: 'inventus est'— a ratione, ex se existit in natura rei. Ita videlicet quod ex natura rei est quod in eadem re aliqua solummodo differunt secundum magis et minus tantum, aliqua vero differunt secundum magis et minus et adhuc amplius, (…). Illa vero que differunt secundo modo ratione ampliori, bene possunt differre inter se alio modo differendi specifico ab eis que in eadem re non differunt penes tale amplius.

What he is trying to say is exemplified thus. Although genus and *differentia* are present in one and the same entity as its *definiens* and *definitum* are, unlike the latter pair they are not convertible and interchangeable. Hence their way of differring is specifically dissimilar to the difference between *definiens* and *definitum*, which are convertible and interchangeable (and logically equivalent).

> *Ibid*.: Verbi gratia, cum genus et differentia sint in eadem re sicut diffinitio et diffinitum sunt in eadem re (…), unum illorum nullomodo potest predicari de altero. Diffinitio vero semper predicatur de diffinito, et econverso. Necessario igitur genus et differentia cum hoc quod plus differunt inter se quam diffinitio et diffinitum (eo videlicet quod neutrum eorum predicatur de altero sicut mutuo predicatur diffinitio de diffinito, et econverso), differunt alio modo differendi secundum speciem quam illa.

Before further entering into the development of the ongoing discussion, it is of utmost importance to be aware of the cognitional and epistemological perspective from which this discussion takes place. Whenever there is talk about any difference between things, what is actually in order is the way in which one and the same object *can be perceived* according to its different modes of being. Take, for example, the difference between one and the same thing in accordance with its being either generically or specifically conceived of, say, Socrates either qua the genus *animal* or qua the species *man* or qua the differentia *rationale*. The differences between these diverse conceptualizations are unmistakable, but none the less 'this man', this animal', and 'this rational animal' denote one and

the same object, Socrates. In other words, there is real sameness and, at the same time, there are conceptual differences between 'being a man' and 'being an animal' etc. The different categorizations (*man*, *animal, rational, rational animal*, and so on) are altogether a matter of focal attention during the cognitive process, which for the sake of argument produces such different conceptualizations.[103] The decisive question of the entire ontological debate is to establish to what amount the conceptual differentiations and distinctions are founded upon diverse ontic articulations present in the objects themselves. Their foundation in the outside reality ('fundamentum in re') is at stake, rather than their befitting in the context of cognition and argumentation.

Henry now considers the opponent's objection that when things are really different, in whatever way they *are said* to differ, it still holds that the same genus cannot be conceived to go with opposite *differentiae*. He replies that in as far as a genus is thus conceivable, you can say that although it does not signify things that are numerically or specifically the same, it still conveys the same generic community which really goes together with either *differentia*, so the same common 'universal' notion (I mean to say by 'universal', Henry adds, 'in accordance with the connotation of the generic community') is found in either species.[104] If not, there would not be any generic identity. Now, it is because of this identity that the generic form differs from either difference, not really or just conceptually, but intentionally. The same applies to the difference between *esse* and existence/non-existence; this too is only an intentional one. All the same, this real unity (meaning, a numerical one) between an essence and *esse* or *non esse* is even stronger than the unity between a generic notion and the opposite differences:

> *Ibid*., Fol. CCCCXLV*recto*: Et dico ego genus ut est intelligibile sub oppositis differentiis: licet non significet eandem rem numero aut specie, significat tamen eandem communitatem generis que in idem re coincidit cum utraque differentia. Et idem re communi (scilicet secundum rationem communitatis generis) est in utraque specie; aliter enim nulla esset identitas illa que dicitur generis. Et per illam identitatem forma generis ab utraque differentia non re nec ratione, sed sola intentione differt. Quod sufficit ad declarationem propositi et solutionem argumenti. Licet maior unitas realis est essentie respectu esse et non esse (quia numeralis) quam generis ad oppositas differentias.

In this way Henry is able to reject the Aegidian real distinction between being and existence. When later on he discusses how it is pos-

103. For the Aristotelian background see de Rijk (2002) I, 170-179; 419ff.; 449ff.; II, 384ff.; 403-416; 572-593. For the medieval context, de Rijk (1994), 205-208.

104. For example, the same generic notion of animality is found in the species *man* and *ass*, no matter if it goes with one of the opposite *differentiae*, *rational* or *irrational*.

sible that a thing's relationship to its Creator can disappear, Henry once again catches his opponent making a logical error, which anew betrays Giles's incompetence to what is meant by differring intentionally as opposed to real difference. Giles has claimed that as far as some things do not differ, they cannot be separated. Henry agrees, but (rightly) rejects Giles's conclusion that for this very reason what does not really differ cannot be really separated. Giles is right, Henry agrees, as long as what is meant by 'being really separated' pertains to the separation of one thing from another. Now such a real separation is not in order when you are insinuating that the factor *esse* that is added to an essence really differs from it. In the next lines he opposes two alternatives to this 'differre secundum rem', viz. (a) 'differre intellectualiter' [= 'secundum rationem' or conceptually], such as when you are talking about separating blackness from a raven, and (b) 'differre intentionaliter', when there is only talk about the above-mentioned intentional separation, in which case the separation of the act providing existence from an essence only requires their being intentionally different. Put in this way, *esse* is really separated from essence by its 'corruption', even though it only differs from essence intentionally:

> *Ibid*., Fol. CCCCXLVII*verso*: Quod assumitur in fine [sc. argumenti]: 'Sicut aliqua non differunt, sic non possunt separari' verum est. Quod autem concluditur ex hoc: 'Si ergo non differunt realiter, realiter non possunt separari', dicendum est quod verum est, intelligendo per 'realiter separari' separationem rei a re. Sic enim nichil potest separari ab eo a quo non differt secundum rem, sicut nec a se. Et sic ponendo quod *esse* non apponat rem aliam super essentiam, non separatur ab essentia realiter, sed tantum intentionaliter, sicut intentionaliter differt ab illa. Intelligendo vero per 'realiter separari' separationem secundam naturam rei (quod distinguitur contra intellectualiter separari, sicut nigredo separatur a corvo), sic *esse* separatur ab essentia realiter per ipsius corruptionem, licet ab illa differat intentione sola. Et sic quidquid accipitur in argumento, sophisma est.

6.3.3 *Henry's 'solus respectus' doctrine*

Giles rejects Henry's view that an essence's actualization should be understood in terms of its acquiring a relationship ('respectus') to the Creator, nothing else, period. When Giles argues that such a relationship cannot be acquired on itself because, in addition to relatedness, some real factor is required fora thing to actually exist, Henry agrees, but he insists that you should express the 'solus respectus' formula more precisely. It is the essence itself in its capacity of end-term of the act of creation that is acquired under the aspect of constituting a relationship to God; in this

way the relationship is acquired as present in the essence. Now this relationship is occasionally separable from the essence. The relation-ship is acquired by the fact that its foundation is acquired simply. And in this foundation there must not be a composition of diverse things. It is indeed not from the conjunction that such a relationship proceeds. The *esse*, then, that is communicated to the compound, is the compound's *esse*, rather than that of the components (such as matter and form). Thus to found the relationship no composition of *esse* and existence is required; the simultaneous production of both elements will do, either by itself or in the compound. And the same applies to the conservation of the compound and its relationship to God:

> *Quodlibet* XI, 3, Fol. CCCCXLVIII*verso*-CCCCXLIX*recto*: Et quod arguitur contra hoc quod solus respectus non potest acquiri, dicendum quod verum est. Sed hic non solus respectus acquiritur, immo ipsa essentia ut est terminus creationis acquiritur sub ipso respectu, et per hoc ille respectus *in* illa. Et quia actio divina circa ipsam essentiam creature (…) est separabilis ab ipsa, ideo et respectus ille secundum actum est separabilis. (…). Et sic acquiritur respectus per hoc quod acquiritur suum fundamentum simpliciter. In quo nullam oportet esse compositionem ex rebus diversis. (…). Non enim ex coniunctione habetur talis respectus, nisi quia fit in ipsis coniunctis. (…). Quod tamen esse ut est communicatum composito est esse suppositi, quod secundum hanc rationem neutri partium convenit. Et sic ad huiusmodi respectum fundandum in re absoluta nulla requiritur rerum compositio, sed sufficit rei cuiusque productio, sive secundum se sive in composito. Et similiter conservatio eius talis sufficit ad conservandum esse in ea et talem respectum.

6.3.4 *The analogy of being and participation*

Giles claims that without a real difference between being and *essentia* (and consequently between essence and existence), the (common) doctrine of the 'analogia entis' is unsustainable; his chief argument is that by the same token participation would be finished. One has to realize, Giles avers, that the first analogy is between the primary dividing notions, viz. 'participatum' and 'imparticipatum'. Now if *esse* and essence did not really differ, in the domain of entities there would be no thing participated. Henry objects that this argument misses the point, for the *esse* involved in this argument does not so much stand for actual existence as it does for 'esse essentie', because in creatures, whatever *is* (no matter if it concerns *esse* or essence), is by participation with respect to the Creator's *esse* and essence. Creatural essence indeed is participated essence with regard to God's essence. Therefore, even if there were no existential being at all, still essential being, as well as the essence itself of the concrete individual taken as such, is something participated. So even despite

the coincidence of actual existence with *esse* in things, these two still remain something participated.

> *Quodlibet* XI, 3, Fol. CCCCXLI*recto*: Quartum (ut dicunt) est quod in entibus est analogia. Que amoveretur nisi re differrent essentia et esse quia: Prima analogia est inter prima dividentia *esse*, que sunt 'participatum' et 'imparticipatum'; sed si non differrent realiter essentia et esse, in rebus non esset participatum (ut dictum est); quare nec analogia. Et est dicendum quod cum dividitur esse in participatum et non participatum, ibi sumitur 'esse' non tam pro esse existentie quam pro esse essentie. Quidquid enim est in creaturis, participatum est, sive fuerit esse, sive essentia, respectu esse et essentie Creatoris. (…). Essentia enim creature est participata essentia repectu essentie Dei. Et sic, licet nullum esset esse existentie omnino, esse tamen essentie et essentia ipsa creature *id quod est* inquantum huiusmodi, participatum quid est. Quare etiam licet esse existentie creature non est in re aliud ab eius essentia, essent tamen ambo (scilicet essentia et esse existentie creature) quedam participata.

When he speaks about the *id quod est* character of the concreta, once again the second Boethian axiom concerning participation from *De hebdomadibus*[105] comes in. Henry summarizes it in these words: "Nothing participates in something else without participating in being". He rejects Giles's conclusion from this authority that for this reason there must be a real difference between *esse* and essence. What does follow instead is that participation of these two is saved only if by creation a relationship is added to a thing's essence, which supervenes on this essence as some intentional (rather than real) accident. In this way, Henry argues, Boethius should be interpreted:

> *Ibid.,* Fol. CCCCXLI*recto-verso*: (..) secundum Boetium nichil participat alio quod non participat esse. Quod bene verum est, sed falsum est quod illi assumunt: 'Si non differunt re essentia et esse, essentia non participat esse. Unde ex eo quod dicimus quod esse existentie nichil reale addit super essentiam, non sequitur quod essentia creature sit ipsum esse suum (quod soli Deo competit), sed tunc illud sequeretur, si nec respectum alterius intentionis adderet essentie. Quem quia addit ut aliquid accidentale illi et ut accidens non reale sed intentionale, sequitur quod essentia non sit suum esse, sed quod accidente quodam intentionali participat ipsum esse, quod est primo participatum ut receptum in alio et supponitur in qualibet alia participatione accidentis realis et realiter differentis a subiecto suo. Et sic secundum Boetium *esse* participat creatura ut *sit*, *est* vero ut participet alio quolibet ut [et ed.] *aliquid* sit.

105. "Fit enim participatio, cum aliquid iam *est*; *est* autem *aliquid*, cum *esse* susceperit".

6.3.5 *Creation as God's voluntary act*

Not only Giles's open-mindedness to Proclean thought, but also the common metaphor of being qua 'flowing from' the First Principle forced both Henry and Giles to maintain their distance from any connotation of Neoplatonic emanation, and to attempt to raise doubts about the opponent's orthodoxy in this respect. First Henry censures Giles's extraordinary opinion that the necessary production of creatural being need not rule out Christian creation:

> *Ibid*., Fol. CCCCXLVIII*recto*: Si enim creatura sic de necessitate fuisset ab eterno quod esset necesse esse, nullomodo esset a Deo creata et conservata et dependens et deficiens ex ipso, quia quod est necesse esse, in se formaliter est ipsum esse. Tale autem etsi habet esse ab alio (ut patet in divinis Personis), non tamen per creationem, quia nichil creatur quod ex se est non ens. Nec conservatur (…).

Next he undermines Giles's assertion that whoever rejects the real distinction between *esse* and essence is forced to reject free creation as well. Henry argues that their disagreement about the real distinction has as such nothing to do with free creation. What counts instead is whether or not the factor *esse* involved in the essence's actualization by God needs to be something really different from essence. Henry maintains his original stand that an intentional difference is enough to rule out the idea that (like in divine Being) the creature's essence includes its actual being. In the final analysis, Henry's position is no more of a threat to voluntary creation than Giles's:

> *Ibid*., Fol. CCCCXLVIII*recto-verso*: Quod vero addunt secundo quod ponendo in creatura non differre secundum rem essentiam et esse, oportet ponere eam procedere a Deo nature necessitate, non libertate arbitrii aut nullo modo indigeret factore, dico quod falsum est. Factore enim creatura indiget, quia non habet ex sua essentia quod sit. Nec est differentia quoad essentiam et esse, sive ponatur procedere a Deo nature necessitate (ut ponunt philosophi), sive libera voluntate, quia indifferentia secundum rem inter essentiam et esse, non magis repugnat uni illorum modorum producendi quam alteri, neque similiter differentia eorum secundum rem.

6.4 Some other participants of the ontological debate

Just as Harvey Nedellec in his own way became involved in the debate between Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome, some other scholars also took sides in the controversy about the real distinction between essence and actual existence. Hocédez points (1927, 381-383) to two of them,

Godfrey of Fontaines and Richard of Middleton.[106] Godfrey — who like Henry of Ghent was a secular and lectured in Paris as regent master from 1285 until 1303 (with an apparent interruption some time after 1297) — chooses his own approach to the matter by rephrasing the controversial question thus: 'Is the essence of created being indifferent to both being and non-being?' His answer is in the negative, because the relationship between essence and existence can be understood in two ways, according to none of which essence is indifferent to existence. If they are different, then essence cannot include actual existence, and is not indifferent to both being and non-being. If, on the other hand, they are the same, with only a conceptual or an intentional difference ('ratione vel intentione'), then essence is still not indifferent to both being and non-being, because in that case they share one another's fortune. Briefly, there is no being of essence without there being an instance of actual existence.[107] He consequently rejects the real distinction between essence and existence, 'existence' only conveying the notion of 'essence involved in actual being'. As Gilson rightly states (125), Godfrey has understood remarkably well that the notion of free creation as such does not necessarily imply a real difference between essence and existence.[108]

The Franciscan Richard of Middleton substantially agrees with Henry of Ghent; he too rejects Giles of Rome's real distinction between essence and existence. The differnence between between these notions is conceptual only. What existence adds to essence can be nothing but a relationship to its efficient Cause, who provides it with actual being. In his *Quodlibet* I (Easter, 1285) Richard explicitly adopts Henry's position without alluding to Giles's expositions brought forward in the latter's *Disputed questions*.[109]

The Dominican Thomas of Sutton, who was a notable defender of Thomas Aquinas against Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus, seems to take sides with Giles of Rome rather than with Aquinas. He claims that essence and existence really differ. Sutton defends this view against the opinion (advanced by Henry and Godfrey of Fontaines) that an essence's actual

106. Hocédez (1927), 381-383, We owe to Gilson a broader picture (1955, 420-427) including the different positions held by Giles of Rome, Thomas of Sutton, Godfrey of Fontaines, and some others. We owe to John F. Wippel (1982) a fine study of different positions on the essence/existence question advanced by some figures who were prominent at the University of Paris in the final decades of the thirteenth century: Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and James of Viterbo.
107. Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* II 2, pp. 53-68; II 3, pp. 68-80; III 1, pp. 156-177.
108. *Ibid.,* III 2, pp. 175-178. Compare Henry of Ghent's remarks with regard to the free creation issue.
109. The pertinent texts are found in Hocédez (1925), *Appendice* II, pp. 397-407.

existence is nothing but the essence conceived of[110] in its relationship ('respectus') to its efficient Cause. Like Giles he comes up with the objection that in Henry's position there is an insufficient basis for this relationship to be founded upon.[111] On the other hand, Sutton rejects Giles's thesis that in creatures the real composition of the components, essence and *esse* (which of necessity should imply their real difference) is required in order to save the idea of creation, because, Sutton argues, essence without *esse* is not even possible, and is in fact nothing at all. The true reason for adhering to the real distinction thesis is that essence cannot possibly be created from nothing unless it is really different from existence.[112] For Sutton, existence is a positive and absolute reality ('aliquid reale'; 'reale positivum et absolutum'), so it cannot be reduced (with Henry of Ghent) to just a relationship to God.[113] Anyway, there is no need, Sutton asseverates, for Henry's intentional distinction as an intermediary between real and conceptual difference.[114]

7. *Assessing the 'being vs. existence' debate around 1300*

The general background of the 'being vs. existence' debate has been pertinently described by Gilson (1955, 421ff.) and Paulus (1938, 260-273). The aim of the present section is to investigate to what extent (given the common scholastic procedures concerning the academic controversies of the time) the diverse arguments and counter-arguments advanced by the disputants are to the point. In particular an apparent ideosyncracy will be examined, which seems to be proper to medieval altercations in general: quite often the combatants seem to care more about the game than about what is seriously at stake.[115] Second, the doctrinal state of affairs coming to the fore in these debates will be evaluated from the viewpoint of philosophic development. First we shall pay attention to the discussion of two chief tenets at issue, viz. the real distinction and the respectus doctrine, together with the frame of mind of the interlocutors. Next we shall discusss the historical question as to how the ontological

110. Once again it becomes clear that the nucleus of the entire argument is found in the cognizer's focussing upon the creature's relationship to the Creator. See our sections 6.3.2, 7.3.2 and 7.3.3.
111. See Sutton, *Quaestiones de reali distinctione*, pp. 45 and 50 ed. Pelster.
112. *Ibid*., pp. 55-57.
113. *Ibid*., pp. 22-23; 50-51.
114. *Ibid*., pp. 24-25.
115. De Rijk (2011), p. XXX.

positions held about 1300 should be evaluated in view of their basic presuppositions.

7.1 Giles of Rome unreasonably accused of wrong or inconsistent ideas

At times the discussions between Giles and Henry give the impression that the parties involved are not very willing to correctly interpret their opponent's intentions and arguments. Giles's adversaries are clearly among them. They commonly accused him of assuming (with Plato) a plurality of separate Forms. They were wrong in doing so (as modern interpreters are, by the way). For one thing, none of them read Giles carefully. Giles incontestably makes us know that, unlike Plato, he definitely rejects a plurality of separate Forms. However, he also argues that one should be open-minded towards Plato and should look upon him as a source of inspiration. Giles thinks it is useful to assume, in the wake of Plato, the fundamental and overwhelming truth that there is one separate Entity that is the cause of all others, which is Divine Being:

> *Super De causis*, prop. 18a, Fol. 60r: Sed licet non sit vera positio Platonis, iuvat tamen nos ad intelligendum quandam maximam veritatem quia, licet non sit dare multa talia separata, est tamen dare Unum aliquod Separatum quod est causa omnium aliorum. (…). Hoc autem est esse divinum.

Hocédez (1930, 72) rather indignantly remarks that with Giles "divine being almost plays the role of Plato's *esse separatum*" and considers Giles's evaluation of Platonism an abortive attempt to salvage it, because (in his words) "Giles *believes* (italics mine) that he is exorcising Platonism from its error". A fair, unprejudiced interpreter[116] should have added some evidence for his own *belief* about what Giles thinks he is doing.

7.2 Giles's putatively perilous ideas

To maintain his doctrinal positions against Henry of Ghent and his minor adversaries Giles had to proffer some uncontroversial ideas about the ins and outs of creation, including plausible teachings on account of causation and participation. A tireless participant of the debates and fully

116. Hocédez frequently seems to testify to his pious conviction that Neothomism enjoys to be in the possession of absolute truth. One quotation of this arrogant partiality suffices (1930, *Introd*., p. 71): "Gilles ne veut pas des formes séparées de Platon, c'est entendu; mais, quoi qu'il dise, il est toujours dangereux d'expliquer une vérité quelconque par un système philosophique faux: non seulement on s'expose à égarer le lecteur, mais aussi à dénaturer la vérité que l'on propose. Gilles eut le tort, croyons-nous, de penser qu'il pouvait emprunter sur ce point l'exposition de Platon; il fut victime lui-même de sa confiance".

convinced of his being basically in the right, he must have been quite annoyed with the bouts of disapproval that were continuously showered upon him by his opponents. This much is certain, I think, the vast majority of their arguments against Giles do not testify to an open mind on their parts. Whenever they were unable to disregard Giles's firm assertions and proofs that he did not have the wrong opinions about participation and the like, they found him guilty of, they even accused him of inconsistency, in that he was not explicitly secretive about these wrong opinions.

7.2.1 *The notion of 'creatio ex nichilo' jeopardized?*

Another frequently repeated objection to Giles's concept of creation is that it would jeopardize the notion of 'creatio ex nichilo'. This objection is based upon Giles's interpretation of the well-known common adage 'Quidquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis' (Whatever is received, is received in accordance with the receiver's capacity'). Several passages from his *Super De causis* deal with Giles's opinion about the process of creation. The general idea is that while the generous Creator ('Deus ita largus et ita liberalis') is ready to communicate all and every mode of being to creatures, this intention is blocked, so to speak, by the limited capacities of the creatures, which are almost nothing against the infinite ocean of Being:

> *Super De causis*, prop. 4a, Fol. 17v: Est etiam advertendum quod huiusmodi esse creatum influxum a Primo, quantum est de se, totum se offert cuilibet enti. Nulla tamen res creata recipit totum esse creatum, sed quodlibet recipit de illo esse secundum modum capacitatis nature sue. (…). Deus (…) paratus est communicare cuilibet totum esse et omnem modum essendi. Sed nichil potest totum esse creatum recipere, quia nichil creatum unum et idem potest in se comprehendere omnem modum essendi quem videmus in creaturis. Propter quod producta a Primo diversificantur in tali esse.

The 'infinitum pelagus perfectionis' against the 'modicum vas' are favourite metaphors (propp. 17a and 20a). In a similar way the diversity of creation is accounted for:

> *Ibid.,* prop. 20a, Fol. 69v: (…) quia vasa non sunt equalia, ideo non equaliter recipiunt de aqua maris, sic quod res create non sunt equales sed quedam sunt maioris capacitatis quam alie et quedam minoris.

The creatures' imperfection is thus described as the result of the receivers' limited natures, but Giles takes care to never deny God's absolute causality:

> *Ibid*., prop. 24a, Fol. 81v: Sciendum autem quod, quamvis nichil sit quod non sit causatum a Deo, verumtamen est aliquo modo etiam in actione prima Dei (…) quedam diversitas ex parte recipientium.

7.2.2 *Giles's orthodoxy unduly doubted upon*

The way in which Giles describes the process of creation unequivocally clarifies some basic facts: (1) God remains the 'Esse separatum purum', and this 'simplex Esse' is not found in creatures, but only a limited amount of *esse* invested in an essence; so any idea of pantheism is excluded. (2) Along these lines the diversity in creation is clarified; (3) Both a thing's nature or essence and its *esse* originate from God. These fundamental theses can be gathered from Giles's expositions, despite his usually repetitious verbosity:

> *Ibid*.: Dicemus enim quod Deus est ipsum Esse purum non receptum in alio. Nichil tamen potest a Deo exire per creationem quod sit *simplex Esse*, sed omne causatum est habens *esse receptum* in essentia. (…) Totum ergo est a Deo, et natura et esse. (…). In hac ergo prima actione Dei ut in ipsa actione creationis rerum, ipsum *esse* et etiam alia que recipiuntur in natura, habebunt *esse* diversum ex parte naturarum recipientium.

Do Giles's statements about the process of creation jeopardize the 'creatio ex nichilo', as his medieval and modern opponents never cease to asseverate? They are of the opinion that Giles regards the 'natura recipientis' as God's pre-existent partner of the act of creation. Giles, however, unambiguously calls God the creator of the different natures (essences, quiddities) to the effect that the act of creation should be considered one sole divine act out of nothing pre-existent. Once again, we should not understand Giles's talk of 'different stages' and 'primary and secondary actualizations' in terms of temporal succession.[117]

7.3 On the right way of making distinctions: 're, ratione, intentione'

Simple Perfect Being, God is such that to make any distinction whatsoever based upon the nature of divine being is out of the question. So any distinctions theologians do make between divine attributes, are solely based upon human consideration; as such they are representative of man's cognitional deficiencies, not of some real diversity in the objects under consideration. To medieval thinkers, both philosophers and theologians, this is not to say that any distinction in the mode(s) of being of finite, compound beings should match with a real intrinsically existent partition or even separateness or separability of these ontic aspects. However this may be, some differentiations with regard to finite beings are unmistakable, particularly the one concerning their twofold ontic principle, essence

117. See our sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 above. Incidentally, none of these quibblers take exception to the usual talk about matter's role in the production of material things, and quite rightly so, because form and matter are created simultaneously.

and existence. One cannot deny or ignore the diversity of these co-principles of finite, created beings, for to do so would simply destroy the Christian idea of creation. It should be asked now how this diversity is to be evaluated.

7.3.1 *Giles's view of the matter*

To any medieval thinker, the only appropriate way to distinguish between essence and existence is to satisfy the rigorous requirements such a distinction should meet so as not to threaten creation. Giles is of the opinion that these requirements can only be met if one takes the distinction between these two principles in terms of 'inter rem et rem';[118] this means that say, Socrates as a quidditative being is simply a different *thing* from Socrates existent, they are 'due res', as he frequently avers. Thomas Sutton, who also advocates the real distinction, rejects the Aegidian view of the real distinction, provided one takes (together with Giles) the term 'res' in its proper sense. If so, *esse* is neither a *res* nor an *essentia* or *forma*. Rather it is a thing's actuality. However, in its large sense, he agrees, the word 'res' applies to anything that is not sheer nothing.[119]

Plainly enough Giles intends to claim that, for example, A existent is not the same thing as A non-existent. Whether or not the Creator has bestowed existence upon things makes the real difference, he seems to think. Unlike Sutton and other advocates of some real distinction, Giles refuses to reduce the difference between existence and non-existence to a thing's diverse *modus essendi*. What he accuses his fellow theologians of is precisely that they disregard the proper nature of the commonly recognized difference between being and existence — which, ultimately, is the chief requirement for saving creation. In point of fact, before Giles's interference in this matter (in 1276), the real distinction was hardly a topic of interest, let alone a subject of vehement debates among

118. Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, propp. 26a and 29a, in particular. The alternative formulas too are clear enough: 'distinguuntur ut res', 'sunt due res', 'faciunt numerum' (= 'bring about a duality'); see our section 2.2, note 7 above.

119. Thomas Sutton, *Qq. de reali distinctione*, p. 35: "Hoc nomen 'res' potest accipi proprie, vel large et communiter. Si accipiatur proprie, sic *esse* non est res, sed actualitas rei, sicut non est essencia sed actualitas essencie. Si autem accipitur communiter pro quocumque reali, sic potest concedi quod *esse* sit res; est enim realis actualitas essentie. Et ideo non sequitur quod esse sit aliqua essentia". *Ibid*.: "Prout 'aliquid' est commune ad omne quod non est nichil, *esse* est aliquid. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod sit aliqua essentia". Unumquodque dicitur existens formaliter, si large accipiamus 'formam' pro quolibet actuali. Si tamen accipiamus 'formam' stricte, non est verum. Et ideo non sequitur quod *esse* quo res dicitur existens, sit forma aliqua, stricte loquendo".

philosophers or theologians.[120] From what Giles says in his commentary on the *Sentences*, it clearly appears that Henry of Ghent was the first to take exception to Giles's rigorous and unfamiliar[121] way of establishing the difference between being and existence. He opens the counterattack against Henry by using an approved method of argument: he accuses the adversary of introducing novelties. Some people,[122] he says, came up with the suggestion that in *no* creature esse and essence are really different. On top of that, they distinguish *three* kinds of distinction: 're, ratione, et intentione'. They maintain indeed that being and existence do not differ *re* and not just *ratione* either, but *intentione*. Those people distinguish *essentia* from *esse essentie* and *esse actualis existentie*, to the effect that 'essentia' indicates a 'thing' on itself and absolutely, whereas 'esse essentie' indicates the same 'thing' in as far as it has its ideal exemplar in God, and 'esse actuale' refers to this same 'thing' in the way in which it is in an exterior effect.[123]

At first glance, this partition of 'distinctio' seems to mainly oppose the *secundum rem* distinction to the one *secundum rationem tantum* and to associate the third (*secundum intentionem*) with the second, the sense of which it seems to invigorate (notice the use of *tantum*). Indeed, the *secundum intentionem* member is nearly always preceded by 'non secundum rationem tantum, sed'. However, as will appear below, the *secundum intentionem* member is also meant to modify the *secundum rem*. So the enumeration runs something like: There are three kinds of distinction, viz. that 'secundum rem', the one just 'secundum rationem', and thirdly that which is not just *secundum rationem*, but 'secundum intentionem'.

120. To Thomas Aquinas, for example, the proper nature of the difference between essence and existence was never a subject of importance, so the altercations of later historians about his view of the matter has turned out to be rather sterile. See Hocédez (1930), pp. 100-116; see also Paulus (1938), 275ff. The absence of this subject matter in general studies on metaphysical positions is remarkable, e.g. in Fabro (1961), passim, esp. 537-551, in which it is patently clear that for Aquinas existence is merely a subordinate function of *esse*. See also the testimonies mentioned in Ludwig Schütz, *Thomas-Lexikon*, Stuttgart 1958, p. 285.

121. Unfamiliar indeed, because of the predominent doctrinal position to the contrary held by Robert Grosseteste; see our section 2.2 above.

122. For this use of the plural see our section 6.1, n. 68.

123. *In II Sent.* dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1, art. 2, Fol. CLXXr: "Respondeo dicendum quosdam noviter huius opinionis fuisse quod in nulla creatura esse et essentia different secundum rem. (…). Insuper vero distinguunt tripliciter 'differre': re, ratione, et intentione. Et volunt quod esse et essentia non differant re neque ratione tantum, sed differant intentione. Distinguunt enim isti inter essentiam et esse essentie et esse actualis existentie; ut 'essentia' dicat rem in se et absolute, 'esse essentie' dicat illam eandem rem ut habet exemplar et ideam in Deo, 'esse autem actuale' dicat illam eandem rem ut est in effectu exteriori". Giles is referring to Henry, *Quodlibet* I, 9, 53,64-56,36.

Giles has observed very well that Henry of Ghent meant the 'differre secundum intentionem' as an intermediary between 'differre re' and differre ratione', and intends to reduce the strength of 'just secundum rationem', which seems to rule out any match with the outside things. In his commentary on the *Sentences* Giles reminds the reader of his clear-cut rejection of that idea in the *Disputed questions*, q. 12 (Fol. 30; see our section 6.2.3 above). There are only two differences, he repeatedly avers. If the distinction is only based upon a move of the intellect, the difference established is only conceptual. If on the other hand it is not purely conceptual but also matches the thing in question, then the distinction matches the thing's being:

> *In II Sent.* dist. 3, pars 1, q.1, art. 2. Fol. CLXXIr: Sed quod non sit dare medium inter differre re et ratione in questionibus nostris de esse et essentia diffusius diximus. Nam omnis distinctio vel est solum secundum intellectum, vel non solum secundum intellectum sed etiam in ipsa re, <in qua> absque intellectu considerante invenitur distinctio. Si est solum secundum intellectum, tunc est differentia secundum rationem. Si autem sit huiusmodi differentia non secundum rationem tantum sed in ipsa re, sic distinctio est secundum esse.

In point of fact, Henry's and Giles's ontological positions are remarkably similar: they both take for granted that the intellect should make a distinction that refers to one specific ontic aspect of the thing in question because that aspect can be conceived of apart from another, however, the different aspects do not differ from one another in an absolute sense, for they equally pertain to the thing under discussion. Giles seems insensitive to the impact of the intellectual operation of distinguishing, and obstinately focuses upon the real character of the ontic aspect in question. Henry honours this real aspect by acknowledging the mind's special attention to it, because it is a real, but inseparable component of the thing under examination, while Giles's real distinction precisely seems to imply separability. This clearly appears from Henry's exposition (in his *Quodlibet* V and *Summa*, art. 27 and 28)[124] of the 'distinctio secundum intentionem'.

7.3.2 *Henry of Ghent's intentional or focal distinction doctrinally assessed*

His opponents' obstinate rejection of Henry's 'distinctio secundum intentionem' should invite the modern historian to investigate what precisely

124. Quoted in our next section.

Henry had in mind when he introduced and developed this novel concept; see also our section 8.6.4 below.

To begin with, the complex term 'intentio' should be considered. Its basic meaning seems to be 'tendency to an object'. Apart from the meaning 'purpose' it has (like English 'intention') in the context of willing, it has a multifarious use in the field of semantics.

Let me begin with the common lore on the significative function of (incomplex) linguistic tools. One of them is the word 'intentio' used in its common sense of 'concept'. In the context of 'conceptual engeneering' there are two kinds of 'intentio'. Some concepts/intentions indicate 'things' or 'beings' that present themselves as being independent of the mind, like man, tree, stone, rationality, love; they are called 'primae intentiones'. Others are used to stand for entities produced by the mind to order and systematize its conceptual engineering regarding the things of the primary order conveyed by 'primae intentiones'; they are accordingly called 'secundae intentiones', exemplified by the concepts/intentions used by the logician, such as 'genus', 'species', 'differentia', 'universale', 'singulare', briefly any 'ens rationis' or 'being founded upon the activity of reason' or (using Schmidt's fortunate rendering) 'rationate being'.[125]

Henry nicely agrees with this common lore. However, there is a fly in the ointment, because from the start, it seems, Henry surreptitiously exploits the slightly different connotation of 'intentio' which is missing in the kindred tools. Let me explain. With 'conceptus' ('conceptio'), 'notio' and 'terminus', the word 'intentio' shares the primarily significative function, meaning that e.g. *tree* is representative of its objective content. Unlike the others, however, the word 'intentio' refers to the objective content as it is (putatively) found in the intentional domain, irrespective of its actually applying or not-applying to objects outside the mind. The problem is that an Avicennian thinker like Henry of Ghent is more aware of this specific use of 'intentio' than other philosophers. So, while he shares with them the common lore of first and second intentions, he also needs to find a way to characterize within that common lore his own, uncommon use of 'intentio' in the phrase 'distinctio secundum

125. See Schmidt (1966), 52, n. 15 and de Rijk (2005), 76, n. 84. For that matter, in expressions like 'differre ratione or secundum rationem' the rendering 'conceptually' is adequate enough because they merely refer to reason's activity of conceptualization, rather than the discursive activities which also concern 'entia rationis'. — We owe an extensive discussion of concept/intention to Giraldus Odonis O.F.M., *De intentionibus*, pars prima, art. I-II, capp. 2-42. Harvey Nedellec wrote an extensive work on secondary intentions and their relationships to the primary ones (*De secundis intentionibus*).

intentionem'. Therefore we should be on the lookout for Henry's own way of clearing up the proper nature of intentionality, which is to be associated with Avicennian metaphysics and epistemology.[126]
An important source for Henry's lore about the concept/intention issue is found in his *Quodlibet* V, qq. 6 and 12. In the fifth *Quodlibet*, which is part of the cluster of five questions (qq. 5-9) dealing with the vexatious problem of relationships found in the divine nature, Henry discusses the question whether the real relations in God differ from his essence. He claims that the difference is 'secundum intentionem' and goes on to define this distinction.[127] To this end he first fixes the meaning of 'res' as standing for any essence or nature having its ideal exemplar in God and being susceptible of outside existence owing to divine operation; he contrasts such a *res* to mental figments and what is only an extraneous (i.e. qua issuing from our mental activity) relationship:

> *Quodlibet* V, q. 6, Fol. CLXI, section K: Hic oportet (…) videre que et qualis sit differentia 'secundum intentionem'. Et quia dependet a notitia aliorum modorum differentie, que quidem sunt 'secundum rem' et 'secundum rationem', ideo altius inchoando oportet videre quid hic appelletur 'res' et quid 'intentio', ut ex hoc pateat que sint differentia *re*, et que *intentione*, et que *tantum ratione*. 'Res' hic appellatur, non figmentum et ens secundum animam tantum (quod dicitur a 'reor, reris'), neque respectus aliquis (…), sed quidquid est natura et essentia aliqua absoluta habens rationem exemplarem in Deo, nata existere in existentia operatione divina, sive sit compositum (ut homo et asinus), sive principium compositi (ut materia et forma), sive sit universale sive particulare.

Then the notion of real difference is explained. Those entities 're-ally' (*re*) differ that re-ally convey diverse natures and essences, no matter if they are simple components (like matter and form) or compounds (like man and ass). On the other hand, whatever conveys the same 'res',

126. Note that Henry likes to speak of the intentional domain as 'esse intentionale et cognoscitivum' (e.g. *Quodlibet* IV, q. 4, Fol. 91r-v). For a comprehensive assessment of this whole area see Paulus (1938), 67-135.
127. A useful treatment of the three kinds of 'distinctio' is found in Paulus (1938), 208-242, whose assessment of the entire 'distinction/composition' issue (*ibid*., 199-257) is still worth taking into consideration. None the less the treatment of the distinction issue ('secundum rem, rationem, intentionem') in his Ch. IV: *Distinctions et compositions*, suffers a bit from his interpretive perspective restraining him to the objects' compositional structure rather than the mutual differences between the components. In addition, Paulus is insensitive to the logico-semantical and cognitional impact of the distinctions lore, and sometimes even fails to see that the three distinctions are all based upon the different ways in which one and the same real thing can *be perceived*, and that accordingly the differences brought into profile by the distinctions originate from our cognitional activities. For this basic feature see our section 6.3.2 above. For the equally important issue of the compositional structure of finite, participated being see our section 7.4.5 below.

whether simple or compound, is re-ally the same, and not mutually complementary, meaning that one does not add something real to the other (as, generally speaking, is the case with a *definiens* and a *definitum*, or a thing unrelated (*absoluta*) and the relationship founded upon it):

> *Ibid*.: Unde re differunt quecumque diversas naturas et essentias important secundum rem, sive fuerint simplicia (ut materia et forma), sive composita (ut homo et asinus). Re vero sunt eadem quecumque eandem rem, sive simplicem sive compositam, important nec unum eorum aliquid rei super alterum ponit (ut sunt universaliter diffinitio et diffinitum et partes diffinitionis inter se et cum diffinito, et similiter res absoluta et respectus fundatus super ipsam; nullus enim respectus aliquid rei ponit preter rem eius super quod fundetur.

Henry proceeds by remarking that it is upon 'res' taken in the above sense that 'intentiones' and 'rationes' occurring in the cognitional context of conceptual engineering are founded. By alluding, then, at length[128] to the well-known division of 'intentio' into primary and secondary intentions (in which 'intentio' in fact is equivalent with 'ratio') Henry prepares the reader for the special use of the term 'intentio' he now has in mind:

> *Ibid*., section L: Res autem iam dicto modo intellecta est fundamentum intentionum et rationum. Super idem enim re fundantur intentiones et rationes diverse. Intentio autem hic appellatur non id quod dicitur 'intentio secunda', qualia sunt ista 'individuum', 'genus', 'species', 'proprium', 'accidens', 'definitio', 'definitum' et talia que dicuntur 'intentiones' nonnisi quia opus intellectus sunt. Et ideo etiam nomina que imponunter ad significandum eas, dicuntur nomina secundarum intentionum et similiter secunde impositionis,[129] quia imponuntur illis que primo sunt imposita ad significandum res; de quibus statim dicetur. Unde et dicuntur 'nomina nominum'. Dicuntur autem 'intentiones secunde'et nomina secundarum intentionum, et 'secunde impositionis' et nomina nominum, respectu primarum intentionum et impositionis nominum ipsorum. De quibus adhuc non est hic sermo (Cuiusmodi sunt 'homo', 'asinus', 'rationale', 'irrationale' etc., que significant id quod universale est. Quod [sc. the universal] quia res est et forma naturalis respectu secundarum intentionum, dicuntur 'res', et nomina eorum 'nomina rerum'. Respectu vero individuorum, que vere res sunt et dicuntur, quia sunt opus nature (ut Sortes, Brunellus), dicuntur 'intentiones', quia quodammodo sunt ab opere intellectus; et nomina eorum dicuntur 'nomina intentionum', et dicuntur 'prime intentiones' propter alias intentiones secundas. De quibus simul consideratis dicit Avicenna quid logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis.[130]

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128. Harvey Nedellec truly has a point when he complains about Henry's verbosity. The latter enjoyed assessing things broadly, but like many ancient and medieval writers, he had the bad luck to have lived before the typographical invention of the footnote.
129. For the grammatical label 'prima/secunda impositio' see our next note.
130. The inserted 'footnote' is continued as follows: "Nomina autem tam universalium (que sunt prime intentiones) quam singularium (que proprie sunt res) communiter

This capacious background information is enough to introduce the special use of 'intentio' Henry is after. As is easily seen, this use in fact restricts this term from generally applying to primary intentions to its referring to a thing's special constitutive component (often labelled elsewhere 'nota constitutiva'), at the same time explicitly ruling out other ones, which equally belong to it.[131] Notice again the way in which Henry associates the intentional distinction with the real one; in point of fact, they are both tied up with the *real* thing. Like the real distinction, the intentional distinction concerns an object's real ontic aspects, be it that it acts by a specific operation of the mind by which the intellect (whose special task it is to discern ontic aspects coinciding in the object) forms diverse concepts about things that are conceptually diverse, yet still really the same. The decisive contrast with 'intention' in the larger sense is found in its focussing on just one of a thing's constitutive essential components:

> *Ibid.*: Sed appellatur hic 'intentio' aliquid pertinens realiter ad simplicitatem essentie alicuius, natum precise concipi absque aliquo alio, a quo non differt re absoluta, quod similiter pertinet ad eandem. Unde dicitur *intentio* quasi *intus tentio*, eoquod mens conceptu suo in aliquid quod est in re aliqua, determinate tendit et non in aliquid aliud quod est aliquid eiusdem rei.[132] Ut sic super idem in re per intellectum — cuius est dividere ea que sunt idem in re — formentur diversi conceptus ut de diversis penes conceptum mentis, eisdem autem in re.

Finally, Henry says something about the meaning of 'ratio' as used in the phrase 'distinctio secundum rationem'.[133] To begin with, it does not designate the cognitive faculty, reason, nor is it used in the sense of 'argument'. Instead is is used to comprehensively stand for some ontic aspect or mode of an object, according to which it presents itself to the mind in this or that determinate way, irrespectively of other equally pos-

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dicuntur prime impositionis, quia immediate imponuntur rebus. Propter quod etiam dicuntur 'nomina rerum', et hoc respectu nominum secundarum intentionum, que imposita sunt nominibus que primo imposita sunt rebus. 'Homo' enim et 'Sortes' primo immediate rebus sunt imposita, 'genus' vero, 'species', 'individuum, 'nomen', 'verbum' et cetera nomina secundarum intentionum tam ad logicam quam ad gramaticam pertinentia imposita sunt illis nominibus rerum universalium et singularium que sunt 'animal', 'homo', 'Sortes', 'currit', 'disputat'. *Animal* enim 'genus' dicitur, *homo* 'species', *Sortes* 'individuum' secundum logicum, et omnia hec secundum gramaticum dicuntur 'nomina'; 'currit' vero et 'disputat' verba".

131. This restriction is well observed by Paulus (1938), 220.
132. Notice that, unlike others (among whom Harvey Nedellec and Girald Odonis) Henry seems to explain the etymology of 'intentio' deriving from *intus tentio* in terms of the exclusively focussing on *one* specific ontic feature of a thing (or essence) with the exclusion of its other equally real ones.
133. See Paulus (1938), 237ff.

sible ones.[134] In this context the 'secundum rationem' procedure is described according to the general (or rather generic; see below) sense, which leaves the bifurcation into real or intentional distinction out of consideration. This is to say that the phrase 'secundum rationem' is comprehensively used for bringing any ontic difference into the picture, whenever what is really or intentionally the same is perceived according to one or another mode of conceiving:

> *Ibid*., section M: 'Ratio' autem hic non appellatur vis quedam cognitiva substantie intellectualis (a qua anima nostra dicitur 'rationalis') neque etiam opus ipsius rationis secundum quod argumentum dicitur 'ratio rei dubie faciens fidem', idest certitudinem. Sed 'ratio' hic appellatur generali nomine modus aliquis circa rem sub quo nata est concipi determinate absque eo quod concipiatur sub alio sub quo similiter nata est concipi; et hoc sine omni eius differentia re vel intentione. Ita quod idem re et intentione, conceptum diversis modis concipiendi, dicitur differre 'secundum rationem' inquantum concipitur uno illorum modorum et non alio; sicut patet in conceptione diffinitionis et diffiniti et in diversitate divinorum attributorum.[135]

7.4 The intentional (focal) distinction being generally rejected and misunderstood

The core of his opponents' objections (including those of Giles of Rome and Harvey Nedellec and many others of the period) to Henry's 'distinctio secundum intentionem' is that there is no need whatsoever for any other distinction to be placed in between the ones 'secundum rem' and 'secundum rationem'. They all think that the distinction 'secundum rationem' can actually do the job when any cognitional differentiations are in order. They all failed to see what Henry was after. To track down the precise sense and application of the intentional (focal) distinction it is helpful to look into both the similarity and the dissimilarity between these two.

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134. For this use of 'ratio' see de Rijk (1994), 202-205.

135. Cfr. Henry's *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, art. 27, q. 1, Fol. CLXIv. Section M: "Dicendum quod differentium quedam differunt secundum rationem tantum (ut diffinitio et diffinitum), et ista nullo modo sunt separabilia, quia idipsum sunt in re et in intellectu indivisibiliter. Et talia separari non possunt, nec secundum rem extra nec secundum intellectum, sicut neque idem potest separari a seipso. Quedam vero differunt intentione, ut diverse differentie unius speciei, que in eodem separari non possunt quia cadunt in idipsum re; ut vegetativum sensitivum in bruto, sed in diversis possunt separari secundum quod in plantis est vegetativum sine sensitive et in brutis sensitivum sine rationali. Quedam vero differunt re, et hoc vel absoluta ex parte utriusque, vel relata saltem ex parte alterius. <Re> absoluta, ut que sunt aliud et aliud in natura, sicut materia et forma; et ista Deus posset separare. Re non absoluta sed relata differunt aliqua dupliciter: aut enim relatio fundatur in natura et essentia rei, aut super aliquod accidens in re."

7.4.1 *The proper sense of 'secundum intentionem'*

To begin with the similarity. It cannot be underlined enough that through the intentional distinction the mind directs itself to the same real object as it does through the (merely) conceptual distinction. However, there seem to be two decisive points of difference. First. While the latter does not affect the object's (or essence's) compositional ontic structure as a whole, leaving the thing's essence (or quiddity) intact, the intentional distinction precisely focusses the mind's attention to just one of its constitutive components; hence my alternative label 'focal distinction'. The other, still more characteristic difference precisely concerns the rival notion of 'secundum rationem tantum'. The merely conceptual difference and distinction, like those between genus and species, do not affect an object's quiddity and solely arise from the human need for organizing and classifying the products of our habitual conceptualizations. The classification of things in terms of genus and species, for instance, serves to clarify the conceptual interrelationships between things, rather than their respective quiddities. As an illustration, to quidditatively understand 'man' as 'rational animal' has as such nothing to do with the existence of irrational animals. It is our invention of the tool 'specific difference' ('differentia specifica'), *rational(ity)* that provokes its logical counterpart, *irrational(ity)*, in a similar way as the concepts 'father' or 'right' logically call forth the correlatives, 'child' ('son'/'daughter') and 'left', respectively. Our logical divisions and subdivisions (and further divisions of subdivisions) primarily serve to clear up our thoughts about things, which are equally hospitable to alternative classifications. The nail box classifies nails, but has no bearing upon their 'nailhood', so to speak. The intentional difference/distinction, on the other hand, does not merely ('non tantum') register logico-conceptual differences arising from our different ways of conceptualizing, but in addition claims to represent the quidditative beingness of things as they occur in the intentional domain which reflects the real domain.

7.4.2 *The proper nature of the intentional domain*

Briefly, from the metaphysical point of view, man is a rational animal, whereas horses are irrational animals, and this has everything to do with the ontic, inseparable relationships between *man* and *rationality*, and *horse* and *irrationality*, respectively, which transcend the logical level of genus, species, and specific difference, conveyed by the concepts 'animal', 'man', and 'rational'. So from the viewpoint of metaphysics, the intentions 'man', 'animal', and 'rational' convey the corresponding

quiddities of real, authentic human beings as they occur in the intentional domain of being, irrespective of their actual existence outside the mind. Like the domain of reason comprising 'entia rationis' or merely rationate being, the intentional domain is a product of the mind, but contrary to the domain of rationate being, it is not the bare outcome of our way of classifying our conceptualizations, but represents authentic features ('quiddities') of things examined in the intentional domain.

It is interesting to observe that Avicenna appears to arrive at exactly the same view as Henry's when he discusses the cognitional function of 'intentio': it brings to the fore just one constitutive essential component, rather than the essence as a whole. Avicenna even uses the term 'intention' in the same way, *viz*. to stand for quidditative forms quasi coincidentally supervening on the object's essence, rather than for its essence as a whole. This is well observed by Henry in his *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum* and in his *Quodlibet* III:

> *Summa*, art. 28, q. 4, Fol. CLXVIII, section X: Ad primum in oppositum quod essentia Dei et esse eius abinvicem dividi possunt per intellectum, dicendum quod intellectus noster non separat indivisa nisi secundum diversos modos intelligendi. Sed hoc potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo ut illa diversitas ortum habet solum ex parte intellectus et concipientis, ita quod diversitas illa non assignatur esse ex natura rei et in re absolute sed solum in relatione ad ipsum intellectum concipientem aut cum hoc ad aliud. Alio modo ut ortum habeat quodammodo ex parte ipsius rei intellecte et concepte. Primo modo intellectus rationalis vel intellectualis distinguit et dividit in Deo diversitatem attributorum et quecumque distinguuntur in Deo pertinentia ad communem essentiam. Unde quia intellectus ipse cum respectu quem concipit circa rem, est tota causa et ratio diversificandi huiusmodi conceptus in eis que sunt omnino indivisa (ut infra videbitur). Ideo talis diversitas dicitur diversitas secundum rationem tantum. Secundo autem modo distinguit intellectus suo conceptu diversitatem eorum que sunt indivisa in re composita ex eis, sed inter se divisa. Et hoc vel in natura et essentia (ut contingit in diversitate materie et forme in composito ex utroque) et ideo talis diversitas dicitur esse secundum rem et naturam. Vel sunt indivisa re et natura, sed non intentione, ut contingit in diversitate generis et differentie in specie, et essentie a supposito, et essentie ab esse (dico actualis existentie, quia cum ipsa facit compositionem in natura), non autem ab esse essentie, quia illud est proprius actus eius essentialis, sicut vivere est actus vite in vivente. Unde in creatura ex essentia et esse essentiali non est aliqua compositio, sicut neque in vivente ex vivere et vita. Et ideo talis diversitas dicitur esse non secundum rationem tantum neque secundum rem et naturam, sed secundum intentiones diversas circa eandem rem simplicem consideratas, quarum una seorsum accipitur ab alia nec eam includit in se.

> *Ibid.,* art. 27, q. 1, Fol. CLXIIr. Sections N-O: Et sic patet quod Deus essentiam creature separare non potest ab esse seorsum, utrumque ponendo vel

> alterum. Sed hoc non est propter aliquam impotentiam sed propter rei impossibilitatem, sicut non potest facere quod contradictoria concurrant. Non tamen propter inseparabilitatem huiusmodi esse et essentie sequitur quod possit dici quod ipsa essentia sit suum esse, aut econverso, quamvis comparatum illud esse ad essentiam incidit omnino in ipsam nec est aliud re omnino ab ipsa. Quantumcumque tamen in substantiam incidat et trahatur ad rationem absoluti, numquam potest dici predicatione formali unum eorum de altero, quia etsi non differunt re, differunt tamen intentione, non sola ratione; que bene predicationem huiusmodi impedit. Propter quod etiam in eodem possunt abinvicem separari secundum intellectum, etsi non secundum rem. Unde et dico differre intentione quecumque de se formant diversos conceptus quorum unus non includit omnino alterum; qui non sunt nisi eorum que in diversis sunt diversa re, etsi in eodem sunt idipsum re.
>
> *Quodlibet* III, q. 9, Fol. XCIXr: Ponit Avicenna quod essentie et quiditati rei qua est *id quod est* secundum se, accidunt omnia alia, non quia sint [sunt *ed*.] secundum ipsum re, essentia et natura alia ab ipsa, facientia realem compositionem cum ipsa, sed quia sunt intentiones secundum se extra intentionem essentie rei conceptibiles.

In outline, unlike the distinction 'secundum rationem' to which Henry opposes his intentional distinction, the latter focusses upon just one 'nota constitutiva' of an object's essence.

The special way in which the intentional distinction splits up the object's essence into different 'forme constitutive' occurs in diverse grades of difference. These diverse grades afford several criteria for recognizing the appositeness of distinguishing intentionally,[136] and at the same time determine the interrelations between the diverse constitutive notes or forms within the essence ('que sunt idem re in eodem'), and the corresponding 'intentions'. In *Quodlibet* V Henry presents a list of six degrees of difference. The first two apply to concepts or focal intentions (ontic aspects) so diverse that they completely exclude one another, as is the case with the concepts of different specific differences, or those of the genus and specific difference that constitute a simple species (like *man*):

> *Quodlibet* V, q. 6, Fol. CLXIr-v: Sed in eis que intentione differunt, sunt gradus secundum differentiam maiorem et minorem. De eis enim que sunt idem re in eodem, aliquando sic formantur conceptus diversi ut neutrum

136. In *Quodlibet* V, q. 12, Fol. CLXXI, section T the grades lore is applied to solve the question whether the diversity of intentions causes a compositional structure in anything, including God: "Ut enim patet ibidem [sc. *Quodl.* V, 6], diversa intentione sunt que fundata in simplicitate eiusdem rei diversos de se formant conceptus. Qui ex hoc intelliguntur esse diversi quod unus eorum alterum excludit vel totaliter (ut patet in duobus primis modis differentium intentione ibi distinctis), vel in parte (ut patet in quatuor aliis). *Ibid.,* section X the compositional structure is discussed in terms of the 'diversitas intentionum'.

> eorum in suo conceptu alterum includat; ut sunt conceptus diversarum differentiarum que concurrunt in eodem, sicut sunt in homine *rationale, sensibile, vegetabile*, inquantum differentie sunt. Et similiter conceptus[137] generis et differentie qui [que *ed*.] constituunt simplicem speciem, sicut sunt *animal* et *rationale*. Et in istis duobus modis est maxima differentia intentionum.

The thing is that such differences exist between the diverse concepts/intentions of, say, an actual instance of *man*, despite the fact that they all designate this same man; while they (viz. 'hic homo', 'hoc animal', 'hoc rationale') indeed regard what is really the same, they are intentionally different. In four other ones the differences are of a lower degree, meaning that one concept includes the other, but not the other way round. Henry's most interesting example of this type of concept is *esse*, which happens to have had led to the main doctrinal conflict between Henry and Giles of Rome, about the nature of the difference between *esse* and existence — is it a real (Giles) or intentional one (Henry)? ---, and Henry's 'respectus ad Creatorem' doctrine:

> *Ibid.,* Fol. CLXIv: Sunt et alii quatuor modi in quibus minor est differentia quia conceptus unius intentionis includit alterum sed non econverso, ut conceptus speciei conceptum generis et differentie, non autem econverso. Similiter conceptus *vivere* in creaturis conceptum esse, non econverso. Similiter conceptus suppositi (sicut *hominis*) conceptum nature (ut *humanitatis*), non autem econverso. Et similiter conceptus respectus sicut *entis* conceptum *essentie*, non econverso.

The absence of convertibility between the different concepts leads to a certain complexity which is to restrict the range of intentional differentiation in that the minor difference does not rule out the real (extensive) identity of part and whole. Henry cannot refrain himself from warning us, because there appears to be some overlap between the concepts with the above two stringent modes:

> *Ibid.*: Et est hic advertendum quod in istis quatuor modis id quod alterum continet, non differt ab illo quod ab eo continetur nisi ratione alterius partis contente in significato eiusdem, ita quod ista duo proprie dicuntur differre intentione sicut contingit in predictis duobus modis. In istis autem quatuor ultimis modis ipsum totum quod alterum continet non proprie dicitur 'intentio', neque proprie dicitur differre intentione ab eo quod est sicut pars eius nisi quatenus includit in se aliquid aliud cum quo in toto illo ponit aliquam rationem compositionis, quod si secundum se concipiatur, proprie debet dici 'intentio'.

137. It should be observed that in this context 'conceptus generis' does not mean 'the concept, genus', but is used to indicate the concept conveyed by a generic term like 'animal'.

7.4.3 *The impact of ancient semantics in the background*

It is worthwhile in the context of the 'intentions'-lore to observe the validity of four chief rules of ancient and medieval semantics. The first is about a term's multiple applicability (which I have elsewhere baptized the RMA).[138] It runs: 'Names (nouns) are used (a) to denote things as self-contained, subsistent wholes, and (b) by the same token connote the special property (or feature) signified by it as being possessed by these things, and also (c) refer to this property in an abstract manner, conceiving it apart from things in which it is enmattered. The second rule concerns the absence of a clear-cut borderline between a linguistic expression taken as a linguistic tool (i.e. its so-called autonymous use) and its significate. Taking autonymous use as a kind of self-reference, I have labelled this rule that of indiscriminate reference (RIR). The third rule (which is closely connected with RIR) concerns the double sense of the phrase 'content of an expression' or 'that which is signified by it' or 'its significate'. In fact these phrases can be used to stand for both (a) mental entities, i.e. things (states of affairs) signified qua conceived of, and (b) the things (state of affaires) signified taken as extra-linguistic (extramental) entities. This rule is called the rule of the multiple significate (RMS). The fourth main rule allows the *simultaneous* application of different senses or nuances of expressions, that is to say, their use on more than one semantic level at the same time. This rule pertains to what is nowadays called 'double entendre', and can be compared to the technique of counterpoint ('contrappunto') in music. I call it 'rule of semantic counterpoint'(RSC).[139]

Applying this cluster of rules to 'intentio' one can observe its different uses, often simultaneous or at least not properly discriminated. Even in the same context, the term is often indiscriminately used to stand for both (a) the conceptual tool 'intentio' and (b) the ontic feature denoted by it, [140] either (b1) on the (extramental) extensional, physical level, or (b2) on the mental level or (c) it refers to the corresponding act of conceptual-

138. The four rules of Aristotelian semantics are extensively discussed in de Rijk (2002) I, 60-74; see also II, *Index*, col. 494b.

139. A quite conspicuous case of RSC is the use of the term; being(ness)' in philosophic contexts: in its basic sense of the ontic cause owing to which something is given: (a) in physical or (b) mental existence; (c) the merely extensional being(ness) of a *suppositum*, contrasted with (d) intensional aspects of being(ness), including (e) partial quidditative modes constitutive of an essence, and finally qua implications of our engineering with 'beings', (f) entities like secondary intentions, such as (being a) genus or universal.

140. In such cases Henry speaks of 'intentio rei qua est *id quod est'*, e.g. in *Quodlibet* III, q. 9 Fol. XCIXr quoted above, in which the similar phrase is found 'essentia et quiditas rei qua est *id quod est'*.

ization (intentio as *intus tentio*). This can be amply exemplified in the foregoing texts.

7.4.4 *Opposing 'secundum intentionem' to 'secundum rationem tantum'*

In the expression 'distinctio secundum rationem' (or 'conceptual distinction'), the term 'ratio' is used in the sense of 'ontic element, feature or aspect under which an object is cognized'; for example, when the entity, Socrates presents itself to the mind qua man or qua animal or qua rational, or qua rational animal and so on.[141] Like the differentiations (respectively distinctions) 'secundum rem' and 'secundum intentionem', the conceptual ones (called 'secundum rationem') have everything to do with the mind's conceptual engineering to adapt objects to cognitional endeavours. The conceptual distinction comprises any conceptualization regarding objects and their essences, and (unlike the real distinction) it primarily depends on the mind's activity. It comes in two shapes: one generic, ranging over conceptualization in general, the other specific, restricted to the focalization upon an object's one sole constitutive feature. As we have seen before, in the wake of Avicenna, Henry of Ghent favours the restricted one under the label 'distinctio secundum intentionem' ('distinctio rationis') and contrasts it with the generic one, which he accordingly designates as 'distinctio secundum rationem tantum'. This usage is clearly confirmed in the passages from *Quodlibet* V and the *Summa* quoted above, in which there is talk of "appellatur generali nomine" and the leaving aside of the restricted sense. In fact, the word 'intentio' is used by Henry (unlike Avicenna, it would seem) *sensu largiori* to indiscriminately stand for any 'ratio' as well as *sensu stricto* for a specific intention conveying an object's one sole essential constitutive component.[142] This may lead to the following diagram:

141. Or qua white, good etc. For the decisive role of focalization and categorization in the Aristotelian strategy of argument see de Rijk (2002) I, 159-179; 449ff.; II, 403-416; 419ff.; 572-593.

142. *Quodlibet* V, q. 12, Fol. CLXXIr, section T: "Et differunt differentia secundum intentionem ab illis que differunt secundum rem et similiter ab illis que differunt secundum rationem tantum quod hec in eadem simplici re fundantur, non sic illa, ut forma generis et differentie [differentia *ed*.] in forma speciei, ita quod illa res in significato utriusque intentionis continetur secundum alium et alium modum concipiendi, in quo conveniunt cum differentibus sola ratione. Sed in hoc differunt quod in diversis secundum intentionem unus conceptus secundum unum modum excludit alium secundum alium modum, non sic autem differentia sola ratione. Ex quo contingit (…) quod quecumque differunt intentione, differunt ratione, non econverso; propter quod frequenter intentio 'ratio' appellatur". *Ibid*., section X: " (…) et intentio non est nisi opus rationis inquantum est intentio". Notice that Giles of Rome (*Disp. Qq*., q. 9, Fol. 20ra (quoted at the end of our section 6.1.2) draws



7.4.5 *Composition as the counterpart of division*

In *Quodlibet* V, 12 Henry discusses the three distinctions (real, conceptual, intentional) from the perspective of the compositional structure of creatural things. All three are associated with the parallellous differences existing in the object's composition. Taken from the viewpoint of ontology (metaphysics), the extramental things owe this structure to real components making up a real unity. Any differentiations and distinctions only come in when the mind tries to account for the ins and outs of the compositional structure of the objects cognized. No matter the plurality of intentions ('ontic features') in whatever thing, it always produces a kind of composition. Be that as it may, the composition (coherence) of ontic features that differ intentionally is weaker than the composition in the real things; this occurs in accordance with the respective diversity. The distinction (or difference) between the ontic features found in one and the same thing is merely a product of the mind's cognitional operation, in that the intellect renders a potential diversity between an object's ontic features actual. Therefore what is conveyed by different intentions is not really different in the outside world. It is the mind that makes two out of what is one. None the less, this duality is not fictitious but has a foundation in reality, because the thing's nature contains the two diverse intentions, as it were *in radice*, in a similar way as leaves and fruits are potentially present in the wood of a tree:

> *Quodlibet* V, q. 12, Fol. CLXXIr, sections V-Y: Dicendum igitur simpliciter quod quecumque diversitas intentionum in quocumque sit, semper in eo facit aliquam compositionem (…). Multo tamen minor est ista compositio quam illa que fit [sit que *ed*.] ex differentibus re, quanto maior est diversitas differentium re quam differentium intentione. Ita quod quia illa ut sunt in re

attention to Averroes *sometimes* taking 'differre intentione' for 'differre ratione'.

143. A similar diagram can be drawn for the corresponding differences the distinctions are applied to. It should be well observed that in the phrases 'distinctio (or 'differentia', respectively) secundum intentionem' and 'distinctio (differentia) intentionalis' the words 'intentio' and 'intentionalis' are used in the strict sense.

> absolute, habent perfecte differentiam in se et absolute, res illa in perfecto actu habet illam realem compositionem. Ista vero que in eadem re differunt intentione: quia ut sunt in re absolute, non perfecte habent suam differentiam, sed solum ut res cadit in consideratione intellectus circa idem concipientis illos diversos conceptus actu suo dividendi que secundum se sunt indivisa, et ut in simplici intelligentia tantum unicum conceptum formant, unde et intentio non est nisi opus rationis inquantum intentio est, — idcirco res eadem in se et absolute in perfecto actu non habet compositionem huiusmodi intentionum nisi virtute et quasi in potentia tantum (quemadmodum [= 'in a similar way as'] genus habet in potentia quodammodo contrarias differentias). Que [sc. potentia] opere intellectus producibilis est in actu circa rem, non ut extra intellectum et secundum se existens sed ut est in actuali eius consideratione (quemadmodum ratio universalis in re extra est in potentia, actu vero est in ea secundum quod cadit in eius actuali consideratione). Unde et intentio non dicitur esse aliquid in re ut est extra, sed solum ut cadit in actuali intellectus consideratione considerantis unum in re ut duo intentione; quod vero non fictitie duo est intentione quia in natura illius rei ut in fundamento et quasi in radice est utraque intentio educenda de ea opere intellectus tamquam res rationis et intellectus, quemadmodum in ligno velut in radice sunt folia et fructus ut diversa educenda opere nature tamquam res nature.

What now to say of Henry's alleged claim that the intentional distinction deserves a position in between the two others?[144] In fact, Henry seems to locate it closer to the real distinction. There is no explicit evidence that Henry ascribes a halfway position to intentions *sensu stricto*. The only thing we can ascertain is that his opponents speak of a putative position in between the real and conceptual distinction.

7.4.6 *Giles of Rome's brusque rejection of the intentional distinction*

Giles of Rome's and other opponents' brusque rejection of the 'distinctio secundum intentionem' probably also has something to do with Henry's sloppy use of language, making no explicit difference between the restricted and the common senses of this key term. Be this as it may, Giles's own account of the 'being vs. existence' issue comes very close to simply reifying the difference between being and existence.[145] His interpretation in the twelfth *Theorem* of the difference in terms of separation is along the same lines. This passage is not very clear, confusing as it does the sound idea that what is really separate must be really

144. The same question is found in Paulus (1938), who seems to look for an answer in terms of the opposition between physics (sensibility) and metaphysics (intelligibility), rather than logico-semantics and cognition.
145. Hocédez (1930: 56 and 64) speaks of 'fallacia formae reificatae'; cfr. our note 154 below. In our section 7.5 we will return to this reproach.

diverse, with the assumption that a thing with potential being only must be really separated from the thing being in actual existence:

> *Theorem* XII, pp. 67,19-68,8: Sicut ergo invenimus aliqua abinvicem separari, sic abinvicem sunt diversa; (…) si vero realiter separantur, oportet quod realiter sint diversa. (…) Eo ergo ipso quod huiusmodi nature sensibiles possunt non esse vel non semper fuerunt coniuncte ipsi *esse* quia aliquando inceperunt esse, arguere possumus quod sint in potentia esse et quod habent essentiam realiter differentem ab *esse*.[146]

7.5 The ambivalence of the 'respectus' doctrine

As we have observed before,[147] Henry reduces the difference between essence and existence to merely a creature's relationship to God which results from the contingency that its essence is actualized by creation. He needs to cope with Giles's objection that the relationship to the Creator should require something absolute to be founded upon. Throughout the bickerings Giles keeps insisting that that the 'respectus ad Deum' cannot by itself constitute something absolute like actual existence. Prior to this relationship the supervenience of the essence's counterpart, *esse* should be assumed. On his part, Henry agrees that like any other one, the relationship to the Creator requires a real foundation, yet he maintains that it is the essence itself in its capacity of being the end-term of the act of creation that procures the required foundation. There is no need for any composition of two separate components, *esse* and essence, because the mere simultaneous production of these two will do.

Once again, Giles's obstinacy seems to be worthy of a better cause. Henry does not belittle the creature's relationship to the Creator at all. Giles's own stance, on the other hand, could easily make one think of two different stages in God's productive act, as in fact did his thesis that finite beings' coming to be requires two diverse 'actualitates', one affording intelligibility to matter, the other procuring existence to the compound of matter and form.[148] Anyhow, Giles's position in question gave Thomas of Sutton (who strongly supported the idea of real distinction as such) ammunition to vehemently criticize Giles's apparent assumption

146. In his second *Quodlibet* Giles goes as far as to contrast a twofold *esse reale*, one owned by a thing as it is potentially present in its causes, the other as it *is* by itself, apart, that is, from its causes: *Quodlibet* II, q. 6: "Dicemus nos quod res habet duplex *esse* reale. Habet enim primum *esse* in suis causis, et sic est in potentia. Rosa quippe actu non existens *est* in potentia materie et in virtutibus activis et passivis ex quibus tamquam ex propriis causis producitur rosa. Habet etiam rosa *esse* in seipsa".
147. Our sections 2.2; 6.1.3; 6.2.4; 6.3.3 above.
148. For this twofold 'actualitas' see our section 3.1 above.

of the essence's previous ontic state, seemingly preceding God's act of bringing the essence to factual existence.[149] It is true, Giles makes it clear enough that any idea of temporal succession or pre-existence of the element 'essence' is out of the question.

The modern reader is often baffled: What is everybody getting so worked up about? It is not as if the truth of Catholic faith is at stake, despite the frequent assertions to the contrary. Who cares if the divine nature and God's creative operations are understood and explained in one faithful way or another? The complex conceptions of the Divine are bound to lack rational transparance, so different theological views are only to be expected; Christians themselves consider their beliefs about God to be ultimately beyond any human form of knowledge. Of course, the Medievals were an exacting bunch: they never ceased to demand from their colleagues that they put their theories to the tests of coherence and relevance. This still does not alter the fact that stances are mainly the result of various skilful (and plausible) modes of conceptual engineering.

Be that as it may, the scholastic discussions were always hospitable to using the *passe-partout* of 'creative interpretation'.[150] Hocédez rightly draws (1930, *Introd*., 29-30) our attention to James of Viterbo's attempt to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds when he comes to speak of his master's (and Prior general) 'real distinction'.[151] In his rejection of this distinction in his *Quodlibet* I, q. 9 (Lent 1292), he remarks that Giles's defence of the indispensability of this distinction is quite reasonable, but the way in which he interprets it is disputable, because, he argues, no authority can be adduced to support it and no stringent argument can either. Henry of Ghent is not entitled, however, to reject the real distinction as impossible, because however disputable it may be, the fact that it has been defended by such a highly-gifted man should warrant its probability:

> *Quodlibet* I, q. 9 Ms. Erlangen 368, f. 131v: Secunda opinio [sc. Giles of Rome's] quantum ad hoc quod ponit essentiam et esse realiter differre, rationabilis est, sed quantum ad modum ponendi in hoc quod ponit quod esse est quedam actualitas essentie superaddita, que neque est materia neque forma neque compositum neque accidens, dubitabilis est, tum quia non videtur esse aliqua ratio necessario cogens ad hoc ponendum, tum quia etiam nulla videtur posse induci auctoritas aut alicuius philosophi aut alicuius doctoris sacri

149. See for Sutton's criticism upon the strictly Aegidian view of the real distinction our sections 3.1 and 6.4.

150. The benevolent *modus operandi* of this kind of 'creative explanation' has its uncharitable counterpart in the seemingly stubborn unwillingness to meet one's opponent with an open mind; see our next section.

151. The Augustinian James of Viterbo replaced his master Giles of Rome on the Augustinian chair of theology in Paris University in 1292 and remained there until 1296.

> qui hoc exprimat. Nam quod dicit Avicenna de ente et essentia potest aliis modis eque convenientibus exponi quam ponendo huiusmodi actualitatem. Auctoritas etiam Boetii in libro De hebdomadibus (ut ex superius dictis patet) non inducit ad ponendum tale esse quod sit quedam actualitas alia ab essentia. Sed licet non videatur esse aliquid cogens ad ponendum huiusmodi esse, negari tamen aut improbari non debet tamquam aliquid falsum aut impossibile, precipue cum excellentes doctores hoc posuerint qui nobis multorum bonorum causa fuerunt et ad quorum altissimum intellectum quem de illo et de multis aliis preclaris theorematibus habuerunt, ego et mei similes ascendere et pervenire non sumus ydonei.

In point of fact, James (*ibid.,* ff. 130v-132r; see Grabmann (1924), 165-174, and his comments, 174-176) does not take sides. All in all the modern historian might be inclined to agree (at least at first glance) with Gilson's characterization of this kind of debate in terms of 'speculative sterility'.[152]

7.6 The apparent doctrinal sterility of medieval altercations

We first need to realize that speculatively sterile or not, the debates certainly covered fundamental issues. Hocédez (1927, 380) has good reason to draw our attention to crucial differences between Giles and Henry on matters concerning theological issues (like God's eternal, necessary being) and philosophic tenets about finite, contingent being, like the compound's nature, act and potency, matter and form or genus and species. What is more, these different starting points testify to a different frame of mind, which has been, and still is of vital importance in matters of philosophy and theology. In this respect, there is anything but doctrinal sterility.

Our observation of the serious and often obstinately controversial medieval debates calls for an equally serious explanation.[153] First of all, the deeply rooted antagonism between Augustinian/(neo)Platonic and Aristotelian thought should be taken into consideration. One cannot, however, leave it at that. The sting of the dissension is to be looked for at a deeper level of thought. It is precisely on this deeper level of epistemology and the confidence in human cognition that the firmness of convictions is rooted. What I am trying to point out is the historic phenomenon commonly called the (ancient and medieval) parallelism postulate. This postulate concerns the 'fundamentum in re' discussion, the nucleus

152. Gilson speaks of sterility (1955, 412) with regard to the altercations concerning the substantial form between unitarists and pluralists around 1300; see our *Introduction* to vol. I, *De formis*, section 9, pp. CVIII-CI.

153. See also what I have remarked on this account in vol. I, *De formis*, *Introduction*, p. C-CI.

of which is the deeply rooted ancient and medieval conviction that, at least in matters of principle, man's cognitive (sensitive as well as intellective) faculties enable us to have an adequate access to the outside world, owing to the fundamental parallelism naturally existing between the various ontic articulations of the outside things, on the one hand, and the natural ways in which man understands these things, on the other. In Aristotelian terms, the substance/accident model rooted in the human mind happily runs parallel to the substance/accident structure of the outside world, owing to which true human cognition actually has a 'fundamentum in re'.

To my mind, it was — in spite of the fact that from as early as the late thirteenth century it was practically called into question by many thinkers — this postulate that continued to have a tremendous impact on medieval dissension and discussion. For example, to seriously consider (with Giles of Rome) the difference between essence and existence as one 'inter rem et rem' is tantamount to thinking that they are two really different *things*, and that, consequently, the rejection of opposite views can be supported with a stringency almost similar to that deriving from empirical evidence.[154] The confidence bestowed upon the parallelism postulate once again prevented people from seeing any other view as a reasonable alternative, at least in principle. More than once the student of medieval theology can see that when an opponent is accused of contradicting Catholic faith, it is not so much the man's disloyalty to the *depositum fidei* that is under attack as his stupidly ignoring the naturally evident facts.

However this may be, Gilson's reproach of 'doctrinal sterility' definitely hits the mark as an appraisal of the course of the discussions themselves. From the modern philosophic point of view, even the chief subject matters of these debates often turn out to be non-issues.[155] At the end of the day, the historian of medieval thought is inclined to judge opposite, hotly debated views as more or less plausible alternatives to solve problems that were mainly produced by different thinkers themselves as a

154. A similar observation is made by Hocédez (1930, *Introd*., p. 56) to the extent that misled by the idea that language runs parallel with the material world it is about, some people (like the Platonists) consider pure forms as concrete real beings existing outside. He quotes with approval Pierre Rousselot, 'Métaphysique thomiste et critique de la connaissance' (in *Revue néoscolastique* 17 (1910, 476-509), p. 478: "C'est que, se laissant tromper par le language (qui reflète directement notre connaissance des objets matériels), ils parlent des formes pures comme si elles étaient des êtres concrets, et des 'éléments de l'être comme s'ils étaient des êtres complets. Ils [the Neothomists are meant] leur reprochent ce qu'on pourrait nommer peut-être, en s'inspirant d'une formule de Kant, la *fallacia formae reificatae*".

155. A similar view is developed in our volume I, *De formis*, *Introd*., p. XCIXf.

result of their controversial *parti-pris* with regard to putative basics. They all firmly believed these basics were unshakable, thought-independent truths. So, even the censorious adherents to the parallellism postulate among them failed to see that, eventually, any thinker is working on 'Reality' inasmuch as it presents itself through our cognitive faculties.

As we have remarked with regard to the discussions about the plurality of forms, yet another idiosyncracy coming to the fore in medieval altercations in general should be considered. Frequently the combatants make us believe that they are not open-minded to their opponents' intentions and arguments. Anything that can somehow (at times with far-fetched ostensible counter-evidence) be explained as untruthful, falls victim to their malignant censure.[156]

A final remark can be made about the historian's *modus operandi*. It is up to the historian to account for the *data*, including those pertaining to the history of ideas, in a wider context, particularly recognizing possible influences and imaginable ascendancies. Any such undertaking needs to take some influential thinker or stream of thought as a point of reference in order to delineate a consistent development. A subjective evaluation of the matter is necessarily part of the enterprise. As such there is nothing wrong with that. One can run the risk, however, of describing the selected thinker as a point of reference in terms of the development under examination and thus misrepresenting his own positions. I am afraid this is what happened (and still threatens to happen) to Thomas Aquinas's position regarding the real distinction issue. Even those who unequivocally (and quite correctly) defend that Henry of Ghent's battle against the real distinction was exclusively directed against Giles of Rome, are inclined to ascribe an explicit opinion on this score to Aquinas or cannot refrain from seriously speculating about what Thomas might have thought of the real distinction. Hocédez for instance clearly exposes (1927; 1928; 1930 *Introd.,* 101f.) the incorrect view (advanced by Pierre Mandonnet among others) that Aquinas was Henry's target, but then proceeds to evaluate (*ibid*., 43-67; 100-116) the late thirteenth-century ontological developments *vis-à-vis* Aquinas's supposed views on the matter, which he brings up under the heading 'L'énigme du Thomisme'.[157] In general, quite a few historians studying the period around 1300 seem predisposed not only to take Thomas Aquinas's thought as a yardstick

156. Cfr. de Rijk (2012).

157. In a similar context Gilson exposes (1955, 421) the senseless use by historians of (supposedly) Thomistic views as a yardstick for evaluating doctrinal positions of the period.

for delineating alternative positions of the time, but also to actually use it to measure their philosophic soundness.[158]

8. *Harvey's intervention in the ontological debate*

Like *De formis*, in this second tract of *De quattuor materiis*, *De esse et essential,* the subject matter is dealt with in the framework of Harvey's antagonism and animosity towards Henry of Ghent and his way of philosophizing. In our Vatican manuscript (V) the second tract is characterized as *Determinatio contra henricum de gandavo.*[159] As is clear from its title, the present tract is devoted to the hotly debated controversy about the proper ontological relationships between *esse* and *essentia*, that between essence and actual existence in particular. It divides into two main parts. The author begins with a survey of five questions selected from Henry's *Quodlibeta*; they are found in capita 1-119 of the present edition. In the second main part (capp. 120-335), they are thoroughly discussed. This second part has two sections. In the first section (capp. 120-178), our author expounds some fundamental viewpoints that he regards as decisive for correctly evaluating the different positions concerning the ontology of finite being. After the conclusion of *De esse et essentia* Harvey has added a short tract of his own, *De materia et forma* (capp. 1-32 in the present edition) which discusses the same subject matter as two preceding treatises.[160]

8.1-8.3 *The basic tenets underlying Harvey's own contribution to the debate*

Like in *De formis* (capp. 205-278), Harvey prefaces (capp. 120-178) his treatment of the five selected questions (capp. 179-335) with a general discussion of three main issues concerning the ontology of created being: first (120-146), the precise meanings of the key notions 'esse' and 'essentia'; second (147-153), their interrelationships in terms of sameness and diversity and third, what is the diverse and multifarious impact of the

158. The misrepresentations by meritorious older Neothomists like Mandonnet certainly had to do with the frame of mind (say, the 'Aeterni Patris syndrome') that became current in Neothomist circles after the publication of the encyclical 'Aeterni Patris'(1879) by the great Pope Leo XIII, who recommended (particularly for the priest seminaries) to replace contemporaneous pastiches like Rosminianism with the sedate study of Thomas Aquinas.

159. See our introduction to vol. I, *De formis*, p. XIX. For the manuscripts of *De quattuor materiis*, see *ibid*., pp. X-XXIV.

160. See *Introd*. to vol. I, p. XXIVf.

sameness position upon the ontology concerning created things ("quomodo stent ea que rebus attribuuntur in positione qua ponetur de ydemptitate eorum"). The four sections (printed in the present edition as CAPITULA I-IV) of the remainder of *De esse et essentia* are announced in cap. 120:

> In hiis stant dicta istius hominis de differentia ipsius essentie et esse. Ad videndum ergo quomodo sit de esse et essentia in creaturis, oportet videre quid nomine 'essentie' importetur et quid nomine ipsius 'esse'. Et postea videndum de essentia quomodo se habeant esse et essentia secundum ydemptitatem et diversitatem. Et ultimo quomodo stent ea que rebus attribuuntur in positione qua ponetur de ydemptitate eorum. Et hiis positis, descendetur ad questiones premissas.

8.1.1 *The Ghentian 'solus respectus' doctrine attacked*

Regarding the first main (definitorial) theme (120-146) it should be remarked (cap. 122) that to Henry of Ghent, the actualized compound entity is something made up of the relationship ('respectus') this entity has towards God as its exemplar, and the generic nature upon which this relationship is founded. Its 'esse essentie' acts as the foundation of this *respectus*. For this reason (still on Henry's view), the created thing's essential nature belongs to the predicamental order only in as far as this nature is regarded as that upon which the *respectus* is founded. A corollary is that essences possess real being from eternity.

Harvey proposes (122) to attack the *respectus* doctrine with regard to the three main tenets it appears to include. He puts forward his own three opposite views: (a) that the creature's essence does not include a real relation to God (this claim is supported in capp. 122-127); (b) The creature's essence as a whole belongs to the predicamental order (capp. 128-131); (c) The creature's essence does not possess real, essential or actual being from eternity (capp. 132-142).

His first argument (122) is taken from the general concept of 'relation', which is not compatible with the notion 'absolute being'. Now substantial, quantitative, qualitative essences (and so on) designate absolute beings, so these concepts rule out that they should include any relationship. Another argument (123-124) is based upon the difference between real being and conceptual being ('ens rationis'). Unlike substantial, quantitative *etc*. essences which are real outside things — as appears from the fact that outside being ('ens extra animam') is divided by Aristotle into the ten categories ('predicamenta') — a relation is a conceptual being. In this context several collateral theses require further examination.

[a] *Specific essences do belong to the predicamental order in their entirety.* This is proved (129ff.) by the fact that the notion 'animal' said of, say, a concrete human being includes everything conveyed by 'ens', just as animality includes the generic notion of essence. Now because both animal and animality totally belong to predicamental being, therefore so do their essences. It can be concluded ultimately (131) that the 'respectus ad Deum' belongs to the category 'relation', and that if essence includes this *respectus*, it signifies things belonging to different categories. All these conclusions are against Henry's position.
[b] *Creatural being does not possess real essential or existential being from eternity.*
Several arguments are adduced to prove this thesis (132-142). One is taken (134) from the notion of exemplarity. Whatever only possesses an ontic state deriving from its having its exemplar in God, without there being God's effective causality, owes its complete being to its being an intellection (no matter the nature of this intellection), rather than real being. Therefore, exemplarity by itself does not include essential or existential being from eternity. There is an important corollary (135) that generally speaking, cognitional conditions do not by themselves cause any real condition in the thing cognized, for real conditions are always the effect of effective causality. In other words, a relationship is never by itself productive (136: 'solus respectus numquam producit').

Furthermore (140), if the essences of things existed from eternity in their cause, God, the outcome of natural agents too would be nothing but some *respectus*. In this line of thought something calefying will not cause heat in a calefactible, because from eternity heat is present in it. If so, the absurd consequence will be that it only causes a certain *respectus* existing in the compound made up of these two. Also the well-known comparison concerning the items 'cursus, currens, currere' comes (141) under examination. According to Henry, 'essentia', 'ens' and 'esse' relate to one another in the same way as this trio. However, it is objected, whenever there is talk of *course*, there is *eo ipso* an act of *running* and an instance of *running thing*. Hence you cannot claim with Henry that while existential being is not from eternity, essence is.

8.1.2 The ontological key notions otherwise defined

In capp. 143-146 Harvey presents his own definitions of the key terms onder discussion. By 'essence' in general he understands that owing to which a being is being, leaving aside the notions 'instance of being' ('ens'), 'created or uncreated', 'in act or in potency'. On the other hand, 'ens' signifies that which has an essence, no matter what essence (either

created or uncreated, either in act or in potency), leaving aside all the specifications to which it is analogically common, rather than univocally. The phrase 'essentia creature' signifies that by which something is a created being, leaving aside its being actually or potentially, although the notion 'actual being' is prior to 'potential being', because potency comes to be known by analogy to its actualization. (143).

Once again, the semantic comparison is taken into consideration (144). Just as 'to shine' ('lucere') and 'to be hot'('calere') are related to 'light' and 'heat', respectively, so is 'esse' to 'essentia', because in either case what one says verbally, the other says nominally. However, there is a significant difference in as far as *course* and *heat* are in order. Unlike 'esse' (and 'lucere', for that matter), 'calere' and 'currere' (and the like) are such that you cannot say 'Heat is hot' or 'Run runs', whereas you can say 'An essence is' or 'A light shines'. This is because the verbs 'calere' and 'currere' are commonly taken to stand for 'possessing heat or a state of running' ('habendo calorem et cursum'), or 'being the subject-substrate of heat or course', rather than for heat and course by themselves. Things are different for the verb 'esse' in that 'A is' both means 'A has an essence' and 'It happens to A to be that owing to which it is a being'.[161] Hence not only a *suppositum* having an essence is said 'to be', but the same applies to an essence and even being itself ('ipsum esse').

Next (145) the concepts 'existence' and 'to exist' are elucidated. Like 'essentia' and 'esse', these two also differ in terms of nominal or verbal use, which has its impact on the use of the phrases 'esse essentie' and 'esse existentie'. So the noun 'existentia' is also used for 'to have an essence', whereas 'the verb 'existere' can convey this condition of 'having' ('habi-tudo'). Finally (146) the difference between 'esse essentie' and 'esse existentie' is established with reference to the foregoing expositions. It is because the notion of 'having an essence' conveyed by the verb 'esse' is signified by 'existence' nominally, that therefore 'esse essentie' and 'esse existentie' differ in the way in which *habitus* and act (i.e. the act ('actus essendi') conveyed by the verb 'esse') differ from 'habere actum'. An alternative explanation of the difference contains an interesting (but rather speculative) allusion to the prefix 'ex' in 'existentia' and 'existere': both terms refer to a thing's being in its proper nature outside ('extra') its cause, whereas the verb 'esse' in a more abstract way stands both for a thing's virtual being in its cause and for its being in its

161. The text reads: "Esse vero dicitur et habere essentiam et convenire sibi esse illud quo ens est".

proper nature. In spite of the weakness of the linguistic support[162] this (would be) elucidation is surely to the point.

8.2 On the sameness of essence and being ('esse')

The second main theme (147-153) is about the sameness of essence and being ('esse'). Harvey cleverly summarizes (147) the previous findings: essence is that by which something is a being (*ens*); to 'be' comes down to 'having an essence'; with 'ens' we designate that which has the essence. The way in which the differences between these terms is expressed also clarifies the kinships upon which their semantic affinities are based. There cannot be talk of *esse* without there being an essence or a compound made up of a plurality of essences involved, in spite of the mutual differences the use of the terms 'esse' and 'essence' have because of their own specific mode of signifying (to wit, verbal and nominal).

From what has now been established, it can be shown (148-149) that *esse* does not add to essence an absolute (read 'unrelated') actuality which would be diverse from the finite being's essence and compound. Firstly (148), the affinity between *esse* and essence is compared to the similar one between 'to shine'('lucere') and 'light' ('lux'). Secondly (149-150), the components of material substances, prime matter and the substantial form, and the compound and its coincidental forms, are one to the other in such a way that matter considered by itself is pure potency with regard to actual *esse*. Now the material substantial form does not act as an absolute *agens*, but requires susceptive matter. Likewise accidents need an actual being to inhere in, and a composite substance needs essential parts (i.e. matter and form), as well as an agent actualizing it, and this alone. Therefore, although in the end only an agent is required for the actualization of an essence, the factor *esse* is not something absolute, unrelated to the compound's essence and its parts.

Cap. 153 makes clear that, like in the previous section, Harvey intends to stay away from Henry of Ghent's 'solus respectus' doctrine, but also keeps his distance from Giles of Rome's distinction 'inter rem et rem'. Once again, the 'esse,essence/currere,cursus' item is explained in the semantic terms of different modes of signifying.

162. From the originally agricultural meaning of the prefix 'ex-' in 'existere' (= 'to turn up', 'to come out' said of field crops), the verb developed its cognitional sense of 'to appear'. See de Rijk (1985), 147.

8.3 A great number of objections raised and solved

Harvey sets out to deal with a gamut of objections (154-178) concerning several substantial matters that usually have their bearing upon the ontological debate. By explicitly bringing them up he has the opportunity to defend his own ways of mastering the difficult ontological issues. He begins (154-158) with the intricate questions resulting from the rejection of the foregoing 'from eternity' thesis. They are three (154): [1] If essence does not possess real being from eternity, the permanent truth of propositions like 'Essence is essence', 'Man is man' will have to do without a real foundation; [2] likewise only actually existing things will belong to the predicamental order, whereas it is clear enough that *man*, *animal* and the like are in the category of Substance from eternity (and not merely after they have been actualized in the outside world); [3] in addition, when the things conveyed by such terms as 'man', 'animal' do not really exist, they will, like 'chimera' and 'bouc-cerf', only signify figments.

As for the first problem, Harvey argues (155), this is something not only he, but his opponents too would have to solve, because the same applies to propositions like 'Existentia est existentia'. The second objection is cast aside by distinguishing between two senses of 'predicamentum', viz. the predicamental order itself, and the extramental things falling under it. The thing is that prior to their actualization, things potentially fall under the predicamental order. It all depends on our consideration. Whether or not we conceive them as actually existing, they will always be subjected to the predicamental order. The third objection is countered (157) by underlining the difference still existing between 'animal' and 'chimera' in that the former signifies a truthful thing, whereas the latter does not.

When passing over (in cap. 158) to his rejection of the Aegidean 'distinctio realis' the author first notifies his reader about the compositorial design of the remainder of the present tract. His own solution to the distinction problem (to the effect that in creatural beings the difference between essence and esse (or essence and existence) should be semantically reduced to different modes of signifying) acts as the chief issue. He reminds us that this was the issue that inspired him to select the five questions from Henry's *Quodlibeta* he reported before (capp. 1-119). The many difficulties raised around the Aegidian real distinction ('inter rem et rem') will be the subject matter of the final section (179-335) in which these five questions will separately come under examination. Some should be brought forward, however, right now, in the present preliminary section (120-178):

> *De esse et essentia*, cap. 158: Circa vero secundum dictum, scilicet quod essentia creature et esse non differunt re secundum subiectum et actus additus ad ipsum sed penes modum significandi, sunt multe difficultates que posite sunt in questionibus supra recitatis de esse et essentia. Quarum alique ponende sunt hic et solvende. Ad alias vero patebit discurrendo per questiones suprapositas.

The difficulties that should be addressed straight away are fourteen. They all arise from the creature's imperfection and its contingency. The questions concerning the creature's imperfection are about the fact that it lacks subsistency ('esse subsistens') and perpetuity ('semper esse'). In this line of argumentation (159-162), four important items will come up for discussion: [a] the division of terms into concrete and abstract; [b] the twofold sense of 'esse' and [c] of 'illimitatio'; [d] the verification of the assertion 'Hoc non est illud', and consequently the precise meaning of 'esse oppositum'.

8.3.1 *On concrete and abstract terms*

The difference between concrete and abstract terms is a very important issue. For one needs to make clear that the assumption (as Giles of Rome avers) that 'esse' does not convey any absolute nature to be added to a creature's essence, should imply that a creature or a creature's substance (e.g. *man* or *animal*) is its own proper being ('suum esse'). For instance, because of its mode of signifying, 'man' (which is the same as 'having manhood') conveys everything that can be possessed by a *suppositum* of the human nature. This means that as a concrete term in the category of Substance and by virtue of its own mode of signifying, 'man' does not exclude accidental being, whereas by virtue of its mode of signifying the abstract term does.

8.3.2 *The twofold acceptance of* esse *as* esse essentie *and* esse existentie

Likewise the previously discussed (146) difference between 'esse essentie' and 'esse existentie' plays a part in matters of ontology (164-165). If 'esse' is taken as 'esse essentie', the concrete creature, *man* or *animal* is not identical with its being because its essence taken abstractively is not its own being either; man indeed is not the same as his manhood. No matter, therefore, if you take 'essence' concretively or abstractively, it still is not its own being.

8.3.3 *The twofold sense of 'illimitatio'*

The solution to the other difficulty previously (cap. 159) raised on account of the limitless character of being as such requires us to distinguish between two different ways of taking 'illimitation' (166-168). This word has one sense in terms of predication, that is to say that any *universale* can be said to be limitless with regard to its possible instantiations; in this sense limitless being is common to the Creator and any creature as well. However, when 'limitless' is taken in terms of perfection without degree, things are different. When taken in the latter sense, the word 'limitless' should be understood as applying to being in general ('esse communiter dictum'), not by itself but in virtue of some kind of being that is analogically embraced by it, for example, in the way in which with regard to *man* we say 'Animal is rational'. In this line of thought it is true that being is limitless, with a view to divine being, that is.

8.3.4 *The verification of 'Hoc non est illud'*

On account of denying assertions such as 'Essentia est essentia' it is useful to recognize the semantic impact of the protocol sentence 'This is not that' (169). For example, the sentence 'Man is not whiteness' is not only verified by the fact that one (whiteness) can be taken away from the other (man) remaining; it can also be verified by the fact that of them one and the same can be imagined with opposite conditions, in the way in which potential whiteness is opposed to actual whiteness. In this manner you can take being away from essence, saying 'Essence is not', which boils down to merely denying that essence in act is essence in potency. And this is true because 'is' said simply is mainly used for actually having an essence, or (in other words) for the kind of being in virtue of which something actually *is*. Therefore, having this in mind you could always truthfully say that essence *is*. The same holds good for the use of 'esse oppositum' (170).

8.3.5 *On the remaining arguments adduced on this score*

The remaining arguments adduced in the *pro* and *con* discussions (159-162) on account of the sameness/diversity issue concerning essence and existence are the subject matter of capp. 171-178. In all of them the act/potency issue is the core business, not only with respect to the potentiality of the creational essence but also to the potentiality of the act of creation, its causality, and the Creator's free will ('liberum arbitrium').

8.4 *Henry's refutation of the Aegidian real distinction*

Coming now to Harvey's treatment (in capp. 1-119 and 179-335) of the five selected questions taken from Henry's *Quodlibeta*, some preliminary remarks should be made about its compositorial complexity. To begin with, our author's report of these questions is interspersed with incidental remarks about the ongoing ontological discussions from 1276 onwards. More than once these remarks contain our author's critical comments upon what other participants of the ontological debates had come up with. Likewise in the proper treatment of the five questions (179-335) Harvey frequently comes to speak about the views held by Giles or other (anonymous) 'adversarii' of Henry's, and quite often he sides with Henry against his adversaries, Giles of Rome in particular. In addition, some important issues (e.g. the well-known Boethian authorities taken from *De hebdomadibus*) come up for discussion piecemeal, scattered as they are over different questions.

Harvey's first question (capp. 1-7; 179-189) directly affects the heart of the matter (the Aegidian real distinction between essence and existence in terms of 'inter rem et rem'). It has been taken from Henry 's *Quodlibet* I, 9 ("Utrum creatura ipsa sit suum esse"), the wording of which has been adapted by Harvey to suit the distinction controversy: 'Whether a creature's being or existence really differs from its essence'.

Harvey reports (capp. 2-5) Henry's specifications of some key concepts. First (2-4). A creature's participating in *esse* should be understood in such a way that its essence considered by itself and abstractively is indifferent to actual being and non-being. Any essence possesses *esse* as a share in divine being. Its actualization, then, is only due to God's creative act, not to *esse* as some supervenient factor different from essence. Further (5-6), there are two kinds of *esse*, viz. of essence and of existence. Now the 'esse existentie' does not befall to something in virtue of its essence, but by being impressed from outside, viz. God's creation. Just as 'esse essentie' differs from essence only conceptually ('sola ratione'), 'esse existentie' differs from it intentionally ('intentione'). The latter difference is compared to the one between 'cursus' and 'currere', which is likewise based upon the different modes of signifying the same thing. The notion of 'essence' consists in God's being its exemplar, that of actual existence in its being God's actual effect.

Finally, as to the authorities from *De hebdomadibus*, either Boethius understood by 'esse' uncreated being and by 'quod est' created being, or he took the difference between 'esse' and 'essence' in terms of an intentional distinction. In cap. 179 Harvey reminds the reader that the difference between creatural being and its essence is to be reduced to different

modes of signifying (viz. verbal or nominal, respectively), but censures Henry's concept of participation as forwarded in his use of the Boethian authorities. While agreeing with his opponent that any being coming from outside implies participated being, none the less Harvey is of the opinion that this feature does not precisely make up the proper nature of participation. He distinguishes three modes of participation. One concerns the way in which a subject-substrate participates a form, in which case the 'participans' and the 'participatum' essentially differ (as in 'Man participates whiteness'), although they both coincide with the subject-substrate. In this line of thinking a creature only participates being in as far as one creature (man) is the other's (whiteness) substrate. Notice Harvey's (quite common)[163] use of the term 'participatum' ('that which is participated') to stand for the immanent share of whiteness. It will appear (184) that a creature's participation of being should not be understood in terms of this first mode of participation.

In the next, final section of the preliminary topics (232) Henry's view of participation is once again somewhat qualified by Harvey. When Giles argues (reported in cap. 44) that an essence must be something really different from *esse* because nothing participates itself, Henry consents, but points out that the creature participates God, rather than a separate factor *esse*. Harvey agrees but repeats his own analysis of participation in terms of modes of signifying. One and the same thing can be said to participate itself if you take its 'being' to refer to the beingness that is common to God and creature, understanding the creature's *esse* diminutively with regard to divine perfect Being. This is to say that the creature's participated being is really the same as God's being, but that to which it is compared in its capacity of being a share, is called God.

8.4.1 *On the three modes of participation*

Returning now to the three modes of participation, Harvey says (181-184) that they come down to the three ways in which something (say, A) can participate something else (say, B). Firstly, in the manner in which a subject-substrate (e.g. man) participates a form (e.g. whiteness). As we have already observed, in this case the participant (A) is essentially different from the thing participated (B), and only makes up the same thing in virtue of the substrate. Now, this is not the way in which a creature participates being. Another kind of participation is in order when a concretum is said to participate an abstract nature, meaning that the concrete term signifies the thing in question in terms of 'whole' and 'having',

163. See our sections 3.2 and 4.1- 4.2 and 5.2 above.

while the abstract term signifies it in terms of 'part' and 'what is had'. In this manner Socrates or man participates manhood. Now, a concrete creature (say, man) is said to participate an essence (manhood) and being. An abstract essence, however, does not as such participate being properly. Therefore it is significant that Boethius always says that 'what is' participates being, rather than that an essence does. The third way of participation is in order when 'A participates B' means that A (e.g. air) has something (heat) imperfectly whereas B (fire) has it perfectly. In this manner a creature's participated being is diminished being ('esse diminutum') with regard to divine Being. In this kind of participation, the participant (A) merely differs from the thing participated (B) like the inferior from its superior. In these two latter ways a creature can be said to participate being, and accordingly you have the Boethian authorities in which he claims that created being participates *esse*.[164]

8.4.2 *The roles of essential and existential being misunderstood by Henry*

After having argued (185-187) that Henry's arguments against the 'adversarius' (= Giles of Rome) are beside the point, Harvey claims that Henry is mistaken about the roles of essential and existential being. Firstly, it is wrong to think that just as the relationship to the efficient cause makes up existential being, so essential being boils down to the relationship to the divine exemplar, as is suggested in Henry's 'distinctio intentionis'.

8.5 *Whether an essence is as such indifferent to being and non-being*

In his report of the next selected question (capp. 8-12) Harvey remarks that Henry's solution to this question of *Quodlibet* III, 9 comes down to making some distinctions about 'created essence', 'non-being', and 'indifference to being and non-being'.

8.5.1 *On the threefold consideration of 'created essence'*

Henry distinguishes (9) between three ways of considering a created essence. It can be considered [a] in its capacity of being a natural thing found in particulars, [b] in as far as qua intellected thing it is present in the intellect, and [c] just by itself. In the last way created essence is considered with regard to its essential being, which belongs to it in as far as it has an exemplar in the divine mind, and is entirely opposite to the two

164. For an extensive discussion of the Boethian authorities taken from *De hebdomadibus* see our sections 6.1.4 and 6.1.5.

preceding kinds of being, because of its priority to these. It should be remarked, however, that in fact an essence is always either in an outside thing, or in an intellect (at least in the divine intellect).

8.5.2 *On twofold non-being*

Another distinction is made (10). The phrase 'non esse' either negates any idea of being, or only actual existence. In the former sense no essence is indifferent to being and non-being. If we take the phrase in the latter sense we are forced to distinguish the notion of indifference.

8.5.3 *On the twofold indifference to being and non-being*

Something can be indifferent to being and non-being in two distinct ways (11). In one way it is indifferent in as far as it has neither being nor non-being and is open to either of them. In this sense nothing is indifferent to actual being or non-being, according to the well-known Aristotelian adage (*Metaph*. IV 6, 1011b20-22)[165] that for anything it holds that it either actually is or is not the case. In another way something can be indifferent to actual being and non-being, meaning that considered by itself it is not necessarily determined to either being or non-being and one of them now befalls to it, now the other. In this manner, Henry asseverates, created essence qua having its exemplar in God is not determined to being or non-being without the simultaneous possibility of non-being and being, respectively.

8.5.4 *Some other scholars' opinions about ontic indifference*

In the greater part of his treatment of this question (190-204) the author is focussed (190-200) on opinions held by some people who disagree with Henry (whose solution to the main question has already been mentioned). These anonymous 'quidam' (among them Giles of Rome in the first place) distinguish between three modes of a thing's being ('esse rei'). According to its being comprised in its ontic principles a thing is simply determined to (actual) non-being because it is only in potency. On the other hand, according to its being in its proper nature it is not indifferent, but actually determined to being. The third mode of being they have in mind is the thing's being cognized. In this capacity it is again indifferent because it can be the object of cognition, no matter if it actually exists or not (190).

165. For the basic importance of the laws of contradiction and excluded middle see de Rijk (2002) II, 85-97.

Harvey rejects this manner of evaluating a thing's ontic indifference. Something is not indifferent to opposites, he argues (191), such that it can have (or has) the one and the other opposite at the same time, but by the fact that when it has the one, its having the other at another time is not logically excluded. For example, an animal is indifferent to health and illness not because it can have both at the same time, but because its having health now is not incompatible with its having illness later on. This view is applied to the essence's indifference to being and non-being and elucidated by the use of the reduplicative formula 'secundum quod', saying that a thing in potency, qua being just in potency, is indifferent to being and non-being, but taken by itself (e.g. in God's mind) its actual being in the outside world at another time is quite possible.

8.5.5 *On the irrelevance of an essence being or not being cognized*

Harvey insists (192-193) on the unavailableness of the third distinction made by the 'quidam' concerning the 'esse cognitum'. The indifference topic has nothing to do with a thing's being or not being cognized by an intellect. Further, it is not because of the fact that something can be actually known, no matter if it exists or does not exist, that a thing cognized is indifferent to being and non-being. The real reason is that the intellectual cognition of a thing is indifferent to its regarding an existent or non-existent object, and also that a thing qua cognized or being present in the intellect[166] is indifferent to being and non-being. Therefore, a creature's essence is indifferent to being and non-being not only according to its cognitive being, but also in its capacity of its being really the case in the outside world. Briefly, in its real being a creature's essence is indifferent to being and non-being, quite independently from any conceptual being.

8.5.6 *Harvey's own position concerning the indifference topic*

The author concludes (194) that the presently discussed position — that a creature's essence should be indifferent to being and non-being only in terms of conceptual and cognitional *esse* — does not seem correct. Next he sets out to develop his own opinion about the creatural essence's indifference to being and non-being and the annex question about the meaning of the phrase 'non esse'.

166. The 'res secundum quod cognita' formula seems to refer to the thing's objective being, whereas 'res secundum quod est in intellectu' rather refers to its subjective being in the intellect as its subject-substrate.

As for the indifference topic proper (195-197), the indifference under examination can be understood in a twofold way. In one sense an essence actually remaining in its proper nature successively acts as the subject-substrate of being and non-being (in a similar way as a body is as such indifferent to whiteness and blackness). In this line of thought the substantial essence is indifferent to actual being and non-being, and a material essence is indifferent to being and non-being of some determinate substantial form. The whole creature, however, cannot be indifferent to the whole actual being or non-being. This sense turns out to be quite useless. The indifference topic should be brought forward in another way.

There is indeed another mode of indifference according to which something is called indifferent to some opposites such that [a] what is conveyed by either of the opposites can befall to it without its being necessarily determined to the one or the other, and [b] what is conveyed by the opposites does not act as a subject-substrate of both opposites. For example, if one says that man is indifferent to being corrupted or not corrupted, the phrase 'being corrupted' does not convey that he himself should be the substrate of the being corrupted, but rather that he is the *terminus a quo* of the corruption, whose essence and *esse* are taken away by the corruption. Now this is the manner in which an essence is indifferent to being and non-being, speaking, that is, about coincidental being; it is clear then that what is conveyed by either of the opposites can befall to him, leaving any act of thinking aside, whereas (in addition) he is not determined to one or the other of the opposites.

Next the meaning of 'non-being'('non esse') should be defined more precisely, because indifference also includes non-being (198). Total non-being boils down to not having any actual reality. This applies to an entity in as far as God, given his free will, can refrain from producing it or from conserving it after production. Things that come to be through intermediate causes are both matter and *agens*. This is to say that this indifference concerns the domain of real being, since although negation is not a real thing itself, that which is negated (viz. the creature's being) is a real being ('ens reale').

In cap. 199 we are reminded that *esse* can be denied of essence (and thus marked off from it) when one is taken in act and the other in potency, or one in the past and the other in the present or the future. In cap. 200 an objection is cast aside to the effect that essence cannot be indifferent to being and non-being, because non-being is incompatible with essence as wel as with *esse*, given that *esse* and essence are at least inseparable. Harvey replies that actual non-being is incompatible with actual essence, but certainly compatible with potential essence. Briefly, non-being is not compatible with essence when they are both taken uniformly.

After having dealt with these 'quidam' our author replies (201-204) to the arguments adduced by Henry (and reported in capp. 8-12). Henry's first remark is right that an essence has being in an outside thing and in the intellect as well, i.e. conceptual being ('esse rationis'). His additional remark, however, that essential being is abstracted from both real and conceptual being is rejected by Harvey. Not only is it contrary to truth, but it also clashes with Henry's own position, according to which 'conceptual being' (i.e, 'being intellected') is part of the idea of 'essence', since 'esse essentie' consists in having its exemplar in God, viz. in the divine intellect. Now the essence's really existing in God is an instance of conceptual being.

Finally Harvey rejects Henry's counter-argument (reported cap. 8 above) that knowledge is of created things, no matter if they exist or do not exist, so the created thing's essence or quiddity is indifferent to being and non-being. This argument only proves that scientific propositions can be true when their objects do not exist. For their truth their existential being is no less required than their essential being.

8.6 The utmost important question about saving creation

Coming now to the third selected question, the most salient controversy of the end thirteenth-century ontological debates was centred around the philosophic position of creation. No minor issue was at stake than to explain the possibility of the phenomenon of free creation *vis à vis* Neoplatonic emanation. As has been remarked before, creation is the key-notion in any system of Christian ontology, creation being not only its fixed (and obligate) starting-point but its truth-standard as well. Arguments against the opposite ontological views are always taken from their supposed incompatibility with the Catholic doctrine of creation. The Christian philosopher has to determine in some way or another the obvious difference between being ('esse') and existence, because every answer to the question has its impact upon the doctrine of creation, its possibility in particular. In the early 1270s Giles of Rome became increasingly convinced that the current lack of clarity on this account, which was even prevailing in academic circles, could be a risk for Catholic truth (see our sections 2.1-2,2 above).

Small wonder, then, that the lion part of *De esse et essentia* is made up of the extensive third and fifth questions (capp. 13-45 and 65-119; 205-232 and 253-335). In these sections, the vivid discussions between the participants, including alternative opinions held by scholars like Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles of Lessines and Thomas of Sutton, tend to dominate the scene, at the cost of Harvey's chief opponent, Henry of Ghent,

against whom the present *determinationes* are said to be directed in the first place.

8.6.1 *Harvey's report of the third selected question. The ongoing debates about it*

The third question, which is taken from Henry's *Quodlibet* X, 7, is about Giles's main complaint against contemporaneous theologians, Henry of Ghent in particular, that whoever rejects the real distinction between *esse* and a creature's essence cannot save creation. Henry vehemently rejects Giles's claim and thrashes the matter out, as also appears from Harvey's report (capp. 14-64). Henry first points out the opinion of his (anonymous) adversaries (read, Giles of Rome's)[167] and their arguments (14-17). Next he repeats (18) his own opinion about the sameness or coincidence of *esse* and essence. Neither essential being ('esse essentie') nor existential being ('esse existentie') are something absolute added (as Giles claims) to an essence; the only thing supervenient on the essence is its relationship to the Creator ('solus respectus sive ordo ad Deum'). Just as a creature has essential being due to its relationship to God as its real formal (exemplary) cause, so it possesses existential being effected by God related as it is to God as its efficient cause, either directly or through a natural agent (in the cases of generation).

8.6.2 *On subjective and objective (or terminative) potentiality*

The first objection (in fact advanced by Giles of Rome) runs as follows (19): An efficient cause only actualizes something potential by impressing itself upon it or another act effecting this potential thing's formal being. Now God cannot impress himself upon a creature's essence if it only has the possibility to exist. Therefore he impresses some other 'thing' upon it which is different from the essence, and this is the factor *esse*. Another objection is directed against Henry's 'solus respectus' doctrine. Existence cannot be effected by a sole relationship, but only by something absolute. The first objection leads (20) Henry to distinguish between subjective and objective potentiality. Subjective (or a subject-substrate's) potentiality is the potentiality a subject-substrate has of being receptive of something, such as the one matter has with regard to the form. In a similar vein a form can be called objectively potential being in as far as it is the agent's object and the end-term of the potentiality. Therefore the opponent's argument can only be agreed to as far as the substrate's potentiality is concerned; it does not apply to objective (or

167. See about the use of the plural in such debates, section 6.1, n. 68 above.

terminative) potentiality. So the potentiality of a creature's essence does not pertain to its (supposed by Giles) being the substrate receptive of the (supposedly) absolute form *esse*, but only refers to the 'esse existentie' qua object or end-term of God's creative act.[168]

8.6.3 *Once again, Henry's 'solus respectus' doctrine*

From cap. 23 onwards we can clearly see how in the ongoing discussions since 1276 the different stances were taking shape and by the same token how they were becoming increasingly fixed. To Henry it matters very much to keep his doctrine on its feet that an essence's actualization by creation does not require the supervenience upon it of *esse* as an absolute form, because God's creative act as efficient cause is enough. Harvey rightly reports the repetitious make-up of the arguments (23-28). They will be subjected by our author to a critical evaluation in capp. 212-221.

8.6.4 *Once again Henry's 'distinctio intentionis'*

The 'solus respectus' doctrine could jeopardize the idea of God's creation if it were to nullify the difference between essence and existence alltogether. This undesirable outcome is prevented by Henry's innovation of the intentional (or focal) distinction ('distinctio intentionis'). Both for Giles and Henry and Harvey, what is at stake in the background of the entire discussion, is the metaphysics of being, the ontological structure of the Universe. With regard to the compositional structure of finite, creatural being, it is vital to solve the main problem concerning the relationship between essence and existence (including creation and Christological matters).

Henry constantly asserts that his 'solus respectus' view does not reduce the difference between essence and existence to a merely rational or conceptual one, because, as we have repeatedly observed, intentional distinction represents a special kind of conceptualisation. Giles's ironical remark that from the start he has been unable to see the difference between 'differre ratione tantum' and 'differre intentione' needs particular attention. Henry goes on to explain what he has in mind. Taking the terms 'man' and 'rational animal' for an example, he explains what he means by the three distinctions ('real', 'conceptual' and 'intentional').[169] 'Man' and 'rational animal' (qua definitum and definiens, respectively) designate the same thing in different ways, but their difference is only concep-

168. The adversary's second objection is simply denied as invalid (cap. 22).
169. See for a broader exposition of Henry's use of the 'distinctio secundum intentionem' our sections 6.1.2; 6.3.2; 7.3, 1-2; 8.6.4; 8.6.8; 8.8.3; 8.9.7.

tual and due to our way of conceptualizing. When, on the other hand, one and the same white man is now designated as 'man', now as 'white thing', there is talk of a real compound made up of several things (manhood and whiteness), but you can imagine man going together with not-white, or whiteness with not-man. A third case is found in the composition of the genus *animal* and the specific difference *rational*. When some human being is designated as *rational animal*, the difference goes beyond mere conceptualization (like it is found in definitum and definiens), Henry asseverates. Supposing a certain human being (man) is designated as *rational animal*, these different constitutive components of the species *man* do not really differ as subject/substrate and coincidental forms do; at the same time, they do differ more than the *definiens*, *rational animal* and the *definitum*, *man* do, because, unlike the latter pair, one of the former pair cannot be said of the other. Therefore, there must be a kind of difference in between the real and merely conceptual one. Now no matter which label you use ('secundum intentionem' or 'secundum rationem'), the difference between essence and *esse* should be indicated in terms of this intermediate difference.

8.6.5 *Saving creation*

Henry replies (30-32) to the principal question about the possibility of saving creation by qualifying his affirmation. To be sure,whoever maintains that in virtue of its proper nature a creature's essence is its own being, is unable to save creation, because this is the Creator's privilege. On the other hand, if someone shares his thesis, Henry avers, to the effect that a creature's *esse* does not add something absolute to its essence, but only some relationship to God as its efficient cause, he can save creation, and does so in a better way than who maintains (with Giles) that the factor *esse* should be something absolute supervening on the essence. To his mind, the adversaries cannot even save the creation of the *esse* itself. Next Henry counters (33-45) all the adversary's arguments. Harvey will evaluate these replies (including what Giles puts forward in his opposite claims) in capp. 206ff.

8.6.6 *Harvey's final evaluation of the entire debate about saving creation*

The highly controversial debate ongoing from 1276 onwards about the philosophic position of creation is the subject matter of capp. 205-232. The subtitle found in two of our better manuscripts 'determinatio contra magistrum henricum de gandavo' is less representative than it appears at

first glance. In many of his stances Harvey in fact takes sides with Henry against Giles of Rome, such as in the principal question in particular when he rejects the Aegidian real distinction. His rejection of Henry's position frequently boils down to discarding some of his opponent's arguments. In addition, Harvey quite often omits an argument advanced by the adversary "because it affects Henry's position, not his".

In the opening chapter (205) the author defends (against Giles) the thesis that the rejection of the real distinction between *esse* and essence does not rule out creation, on the proviso that their sameness is understood as meaning that *esse* is the same as 'to have an essence' and *ens* as 'possessing an essence'. The Aegidian distinction pushes things too far, which is clear from several circumstances. Creation does not require a separate substrate into which the Agens should be in action, since the objective or terminative potentiality of the thing to be created — rather than the subjective one, which only concerns creation's material starting-point, so to speak — does not require the composition of two different components. In the following chapters 206-210 Giles's position is cast aside by Harvey because he fails to recognize the different senses of 'participated esse' explained earlier (see our sections 6.1.3 and 8.4.1) and the proper sense of 'analogia'.[170] Harvey's censure of Henry's refutation of the adversary's three initial arguments (212-221) is mainly about Henry's 'solus respectus' doctrine and his novel intentional distinction.

8.6.7 *Henry's 'solus respectus' doctrine rejected*

The *esse* falling to an essence by creation, Harvey argues (212-215), is not just the relationship to the Creator nor is it something existing in virtue of this relationship. It rather consists in God's activity as the efficient cause. Formally speaking, it is the case owing to the essence involved. As for the relationship to God, this follows the essence after it has been created. Henry's opposing the subject-substrate's potentiality to the terminative (or objective = 'final object-oriented') one does not help to save his 'solus respectus' view because a terminative potentiality needs to end in something absolute.

170. Remarkably enough, in the (philosophical faculty of the) fifteenth-century Dominican convent at Eichstätt (Bavaria, Germany) it is the Augustinian Giles of Rome's ontological doctrine that is predominant in the speculations about *esse* and *essentia*, rather than their fellow brother Harvey's. See Hoenen (1994), 446; 452; 458, who thoroughly discusses the anonymous *Zophismata Egidii de esse et essencia* found in Ms. Eichstätt, cod. st. 683, ff. 154v-157v.

8.6.8 *Henry's intentional (or focal) distinction radically rejected*

In capp. 218-221, Harvey presents his arguments against Henry's intentional distinction. Firstly it is said not to be to the point (218). Further, Henry's claim that within the domain of conceptualization there should be a separate species of distinguishing, one that is not entirely the same as the purely conceptual one ('distinctio rationis'), is denounced as being groundless, as is his exemplification concerning genus and definition. The man is mistaken when he opposes the mode of difference concerning genus and *differentia* to the one concerning *definiens* and *definitum*. Harvey proceeds to argue that even if this opposition as such is right, this does not justify the conclusion that the two differences should be more than merely two versions of the 'distinctio rationis', just as there are many within the domain of the real difference/distinction. For example, the real difference between a man and his whiteness is of another kind than that between *man* and *ass*. In addition, Henry's argument that a thing's genus and specific difference make up a compound is useless. If he means to say that these components are really diverse, he is wrong. If he tries to say that the composition is only conceptual he is surely right, but should realize that from this only a conceptual difference arises.

In cap. 227 — in which refers to cap. 35, conaining his reports about the putative three different stages of the act of creation ---, Harvey has an another opportunity to cast aside the intentional distinction as something absurd. He starts off by presenting Henry's account of creation. In order to analyze the act of creation, Henry conceptually ('secundum rationem') divides the indivisible instant in which it takes place into three so-called 'signa'. In the first the essence is deprived of *non-esse*; in the second, the proper transmutation that is called creation takes place; in the third the essence acquires *esse*, in such a way that the creature becomes a compound made up of two intentionally diverse things, viz. *esse* and essence, meaning that the essence by itself, in its capacity of being indifferent to being and non-being, is the subject-substrate of creation (which refers to subjective potentiality), while as some feature of the thing created it is the end-term of creation (which has to do with terminative potentiality). Harvey's report in cap. 35 winds up with the remark that Henry produces many absurdities on this account. In cap. 227 Harvey remarkably confines himself, however, to saying that the novelty of the three instances marked off in the act of creation is completely fantastic, because Henry imagines that some essence prior to creation is the substrate of non-being. Our author promises us he will extensively return to the three 'signa' view.[171]

171. The promise is not carried out in *De esse et essentia*. Presumably Harvey refers to

Yet another way in which Henry applied (reported earlier, capp, 40-41) the intentional distinction in order to solve an objection made by the adversary, was to the effect that although objective or terminative potentiality is not the same as subjective potentiality, they always go hand in hand, so their difference does not matter. Henry now tries to evade this reply by stating that to create a form is not the same as bringing the form to *esse* as to something that is really different from essence (as Giles maintains), but to what is intentionally different; consequently, Henry avers, the intentional difference is enough. Likewise you can say that this process not only implies the causing of matter to be matter or of essence to be essence, but equals no less than bringing matter or essence to an act of being that is intentionally different from them. Briefly, all that is required in a created thing is that the potential and the actual should be intentionally different and that it is made up of *esse* and essence as two intentionally (and definitely not really) different components. This reply to Giles is nullified by Harvey (230), because in case of factors being really the same, something cannot really come to be with regard to one of them without the other. For this reason you should simply say that to create an essence is not to bring it under the regime of something else, but simply to cause it, period.

In the final section (232) Harvey's depreciation of Henry's novel 'intentional distinction' is as radical as it is brute: he gives his consent to an argument of Henry's on the proviso that 'intentione' should be replaced with 'ratione'. In our section 8.8.3 it will be argued that like all Henry's other opponents Harvey did not understand the significance and semantical impact of Henry's phrase 'secundum intentionem' as opposed to both 'secundum rationem' and 'secundum rem'. Presumably all his opponents were hampered by their animosity towards Avicennian metaphysics.

8.6.9 *The authorities taken from* De hebdomadibus

Our author is of the opinion (231) that the Boethian 'esse' can be taken abstractively and 'quod est' concretively. Henry's additional remark that the former term refers to the Creator and the latter to creatures find some support, Harvey agrees, in Boethius's own comments (*De hebdomadibus*, p. 170, 14ff.). However, his explanation of Boethius's sayings in terms of a supposed intentional difference between *esse* and essence lacks good sense, Harvey insists.[172]

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his Quaestiones *In Sententias*; see our section 8.9.7 below.

172. It should be reminded that owing to Porretanus' authoritative comments both the theological and the philosophical interpretations of *esse* were available; see our

8.7 The collateral question about the composition of coincidental being

The controversial question about the relationship between essence and existence makes up the core business of *De esse and essentia*. As is patenly clear from the foregoing, no scholar, whether philosopher or theologian, ever denied that there was any relationship between these two. The thing was rather to determine the precise nature of the difference between being and existence without jeopardizing the unique act of divine creation. Giles of Rome thought that God's free creative act could only be fully recognized by assuming a real difference between essence and *esse* (i.e. the essence's actualization). His various opponents, on the other hand, maintained with an equal resoluteness that the Aegidian real distinction — including as it does the separateness of the factor *esse*, and, accordingly, suggesting a sort of pre-existence of the creature's essence — does not harmonize with the idea of the 'creation from nothing'. In this connection there was a collateral question[173] concerning the composition of the creature's essence with the act of being ('actus essendi'), the going together of which was compared to, or at least associated with, the hylomorphic composition of matter with form. The idea of 'composition' was indeed compulsory in any ontology of created being as opposed to Simple Being, whose essence completely coincides with its proper act of being ('suum esse').

It is understandable, then, that the fourth selected question is devoted to the composition issue, asking whether the accident's existential being differs from the (material) subject-substrate's.[174] In the usual way Harvey first gives (capp. 49-64) an account of Henry's *Quodlibet* X, 8 ("Utrum accidentis existentis in subiecto sit aliud esse existentie quam sit esse existentie sui subiecti"). His own reply is found in capp. 233-252.

8.7.1 *Harvey' report of Henry's* Quodlibet *X, 8*

After the usual *pro* and *con* (46) Harvey starts (47) by summarizing the replies given by some other participants of the debate (in fact Giles of Rome is meant), as they are recorded by Henry prior to his own account. Giles presents three arguments in support of his thesis that in one and the

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section 6.1.4 above. For Giles's and Henry's controversial interpretations of the first Boethian axiom see also Nash (1950).

173. Harvey significantly remarks (cap. 66) that Henry has put the real distinction issue into a larger scope by inquiring after the creation of essence and *esse*.

174. The same holds good for Harvey's short tract *De materia et forma* appended after the cluster consisting of *De formis* and *De esse et essentia*; see vol. I, *Introd*., p. XXIVf.

same substance, no matter the number of its accidents or forms, there is only one and unique existential being. Firstly, there always is only one extension acting in a substrate and its coincidental forms; secondly, if not, the analogy of being between subject and accident would be destroyed; thirdly, there is the linguistic reason that if you were to assume a plurality of instances of existing, one and the same substance could be called a plurality. Therefore the unicity of substantial being is doubtless, no matter if you posit more than one real (or intentional) form in it.[175] In addition, the conception of a substance's complete and incomplete being is of no help because there still is one unique *esse* afforded by the ultimate, more perfect form or more perfect 'intentio' (i.e. the focal ontic aspect).

8.7.2 *On threefold being*

Next Henry's three kinds of *esse* are reported (48-57). First there is the being(ness) of an essence ('esse essentie') which is a certain likeness with divine Being and befalls to a thing in virtue of its relationship to its exemplar, God; it is owing to this relationship that a creature is a nature and a thing ('res') properly, rather than just a figment. A thing is made up of this kind of *esse* and its nature (say, manhood or animalhood), to wit of the factors *quo est* and *quod est*; its nature is the *quod*, and the relationship to God its *quo*. This is the *esse* from which the common name 'ens' derives and which analogically applies to the ten categories.

The second kind is existential being ('esse existentie') falling to a thing existing outside the mind in virtue of its actually being the effect of the Creator. From this kind the common name 'existens' is taken, which analogically applies to the ten categories in as far as they (i.e. the things designated by them) actually exist outside the mind. The third kind is subsistent being ('esse subsistentie') which befalls to a thing in virtue of its having *esse* by itself, rather than owing to its conjunction with something else. Any entity possesses as many instances of essential and existential being as it has essences. Things are different, however, with regard to subsistential being. Supposing that everything subsists in virtue of its ultimate form or ultimate essential *differentia*, there is in everything only one subsistential being. Henry adduces (50-56) six arguments in support of his position.

As to the difference between existential and subsistential being Henry points out (57) that the subsistential being is that which a form bestows

175. Giles explicitly refers to the controversy about the plurality of forms debate dealt with in the first tract, *De formis*.

on that whose form it is. This *esse* boils down to existential being simply.[176] However, if this form affords some being distinctly and separately from any other thing, we speak of 'subsistential being'; if it is afforded by means of a union with a *suppositum* of another nature, then we have existential being, but not subsistential being.

8.7.3 *The principal question about substantial and coincidental being*

Harvey starts (233) his replies to the principal and the additional questions (capp. 233-252) by distinguishing between two senses of the sentence 'the substrate's and the accident's being is the same'. In one sense it means that the existential or subsistential being of the substrate is the being of the substance and somehow also of all the accidents depending on it, meaning that this common being in one way or another belongs to all accidents of the same *suppositum* and each accident adds it own proper being to the whole; this is the true sense. On the false understanding there is no substantial and coincidental being in a *suppositum* apart from the *suppositum*'s being and the subsistential being of the whole. Therefore, he concludes, any being depends on the intermediate ontic role of the substance. Once again he refers (238-239; 251) to his mode of signifying argument to explain the Boethian authorities. As to the adage taken from Aristotle's *Topics* (cfr. VII 3, 153a15-22; 4, 153 a30), saying 'unius rei unum est esse'), he replies (240; 251) that 'res' is here used in the sense common to all categories, designating the separate unity of each category. Most of the adversary's counter-arguments (against Henry's position) are rejected (243-245; 250; 252). Some of them, however, seem to stand up to Henry's rejoinders (246-248). The adversary's statement that when there is a plurality of forms in a *suppositum* and the ultimate form bestows subsistential being, the preceding ones cease to afford such being, is cast aside (252) as frivolous, because there cannot be a plurality of substantial forms in one and the same *suppositum*, and if this were at all possible, each of them would procure subsistence.

8.7.4 *On existential and subsistential being*

Harvey rejects (245) the way in which Henry distinguishes essential from existential being, agreeing at the same time with his remarks about subsistential being. However, Henry's proviso about the occurrence of subsistential being (reported in cap. 49) — to the effect that a thing's subsistential being must be afforded by its ultimate form or ultimate essential

176. Hence the frequent formula 'esse existentie et esse subsistentie, quod quidem est unum' (e.g. cap. 233).

differentia — is judged senseless, since in the course of nature no substantial form can afford anything other than subsistency to its *suppositum*.

8.8 That neither form nor matter is properly created but their compound

One of the salient issues concerning creation was the logical possibility of the creation from nothing, this idea being seemingly jeopardized by any distinction between essence and existence, the Aegidian real distinction in particular. This problem was impinged upon by Henry's *Quodlibet* XI, 3: "Whether in a created compound made up of matter and a form educible from matter's potency matter or form is the principal object of creation". After the usual *pro* and *con* (65) Henry's treatment of this question (reported by Harvey in capp. 66-119) is entirely interwoven with his unremitting struggle against the Aegidian real distinction between essence and its actualization 'existence' taken as one 'inter rem et rem'. Several chief issues concerning the ontology of created being come up for discussion (66-73).

8.8.1 *On participation and analogous being*

The opponent has argued that the creature's being can only be participated and diminished if its actualization by creation, which takes place in terms of bringing potential into actual being, does not imply that potency and act are really different. Henry acknowledges their difference and reduces (67-69) it to an intentional one. Giles's argument (reported in cap. 70) that the analogy between 'ens participatum' and 'ens non participatum' can only be saved by maintaining the real distinction between *esse* and essence, is likewise cast aside by Henry. Giles's additional argument about the participation of coincidental being is submitted to a similar treatment. *Esse* is indeed something intentional (rather than real) supervenient upon an essence.

8.8.2 *On creation jeopardized by the Aegidian real distinction*

Henry's first argument (73-81) against Giles's real distinction is directed at the heart of the matter: it is bound, he argues, to imply the pre-existence of a component before its actualization through creation, which contradicts the idea of creation. Giles replies that the real difference between the factors *esse* and essence does not rule out their simultaneous creation. But Henry insists that assuming the form's educibility from matter's potency, nevertheless gives to understand matter's natural priority to the form. Likewise, if *esse* is educible from the essence (what the adversar-

ies are implicitly assuming, he argues), the latter will be created in a more proper way than the former. Henry's final objection taken from *De causis*, prop. XVIII ("Prima rerum creatarum est esse"), in which the supposed priority of essence over *esse* seems to be contradicted, is invalidated by the adversaries by pointing out the larger use of *esse* common to essential and existential being. In his rejoinders (80-81; 109-119), Henry sticks to his opinion that (in the opposite point of view, that is) *esse* is created more properly than essence, and this could easlily undermine the unicity of the act of creation from nothing.

8.8.3 *On the three doctrinal distinctions made by Henry*

In order to overthrow the adversaries' objections to the arguments against their position he advanced at an earlier occasion, Henry proposed three distinctions: [1] between objective and subjective potentiality, [2] a thing's existing by its proper nature vs. by extrinsic participation, and [3] the intentional distinction in between the real and the merely conceptual distinctions. If we examine these differences more closely their objections are nullified (82-83).

The adversaries think these distinctions are useless (84-93). The one concerning potentiality does not matter, because objective and subjective potentiality always go together, given that the agent does not simply cause a potency to be potency and an act to be act, but produces an act that existed potentially and causes a potency to be submitted to actuality. And by doing so, the agent makes an objectively potential compound in which a subjectively potential thing comes together with an act from outside. Henry repeats that all the same the components of this compound only differ intentionally, not really.

When other defendents of the real distinction claim (85) that if *esse* and essence are really the same, the making of an essence comes down to causing an essence to be an essence, they are told that they ignore the 'respectus ad agens' involved in the agent's action. When these people remark that the reason why the proposition 'Essence always is essence' is always true — unlike 'Existence is always existence' — resides in the real difference between *esse* and essence, Henry replies that this is wrong because a proposition's constant truth does not require the real sameness of its subject and predicate, as, for example the sameness of *ens* and *unum* is merely due to their conceptual sameness.

The intentional distinction, which plays a role in almost every discussion, is given special attention in capp. 89-90. The proper meaning of the intentional distinction comes to the fore in the diverse ways in which Henry attempts to refute Giles'objections. Giles had argued that the

notion of 'conceptual difference' ('differentia secundum rationem') implies grades of difference, so there is no need to think that the difference between a genus and its specific difference surpassing that between *definiens* and *definitum* should be of a specifically different kind deserving a proper name of its own. Henry replied that Giles underestimated the importance of the fact that, unlike *definiens* and *definitum*, a genus and its specific difference make up one compound, and stuck to his opinion that, given the above-mentioned difference between the pairs 'genus/differentia' and 'definiens/definitum', the members of the former pair differ from each other in another way than just 'secundum rationem'.

Giles's rejection of the intentional distinction is remarkable in a way. He has well observed that in declining the Aegidian real distinction Henry cannot be accused of neglecting the unmistakable difference between essence and existence or of reducing this difference to one merely invented by reason. So Giles does his utmost to show that whoever defends the factual sameness of essence and existence — which according to Henry and the other opponents of the Aegidian real distinction is actually found in created things — cannot escape the above-mentioned charge by inventing a special conceptual mode of difference (baptizing it 'secundum intentionem') that is supposed to be of a different kind than the merely conceptual one ('secundum rationem tantum') and thus can better satisfy the dissimilarities existing in the 'natura rei'. In brief, Giles constantly goes out of his way to show that in fact Henry must accept the Aegidean real distinction to evade the merely conceptual one.

As I have argued before (sections 7.3.1-7.3.2), Giles obviously misunderstood Henry's intentional distinction by taking it as a superfluous subtype of the 'secundum rationem' distinction. To Henry, like the real distinction, the intentional or focal distinction concerns an object's real ontic aspects, be it that it acts by a specific operation of the mind in which the intellect (the special task of which it is to discern ontic aspects coinciding in the object) frames diverse concepts ('intentiones') about things that are conceptually diverse, but still really connected in the intentional domain of quidditative being. Giles shares the fatal misconception found in all Henry's opponents of the proper semantic practical function of an 'intentio': it refers to some special real (whether essential or coincidental) component of a thing's quiddity qua represented in the intentional domain, leaving aside, throughout the course of a particular discussion, any other, less relevant ontic aspect. In this respect, it would seem, Henry's intentional distinction bears a close resemblance to the Aristotelian argumentative strategy of focalization.

8.9 Harvey's own position in the ongoing ontological debate

From cap. 179 onwards the five selected questions are dealt with. Harvey in fact joins Henry's rejection of the Aegidean real distinction, and reduces himself the difference between a creature's *esse* and its essence to a matter of different modes of signifying (see cap. 153; our section 8.2 above). The same mode of signifying device is also the key for establishing the precise intentions of the *auctoritates* of Boethius, *De hebdomadibus*.

8.9.1 *Henry's view of participation censured*

Harvey's chief criticism is about the collateral issue of participation. Henry's concept of participation, our author argues, is too simple. Harvey instead distinguishes (181-184) three ways in which something can participate something else. One is the way in which a subject-substrate (e.g. man) participates a form (e.g. whiteness). In this case the *participans* and the *participatum* essentially differ. A creature only participates being in this way in as far as one creature is the subject-substrate of another (applying the term 'creature' indiscriminately to substance and accident). In another way a concretum is said to participate an abstract nature, meaning that the *concretum* acts as a whole that possesses the other, whereas the abstract nature acts as a part that is possessed; e.g. Socrates (or man) participates manhood. Now a concrete creature (man or animal) is said to participate manhood (or any other essence) and being. Things are different, however, when it comes to an abstract essence; this is not properly said to participate being (unless the verb 'est' is involved, which does not as such convey the notion 'essence'). It should be noticed on this score that Boethius never says '*Essence* participates being'; instead he always has 'That which is participates being'. In this case the *participatum* differs from the *participans* in the manner in which *concretum* and *abstractum* are differently significative.

The third mode of participation is the one in which something is said to participate something else because it diminutively has what the other possesses in a perfect way. For example, the heat of air can be called a participated heat with regard to the heat of fire, because the fire's heat possesses the nature of heat to a higher degree than the air's heat does. Regarding this kind of participation, being diminutively befalls to a creature when compared to God, who is perfect Being. However, this difference does not justify our assuming the Aegidean real distinction between essence and existence.

After his dismissal (185-187) of Henry's counter-arguments against Giles, Harvey goes on (188) to criticize Henry's conceptions about essential and existential being to the effect that a creature's essential being should come to the relationship (*respectus*) to the divine exemplar, and existential being to the one it has to God as its efficient cause. Once again Henry's explanation of the predicational difference between existential being and *esse* in terms of his intentional difference (rather than in terms of just different modes of signifying) is turned down.

8.9.2 *Harvey's own position concerning being and non-being*

Most of Harvey' comments (190-204) on the second selected question ("Whether an essence as such is indifferent to being and non-being") are about Giles's (and other people's, rather than Henry's) view of the matter. Some people ('quidam') are of the opinion that a thing has a threefold *esse*. One is the thing's being in its principles, to wit its potentiality according to which it is simply determined to non-being, and consequently not indifferent to being and non-being. Besides a thing has its own proper ontic nature ('esse in propria natura') by which it is determined to being, and consequently is not indifferent to being and non-being either. Finally there is a thing's intellective or cognitional being, according to which it is indifferent to being and non-being, because for its being actually cognized a thing's actual existence or non-existence does not matter.

Harvey differentiates (195-200) both the notion of indifference and that of non-being. For one thing (195-196), the indifference to being and non-being can be taken to mean that an essence at one time is the subject-substrate of being and of non-being at another time, successively that is. In this regard a substantial essence is indifferent to actual being or non-being, as a material essence is indifferent to being or not being the matter of some determinate substantial form. However a creature in its totality of matter *and* form cannot be indifferent to actual being or non-being. It should be noticed that when you say that an essence is not, this does not mean that this essence is the subject-substrate of non-being. It rather means that it is merely in potency, and not in reality. This other kind of indifference (197) is the one in which something is said to be indifferent to a pair of coincidental opposites. In this line of thought an essence is indifferent to coincidental being and non-being, because it is not necessarily determined to one or the other opposite (e.g. 'esse corruptum' or 'non esse corruptum').

Likewise the notion of 'non esse' deserves further specification (198-200). When it refers to an essence's total deprivation of actual reality,

meaning that it only exists in potency in God's mind, who is fully free to bring it into actual existence or to leave it in its potential state, then it is indifferent to being and non-being. When, on the other hand, next to God intermediate causes are involved (viz. in the case of generation), such an indifference can be concerned with matter or an intermediate agent (which may indiscriminately be active or not). It is important to notice that the denial of an essence's actual being depends on mental activity ('est ens rationis'), but what is negated is a real fact.

Next the question arises (199-200) how in spite of the sameness of being and essence the former can be negated of the latter. Harvey replies that the answer depends on the uniform use of these two terms. This is to say that one should not confuse act and potency by taking one in act and the other in potency, or one in the past and the other in the present or future. The truth of propositions such as 'Essence is not' is not directly based upon the diversity of essence and being, but upon that of act and potency or of the different times (tenses).

Finally (201-202) Henry's opinion that essential being detaches from both outside natural being and conceptual being is judged to be not only incorrect but also contradictory to his own ontological position. Some other minor negligencies are exposed and remedied (203-204).

8.9.3 *The basic issue of saving creation*

In his response to the third selected question ("Whether assuming (against Giles of Rome) the sameness of being and essence creation can be saved") Harvey joins Henry and the other opponents of the Aegidean real distinction, rejecting *inter alia* his incorrect view of 'esse participatum' and the analogy of being (205-210). As to Henry's refutation of the three objections advanced by the adversaries, one part of it is valid, another is not, e.g. the part in which he Henry comes up with his whimsical idea that existence is identical with the relationship to God as the Creator ('respectus fantasticum quem ponit'; 212-214; 217-218; 222).

Our author's rejection (219-221; 223-226; 229-230; 232) of Henry's 'intentional distinction' only displays the usual misunderstanding of Henry's intention. Briefly, all the opponents (Giles of Rome, in particular) fail to observe that the intentional or focal distinction has to do with an object's *real* ontic property, whereas the 'distinctio rationis' merely involves our conceptually concentrating on some ontic aspects of the object under examination, while disregarding others. Hence, contrary to what Giles and the other opponents try to show, the focal distinction goes beyond a 'modus differendi secundum rationem tantum', as Henry has it (219).

8.9.4 *Whether a subject-substrate's existential being coincides with its accident's*

The problem raised in the fourth selected question is about the nature of existential being as differently found in an accident and its subject-substrate. Harvey replies (233-236) with a *distinguendum*. If their sameness is taken as the material (or extensional) coincidence of the substrate's existential being and the totality of coincidental modes of being, the question at issue should be answered in the affirmative. To take it, on the other hand, as meaning that that the *suppositum* does not have any substantial (or subsistential) or coincidental modes of being, but only the subsistential being of the *suppositum* itself, is erroneous. There is indeed in any *suppositum* a plurality of different existential modes of being which corresponds to the plurality of its different essences (i.e. the substantial one and the coincidental ones). As a matter of fact, the coincidental modes of being befall to the *suppositum* through the substance as its source. The mode of substantial being flowing from a substantial essence primarily actualizes the essence from which it flows, and secondarily and by mediation the coincidental essences. See also cap. 241.

Once again, the Boethian authorities around *esse* and *id quod est* are explained in terms of the different modes of signifying and the corresponding ways of participation (238-239; see also 309). In capp. 242-245 Harvey mainly criticizes Giles's objections against Henry, as well as (246-249) some of his replies to Giles, which the latter, Harvey thinks, could easily evade by skilfully qualifying them. With regard to Henry's replies to the three arguments to the opposite thesis advanced (see capp. 58-60) by Giles *cum suis* (to the effect that the accidents' existential being really differs from the subject-substrate's), our author (250) mainly takes sides with Henry, particularly when it comes to Giles's conception of the relationship between quantity and extension. Likewise Harvey's evaluation (251-252) of the four arguments concerning the principal issue of the fourth selected question does not testify to a rigorous all-embracing abhorrence on our author's part of the Ghentian philosophic approach to the matters at issue, which is unmistakable in the first part of *De quattuor materiis*, *De formis*.

8.9.5 *The collateral question about the creation of matter and form*

The final, fifth selected question once again returns to the creation issue. It asks whether, given the creation of the composite made up of matter and the form educible from matter's potency, one should assume that, properly speaking, the form is created rather than matter. That this inter-

esting (at first glance somewhat sophisticated) question has everything to do with the principal ontological issue concerning the relationship between being and existence comes to the fore in Harvey's unambigious statement (253-255) that it is the composite that is properly created, rather than matter or form. The objection arises that a composite by definition is made of parts (i.e. matter and form) and that its creation, consequently, seems to presuppose 'something from which' and thus jeopardizes the 'creatio ex nichilo'. Harvey goes on (254) to make a distinction. 'To presuppose nothing' should here be taken in the sense that nothing as a subject-substrate should exist prior to the act of creation.

Still, the question remains (256) whether matter or form more truly can be said to be created. Harvey is of the opinion that the exclusion of any material pre-existent element should make us assume that the form is more truly created than matter.

The chapters 258-262 are devoted to Henry's reaction to the arguments (supposedly) supporting the Aegidian real distinction between being and existence. Once again, our author would be perfectly happy to join Henry's rejection, if only Henry were willing to dismiss his favourite 'distinctio intentionis' (259). Henry's *respectus* theory is another obstacle for Harvey to take Henry's side against their common opponent, Giles of Rome.

In the chapters 263-272 again Giles's opinion and arguments are subjected to Harvey's criticism. In cap. 266-267 our author comments upon Giles's remarks on account of the phrase 'forma educitur de potentia materie'. As long as the idea of the contemporaneous creation of matter and form in the composite is maintained, there is nothing wrong with this phrase, because in this case the form being educed from matter amounts to its being created. If, however, one takes the phrase as meaning that matter should be presupposed to the agent's creative activity, this idea contradicts the very notion of creation.

In cap. 269 Harvey comments upon Henry's suggestion (reported in cap. 78) that in defending his real distinction between essence and existence Giles in fact seems to imply the notion 'esse educi de potentia essentie'. This is rejected by Giles as a product of Henry's fantasy. Henry insisted that anyway to Giles a particular essence is more truly created than its existence. In his previous report of this question Harvey remarked (cap. 78; cfr. 279) that Henry fails to clarify the supposed implication. Now, commenting (269-271) upon their discussion and referring to his own previous distinction of the twofold sense of 'formam educi de potentia materie' Harvey qualifies the foregoing statement by admitting a third possibility: the potentiality under discussion can be understood in terms

of what is called 'potentia obedinalis'. This kind of potency, he explains, is the one involved in some miraculous divine intervention — for example (one might suggest), when God causes a shoot of a vine or vine-twig to grow from Aaron's staff in order to show his prominent position among the tribal chiefs of Israel (see *Numeri*, 17, 5)[177]. It is defined as the potentiality of a subject-substrate to change into something else when taken in its relationship to the divine Agent, such as when a dead piece of wood obeys God's command to rightaway come into bud. Such a production indeed comes closer to creation than natural generation.

In capp. 280 ff. Harvey rejects the respective interpretations advanced by Giles and Henry concerning the 'auctoritates' from *De causis*. In 284 ff. our author invalidates Henry's counter-arguments against Giles because of the former's ambiguous use of the concept 'esse latissimum' and the ill-considered application of his favourite 'respectus ad Deum' doctrine.

Capp. 288-301 are devoted to the three distinctions Henry adhibited (see capp. 83-93) in order to solve the difficulties Giles raised against his rejection of the Aegidian real distinction. The first concerns the difference between objective and subjective potentiality (for this distinction see section 8.6.5 above). On this account Harvey in the main takes sides with Henry (288; 290-292). The second — which is about the difference between an essence that has existence from its proper nature (i.e. the divine Essence) and those that need something else in order to exist, something that affords them some generic being (which holds for any created essence) — is in principle agreed to by Harvey; however, Henry's explanation in terms of his *respectus* doctrine is (as usual) rejected (288; 293-294). It will not come as a surprise that Henry's third distinction concerning the differentiation of the kinds of distinguishing between things, which made him introduce the innovative 'distinctio intentionis' in between the real and the merely conceptual distinction, cannot find favour in Harvey's eyes, who easily shares (289; 295-300) the contemporaneous misinterpretations of Henry's purpose on this account (see our section 7.3.2 above). In capp. 302-313 Harvey joins Henry's rejection of the Aegidian position but censures some of Henry's arguments against it as not to the point.

The momentous question about the impact of the adherence to or rejection of the Aegidian position upon the Christian doctrine of the free 'creation from nothing' is given full attention in the final chapters (314-335, corresponding to capp. 110-119 of Harvey's report) of *De esse et essentia*. Harvey definitely repudiates Giles's position that God's free

177. For the expression 'de trunco fit vitulus' see *De esse et essentia,* to cap. 78.

creation cannot be saved unless there is a real difference between essence and existence. Again he cannot refrain from qualifying Henry's arguments against Giles by subtly judging them from a different point of view, such as the philosophers' (Neoplatonic) opinion about God's acting of essential necessity (315). Not surprisingly Henry's *respectus* doctrine once again comes under attack (320-322).

Capp. 324-329 deal with Giles opposing (see cap. 116) God's speculative to his practical intellect. On the assumption, Giles was arguing (116), that a creature should exist by its own nature — in which case there would not be a real difference between essence and existence ---, then an essence would have the same relationship to God's speculative and practical intellect, as a result of which God's conceiving essences from eternity would imply their outside production from eternity; which is absurd. Henry rebuked this argument by distinguishing a twofold sense of the phrase 'creaturam existere per suam essentiam'. Now the adversary takes it in the wrong sense that a creature owes its existence to its essence as such, instead of its being brought into existence. This misunderstanding cannot fail to frustrate the difference between God's practical and speculative intellect.

What is more, the discussion found in 324-329 is of importance because it centres around the general issue of intentionality. Harvey is very keen on this account (which will clearly come to the fore in volume Three of this series, *De intellectu et specie*), and proceeds to differentiate the opposition 'speculative vs. practical intellect' as applied to God. This distinction, he argues (324-328), can be viewed in a twofold way, viz. either in terms of the things intellected themselves ('penes ipsas res intellectas') or according to the way in which they are intellected ('penes modum intelligendi res')[178]. In the former way God's speculative intellect is about things that are not realizable ('factibiles'), whilst his practical intellect regards realizable things. Now, neither a creature's essence nor its existence is related to God's speculative intellect as not-realizable, but qua realizable they both regard his practical intellect. Things are different, however, when the mode of being intellected is at stake. In this case, God's speculative intellect (unlike his practical intellect, which focusses upon the ins and outs of the actual realizations) considers things not so much as realizable but rather as merely comprehensible ('open to be known'; 'scibiles'), quite apart from their being actually produced, and rather speculatively considering their nature and potency to become realized. In this line of thought, Harvey claims, according to its real being,

178. As often, the Medievals appear to be well aware of the above-mentioned (in our section 7.3.2) Aristotelian semantic main rules.

the being and the existence of a creature are related to both God's speculative and his practical intellect.

Therefore, both its being and its existence are related to God, although not in the same way. When considered from their being the intellect's object, they have a relationship to his speculative intellect as some abstract thing realizable, whereas to his practical intellect as something realizable at some determinate time. Regarding their relationship to God's intellect itself their universal nature as such is focussed upon, whereas their relationship to God's practical intellect concerns his benevolent, free will and wisdom to bring them into actual existence. Harvey concludes (329) against the Aegidian real distinction that the different focusses do not imply any real diversity between being and existence. So far he completely agrees with Henry, but he implicitly rejects the latter's position in which God's causality seems to be reduced to the creature's 'respectus ad Deum', rather than the causality issuing from the 'virtus divina'.

Giles's final argument (reported in cap. 117), which was also about Henry's *respectus* doctrine, is rejected (330) by Harvey. However, Henry's claim that the essence as such is the sufficient foundation for the relationship to the Creator and that no action on God's part is required is, as usual, cast aside (331-332). Unsurprisingly, Henry's use of his innovative 'distinctio intentionis' instead of the customary 'distinctio rationis' cannot escape Harvey's ironic disapproval. On the other hand, when he dicusses, in his Commentary on the *Sentences*, the basic theological thesis ('Deus est suum esse' = 'In God Essence and Being are quite the same'), our author testifies to his hesitance about the real difference between being and essence in creatural being.[179]

8.9.6 *Girald Odonis's testimony about the ontological controversies*

We owe also a tract *De esse and essentia* to the Grey Friar Giraldus Odonis (1273-1349), presumably written in the 1320-1330s as part of his *Commentary on the Sentences* (*In I Sent.,* dist. 7) and later on also separately featuring in some manuscripts.[180] In the Madrid fourteen-century copy (Biblioteca Nacional, cod. 4229, ff. 125ra-132vb) it is entitled 'Incipit tractatus de esse et essentia et de 3o adiacentem (!) et 2o sub (!).[181] 4 questiones queruntur hic'.

179. *In I Sent*., dist. 2, q. 4: " (…) non est multum certum quod in creaturis differunt re esse et essentia", quoted by Hocédez (1930), *Introd*., p. 31.
180. For his works see de Rijk (1993), 173-193, esp. 183f.
181. This 'sub.' possibly alludes to 'est substantive', which is commonly called 'est secundo adiacens'.

The opening lines refer to the well-known ontological debate of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, and straightforwardly anticipate the author's own semantic approach to the matter in question, which focusses on the status of *esse* in terms of statemental being:[182]

> Madrid, *Bibl. Nac*. cod. 4229, f. 125ra: Quia apud doctores de esse et essentia ac de esse tertio et secundo adiacenti multe difficultates inveniuntur, ideo ad elucidationem plenam totius istius materie quatuor questiones queruntur. Primo utrum in solo Deo sit idem esse et essentia. Secundo utrum esse tertio adiacens (vel secundum adiacens) sit fictio anime ['mental construct']. Tertium (!) utrum esse quiditativum sit aliquid reale. Quartum utrum esse essentie sit accidentale alicui.

The four questions are dealt with in four *articuli*. The first one about God's exceptional nature is (as usual) answered in the affirmative, saying that, unlike God, in any creature its being and its essence really differ. This difference is explained: just as *agere* really differs from *potentia*, so do being and essence. Next follows a counter-argument against the exclusion of creatural being in this respect: because knowing (*scire*) does not differ from knowledge (*scientia*), therefore being and essence do not either. The reasoning is sound, the author argues, since just as 'scientia' derives from 'scire', so does 'essentia' from 'esse' (*ibid*.). The solution to the question is thoroughly presented. Part of it is the rejection of three alternating opinions.[183] One is ascribed to Avicenna and Algazel and their followers, holding that being really differs from essence. Another runs that they only differ conceptually, still another says that they differ more than just conceptually, but less than in reality:

> *Ibid*.: Sciendum ergo de primo quod est una opinio Avicenne et Algazelis et suorum sequentium, dicens quod esse differt ab essentia secundum rem. Alia est opinio dicens quod differunt tantum secundum rationem. Tertia vero dicit quod differunt plus quam secundum rationem et minus quam secundum rem. (*ibid*.)

[a] Opinio prima. Obviously the first opinion concerns the well-known Avicennian 'real distinction' advanced and ardently defended by Giles of Rome, who is, however, (like other Latin adherents) vaguely indicated by 'the followers'. As a matter of fact, three arguments in support of the real distinction are reported:

> *Ibid*., f. 125ra-rb: Prima quidem opinio fundatur dupliciter. Primo quia: De uno et eodem non potest vere affirmari et negari unum et idem. Sed de uno

182. See below. For the doctrinal context see de Rijk (1997) and (2005a).
183. 'Pro solutione questionis sunt primo recitande tres opiniones; secundo ponende tres distinctiones pro intellectu questionis; tertio probande quinque conclusiones. Et quarto respondendum est ad rationes contrariarum opinionum'.

> et eodem vere affirmatur esse et vere negatur esse. Patet in terminis, quia hec est vera 'Actio est actio' et hec est vera 'Actio non est'; in prima vero affirmatur esse, in secunda negatur esse. Quare etc. Secundo sic. Quod non inest alicui quiditati ex se sed ex causa extrinseca, est accidens tali quiditati. Sed esse non inest alicui quiditati ex se sed ex causa agente ponente eam in esse. Quare ipsum esse est accidens cuilibet quiditati create, et per consequens a qualibet realiter distincta. Et fit tertia ratio[nem], que red[d]it ad eadem, talis: Nulla res potest intelligi sub suo contradictorio, quia nulla res est indifferens ad se et ad suum contradictorium. Sed esse potest intelligi sub non esse et est indifferens ad esse et ad non esse et abstrahit ab utroque, dicente Avicenna 5o *Metaphisice* sue quod equinitas est tantum equinitas; et accipitur ibi 'equinitas' pro quiditate que nec est una nec plures, universalis vel singularis actu vel potentia. Constat autem quod esse quod est idem realiter cum essentia, est aliquod singulare et ens actu.

Avicenna's position is criticized upon at the end of the first article by showing that the difference between the respective uses of the term 'actio' (or 'rosa') need not be explained in terms of the real distinction between being and essence, and that the common doctrine concerning simple and personal supposition can easily do the job:

> *Ibid*., f. 128vb: Dico quod in ista propositione quam dicit esse falsam, scilicet 'Actio est', iste terminus 'actio', qui habet subpositionem personalem, vel subponit pro appellato et actu participante naturam specificam, vel pro appellabili, scilicet pro non participante actu naturam specificam sed pro possibili participare. Si pro actu participante naturam specificam, sic ista est vera 'Actio est' et ista falsa 'Actio non est', et ista vera 'Actio est actio'. Si tamen 'actio' a parte subiecti subponit pro possibili participare naturam specificam non participante, sic ista est vera 'Rosa non est' <vel> 'Actio non est', et ista falsa 'Rosa est', vel 'Actio est'. Si tamen 'actio' subponat simpliciter, sic ista est falsa 'Actio est', quia existere non debetur speciei unde species est, sed debetur individuo primo.

As to Avicenna's second argument, Girald ascertains (129ra) that actual being befalls to an entity owing both to an intrinsic cause (viz. its essence as formal cause) and an extrinsic cause (God as its efficient cause). The third alternative argument to the effect that no quiddity can be conceived of under its contradictory, is countered by making a distinction between quidditative being and existential being:

> *Ibid*., f. 129ra: Ad aliud cum dicitur '"Nichil potest intelligi sub suo contradictorio", concedo. Sed quiditas potest intelligi sub *non esse* <dupliciter>. Si loquaris sub *non esse* quiditativo, nego. Si de *non esse* essentie existentiali, concedo. Tale enim esse non est simpliciter idem cum esse quiditativo. Et de illo esse procedit ratio. Quare nichil ad propositum.

So much for the first opinion. The second and third opinions are anonymous, but when some lines further on (f. 125rb) their adherents' lines of

reasoning are reported, we find two asciptions in a contemporaneous hand, which unfortunately were partly cut off when the codex was bound. **[b] Opinio secunda**. The second opinion is ascribed in the margin *Oppinio Gar*[…] where the *a* is superscribed by an *e*. My guess is to read Gar<vei> (or Ger<vei>), by which Hervaeus Natalis (Harvey Nedellec) seems to be meant.[184] Girald's report of this opinion and its defence clearly allude to Harvey's rejection of the Aegidian real distinction between being and essence by explaining their diversity 'penes modum significandi':

> *Ibid.,* f. 125rb: Alia opinio, que ponit quod differunt secundum rationem, probatur dupliciter. Primo sic. Illa que differunt tantum sicut actus significatus per verbum et actus significatus per nomen verbale, differunt tantum ratione. Sed esse and essentia sunt huiusmodi, nam 'essentia' est nomen verbale descendens ab isto verbo 'sum', [vel] 'fui'; 'esse' autem [alicuius *MS*] est infinit<iv>um istius verbi, ita quod tam 'esse' quam 'essentia' eundem [eandem *MS*] actum important sola ratione distinctum. Secundo sic. Que tantum differunt sicut *ens* et *unum*, differunt tantum ratione. Sed esse et essentia sunt huiusmodi. Quare etc. Maior probatur quia: 'Unum' dicit indivisionem *esse* et *eius quod est*. Minor etiam patet, quia esse uniuscuiusque est indivisum a quolibet cuius est.

Both arguments are rejected (129ra) by Girald. The major of the first one can be conceded for the time being, he says. However, if you only take the difference between quidditave essence and quidditative being into consideration, Girald argues, the argument concerning the merely conceptual difference between being and essence can no longer be adduced against his position. Harvey' s second argument will not do either. When it is said 'Things that only differ like *ens* and *unum*, differ only conceptually', my reply is, he says, that they differ in virtue of the nature of the thing in question, rather than only according to something fictitious ('ratione ficti per intellectum'). Therefore the major is false. The same goes for the minor, because being and essence, when they are taken uniformally, do not differ like *unum* and *ens*, which differ as subject-substrate and *passio*, but qua form and formal effect.

Girald's reply to the 'argumentum principale' of this first article concerning the nature of the difference that (in opposition to the divine nature) in creatural being exists between being and essence, is in fact directed against both the first and the second opinion:

> *Ibid*., 129ra: Ad argumentum principale dico quod agere comparatur ad potentiam sicut effectus in genere cause efficientis ad causam efficientem,

184. The surmise in de Rijk (1993), 183 that Gualterus Burley should be meant should be corrected.

esse autem comparatur ad essentiam sicut effectus in genere cause formalis ad causam formalem. Quare non eodem modo comparatur agere ad potentiam et esse ad essentiam. Sed posse bene comparatur ad potentiam sicut esse ad essentiam.

[c] Tertia opinio. The arguments in support of the third opinion are reported as follows:

Ibid., f. 125rb-va: Tertia opinio, scilicet quod esse et essentia different plus quam secundum rationem et minus quam realiter, probatur. Et primo quod different plus quam secundum rationem quia: Illud quod addit ad essentiam respectum dependentie ad causam efficientem, differt ab ipsa essentia plus quam rationem. Sed essentia est huiusmodi. Nam essentia secundum se est absoluta, sed, addito sibi *esse*, statim dicit respectum ad efficientem. Unde essentia secundum se dicit respectum additum sub ratione qua plura ibi sunt. Sed esse dicit respectum dependentie additum sub ratione cause efficientis. Quare plus differt quam secundum rationem. Sed quod different minus quam secundum rem patet quia: Una et eadem res que prius est in potentia, postea ipsamet est in actu realiter. Quare realiter non differunt. Et per consequens minus quam realiter et plus quam secundum rationem. Secundo ad idem sic. Id quod addit ad essentiam *esse ratum* (dictum a 'ratus, rata, ratum')[185] differt plus et minus ab ipsa essentia modo predicto. Esse <est> huiusmodi. Quare etc. Hec de primo articulo.

No doubt, Girald has Henry of Ghent's 'respectus ad Deum' lore in mind. The marginal note (125rb) *Oppinio Enr<ici>* is quite to the point.[186]

The dismissal of Henry's arguments points in the same direction:

Ibid., f. 129ra: Ad rationes 3e [2e *MS*] opinionis. Ad primam cum dicitur "Illud quod addit respectum etc.", concedatur maior. Minor tamen negatur. Unde dico: licet creatura, ut lapis, non possit esse sine respectu dependentie, non tamen ille respectus est de conceptu 'lapidis'. Possum enim intelligere lapidem sine illo respectu. Ad aliud dico quod *esse ratum* est tota realitas que est in lapide.

It may strike the reader that Henry's commonly repudiated innovation of the intentional or focal distinction is not paid any attention to by Girald.

8.9.7 *Harvey's own metaphysics of being*

As will be clear from the foregoing, Harvey's conspicuous animosity against Henry's metaphysical views including the basic Ghentian inspiration did not lead him to turn a blind eye to the shortcomings of Giles of Rome's metaphysics of being Henry never tired of exposing, the real

185. The phrase 'esse ratum' is indiscriminately used to stand for *esse reale* and *esse rationis* (in so far as they are both object of thinking ('reor, ratus sum, reri'), whereas 'esse reatum' only stands for *esse reale*.

186. My reading of this marginal note in de Rijk (1993), 183 is wrong.

distinction between essence and being ('esse') in particular. There is, however, a peculiar circumstantial factor hampering the perspicacity of Harvey's approach to the controversial issues. In his fine study on Harvey's metaphysics Elliott B. Allen rightly drew (I, 17-19) our attention to the remarkable fact that a careful reading of the relevant texts reveals our author's peculiarly elusive account of the precise nature of the relationship between essence and *esse*. On numerous occasions in the course of his *Questions on the Sentences* he refuses to make any definitive declaration as to the distinctness or identity of essence and existence, preferring to avoid commitment when handling problems in which the issue naturally comes up. His habitual method on such occasions is to avoid the issue by trying to show how the problem at stake can be plausibly solved on the basis of either alternative, no matter if you opt for the assertion or denial of the real distinction between essence and existence. Most of the time the plausibility of the assertion is only argued for by undermining the arguments for the denial.[187]

At *In I Sent*., dist. 8, q. 1, art. 1, Harvey discusses the problem of the proper nature of the distinction between essence and existence. In the course of his analysis he displays the two contrary opinions on the issue (which the reader easily recognizes as the Aegidian and the Ghentian ones) without taking sides with either of them. The text winds up (Fol. 23rb) with, so to speak, an apology for his taciturnity: "… because I have spoken of this at length elsewhere (*quia locutus sum diffuse de hoc alibi*)". It is patently clear that our author is referring to his *De esse et essentia*. Nevertheless, the reader should not start celebrating yet. As we have frequently observed, in this tract Harvey definitely rejects Henry's anti-Aegidian approach to the problem of the difference between essence and existence, yet likewise without taking sides with Giles of Rome, who takes this difference most strictly as one 'inter rem et rem'. In fact, while he shares Henry's abhorrence of the Aegidian view, the only disagreement he still has with Henry is about how to explain the difference between essence and existence in such a way that creation can be saved.

187. *In I Sent*., dist. 2, q. 4, art. 1, Fol. 13rb; *ibid*., dist. 8, q. 1, art. 1, Fol. 23ra-rb; *ibid*., dist 17, q. 4, art. 2, ad 4um, Fol. 37rb; *In II Sent*., dist. 1, q. 2, art. 2, Fol. 4rb; *ibid.,* dist. 3, q. 1, ad 2um, Fol. 6rb; dist. 3, q. 2, art. 1, Fol. 8ra; *In III Sent*., dist. 1, q. 1, obi. 2, Fol. 2ra; *ibid*. dist. 6, q. 1, art. 3, Fol. 6rb-va and Fol. 6va; *ibid*., dist. 13, q. 1, Fol. 19rb. These passages are quoted by Allen in his note 14 to Part II of his *Study*. Sometimes Harvey's argumentative hospitality to both alternatives cannot prevent the impression of a certain predilection on his side for the Ghentian position as such against the real distinction. By the way, in the third volume (*De intellectu et specie*) we will be confronted with another annoying specimen of our author's slippery attitude when it comes to uncompromisingly speaking out either in favour of or against the intelligible species.

He refuses to go the whole way with Henry's opponent, who thinks that the Christian lore of creation should imply a clear-cut line of demarcation between God and creature which can solely be based upon the act of creation qua effecting a real composition of essence and actual existence (which as such are really distinct). Like Henry, our author founds the distinction under consideration upon the specific way of human cognition and evaluation of the difference between infinite, perfect, unparticipated Divine Being and finite, imperfect, participated creatural being. In Harvey's view, this cognitional approach can be satisfactorily explained in terms of a logico-grammatical analysis of the key terms 'ens', 'esse', and 'essentia' such that the distinction between essence and existence is a purely conceptual distinction ('secundum rationem').

In *De esse et essentia* there is a clear tendency to reduce the entire problem of the distinction between essence and existence to a matter of the semantics of terms and conceptual engineering. On the background there is the well-known idea of the parallellism between thought and being, and the confidence, as it were, that semantic analysis will somehow reveal the extramental status of the things referred to by our concepts. Any phrasing of the difference between essence and existence in terms of a real difference is bound to misrepresent the actual or factual status of a materialized, concrete essence inasmuch as it is possessed by a subject-substrate, by failing to see that in this status the thing's quiddity is indistinguishable from the very essence itself. The conceptual distinction between essence and existence is enough to roughly identify these ontological components taken as such. On the other hand, inspired as he is by Avicennian thought, Henry thinks that there is more to the concept of beingness preceding the bifurcation 'infinite *etc*. vs. finite *etc*., something he intends to grasp by means of his intentional distinction ('distinctio secundum intentionem, non secundum rationem tantum').[188]

Harvey's metaphysics of being fundamentally differs from both Henry of Ghent's and Giles of Rome's: to his mind, to be, and act as, a being ('ens') is not to be related to God as both its exemplar and creative efficient cause (as Henry thinks), nor can it be identified with existing in virtue of the reception of an act of being ('esse') by a really distinct potential subject-substrate (as Giles maintains). 'To be' quite simply is 'to have an essence' as its formal principle constitutive of being as such. Accordingly, a thing's 'be-ing' ('esse') is nothing but its essence in its relationship to the subject-substrate having it, and in fact stands for an essence's actuality in virtue of its being possessed by a subject-substrate owing to God's creative act (including natural generation). Prior to its

188. See our sections 6.1.2; 6.3.2; 7.3, 1-3; 8.6.4; 8.6.8; 8.8.3 above.

actualization no essence has an ontological status beyond its being included in God's mind ('in mente divina').

As for Harvey's controversy with Henry and Giles, there is no room for doubting his sound theology: the relationship to God as exemplar and efficient cause is not denied, nor is the importance of the act of creation. However, Harvey believes that what from the viewpoint of metaphysics counts as a thing's 'being given' (in any respect, including the mental domain of being), is its being constituted as a quiddity, period.[189] Unlike Giles of Rome, Harvey is not afraid that the rejection of the real distinction will necessarily undermine the metaphysics of creation. God's liberty and omnipotence warrant the contingency of finite, creatural being, and the Christian abhorrence of any form of emanational becoming makes the idea of a thing's coming to be solely in virtue of the creative *fiat* of the divine causality compulsory.

9. *On the annexed short tract* De materia et forma

In all the manuscripts extant the tract *De esse et essentia* is followed by a short tract about one single additional question whether matter can be without form.[190] It concerns Henry's *Quodlibet* I, q. 10. After reporting (1-2) the *pro* and *con* arguments, Harvey goes on (3-4) to comment upon Henry's remark that the usual counter-argument fails to distinguish matter's threefold mode of being, one simple mode, and two special ones. Like any other thing, matter can be said, Henry claims, to have a simple mode of being owing to an extrinsic denomination from divine Being. The first special one is due to matter's proper nature; this too it shares with any other thing. The third mode is the special mode of being matter owes to the form as part of the actual compound. Now, Henry argues, it is only with respect to the third mode that matter cannot be without form. Harvey renders (with other adversaries) this view as impossible, even supernaturally.

Harvey advances (6-20) six arguments to the contrary. To begin with (6-7), Henry fails to recognize the complex nature of 'being simply' (*esse simpliciter*). In one sense only, viz. in as far as to be simply concerns the ontic simplicity of actual substantial being with respect to actual coincidental being, Henry's view can be maintained, on the proviso that one

189. See our section 8.9.2 above, and the pertinent expositions in Allen, *Study*, 101-116 and 134-175.

190. See the *Introduction* to tract I *De formis*, *Introd*., pp. XXIVf. My final remark about Harvey having added himself this *Questio* to the precedent ones is entirely erroneous and due to a disorder of my working notes.

properly understands the potentiality involved. That is to say (8), insasmuch as it acts as the subject-substrate of the form, matter is potentially related to simple being. The only sound conclusion to be drawn is to the effect that matter cannot *actually* be without any form (9-10).

In one of the counter-arguments (16) another aspect of matter's nature during the process of generation comes to the fore, viz. matter as terminative of becoming. Harvey shares the conviction with the other adversaries that still matter cannot be without form. Henry's appeal to God's supernatural intervention will not do either.

Henry's own arguments in support of his answer to the principal question find no favour in Harvey's eyes either (22-25), no more than his reply against the chief argument the adversary (viz. Giles of Rome) advanced in support of his own position. Harvey regards it as frivolous, and Henry's verbosity 'worthy of a tragedy' (26; cfr. 19; 33; 64): one cannot claim that a thing has being (*esse*) owing to one entity and being such-and-such owing to some other factor, and this particularly holds when there is talk about prime matter which he regards as being by itself. It is necessary, Harvey argues (27-31) to distinguish between two ways in which something can be said to owe its material being to something else, viz. one way in terms of the efficient cause, the other according to its formal cause. In the first sense a thing owes its complete material being to God, and its being and being such and such coincide. Taking the second sense, however, you have to recognize that a thing owes its substantial being to one agent and its coincidental being, including its being such and such to another. The question whether matter owes its simple being to God should be answered along similar lines. Matter owes its determinate being such and such to one agent as its efficient cause, as well as to another as its formal cause. In order to simply be, matter depends on a thing's formal cause, and this not as its efficient cause, but as that which terminates its potentiality. However this may be, it rules out any possibility that matter should be without form.

The short tract winds up (32) with a final critical remark about Henry's idea that in a way the substantial form does not differ from the coincidental one, including the bizarre view that a subject-substrate could depend on an accident, whereas it only holds that it is informed by it. Harvey's conclusion (33) cannot come as a surprise: "As for the truth of this question (*Quodlibet* I, 10, that is), I think, this man says nothing, period.".

10. *On the edition*

The present edition is based upon the same three manuscripts selected for volume I, *De formis.* My preference for them to the others is argued for in the *General Introduction* to the comprehensive *De quattuor materiis*, pp. X-XXIV. For the editorial strategy followed in the present edition with regard to the *ratio edendi*, orthography, punctuation and headings the reader should consult the *Introduction to* De formis, *ibid.,* p. CIIIf.

After completing my edition I had the opportunity to see the edition of *De esse et essentia* Dr. Elliott Allen added to his unpublished Toronto thesis (1958). While using the manuscript Worcester, *Cathedral* F. 69 as the basis of his edition, Allen presented a readable and reliable text, which enabled him to write his penetrating thesis on Harvey's notion of being. Although he seems to have been acquainted with the existence of the extant better manuscript Bordeaux 147 (see his *Introduction*, p. 20), he (without giving an account) left this manuscript out of examination (*ibid.,* 24f.). For that matter, his description of the five manuscripts (*ibid*., 22-24) he selected for his edition is rather poor and unsatisfactory, not in the least by the lack of textual collations between the manuscripts.[191]

191. Incidentally, Allen continuously indicates the Cambridge manuscript Gonville &Caius 302/516 as '320/516.

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TRACTATUS DE ESSE ET ESSENTIA

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SIGLA

B = Bordeaux, Bibliothèque municipale, cod. 147 saec. XIV *init.*
P = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, cod. 3157 saec. XIV *init.*
V = Vatican Library, *Vat. lat.,* 859, saec. XIV *init.*

Bc, **Pc**,**Vc** = manus quae correxit **B**,**P**,**V**
Bm, Pm, Vm manus in margine **B,P,V**

] = scripsi(t), scripserunt
… = usque ad
<…> = supplevi
(!) = (sic!)
add. = addit, addunt
om. = omittit, omittunt
coni. = conieci, coniciendo
coll. = collato, collatis

TRACTATUS DE ESSE ET ESSENTIA

PARS PRIOR: DE QUIBUSDAM QUESTIONIBUS QUODLIBETALIBUS MAGISTRI HENRICI

QUESTIO Ia: UTRUM ESSE CREATURE REALITER DIFFERAT A SUA ESSENTIA

Status questionis

[1][B 216va;P23ra;V35rb] Eodem vero primo *Quolibet*, questione nona querit utrum esse creature realiter differat a sua essentia.[1] Et arguit primo quod sic quia: Cum creatura sit quid subsistens: si esset suum esse, tunc esse creature esset esse subsistens, quod soli Deo convenit. Ergo etc. Preterea. Esse secundum se est illimitatum. Si ergo creatura esset suum esse nichil habens preter esse cum ipso esse admixtum, creatura esset quid illimitatum. Quod est inconveniens. Preterea. Si creatura esset suum esse: cum esse a seipso non possit separari, sequitur quod creatura non possit non esse. Preterea. Dicit[2] Boetius libro *De hebdomadibus* prima hebdomade quod diversum est esse et id quod est. Ergo videtur expresse quod differat realiter esse creature ab ipsa essentia. Item. In eadem hebdomade: «Quod est, accepta forma essendi, est atque subsistit». Item. In secunda hebdomade dicit[3]: «Fit participatio cum aliquid iam est». Et in quinta dicit[4]: «Omne quod est participat eo quod est esse ut sit». Et in sexta dicit[5] «Aliud est esse et ipsum quod est». Ex quibus omnibus videtur quod creatura realiter differat a suo esse. Ad alteram partem non opponit.

1. I, 9: *Utrum creatura ipsa sit suum esse*.
2. *Quomodo substantiae* [= *De hebdomadibus*]: p. 169, 26-28; videas supra *Introd*., section 6.1.4.
3. *Ibid*., p. 169,29-32; videas *ibid*.
4. *Ibid*., p. 169,39-42; videas *ibid*.
5. *Ibid.,* p. 169,43-44; videas *ibid*.

1 eodem vero] *BV om. P* 2 realiter] *BP om. V* 5 esset suum] *V* cessavit *BP* 6 preter] *BP* post *V* 7 quid] *BP om. V* 8 non] *BP* nunc non *V* 9-10 prima hebdomade] *BP om. V* 11 essentia] *BV om. P* 11-12 quod ... hebdomade] *BP om. V* 13-14 et in ... quod est] *BV om. P* 15 sexta] *B* quinta *V*

De duplici modo intelligendi participationem ipsius esse

[2] Responsio sua ad **[V35va]** hanc questionem stat in hoc quod primo distinguit de duplici modo intelligendi participationem ipsius esse. Primus modus est secundum quod aliquod subiectum participat aliquam formam re ab eo differentem, sicut aer participat lumen; et sic secundum eum ponere creaturam participare esse est falsum. Alio modo potest dici creatura participare esse, quia scilicet ipsa essentia creature secundum se considerata et abstracte, est indifferens ad esse et non esse in actu. Et tunc quando Deus sua potentia eam ad sui similitudinem defectivam, tamen bene ad similitudinem sue Ydee quam habet in seipso, producit in actu ipsam sic indifferentem ad esse et non esse, fecit indeterminate habens esse fieri in actu determinate ad quandam similitudinem divini esse, idest ipsam participare esse, ita quod illa similitudo divini esse inest ei per suam essentiam, non per rem additam. Sed quia hec inest sibi ab efficiente extrinseco, dicitur ipsum participare. Et sic dicitur creatura participare esse, et non per rem additam que sit ipsum esse. Et quod ex hoc dicitur participare esse quod est esse similitudo expressa in effectu ab esse puro quod Deus est, <est> quia ipsa creatura est similitudo esse divini, non tamen quia ipsa similitudo qua esse participat creatura, est aliquid quod est eius essentia differens re ab ipsa et ei impressa.

4 re] *BP* realem *V* / differentem] *BV* differente *P* 5 esse est falsum] *BV* est esse P 5-6 dici creatura] *BV* intelligi creaturam *P* 6-8 quia ... et tunc quando deus] *BV* ipsam scilicet essentiam creature intelligendo ut aliquid abstractum per intellectum et indifferenter se habens ad esse et non esse inquantum enim est de se quoddam non ens habens tamen formalem ydeam in deo per quam in deo est quoddam ens antequam fiat in propria natura ad modum quo quelibet res habet esse in deo secundum illud johannis primo Quod factum est etc. et quod tunc fit ens in actu *P* 8 sui] *B* suam *V*

[3] Et hoc probat quatuor rationibus. Prima talis est quia: Creatura per idem est ens per quod est vera, bona et una. Sed per suam essentiam est vera, bona et una, ut probat diversis auctoritatibus. Ergo per suam essentiam est ens. Sed ens est per suum esse. Ergo suum esse est realiter idem cum sua essentia. Secunda talis est quia: Si nulla essentia creata esset ens nisi per aliquid sibi additum, nichil in creaturis esset ens per se. Quod est inconveniens. Tertia talis est quia: Illud esse, cum sit aliqua res creata, aut est per aliquid additum, aut per seipsum. Si est per seipsum, ergo aliqua res creata est que habet esse per seipsam, et qua ratione hoc poni-

tur in una creatura, **[P23rb]** eadem ratione hoc ponendum est in qualibet alia. Si autem est ens per aliquid additum, queretur ulterius de illo addito utrum sit ens per se vel per aliquid aliud additum. Et sic oportet venire ad rem creatam que sit ens per se, aut oportet ire in infinitum.

12 aliquid aliud] aliquid *V* aliud *BP, sic persaepe*

[4] Quarta talis est. Illud additum aut est substantia, aut accidens. Non accidens, quia tunc **[B 216vb]** substantia esset ens per accidens et accidens esset ens per se et primo. Quod est inconveniens. Nec etiam potest aliquis assignare in quo genere accidentis istud ponatur. Nec potest dici substantia que est materia, quia cum materia sit pars essentie create materie, esset materia, et forma et compositum essent per materiam. Quod est inconveniens. Nec potest dici compositum, quia tale in creatura est subsistens, et tunc sequeretur quod esse creature esset subsistens. Nec forma substantialis subsistens, quia sequeretur idem sicut dictum est de composito; et sequeretur etiam quod essentia creature talis, scilicet immaterialis, non differret re a suo esse. Nec etiam potest esse forma substantialis inherens, quia talis in substantiis compositis etiam est pars essentie rei, et sic esse non differret re a tota essentia rei create. Ergo nullo modo potest poni esse differre re ab essentia.

2 ens] *BP om. V* 4 istud] *P om. BV* 5 *sec.* materia] *BP* forma *V* / create] *BV* creature *P* 12 talis] *BPV* essentia *perperam add. P* 13 re] *BP* realiter *sic saepius V*

De duplici esse, scilicet esse essentie et esse existentie

[5] Postea ostendit quid sit dicendum de ista propositione, scilicet ‘Essentia creature est suum esse’. Et dicit quod duplex est esse, scilicet esse essentie, quod res non habet ab alio effective sed sibi convenit ex sua essentia; tamen est participatum a Deo exemplariter, quia est a Deo solum per hoc quod eius ydea sive exemplar est in Deo. Et de tali esse dicit quod sola ratione differt ab essentia. Et potest (ut dicit) concedi quod essentia est tale esse propter eorum concomitantiam inseparabilem. Aliud est esse existentie. Quod non convenit rei per suam essentiam, sed per impressionem ab alio, scilicet per creationem Dei creantis. Non quod tale esse sit additum inherens essentie ut materie. Sed quia essentie non convenit nisi per aliquod extrinsecum quod habet ex sua essentia per quandam extrinsecam participationem; vel sibi convenit per extrinsecum ad modum accidentis se habens, scilicet per hoc quod est effectus Dei in actu, ideo dicitur accidere essentie. Et differt intentione ab essentia. Et ideo non predicatur tale esse de essentia. Immo vere dicitur quod essentia creature non est tale esse. Ostendit etiam per exempla differentiam intentionis que

est inter essentiam creature et tale esse, quia sic se habent sicut cursus et currere, que non differunt nisi penes modum significandi, et tamen unum non predicatur de alio.

9 quod] *PV* autem *B* / essentie ut materie] *P* essentie ut *V* esse materie *B* 11 nisi] *BV om. P* 11-12 quod ... extrinsecum] *V om. BP* 17 et tale esse] *BPcV om. P*

Ad argumenta in oppositum

[6] Ad primum ergo in oppositum dicit quod non sequitur ex sua positione quod aliquod esse creature sit esse subsistens, quia utrumque esse, scilicet essentie et existentie est participatum ab alio vel exemplariter vel effective. Per idem patet ad secundum, quia non oportet ponere aliquod esse creature esse illimitatum, quia utrumque est participatum, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicit quod quia ratio essentie consistit in hoc quod ei in Deo respondet exemplar, ratio vero actualis existentie in hoc consistit quod sit actualiter Dei effectus, ideo potest unum concipi sine alio. Et dato quod unum conciperetur sine alio et dato quod unum conciperetur cum alio: quia tamen differunt intentione et non solum ratione, ideo possunt abinvicem separari.

6 quia] *BP om. V* 8 potest] *BPcV* ponit *P* 9 sine ... conciperetur] *B om. PV*

Ad auctoritates Boetii respondet Henricus

[7] Ad auctoritates autem Boetii *De hebdomadibus,* quibus dicit ‘diversum est esse et id quod est’, et ‘id quod participat esse ut sit’, et omnia talia, solvit vel quia ibi aliquando accipitur ‘esse’ pro esse increato et ‘quod est’ **[V35vb]** pro creatura, et tunc non est mirum si *esse* et *id quod est* differant sicut Deus et creatura. Vel intelligit Boetius de differentia intentionis que est inter esse et essentiam creature, ratione cuius potest unum negari de alio et dici aliquo modo diversum ab eo et participare eo, non sicut re addita sed sicut seipso differente a se intentione. In hoc in brevi stat expositio sua.

2 quod] *BPcV om. P* est *perperam add. BPc* 3 ibi aliquando] *BP* in illis *V* 8 a se] *BP om. V*

QUESTIO IIa: UTRUM ALIQUA ESSENTIA SE HABEAT PER INDIFFERENTIAM AD ESSE ET NON ESSE

Status questionis

[8] Tertio *Quolibet* questione nona querit utrum aliqua essentia se habeat per indifferentiam ad esse et non esse.[6] Et arguit primo quod non quia: Secundum **[P23va]** Augustinum[7] septimo *De Trinitate* sicut sapientia ad sapere, ita essentia ad esse. Sed sapientia non est indifferens ad sapere et non sapere. Ergo etc. CONTRA. Quod scitur est *quod quid est*. Sed scientia habetur de rebus creatis, sive sint sive non sint. Ergo essentia sive quiditas rei create est indifferens ad esse et non esse.

3 septimo] 1o *BPV*

De triplici consideratione essentie create

[9] Responsio sua ad illam questionem stat in hoc quod primo proponit triplicem considerationem essentie create. Primo enim potest considerari ut in singularibus extra; et sic est res nature. Alio modo potest considerari prout est in anima sive in intellectu; et illo modo est res rationis. Tertio modo potest considerari secundum se; et illo modo consideratur quantum ad esse essentie; quod quidem esse essentie respondet sibi prout habet exemplar in mente divina. Et istud esse essentie abstrahit ab utroque esse prius dicto, scilicet ab esse extra naturali et ab esse rationis, quia res secundum se considerata, quantum est de se, non determinat sibi quod sit in re extra et particularis, vel quod sit in intellectu et universalis. Immo omnia illa sunt preter rationem eius. Et illo modo abstrahit ab eis et est prius eis. Non autem sic abstrahit ab illo duplici esse quod sit sine aliquo eorum, quia essentia semper est vel in re extra vel in intellectu, saltem divino. Sed sic abstrahit ab eis quod utrumque est extra rationem eius, ut dictum est.

4 res] *BP om. V* 7 abstrahit] *V* extrahit *BP* 8 naturali] *BP* extracti *V* / esse] *BPcV* essentia *P* 11 preter] *PV* super *B* 12 sit] *PV om. B*

De duplici non esse

[10] Hiis suppositis, quando queritur utrum aliqua essentia sit indifferens ad esse et non esse, distinguit de non esse, quia aut per li ‘non esse’

6. III, 9: *Utrum sit ponere aliquam essentiam per indifferentiam se habentem ad esse et ad non esse*.
7. *De Trinitate* VII, 1.

negatur omnis ratio essendi, aut solum negatur esse actualis existentie. Si primo modo, tunc dicit quod nulla essentia est indifferens ad esse et non esse, quia illud quod est isto modo non ens, scilicet quod nullam rationem essendi habet, necesse est non esse, sicut Deum necesse est esse. Tale autem non est indifferens ad esse et non esse exquo necessario determinatur ad alterum. Ideo etc. Si autem accipiatur 'non esse' prout negat actualem existentiam in rebus extra, tunc distinguit de indifferentia.

3 essendi] *P* existendi] *BPcV* 3 existentie] *BPcV* essentie *P*

De duplici indifferentia ad esse et non esse

[11] Et dicit quod aliquid potest dici dupliciter indifferens ad esse et non esse. Uno modo quod neutrum eorum habeat et quod equaliter possit sibi advenire utrumque. Et illo modo nichil est indifferens ad esse in actu et non esse, quia 'De quolibet affirmatio vel negatio'.[8] Alio modo potest aliquid indifferens esse ad esse et non esse in actu sic quod quantum est **[B217ra]** de se, non determinet sibi hoc vel illud determinate et necessario, nec tamen sibi repugnat aliquid illorum sed modo convenit sibi unum, modo aliud. Et sic essentie creature est indifferens (ut dicit) ad esse in actu et non esse, quia scilicet creatura secundum suum esse essentie quod sibi convenit per hoc quod habet exemplar in Deo, non determinat sibi ita esse quin possit non esse, Deo non conservante, nec ita sibi determinat non esse quod non possit esse, Deo efficiente.

8 ut dicit] *PV om. B* 11 quin] *BV* quod non *saepius P* 12 *sec.* non] *PcV om. B*

Ad argumentum in oppositum

[12] Ad argumentum in oppositum, quando dicitur quod sicut sapientia ad sapere et non sapere, ita *etc*., dicit primo quod quantum ad esse essentie verum est quod essentia non est indifferens ad esse et non esse, sed si loquamur de esse actualis existentie, tunc distinguit de sapere creato et increato. Et dicit quod loquendo de sapere increato non sic se habet sapientia ad sapere et non sapere sicut essentia creata ad esse et non esse, quia sapientia increata est suum sapere per essentiam et per rationem essentie sue, sed essentia creata non est suum esse per essentiam, ut supra expositum est. Si autem loquamur de sapere creato, tunc aut accipitur 'non sapere' privative pro 'desipere'. Et tunc maior est falsa, quia tunc non sic se habet sapientia ad sapere et non sapere illo modo acceptum sicut essentia creature ad esse et non esse. Aut accipitur 'non sapere'

8. Conferas Arist., *Metaph*. IV 3, 1005b19-20; 23-24.

negative pro eo quod est non habere **[P23vb]** actualem existentiam sapiendi sive considerandi. Et sic maior est vera, scilicet quod sicut sapientia ad sapere et non sapere, ita essentia ad esse et non esse. Sed minor, que dicit quod sapientia non est indifferens ad sapere et non sapere, est falsa.

2 dicit] *PV* dico *B* 2-3 essentie] *P* existentie *BV* 3 essentia] *BV* esse essentie *P* 5 loquendo] *PV* loquere *B* debet loqui *Bc* 6 creata] *BP om. V* 10 non] *BP om. V* / desipere] *BPcV* decipere *P* / *alterum* tunc] *P om. BV*

QUESTIO IIIa: UTRUM PONENS ESSENTIAM CREATURE ESSE IDEM QUOD SUUM ESSE POSSIT SALVARE CREATIONEM

Status questionis

[13] Decimo *Quolibet* questione septima querit utrum ponens essentiam creature esse idem quod suum esse possit salvare creationem.[9] Et arguit primo quod non quia: Sicut materia acquirit formam in generatione, ita essentia acquirit esse in creatione. Sed ponens **[V36ra]** materiam esse idem re cum sua forma tollit generationem. Ergo ponens creaturam esse eandem re cum suo esse tollit creationem. Preterea. Quod potest creari, potest non esse et intelligi sub non esse, quia creatio est mutatio a non esse in esse. Sed si creatura esset idem cum suo esse, non posset intelligi sub non esse, quia illud quod est realiter idem cum aliquo (sicut animal quod est homo est idem realiter cum rationali), non potest esse vel intelligi sub opposito illius, licet possit intelligi, illo non cointellecto. Ergo si creatura est idem cum suo esse, non est creabilis. Preterea. In omni transmutatione subiectum transmutationis debet esse re diversum ab utroque termino. Sed in creatione subiectum transmutationis est essentia, esse vero et non esse sunt termini. Ergo si essentia creature est creabilis, oportet quod differat realiter ab esse et non esse. CONTRA. Si esse esset re differens ab essentia et esset in ea sicut in subiecto, esse educeretur de potentia essentie, sicut forma de potentia materie. Et sic in creatione ipsius esse creatura produceretur de aliquo et non de nichilo, quod est contra rationem ipsius ‘creationis’.

5 sua] *V om. BP tertium* esse] *BP* essentia *V* 13 transmutationis] *BPcV om. P* 13 re] *V om. BP* 15 est creabilis] *PV* talis *B* 17 esse] *BP* essentia *V* 18-19 in creatione ipsius] *PV* interimeret *B* 19 produceretur] *V* educeretur *BP* / *prius* de] *PV* ab *B* 20 ipsius] *P om. BV*

9. X, 7: *Utrum ponens essentiam creature esse idem re cum suo esse potest salvare creationem*.

De positione et rationibus adversariorum

[14] Responsio in illa questione sic procedit quod primo ponit positionem adversariorum, qui ponunt esse realiter differre ab essentia in creaturis. Et ponit rationes eorum. Prima est quia: Nulla res est actu talis per illud per quod est in potentia talis. Sed creatura per essentiam est in potentia ad existendum. Ergo creatura non est actu per essentiam suam, sed <per> illud per quod est actu in esse. Ergo essentia creature est diversa re a suo esse. Secunda talis est et confirmat primam. Sicut se habet genus ad oppositas differentias et materia ad formam et privationem, ita essentia ad esse et non esse. Sed potentiale quod est genus, differt a suo actuali quod est differentia, quia est extra rationem eius (et econverso), et materia re differt a forma et privatione. Ergo et essentia re differt ab esse et non esse. Et multo plus debent esse et non esse differre a suo potentiali quod est essentia quam alia, quia magis a seinvicem differunt, cum non communicent in aliquo reali extra intellectum. Tertia talis est. Nichil est in actu per illud per quod potest esse et non esse. Sed essentia creature est illud per quod creatura potest esse et non esse et est illud quod potest esse et non esse. Ergo essentia creature differt re a suo esse per quod est actu.

1 responsio] *B* ratio *PV* / ponit] *BPV* contra *add. B* 2 realiter] *V om. BP* 6 essentia creature] *BP* creatura *V* / re] *BP* realiter *sic persaepe V* 15 *secundum* per] *BP om. V* 15-17 sed ... *alterum* non esse] *BPcV om. P*

[15] Hoc idem ostenditur per Boetium *De hebdomadibus*. Qui dicit[10] quod diversum est *esse* et *quod est*. Et accipitur ibi ‘esse’ pro esse creature. Quod patet, quia statim subdit ‘esse vero nondum est’, quod de esse Creatoris dici non convenit. Dicit[11] etiam quod id quod est, accepta forma essendi, est atque subsistit, et quod in omni composito aliud est *esse*, aliud *quod est*.

4 creatoris] *BV* creationis *P* / quod est] *BP om. V*

[16] Addit etiam duo que tacta sunt supra, scilicet quod sicut transmutatio naturalis fecit scire formam esse aliud re a materia, ita creatio facit scire quod esse sit aliud re ab essentia. Repetit et illud dictum de genere respectu differentiarum, scilicet quod sicut in generatione differunt potentiale et actuale re, ita et in creatione. Et sic finaliter concludunt adversarii quod ponens essentiam et esse esse idem re non potest salvare creationem.

10. *De hebdomadibus*, p. 169, 26-28 ed. Peiper.
11. *Ibid*.

3 quod ... essentia] *BV* de genere illarum differentiarum *P* 3 dictum] *PV* quod dictum est *B* et repetit illud dictum *add. V* 4 respectu] *BP om. V* 6 *alterum* esse] *BV om. P*

[17] Postea ponit quomodo adversarii ostendunt quod secundum positionem suam non possint salvari multa que sunt in entibus. Primum est **[P24ra]** quod essentia non possit intelligi sub non esse, ut supra in secunda ratione conclusum est. Secundum est quod essentia creature non esset quid diminutum, quia non haberet esse participatum, quia nichil potest esse participatum nisi vel quia est potentiale recipiens aliquid actuale, vel quia est aliquid actuale receptum in potentiali, quia nichil participat seipso. Et sic etiam tollitur omnis defectus a creatura et in se et in ordine ad aliud, quia quod non deficit in se, nec in ordine ad aliud. Tertium est quod in rebus non esset ens per accidens, **[B217rb]** quia si tollitur a creatura participare esse, tollitur etiam ab ea participare accidens sive quodcumque aliud, quia unumquodque (ut habetur[12] a Boetio *De hebdomatibus*) prius participat esse quam quocumque alio. Quartum est quod tollitur generatio ab entibus, quia si non differunt in creatura potentiale et actuale et esse et essentia, essentia iam non erit in genere, sicut nec Deus, qui ideo non est in genere quia in eo est idem esse et essentia. Quintum est quod tolleretur analogia secundum decem predicamenta, que quidem analogia est ex hoc quod idem esse quod primo est substantie, secundario est accidentium. Quod stare non posset, si esse et essentia essent idem, quia substantie et accidentis non est eadem essentia.

5 quid] *P* quoddam *V om. B* / quia] *BcPV* etiam *B* 6 participatum *BP om. V* 7 aliquid] *V om. BP* 8 seipso] *BPcV* in seipso *P* 14 si] *BPVc om. V* 15 *alterum* essentia] *P om. BV* 16 non] *BP om. V*

De Henrici positione circa ydemptitatem esse et essentie

[18] Hiis ergo sic positis, primo repetit positionem suam de ydemptitate esse et essentie. Et dicit quod nec esse essentie nec esse existentie aliquid absolutum addit super ipsam essentiam sed solum respectum sive ordinem ad Deum. Nam creatura in ordine ad Deum sicut ad causam formalem extra rem habet esse essentie, sic esse existentie habet prout est quedam similitudo Dei in eis ut in effectu respiciens eum ut causam efficientem, vel immediate vel mediante agente naturali. Dicit tamen quod esse essentie **[V36rb]** non dicitur proprie addi ad essentiam, sed ad illud quod pertinet ad genus essentie, quod cum illo respectu ad Deum constituit essentiam in <esse>. Essentia enim sine illo respectu esse non potest.

12. *De hebdomadibus*, p. 169 ed. Peiper.

6 in eis ut in effectu] in eis *B* in effectu *PV* 7 tamen] *V* enim *BP* 9 quod] *BV* quia *Pc om. P*

De tribus rationibus adversariorum

[19] Contra hanc positionem suam primo ponit tres rationes adversariorum. Prima talis est. Efficiens non facit aliquod potentiale in actu nisi imprimendo sibi vel seipsum vel aliquem alium actum quo sit formaliter. Sed Deus non imprimit se essentie creature que est potentiale esse. Ergo imprimit ei aliquid aliud a se quod est actus eius quo est formaliter. Sed hoc est esse. Ergo esse est aliquid impressum essentie diversum re ab ea. Secunda talis est. Nichil est simpliciter per respectum, sed est tantum *ad aliquid*. Ergo esse creature non existit per respectum ad Deum, sed per aliquod absolutum additum. Tertia talis est. Materia habet respectum ad esse extensum. Non tamen est extensa nisi adveniente aliquo absoluto, quod est quantitas. Ergo simile erit de esse et essentia.

1 positionem] *BPcV* questionem *P* 3 sit] *BP* inest *V* 4 creature] *BP* create *V* / potentiale] *P* possibilis *BV* 9 ad] *BV om. P* 10 esse] *BPcV* essentie *P* 10 aliquo] *BV om. P* 11 de] *BPVc om. V*

De duplici potentiali, scilicet subiective et obiective

[20] Ad primum istorum trium statim respondet distinguendo de duplici potentiali, quia uno modo dicitur aliquid potentiale subiective, et sic materia est potentiale respectu forme. Alio modo dicitur aliquid potentiale obiective, sicut dicitur forma potentiale esse. Quod quidem posse convenit forme, quia potest esse obiectum actionis agentis, non autem per hoc quod possit recipere esse sicut quandam formam sibi impressam; alioquin in generatione naturali esset duplex transmutatio, una materie ad formam et alia forme ad esse.

1 de ... subiective] *BPVc om. V* 2 potentiali] *Vc* possibili *BP* 2 potentiale] possibile *BPV* 3 *prius* potentiale] *V* possibilis *sic persaepe BP* 3 aliquid] *V om. BP* 3-4 potentiale obiective] *V* possibile obiective *BP* a duplici possibili (!) quia uno modo accipitur possibile subiective *add. V* 4 dicitur] *BPV* quod *add. PV* / potentiale] *Pc* possibilis *P* potest *BV*

[21] Hoc posito, dicit quod maior (que dicit quod efficiens non facit illud quod potentiale est, esse in actu nisi imprimendo sibi vel seipsum vel aliquem alium actum) vera est de potentiali subiective, non autem de potentiali obiective. Essentia autem creature (ut dicit) est potentiale esse non subiective sed obiective, quia si esset potentiale respectu esse subiective recipiendo ipsum ut quandam formam absolutam, aut educeretur de

potentia essentie – et sic productio creature a Deo quantum ad esse non esset creatio sed generatio ---, vel si induceretur sicut gratia, saltem ordine nature presupponeret essentiam esse creatam. Et sic non esset verum quod prima rerum creatarum sit esse. Cuius oppositum dicitur[13] libro *De causis*, et infra ostendetur, ut dicit.

2 potentiale] *coll. textu in Quolibet* possibile *sic saepius BPV* 3 potentiali] *coll. textu in Quolibet* possibili *sic saepius BPV* 4 ut dicit] *BV om. P* 8 si induceretur] *BV* educeretur *P* / sicut] *PV om. B*

[22] Ad secundum dicit per interemptionem dicens quod **[P24rb]** esse creature est ad aliud existere, scilicet existere in ordine et respectu ad Deum; quo respectu amoto, omnino creatura non esset, quia non est nisi per manutenentiam Creatoris. Ad tertium dicit quod non est simile de potentia materie qua materia est in potentia ad extensionem, quia illa potentia est potentia subiectiva; sed est de potentia qua creatura est in potentia ad esse, quia illa est potentia obiectiva, ut dictum est. Et ideo ratio non valet.

6 *secundum* potentia] *B om. PV* 6-7 est de ... obiectiva] *BV om. P*

De Henrici rationibus suam positionem probantibus

[23] Postea ponit tres rationes suas quibus probavit in primo *Quolibet* quod esse est idem re cum essentia. Et ponit responsiones adversarii ad eas et improbationes responsionum. Prima ratio fuit quod sicut veritas, bonitas et unitas nichil addunt super essentiam rei, ita nec entitas nec esse. Ad quod respondet adversarius quod verum est loquendo de esse essentie, non autem de esse existentie; alioquin creatura esset tante actualitatis quod esset sufficiens per se existere. Ipse autem dicit quod adversarius in illa responsione sua assumit falsum, scilicet quod si esse creature non esset aliquod absolutum additum ad essentiam eius, quod ipsa esset per se tante actualitatis quod sufficeret esse per se, quia ad esse creature requiritur respectus ad Creatorem ultra rationem essentie; quem respectum essentia non habet a se sed a creante ut est eius effectus. Et propter hoc non sufficit esse per se, non autem propter aliquod absolutum additum.

2 esse] *BP om. V* 4 *secundum* nec] *V* sive *BP* 8 esse] *BV* essentia *P*

[24] Secunda ratio sua (ut dicit) fuit illa quia: Illud esse additum cum sit quid creatum, habebit esse per aliquod aliud esse sibi acquisitum et additum, et illud per aliud, et sic in infinitum. Item. Iuxta hoc adversarius

13. *De causis*, prop. IVa, 37.

arguit contra seipsum, quia sicut essentia creature potest esse et non esse, ita et illud esse quod ponitur additum potest esse et non esse. Ergo habebit esse per aliud et illud per aliud, et sic in infinitum. Et ad illa respondet adversarius quod esse est possibile esse per accidens, quia scilicet recipitur in eo quod est possibile. Sed quantum est de se, semper est, sicut secundum philosophos omnis forma, quantum est de se, semper et necessario est. Sed per accidens est possibile esse, quia scilicet recipitur in potentiali quod est materia. Nec oportet quod illud esse quod sic est possibile, habeat esse per aliud esse additum sicut essentia, quia istud esse aliter habet esse quam essentia. Nam essentia est per hoc quod recipit actum qui est esse, sed esse est per hoc quod ipso est aliquid. Et ideo non oportet ponere processum in infinitum propter hoc quod ponitur quod esse sit possibile, nec propter hoc quod ponitur quod esse sit. Sed ipse dicit quod illa responsio supponit periculosam falsitatem, scilicet quod forma vel esse creature, quantum est de se, sit necesse esse, quia solus Deus est necesse ex **[B217va]** se esse. Et sic forma et esse creature essent quedam divine essentie. Quod est absurdum. Et si dicat adversarius quod hoc non dicit secundum opinionem propriam, sed secundum opinionem **[V36va]** philosophorum, tunc (ut dicit) si vult loqui adversarius ut christianus, manet illa ratio insoluta.

2-3 et additum] *PV om. B* 3-6 item ... infinitum] *BPcV om. P* 9 philosophos] *PV* platonem *B* 11 quod est materia] *BV om. P* 12-13 quia ... *prius* essentia] *BV om. P* 20 quedam divine] *PV* aliud ratione *B*

[25] Tertia ratio sua fuit quod illud esse non potest esse substantia materia nec substantia forma nec substantia compositum nec accidens. Ad quod dicit adversarius quod licet esse non sit directe in genere Substantie sicut recipiens predicationem generis, est tamen in genere Substantie per reductionem sicut principium eius, sicut quodammodo punctum est in genere Quantitatis. Et ipse reprobat hanc responsionem sic quia: Nulla forma est in genere Substantie sicut principium nisi sit forma substantialis. Sed non potest dici quod illud esse sit forma substantialis. Ergo etc. Maiorem probat per simile de esse essentie quod quia non est forma substantialis proprie loquendo, sed est forma extra genus, scilicet ut quedam divina participatio non est in genere sed solum illud cui convenit tale esse. Quod etiam probat per commentum Boetii in libro *De hebdomadibus* et in libro *De duabus naturis et una persona Christi*. In quorum primo dicitur[14] in commento quod *id quod est* et *esse* non communicant in eodem genere, et in alio dicitur[15] quod non sunt eiusdem generis <nec

14. Gilbertus Porretanus, *Comm. in De hebdomadibus*, 194,78-195,7.
15. Gilbertus Porretanus, *In Boethium De una persona et duabus naturis Christi*, pp. 258,51-259,74.

eiusdem rationis>, et idem valet. Minorem probat tum quia secundum hoc res non essent in predicamento nisi quando actu existerent --- quod reputat inconveniens ---, tum quia questio de esse existentie, ut probat per Avicennam[16], Averroem[17] et Algazalem[18], pertinet ad problema de accidente; quod non esset verum, si *esse* esset forma substantialis.

8 esse] *BP om. V* 15 dicitur] *BV* dicit *P*

De argumentis adversarii contra eum factis

[26] Postea iterato repetit suum **[P24va]** modum ponendi, ut ponat argumenta adversarii contra se et solvat. Dicit ergo quod esse existentie nullam rem absolutam addit super essentiam, sed solum respectum ad Deum ut ad causam efficientem, non quod sit ipsa relatio sed ipsa essentia ut sub relatione. Et ideo non potest ex toto simpliciter dici quod esse essentie sit idem cum essentia. Nec potest dici re diversum ab ea, sicut nullus respectus potest dici alia res a fundamento, nec tamen est suum fundamentum.

6 essentie] *BV* existentie *P*

[27] Contra hunc modum ponendi ponit duas rationes adversarii et ponit solutiones earum. Prima est quod respectus nec acquiritur nec amittitur nisi quia fundamentum eius acquiritur vel amittitur, quia si fundamentum et alterum extremum sit immutabile, respectus non potest annichilari vel non esse. Ergo cum Deus sit omnino immutabilis et essentia creature sit omnino incorruptibilis: quia essentia est semper essentia, respectus fundatus in essentia in ordine ad Deum numquam potest non esse. Et si potest non esse, hoc erit quia fundatur in aliquo addito ad essentiam quod potest ab ea separari. Et ad hoc solvit dicens quod verum est quod respectus non potest acquiri nisi per acquisitionem fundamenti. Sed quod dicitur ultra quod nec potest amitti nisi quia amittitur fundamentum, dicit quod verum est de illis respectibus qui fundantur in aliqua re ex proprietate sue nature. Nunc autem respectus ille creature ad Deum non fundatur in ipsa re ex proprietate sue nature, sed per actionem Dei. Et sicut per actionem Dei potest creari in ea, ita per actionem Dei potest amoveri.

3 quia] *BP om. V* 3 si] *PV om. B* 4 immutabile] *PV* mutabile *B* 6-7 fundatus in essentia] *BP* fundatur *V* 11 amitti ... fundamentum] *BP* fundamentum amittere *V* 13 creature] *PV om. B* / re] *B om. PV*

16. *Metaphysica* I, 6.
17. *In Arist. Metaph*. ad V 9, 1017b27sqq.
18. *Logica*, cap. 3.

[28] Secunda ratio est illa. Illud quod non est ex se tale, non habet esse tale ex sola relatione ad efficiens. Sed essentia ex se non habet esse. Ergo non potest convenire sibi esse ex sola relatione ad efficiens. Et ad hoc dicit quod esse existentie nichil addit super essentiam nisi respectum ad agens; propter quod etiam (ut dicit) tale esse pertinet ad problema de accidente secundum quod ponit[19] Commentator quinto *Metaphisice*. Et propter additionem istius respectus esse et essentia non sola ratione differunt, sed differunt intentione. Et ideo unum potest intelligi sub opposito alterius, quia essentia potest intelligi non esse. Istud autem dictum non applicat ultra ad solutionem argumenti prius facti. Nec video quomodo possit applicare nisi interimendo ex dictis maiorem illius argumenti, scilicet quod illud quod non est ex se tale, non habet esse tale ex sola relatione ad agens.

2-3 sed ... efficiens] *BPcV om. P* 5 quod] *Pc* hoc *B om. V* 7 sola] *BP om. V* 8 sed differunt] *BPcV om. P* 12 habet] *V* potest *BP*

[29] Et quia adversarius dicit quod non videt quid interest inter differre ratione et differre intentione, ipse dicit quod ostendet sibi hoc in hiis terminis ‘homo’ et ‘animal rationale’, que sicut diffinitio et diffinitum sola ratione differunt. Unde nec aliqualiter compositionem faciunt, nec unum potest intelligi sub opposito alterius. Accidens vero et subiectum, sicut homo et album, re differunt et faciunt compositionem realem plurium rerum, et unum potest intelligi sub opposito alterius. Sed genus et differentia, puta animal et rationale plus differunt quam diffinitio et diffinitum. Et non tantum plus quia magis secundum eandem speciem differendi, sed plus quia pertinent ad speciem aliam differentie, cum faciant compositionem in specie constituta ex eis et unum non predicetur de alio; et quia constat etiam quod non differunt re sicut accidens et subiectum, quia tunc genus et differentia non dicerentur idem secundum formam; quod falsum est. Relinquitur ergo quod sit alius modus differendi secundum speciem ab utroque modo differendi predicto. Et sive vocetur differentia secundum intentionem, sive secundum rationem, sive quocumque alio nomine nominetur, secundum istum **[V36vb]** modum dicit esse et essentiam differre. Et propter hoc potest essentia intelligi sub non esse.

3 homo] *BPV* enim *add. BP* 3 sicut] *BP* sunt *V* 4 aliqualiter] *B* aliquam *PV* 12 quia] *V om. BP* 13 dicerentur] *BPc* differrent *PV* 15 et] *BV om. P* 17 nominetur] *BV* nuncupetur *P* 17 dicit] *BP* debet *V*

19. Averroes, *In Arist. IV Metaph. Comm*., ad *Metaph.* IV, 28, 1024b9-12; cfr. 30, 1025a14sqq.

Respondet Henricus ad questionem principalem

[30] Hiis positis, respondet ad questionem principalem qua queritur utrum ponens quod essentia creature et suum esse sint idem re, possit salvare creationem. Et dicit quod ponens quod essentia creature ex proprietate sue **[B217vb]** nature sit suum esse, non possit salvare creationem, quia hoc soli Creatori competit. Sed ponens quod esse creature nichil absolutum addit super essentiam eius sed solum respectum ad Deum ut ad causam agentem, ita quod participet esse non sicut aliquod absolutum **[P24vb]** additum, sed protanto quia est quedam similitudo defectiva Dei creantis, potest salvare creationem; et magis proprie potest salvare creationem quam ponendo quod esse sit res absoluta addita ad essentiam. Quod sic probat quia: Creatio sive fieri per creationem nichil presupponit sicut fieri per informationem supponit aliquid quod informetur. Sed ponentes quod esse nichil addit nisi respectum ad creantem, possunt salvare quod esse nec secundum rem nec secundum intentionem aliquid presupponit, sed alia presupponant ipsum et fiant de ipso per quandam informationem secundum intentionem. Et ideo tales maxime et propriissime possunt salvare creationem

1 principalem] *BP* quando vel *V* 8 defectiva] *BP om. V* 11 presupponit] *BPcV* supponit *P* 13 esse] *BPcV om. P* 14 rem] *BP* rationem *V* 15 sed] *V* et quod *BP*

[31] Ad evidentiam autem predictorum in ista ratione sciendum quod ipse ponit quod omnis res creata esse suum habet per respectum ad Deum, quod quidem esse est magis commune et magis informe quam possit esse in creatura. Esse autem aliquid habet per illud in quo fundatur ille respectus, sicut per humanitatem vel animalitatem, ita quod humanitas vel animalitas adveniens ipsi esse per informationem ipsius constituit ipsum hominem existentem vel existens animal. Et sic (ut dicit) secundum viam suam potest salvare quod res creetur secundum suum esse et quod esse sit prima intentio creata, alie vero intentiones, sicut animal vel homo, non creantur proprie sed fiunt (ut dicit) de illo esse per informationem. Sed ponens quod esse sit quoddam absolutum additum super essentiam, non potest ita salvare creationem ipsius esse, quia si ponatur educi de potentia essentie, tunc constat quod productio ipsius esse erit generatio.

1 ratione] *BPcV* scientia *P* 4 habet] *BP om. V* 6 constituit] *BP* constitutum *V* 13 essentie] *BV* materie *P* / esse] *BV om. P*

[32] Si vero dicatur quod esse fiat in essentia sicut gratia fit in anima, adhuc (ut dicit) non poterit dici esse per creationem, sed magis per informationem, quod cum secundum rem presupponat ordine nature essentiam quam informat, multo plus quam esse animal presupponit esse de quo fit

per informationem (ut dicit), et multo plus quam forma specialis presupponat generalem secundum Commentatorem[20] *Metaphisice* qua insit, cum sint idem re. Et multo plus deberet dici educi esse de essentia quam sensitivum de vegetativo --- quod tamen quidam ponunt, scilicet sensitivum secundum rem educi de vegetativo, ita quod illud quod est a principio solum anima vegetativa, actione nature pertingit ad hoc quod sit sensitiva successive. --- Et sic (ut dicit) adversarii proprie non possunt salvare creationem ipsius esse.

3 quod] *B om. PV* 3 ordine] *BP* ordinem *V* 12 esse] *BP om. V*

Solvit Henricus ad argumenta adversarii

[33] Post hec solvit ad argumenta facta contra hanc partem et ad dicta adversariorum. In solvendo autem non intendo tenere ordinem inordinatum quem ipse tenet. Sed magis intendo sequi ordinem quo facta sunt argumenta. Ad primum ergo dicit quod non ita esse se habet ad essentiam in creatione sicut materia ad formam in generatione, quia materia in generatione est tantum potentiale subiective et respectu ipsius transmutationis et respectu ipsius termini eius. Non sic autem essentia in creatione, quia est potentiale obiective.

1 post hec] *BP* propter hoc *V* 3 sequi] *BV* tenere *P* 6 potentiale] possibilis *sic persaepe BPV* 7 *alterum* respectu ... creatione] *BV om. P*

[34] Ad secundum dicit quod licet essentia et esse non differant re, differunt tamen intentione, ut frequenter expositum est. Et ideo unum potest intelligi sub opposito alterius, sicut *sensibile*, quod a *rationali* differt non re sed intentione, potest intelligi sub opposito ‘rationalis’. Sed adversarius obicit contra hoc et dicit quod sensibile non potest stare cum opposito ‘rationalis’ nisi secundum quod accipitur pro eo quod est aliud a rationali. Si autem accipiatur pro eo quod est idem re cum rationali, scilicet pro sensibili quod est homo, de tali sensibili falsum est quod posset stare cum opposito rationalis; alioquin per sillogismum expositorium concluderetur oppositum de opposito sic: ‘Hoc sensibile (demonstrato homine) est rationale; hoc sensibile est irrationale <demonstrato bove>; ergo rationale est irrationale’; quod est impossibile. Et ad hoc dicit quod sensibile iam contractum in homine non differt intentione a rationali, sed sola ratione. Sed sensibile contractum quod est idem cum homine secundum rem, differt ab eo secundum intentionem. Et sensibile sic acceptum quod est idem cum homine, potest intelligi sub opposito rationalis, licet hoc prout **[P25ra]** est in homine, non sic possit intelligi.

20. Averroes, *In Arist. V Metaph. Comm.*, ad *Metaph.* V 9, 1017b27sqq.

2 unum] *PV om. B* 4 *alterum* sed] *BPV* quia *add. BP* 14 contractum] *V* non contractum *BP* 14 rem] *V* rationem *BP* 17 hoc] *V* non *BP* / non] *V om. BP*

[35] Ad tertium dicit quod in transmutatione in qua est aliquod subiectum substratum sic transmutationi quod sic est subiectum eius quod non terminus, differt subiectum transmutationis ab utroque termino re. Sed de eo quod sic est subiectum quod idipsum re est etiam terminus differens ab eo tantum secundum intentionem, non est verum. Et sic essentia est subiectum creationis. Ad cuius evidentiam dicit quod illud instans indivisibile in quo est creatio, dividitur in tria signa secundum rationem. Et in primo signo est abiectio ipsius non-esse ab essentia; in secundo vero est ipsa transmutatio que dicitur creatio; in tertio vero est acquisitio ipsius esse in ipsa essentia, ita quod creatura facta est composita ex duobus secundum intentionem, scilicet esse et essentia. Et ipsa essentia ut est indifferens ad esse et non esse, est subiectum creationis, ut vero est aliquid ipsius creati est terminus. Et preter hec ponit hic multas truffas. De quibus non est curandum.

1 aliquod] *PV om. B* 2 *alterum* quod] *BPcV om. P* 8 ab essentia] *BP om. V* 13 preter] *V* per *BP*

[36] Iuxta hoc etiam ponit tres rationes adversarii quibus probat quod esse et **[B218ra]** creatio passiva sint idem, et solvit. Prima est quia: Creatio passiva est perfectio ipsius essentie ut receptivi. Et esse est eius perfectio illo modo. Ergo etc. Et ad hoc dicit quod licet alique perfectiones sint receptivi cuiusdam, sicut quantitas et qualitas sunt perfectiones substantie corporee, non oportet quod unum sit aliud quando sunt perfectiones secundum aliam et aliam rationem perficiendi. Nunc autem ita est in proposito. Nam creatio est perfectio essentie prout est in potentia et sub transmutatione, sed esse est eius perfectio inquantum est terminus.

7 perficiendi] *PV* participandi *B*

[37] Secunda ratio est quia: Sicut motus est idem re cum termino per motum acquisito, ita creatio est idem re cum esse acquisito per creationem. Et ipse dicit quod motus non est idem re cum re acquisita per motum. Et hoc etiam dixit in precedente ratione. Et ulterius addit hic quod quomodocumque se habeant motus et eius terminus, in hoc tamen differt inter motum et creationem quod subiectum motus non est idem re cum termino eius, sed in creatione idem est subiectum et terminus.

3 cum re] *PV om. B*

[38] Tertia est quod in hoc differt motus a creatione quia motus est actus imperfecti et existentis in potentia, creatio vero est actus perfecti et respicit magis actum quam potentiam et essentialius, quod non convenit

motui. Unumquodque autem est in actu per esse. Et ideo creatio essentialiter est idem cum esse. Et ad hoc dicit quod falsum assumitur in maiore, quia tam motus quam creatio magis respiciunt rem ut est in potentia quam ut est in actu, quia respiciunt eam ut est medium inter privationem et actum esse et non esse.

4 autem] *PV* aliud *B*

Ad rationes adversarii in principio corporis solutionis positas

[39] Postea respondet ad rationes adversarii positas in principio corporis solutionis. Ad primum ergo dicit quod illud quod est in potentia subiectiva ad aliquid, non est aliquo modo per se illud in actu, sicut patet de materia respectu forme. Sed illud quod est in potentia ad aliquid ita quod est potentiale obiective ad hoc, tale non est illud per se in actu, si li 'per' importet habitudinem cause efficientis, quia impossibile est quod aliquid efficiat se. Secundum vero genus cause formalis illud quod est potentiale obiective est per se illud actu ad quod est in potentia. Secundum tamen aliam et aliam intentionem est in potentia et in actu, quia impossibile est (ut dicit) quod secundum eandem intentionem sit in potentia et in actu.

3 illud] *BP om. V* 9-10 quia ... actu] *BP om. V*

[40] Sed contra hoc obicit adversarius. Et dicit quod licet differat potentiale obiective a potentiali subiective, tamen unum eorum numquam est sine alio, quia creare materiam vel aliquid aliud potentiale non est facere quod materia sit materia vel quod potentiale sit potentiale, quia ad hoc quod materia sit materia non requiritur agens. Ergo facere materiam vel quodcumque potentiale est facere materiam sub forma et potentiale sub actu. **[P25ra]** Et facere formam vel actum non est facere quod forma sit forma vel quod actus sit actus, sed facere quod actus sit in potentiali.

4-5 vel quod ... materia] *BPcV om. P*

[41] Et ad hoc respondet quod creare materiam non est facere materiam sub forma. Nec creare formam est facere eam sub esse re differenti ab ea, sed facere eam sub esse differenti ab ea sola intentione. Et hoc sufficit ad factionem eius. Et hoc facere non est solum facere quod materia sit materia vel quod essentia sit essentia, sed facere materiam vel essentiam sub actu intentione differenti ab ea. Et dicit quod materiam creare non est facere eam sub forma, quia ponitur quod possit creari per se et similiter quod possit per se annichilari. Et dicit quod si ponatur quod materia non potest fieri nisi quia fit sub forma, nec forma nisi quia fit in materia, redibit opinio philosophorum ponentium essentias respectu esse

necessarias et non possibiles nisi quia sunt cum alio. Et dicit quod sufficit quod in re creata differant potentiale et actuale secundum intentionem et quod sit composita ex pluribus secundum intentionem.

7-8 per se ... possit] *BP om. V* 9 *prius* nisi] *PV om. B* 13 sit] *V* sint *BP*

[42] Ad aliud dicit quod non est simile de potentiali quod est materia respectu privationis et forme, et de potentiali quod est essentia respectu esse et non esse, quia materia est potentiale subiective, essentia vero est potentiale obiective.

Respondet ad auctoritates Boetii

[43] Ad auctoritates autem Boetii dicit quando dicitur quod *esse* est diversum et *id quod est*, quod potest ibi accipi 'esse' pro esse increato. Et quod dicitur quod ipsum autem *esse* nondum est, non est intelligendum (ut dicit) quin sit in se semper, sed quod nondum est **[V37rb]** in eo quod participat ipso. Vel potest (ut dicit) exponi 'esse' pro ipsa subsistentia sive quiditate rei, ut pro humanitate, et 'quod est' pro concreto, ut pro homine. Et tunc *esse* et *quod est*, ut humanitas et homo, differunt sicut abstractum et concretum, non autem per aliquam rem additam. Et similiter quod dicit 'Quod est, accepta forma essendi *etc*.' ibi accipit secundum commentum[21] 'quod est' pro concreto, ut pro homine, et 'esse' pro abstracto, ut pro humanitate, que non differunt secundum rem. Et sic exponit omnia dicta Boetii vel secundum diversitatem abstracti et concreti, sive secundum diversitatem intentionum.

6 quod] *BPcV* prout *P* 7-10 *alterum* quod est ... homine et esse] *BP om. V*

Respondet ad obiectiones contra suam positionem principalem adductas

[44] Postea respondet ad hoc quod ponit quod multa sunt in entibus que non possint salvari secundum positionem ponentem esse et essentiam esse idem re. Ad primum ergo patet per illud quod dictum est ad secundum argumentum principaliter factum. Ad secundum dicit quod cum ista positione stat quod creatura est quid diminutum et participatum. Et quando adversarius dicit quod non, quia nichil participat seipso, concedatur quod nichil participat seipso. Et quando dicitur ultra quod si essentia esset suum esse, tunc idem participaret seipso, dicit quod falsum est, immo creatura participat Deo, quia est in effectu eius defectiva similitudo essentialiter. Et hoc est ipsam participare esse, non autem ipsam partici-

21. Gilbertus Porretanus, *In De hebdomadibus*, p. 194,93-195,7.

pare esse est ipsam recipi esse ut quoddam **[B218rb]** absolutum re ab ea differens, ut ponunt alii qui ad hoc probandum adducunt tertiam regulam Boetii *De hebdomadibus*.[22]

6 non quia] *BP om. V* 12 tertiam] *BV om. P* / regulam] *PV* rationem *P* sive regulam *add. Pc*

[45] Ad tertium dicit quod si nullo modo essentia differret ab esse, nec participaret esse nec posset participare accidens, sicut nec Deus. Nunc autem differunt, saltem intentione. Et etiam est ibi participatio qualis dicta est. Que sufficit ad hoc quod possit sequi participatio accidentis. Ad quartum dicit quod ad salvandum genus in rebus sufficit quod potentiale et actuale differant intentione. Ad quintum dicit quod, non obstante quod aliud sit esse subiecti ab esse accidentis sicut essentia ab essentia, tamen possunt habere analogiam in ente communi abstracto analogo inquantum substantia verius participat esse divino quam accidens. Ad sextum dicit quod tolleretur unitas a rebus, nisi esset aliud re potentiale et actuale, loquendo de potentiali subiective. Sed loquendo de potentiali obiective sufficit quod differant intentione.

5 rebus] *BV* entibus *P* 7 *prius* ab] *BV* et aliud *P* / *alterum* essentia] *BP* esse *V* 8 communi] *BV om. P* 10 unitas] *BP* mutatio *V*

QUESTIO IVa: UTRUM SIT ALIUD ESSE EXISTENTIE ACCIDENTIS AB ESSE SUBIECTI

Status questionis

[46] Eodem *Quolibet* questione octava querit utrum sit aliud esse existentie accidentis ab esse subiecti.[23] Et arguit quod non. Primo quia: Accidens **[P25va]** non est nisi quia est entis. Quod non esset verum nisi idem esset esse entis quod est substantia et ipsius accidentis. Secundo quia: Si plura esse essent in eodem, unum participaret alio. Quod est inconveniens, cum esse sit maior actualitas que potest esse, et Boetius dicat[24] in *De hebdomadibus* quod ipsum *esse* nullo participat. Tertio quia: Dicitur[25] sexto *Topicorum* quod unius rei unum est esse. Ergo unius substantie, quotquot accidentia habeat, non est nisi unicum esse. Quarto quia: Secun-

22. *De hebdomadibus,* p. 169,33-35 ed. Peiper: "Id quod est habere aliquid praeterquam quod ipsum est, potest. Ipsum vero esse nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum".
23. X, 8: Utrum accidentis existentis in subiecto sit aliud esse existentie quam sit esse existentie sui subiecti.
24. *De hebdomadibus,* pp. 169,29-32 ed. Peiper:
25. Arist., *Topica* VI 4, 141a35-36.

dum Boetium[26] *De unitate et uno* omne quod est, ideo est quia unum est et suum esse consistit in unitate. Subiectum autem et accidens faciunt unum sicut forma et materia. Ergo eorum est unum esse. CONTRA quia: Conversa substantia panis in corpus Christi, accidentia remanent. Quod non posset contingere nisi haberent proprium esse preter esse subiecti secundum quod remanent, quia nulla res est suum esse.

10 unum] *BPV* numero *add. P* 11 subiectum] *BV* substantia *P* 12 unum] *PV om. B* 12 ergo ... esse] *BPcV om. P* 14 subiecti] *BPcV* subiectum *P*

De responsionibus a quibusdam aliis ad questionem principalem datis

[47] Responsio. Primo ponit responsionem aliorum de illa questione. Qui ponunt quod in eadem substantia, quotquot ponantur accidentia vel forme, non est nisi unicum esse. Et hoc declarant primo sic quia: In una substantia non est nisi una extensio qua sunt extensa substantia et omnia accidentia que in ea sunt, substantia quidem ut subiectum extensionis, sed accidentia alia a quantitate quia sunt in extenso. Ergo a simili in una substantia non erit nisi unum existere quo substantia subsistit ut subiectum existendi et quo accidentia existunt quia sunt in existente. Secundo sic: Quia aliter non salvaretur analogia substantie et accidentis in ente nisi utrumque esset existens per unum esse in relatione ad quod habeant analogiam. Tertio sic. Existens dicitur ab 'existere'. Si ergo in una substantia essent plura *existere*, illa substantia posset dici plura existentia et plures existentes. Quod est inconveniens. Propter quod dicunt quod, sive ponantur plures forme in eodem secundum rem sive secundum intentionem, tamen non est in eo nisi unicum esse. Nec convenit ibi ymaginari esse completum et esse incompletum sed unicum esse tantum quod dat ultima et perfectior forma sive perfectior intentio. Unde in Christo dicunt quod non est nisi unicum esse existentie. Alioquin Christus esset duo existentes, et per consequens duo supposita.

1 de illa questione] *BP om. V* 1-2 qui ponunt] *BPcV om. P* 2 accidentia] *BP* actus *V* 10 in relatione] *BP om. V* 16 tantum] *P* tamen *BV*

De triplici esse

[48] Postea prosequitur suam opinionem. Et ponit distinctionem triplicis esse. Primum est esse essentie. Quod est quedam similitudo divini esse, et convenit rei ex habitudine ad Deum sicut ad suum exemplar, per quod habet creatura quod sit natura et res quedam proprie dicta et non figmen-

26. ps.-Boethius (Dominicus Gundissalinus), *De unitate liber* p. 3, 8-9 et 4,4-8.

tum. Et ex isto esse et ipsa natura rei, puta humanitate vel animalitate, constituitur essentia ut **[V37va]** ex *quo est* et *quod est*, ita quod ipsa natura est *quod* et ipsa habitudo ad Deum est *quo*. Et ex hoc abstrahitur commune nomen 'entis', quod est analogum ad decem predicamenta. Aliud est esse existentie quod convenit rei ex hoc quod est actu extra animam effectus Dei creantis. A quo accipitur commune nomen 'existens', quod est analogum decem predicamentis prout actu existunt extra animam. Et utrumque istorum esse distinguitur. Nam uno modo dicitur simpliciter esse vel essentie vel existentie per hoc quod est simpliciter, sive cum alio sive per se. Aliud vero est esse subsistentie ex hoc quod habet esse per se non coniunctum alii.

2 primum est esse] *PV om. B* 2 essentie] *V* existentie *BP* 6 essentia] *PV* esse B **7** est quod et] *P* est quo etiam *B* est quod etiam *V*

[49] Hiis suppositis, perstringendo verba sua tenet quod quot sunt essentie in quolibet ente, tot sunt esse essentie et esse existentie. Sed de esse subsistentie, supposito quod unumquodque subsistat per ultimam formam sive per ultimam differentiam essentialem, dicit quod non est nisi unum tale esse in quolibet supposito. Et hoc probat pluribus rationibus.

1 tenet] *B* respondet *V* oportet *P* 3 subsistat] *BPcV* supponat *P*

[50] Quarum prima talis est quia: Proprius actus essentie est esse, et existentie est proprius actus existere. Sed nichil potest esse sine proprio eius actu, sicut album non potest esse sine albedine, que est proprius actus albi. Ergo nulla essentia vel existentia potest esse sine proprio esse sibi **[P25vb]** correspondente, ita quod quot sunt essentie in eodem, de quocumque genere sit, tot sunt esse, licet unum esse sit perfectius alio, sicut una essentia est perfectior alia; sicut patet de substantia respectu accidentis et de forma respectu materie.

4 potest esse] *V om. BP*

[51] Secunda talis est. Sicut ex forma substantiali et materia fit unum simpliciter, ita ex forma accidentali et substantia fit unum per accidens. Sed ex forma et materia fit unum simpliciter per hoc quod forma communicat suum esse simpliciter materie **[B218va]** et composito ex ipsa forma et materia, et aliter non, quia unumquodque intantum est ens inquantum est unum. Ergo a simili ex substantia et accidente non posset fieri unum nisi accidens communicaret suum proprium esse accidentale substantie et composito ex subiecto et ipso accidente. Et iuxta hoc dicit quod quotquot sunt <esse> essentie in Christo, tot sunt esse existentie, licet unum sit perfectius alio, sicut esse forme quam esse materie et esse divine nature quam esse nature humane, per quod quidem esse nature

divine communicatur ipsi nature humane. Propter quod est ibi unum esse subsistentie propter istam communicationem.

6 substantia] *BP* subiecto *V* 8 substantie] *BP* subiecto *V* 11 per] *V om. BP*

[52] Tertia talis est. Sicut se habet unitas existentium in aliquo composito ad unitatem compositi, ita esse plurium existentium in uno composito ad esse compositi. Sed plura existentia composita in aliquo composito habere plures unitates sibi proprias non repugnat unitati compositi, immo unitas compositi non esset nisi essent plures unitates proprie plurium ipsum componentium. Ergo a simili plura existentia in aliquo composito habere plura esse propria non repugnat esse compositi, immo non constituerent esse compositi nisi haberent sua plura propria esse.

3 composita] *V om. BP* 4 habere] *B* habent *P* habente *V* / proprias] *BPV* que *add. P* 6 componentium] *BP* componentes *V* 7 habere] *BP* habente *V*

[53] Ad probandum autem maiorem, quod scilicet sicut unitas ad unitatem, ita esse ad esse, adducit multa verba de Boetio in libro *De unitate et uno*, scilicet quod esse et unum se consequuntur[27], et multa consimila. Ex hoc etiam concludit ulterius quod cum res sic se habeat ad esse sicut ad unitatem: cum res sit una non per rem additam sed per essentiam, ita etiam erit ens per suam essentiam, non per rem additam. Et ad hoc etiam adducit verbum Philosophi de octavo *Metaphisice*, ubi dicit[28] quod errant qui ponunt aliud esse illud quod est in potentia ab eo quod est postea in actu. Et Commentator dicit[29] ibidem quod idem est quod est primo in potentia et postea est in actu. Et Aristotiles dicit[30] quod ad hoc quod illud quod est in potentia fiat in actu, nichil aliud requiretur enti cum est in potentia nisi motor. Si autem requiretur esse additum essentie, tunc preter ens quod est in potentia requiretur aliquid aliud quo fieret ens in potentia ens in actu.

5-6 sed ... additam] *BPcV om. P* 10-11 et ... actu] *PcV om. BP*

[54] Quarta ratio talis est quia: Esse quod habent accidentia remanentia, conversa substantia panis in corpus Christi, aut est esse quod prius habebant in subiecto diversum ab esse subiecti --- et sic habetur propositum ---, aut est esse de novo creatum. Et hoc esse non potest, quia non creatur per se ab aliquo generante (ut de se patet) nec ab aliquo creante. Nec etiam a removente prohibens quod nichil facit ad effectum, quia tale nichil agit sed relinquit naturam rei agere illud in quo prohibebatur. Et si sic, tunc quantitas faceret se esse simpliciter; quod est impossibile, quia

27. Ps.-Boethius (Dominicus Gundasilinus), *De unitate liber*, p. 4,10.
28. *Metaph*. VIII 8, 1045b16-18.
29. Averroes, *In Arist. VIII Metaph. Comm*., *ad* 1045b16-18.
30. *Metaph*. VIII 8, 1045b21-22.

licet ens in actu simpliciter faciat se in actu secundum quid, ens tamen in potentia secundum quid; nulla tamen res potest facere se in actu essendi simpliciter. Nec etiam tale esse potest causari a removente prohibens quod aliquid facit ad effectum, sicut dividens continuum facit ipsum plura in actu inquantum removet continuitatem prohibentem pluralitatem actualem, et ipsum dividens facit aliquid ad pluralitatem. Isto modo non potest dici quod quantitas illa remanens recipiat esse **[V37vb]** de novo ab aliquo. Et propter hoc esse in composito non prohibet quantitatem habere proprium esse, quia, ut supra ostensum est, entitates proprie partium non repugnant entitati compositi, nec econverso.

7 agit sed] *PV* agens *B* 9-10 ens tamen ... quid] *PV om. B* 10 essendi] BV *om. P* 15 recipiat] *BPcV om. P* 16 quantitatem] *V* continuitatem *BP* 17 entitati compositi] *PV* essentiali composito *B*

[55] Quinta talis est quia: Si potentia divina diverteret naturam humanam (sicut potest facere), **[P26ra]** non acquireretur illi nature aliquod novum esse, quia nec a generante nec a creante nec a removente prohibens (ut patet), quia assumptio non prohibet esse nature humane sed modum essendi, scilicet esse distinctim per se sive subsistere, quod sibi non convenit quando est unita. Sed si separatio conveniret sibi, et in illo esse essentie quod habet in supposito divino remaneret, licet sub alio modo.

1 diverteret] *B* dimitteret *PV* 2 non] *PV* ut *B* 5 distinctim] *BP* distincti *V* 6 sed] *PV* videlicet *B* / separatio conveniret] *BP* separetur communicet *V* 7 supposito] *BP* subiecto *V* / divino] *BV om. P*

[56] Sexta talis est. Si humana natura in Christo non habet esse creatum proprie nature, nullum esse creatum est in Christo. Et sic Christus non esset creatura secundum humanam naturam. Quod est inconveniens. Relinquitur ergo quod in supposito Christi sunt plura esse existentie. Septima talis est. Esse suppositi divini est esse relatum. Si ergo non sit ibi esse proprium humane nature, Christus non habebit aliquod esse absolutum. Quod est inconveniens. Et sic idem quod prius. Octava talis est. In Christo sunt duo vivere. Sed vivere viventibus est esse. Ergo etc.

4 christi] *BP om. V*

[57] Addit tamen de esse subsistentie quod istud esse est quod forma communicat illi cuius est forma. Et istud esse est esse existentie simpliciter. Et si quid communicetur a forma ei cuius est forma distinctim et separatim, a quolibet alio dicitur esse subsistentie. Si vero communicetur ei cuius est forma in ordine ad aliquod suppositum alterius nature per assumptionem sibi unite, tunc erit quidem esse existentie sed non subsistentie; sicut est in Christo. Et istud esse (ut dicit) aut est a forma absoluta et facit subsistentiam absolutam, aut est a forma relata, et tunc

constituit subsistentiam relativam, sicut in personis divinis. Et dicit quod quia natura divina non habet esse distinctum a subsistentiis personarum divinarum, non dat aliquod esse subsistentie sed dat eis unum esse existentie, quod est unum in eis, sicut et divina essentia est una in eis. --- Et in hoc consistit sua solutio.

1 est] *BP om. V* 3 ei] *V om. BP* 4-7] si vero ... subsistentie] *BPcV om. P* 7 aut] *PV* aliud *B*

Ad argumenta in oppositum ab adversariis adducta

[58] Ad primum ergo in oppositum adductum ab adversariis dicit quod illud simile ibi positum est pro se, quia sicut preter extensionem quantitatis materia et accidentia existentia in ea habent aliquid proprie extensionis, quia habent partes aliquas alias a partibus quantitatis, licet nonnisi per quantitatem, ita etiam accidentia habent propria esse diversa ab esse substantie, licet nonnisi per esse substantie.

1 adversariis] *BPV* in principio solutionis *add. P* 2 pro] *PV* secundum *B* / quantitatis] *BV om. P* 4 aliquas alias] aliquas *P* alias *BV* 5-6 per ... nonnisi] *BP om. V*

[59] Ad secundum de analogia entis patet ex precedenti questione quod illa analogia non est propter hoc quod non habeant nisi unum esse, sed quia communicant in ratione entis communis, quod est esse similitudo esse divini. Et unum illorum illo esse divino perfectius participat quam aliud.

3 similitudo] *BP* simillimum *V* 4 illo esse] *B* esse *V om. P* 4 quam] *PV* quod *B*

[60] Ad tertium dicit quod ad plura esse bene sequitur plura existentia et plures res entes, quia ista **[B218vb]** supponunt pro esse existentie. Sed non sequitur quod sint plures entes masculine quia hic supponunt pro suppositis.

1 bene] *BV om. P* 3 hic supponunt] *coni.* hoc supponit *BPV* 4 suppositis] *B* supposito *PV*

Ad argumenta principaliter facta ad questionem

[61] Ad primum argumentum factum principaliter ad questionem dicit quod quando dicitur quod accidens non est nisi quia est entis, hoc non dicitur protanto quia accidens non habeat esse proprium preter esse substantie, sed quia accidens et quoad esse et quoad essentiam dependet a substantia sicut ab eo in quo est, sine quo nec esse nec essentia accidentis posset esse. Unde sicut accidens non est nisi quia est entis, ita nec est

essentia nisi quia est essentie que est substantia. Et tamen accidentis et substantie sunt diverse essentie.

1 argumentum] *BP* articulum *V* 2 *alterum* est] *BP om. V* 7 essentia] *BV* esse] *P* / essentie] *BV* esse *P*

[62] Ad secundum dicit quod secundum suam viam nullum esse fundatur in alio esse, sed omne esse fundatur in essentia ex relatione ad Deum. Et ideo posito quod sint plura esse in eodem numero, non oportet quod unum esse participet alio. Item. Etiam dicit quod si esse, ut alii ponunt, esset aliquod absolutum additum ad essentiam, ponere quod compositum ex primo esse et essentia participaret secundo esse, nullum esset inconveniens.

[63] Ad tertium dicit quod illud verbum[31] Philosophi de sexto *Topicorum* intelligitur de esse subsistentie quod in uno non est nisi unum. Et tale esse (ut dicit) est quod diffinitio significat. Et de tali esse dicit[32] Boetius in *De Trinitate* quod esse est a sola forma. Nec per hoc intendit quin materia habeat proprium esse.

[64] Ad quartum patet ex predictis, quia plura esse et plures unitates partium componentium non repugnant unitati et uni esse compositi. Dicit etiam quod dictum adversarii quo dicit quod, adveniente **[P26rb]** ultima forma, si sint plures forme in eodem, alie precedentes deficiunt dare esse et ultima sola dat esse, istud, inquam, dictum falsum est, quia licet prime forme (ut dicit) non dent esse completum, dant tamen esse incompletum. Nec ultima adveniens tollit esse earum, sicut nec essentias. Sed verum est quod non est ibi nisi unum esse subsistentie. Quod incompletive (quia inchoative) dant precedentes et completive dat ultima.

8-9 quod ... inchoative] *coni.* quod incompletive *BV* quia inchoative *P*

QUESTIO Va: UTRUM IN COMPOSITO CREATO CUIUS FORMA EDUCIBILIS EST DE POTENTIA MATERIE QUANTUM EST DE SE VERIUS DICATUR CREARI FORMA QUAM MATERIA

Status questionis

[65] [V38ra] Undecimo *Quolibet* questione tertia querit utrum in composito creato, cuius forma educibilis est de potentia materie, quantum est de se verius dicatur creari forma quam materia.[33] Et arguit quod sic quia:

31. *Topica* VI 4, 141a35-36.
32. Boethius, *De Trinitate*, cap. 3; conferas Gilbertum Porretanum *ad loc*. (p. 371, 18-19).
33. XI, 3: *Utrum in composito ex materia et forma educibili de potentia materie creato principalius creetur materia an forma*.

Creatio sicut et quelibet productio est ad esse. Sed forma habet verius esse quam materia. Ergo verius sibi competit creari quam materie. CONTRA. Creatio est productio, nullo presupposito. Sed materia nichil presupponit in sua factione, forma vero materialis, saltem ordine nature, presupponit materiam. Ergo materia verius creatur quam forma.

Arguit Henricus primo ad questionem principalem

[66] Responsio. Quia aliqui ponunt in omni creatura esse et essentiam esse diversas res, ideo illam questionem extendit ad inquirendum de esse et essentia quid eorum verius creetur et utrum sint diverse res. Et recitat dicta adversariorum eis respondendo. Qui quidem adversarii ponunt sex esse in rebus que salvari non possunt nisi esse earum re differat ab essentia. Primum illorum sex est quod essentia non possit intelligi sub opposito ipsius esse, scilicet sub non-esse, quia nichil potest intelligi sub opposito illius quod est idem re cum eo. Et ad hoc dicit quod verum esset, si essent idem re et intentione. Sed si differant intentione, licet sint idem re, sicut est in proposito de esse et essentia, unum potest intelligi sub opposito alterius.

5 earum] *P om. BV* / re] *BP* realiter *sic saepius V* 7 ipsius] *BP* illius quod est *V* 7 ipsius ... opposito] *BP om. V* 9 et intentione] *PV* secundum intentionem *B* / sed ... intentione] *BV om. P*

[67] Secundum est quod esse creature non esset esse participatum et diminutum, quia nulla res potest habere esse participatum nisi vel quia est potentia recipiens actum vel actus receptus in potentia, ita quod actus et potentia sint re diversa, quia nichil recipit seipso seipsum diminute. Nec sufficit quod sit diminutum respectu Dei, sed oportet quod etiam in se, quia si non esset diminutum in se, non esset diminutum respectu Dei. Et ad hoc dicit quod essentia creature participat esse sicut potentia participat actum non differentem re ab ea, sed intentione. Et quando dicunt alii quod nichil recipit seipsum diminute, dicit quod verum est ratione qua idem, sed idem re recipit seipsum diminute ratione qua est differens intentione. Et dicit quod tam essentia quam esse sunt in se diminuta in creaturis. Nec etiam posset essentia recipere esse diminute nisi ipsa esset realiter diminuta, non respectu sui sed respectu Dei, ita quod licet sit diminuta in se, non tamen respectu sui.

1-5 quia ... diminutum] *BPcV om. P*

[68] Tertium est quod non esset essentia creature determinata ad genus, quia secundum Commentatorem[34] forma generis est media inter poten-

34. Averroes, *In Arist. Metaph. Comm*., *ad* VIII 8, 1045b16-18; 21-22.

tiam et actum. Et ita si essentia creature non esset in potentia ad esse, non esset creatura in genere, quia per hoc quod est nata ad habendum magis vel minus de esse, secundum hoc constituit alium et alium gradum in entibus. Et ad hoc dicit quod hoc quod dicitur hic verum est, scilicet quod oportet in re determinata ad genus esse potentiam et actum, scilicet formam generis et differentiam. Sed non secundum <diversa secundum> rem sed solum secundum diversa intentione, sicut patet in substantiis separatis, que sunt per solam essentiam, sicut et alia in genere, quia res non est aliud in genere per esse existentie. Et tamen in essentia eorum non est compositio diversarum rerum, sed diversarum intentionum, nec est etiam eadem potentia generis ad differentias et essentie ad esse.

3 ita] *PV om. B* 4 creatura] *P om. BV* 7 in re] *BV* scire *P* differentiam] *BV* differentie *P* 10 in genere] *BV om. P* 11 essentia] *BP* esse *V*

[69] Ex hoc etiam ostendit quod quoddam dictum adversariorum non valet, quo dicunt quod sicut non posset dici unum elementum materialius alio, si materia non differret realiter a forma, ita non posset dici una creatura potentialior alia nisi potentia re differret ab actu. Ad quod dicit quod non sequitur, quia (ut dicit) sicut patet ex dictis, licet semper materia et forma differant re, non tamen oportet semper actum et potentiam etiam re differre.

[70] Quartum est quod non salvaretur analogia entis que est inter ens participatum et ens non participatum, quia non potest esse participatio in esse nisi esse re differat ab essentia. Et ad hoc ponit quod tam esse quam et ipsa essentia est participata non solum respectu Dei sed etiam secundum se. Et non solum compositum ex eis, sed etiam quodlibet ipsorum <componentium>. **[P26va]** Et ideo, non obstante quod re non differant, possunt ambo esse **[B219ra]** participata. Si enim quodlibet eorum non requirit diversitatem secundum rem a seipso ad hoc quod sit participatum, nec ambo simul talem diversitatem requirunt.

4 compositum] *P* componitur *perperam BPcV*

[71] Quintum est quod substantia creata si in ea non differret re esse ab essentia, non participaret accidens, quia quod non participat esse, non potest participare accidens. Ad quod dicit quod falsum est, quia absque reali differentia ipsius esse et essentie unum potest participare aliud propter hoc quod esse addit super essentiam respectum alterius intentionis ab essentia. Et propter hoc etiam creatura non est suum esse sed participat ipsum, ita quod esse est quoddam accidens essentie non reale sed intentionale.

2 participat] *BP* potest participare *V*

[72] Sextum est quod omnis creatura est mutabilis secundum substantiam. Quod non posset esse nisi esse acquireretur creature sicut perfectio acquiritur ei quod de se est informe. Et hoc esse non posset nisi esse re differet ab essentia. Ad quod dicit quod totum verum est, excepto illo ultimo, scilicet quod **[V38rb]** requiratur ad hoc differentia realis ipsius esse et essentie. Et hoc (ut dicit) patet ex dictis.

Arguit secundo principaliter

[73] Postea secundo principaliter ostendit quomodo adversarii solvunt tres rationes factas ab eo ad probandum quod si esse re differret ab essentia, non posset salvari creatio ipsius esse. Quarum prima fuit quod si esse reciperetur in essentia ut in re differente realiter ab eo, tunc creatio ipsius esse presupponeret subiectum. Quod est contra rationem 'creationis'.

5 rationem] *B* naturam *PV*

De adversariorum triplici responsione ad eius primam rationem

[74] Adversarii autem ostendunt triplici via quod illa ratio non concludit. Prima via est quia: Nulla causa presupponit suum effectum. Cum ergo effectus Dei sit totum simul, scilicet essentia et esse, Deus producendo totam simul essentiam et esse agit, nullo presupposito; sicut si crearet totum bovem simul, licet non faceret formam nisi in materia, non tamen ageret ex presupposita materia. Ad quod dicit quod quando Deus creat aliquod compositum ex materia et forma educibili de potentia materie, etsi totum fiat simul tempore, tamen secundum ordinem nature prius fit materia et secundo educitur forma de potentia materie. Quod sic probat quia: Quando Deus aliquid agit in quo communicare potest natura, Deus relinquit nature quod suum est. Cum ergo natura materie hoc habeat quod talis forma sit educibilis de potentia eius, Deus talem formam inducet in materiam educendo eam de potentia materie. Et talis forma fit per informationem, et productio eius presupponit materiam. Et ideo si esse sit educibile de essentia: licet simul ambo fiant a Deo, tamen esse non ita proprie creatur sicut essentia. Cuius oppositum dicunt adversarii, quod scilicet esse magis creatur, quia essentia non creatur nisi susceptione ipsius esse.

5 nisi in materia] *BP om. V*

[75] Secunda via adversariorum est quia: Secundum Commentatorem[35] quando aliquid fit in aliquo subiecto et non educitur de potentia illius per

35. Averroes, *In Arist. VII Metaph. Comm.*, *ad* 1028a18-24.

eius transmutationem, est creatio, sicut etiam patet de anima rationali. Ergo dato per impossibile quod essentia prius sine esse fieret et Deus postea faceret esse in ea sed non educendo de potentia eius, adhuc deberet dici ipsum vere creari. Sed illam viam ipse improbat. Primo quia: Si esse non educeretur de potentia essentie nec sicut anima rationalis non educitur de potentia materie, tunc sicut anima potest per se esse sine corpore, ita esse posset per se esse sine essentia. Item. Falsum est quod esse fiat in essentia absque aliqua mutatione eius, quia etiam creatio est aliqua mutatio. Et in contrarium est articulus dampnatus[36], et ipsimet concedunt creationem esse mutationem. Tertio quia: Non fit anima in corpore sine eius mutatione, quia fit de non animato animatum. Nam etiam in ipsis relativis, mutato uno, fit aliquo modo mutatio in alio.

1 adversariorum] *V* aliorum *B* eorum *P* 6 vere] *B* esse *PV* / si] *P om. BV* 7 essentie] *BPV* nec *add. B* 10 etiam creatio] *BP* in creatione] *V* 14 alio] *BP* aliud *V*

[76] Tertia via est quia: Illud quod producitur in quacumque productione est compositum. Et una productione producuntur tam partes quam compositum; compositum quidem primo et per se, partes vero secundario et ex consequenti. Et ideo quia compositum **[P26vb]** simul totum ex esse et essentia est quod per se producitur, totum per se creatur et partes ex consequenti, et una productione. Et ideo non plus creatur una pars quam alia etiam. Et si plus creatur unum eorum quam aliud, hoc erit ipsum esse, quia productio magis terminatur ad actum quam ad potentiam, sicut magis generatur forma quam materia. Et ad hoc dicit quod licet ex parte productionis non possit assignari ordo quia est una et in una re, non potest assignari ordo realis ad seipsam, tamen inter illa creata est ordo nature quo unum ordine nature est prius alio, quia ipsa potentia in qua recipitur actus, prior est actu et actus ordine nature eam presupponit, puta forma materiam et esse essentiam.

9 forma quam materia] *BP* materia quam forma *V* 10 non ... ordo] *BPc om. PV* / potest] *B* posset *P* pariter *V*

[77] Et ideo magis debet dici creari materia vel essentia quam forma vel esse. Sed tamen forma educibilis de potentia materie debet dici aliquo modo creari; de quo infra dicet. Et quod dicitur contra hoc quod immo est econverso, quia producere magis terminatur ad magis actuale et tale magis producitur sicut magis generatur forma quam materia, --- ad hoc dicit quod creatio differt essentialiter ab aliis mutationibus ratione termini a quo. Et ideo per comparationem ad terminum a quo debet dici aliquid principalius creari, scilicet quod magis est ex nichilo; in aliis vero muta-

36. *Condamnatio parisiensis* (anno 1277), prop. 217: "Quod creatio debet dici mutatio ad esse: Error, si intelligatur de omni modo mutationis".

tionibus, que distinguuntur penes terminum ad quem, principalius attenditur penes terminum ad quem. Et ideo non oportet quod in creatione dicatur illud principalius creari quod est magis actuale, sed quod est magis ex nichilo. Et tale est materia et essentia. Nec valet simile adductum de forma que dicitur magis generari, quia distinctio generationis ab aliis consideratur penes terminum ad quem. Sic ergo solvunt adversarii primam rationem suam, et sic respondet eis.

2 sed tamen] *V* si vero *BP* 3 contra hoc] *BPcV om.* P 6 essentialiter] *BV* realiter *P* 9 que] *BP non V*

De eorum responsione ad eius secundam rationem

[78] Secunda ratio sua ad idem erat quod si compositum ex esse et essentia produceretur, esse educeretur de potentia essentie. Et adversarii dicunt quod si ipse hoc dicit de se, falsum dicit, quia actus non educitur de potentia alicuius, nisi illud tempore precedat illum actum. Si autem accipit hoc tamquam dictum ab aliis, dicunt **[V38va]** adversarii quod tale dictum numquam viderunt. **[B219rb]** Et ad hoc ipse respondet quod licet in generatione naturali sit verum quod actus non educitur de potentia alicuius, nisi illud tempore precedat illum actum, non tamen est verum de generatione supernaturali. Unde si Deus produceret totum lapidem simul et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam, materia proprie crearetur et forma proprie generaretur supernaturaliter, sicut etiam generaretur supernaturaliter si fieret de trunco vitulus.[37] Et sic generata fuit forma corporeitatis in Christo (ut dicit). Et ideo si essentia est in potentia ad esse, non solum receptiva (sicut corpus se habet ad animam) sed etiam formativa, sicut materia ad formam naturalem, essentia proprie crearetur et esse proprie supernaturaliter generaretur. Si autem essentia esset in potentia receptiva tantum: si utrumque crearetur, tum essentia crearetur magis proprie. Et dicit quod ‘esse educi de potentia essentie’ accepit ex dictis adversariorum, in quibus (ut dicit) hoc implicatur. Sed quomodo hoc implicatur in dictis eorum non explicat.

2 educeretur] *BP* produceretur *V* 4 precedat] *PV* precedente *B* 5 tamquam] *BP om. V* 10 *prius* quantum ad] *P* ad quantum *BV* 18 educi] *P* adduci *BV* / accepit] *BV* accipit *P* 20 in] *PcV* ex *BP*

37. Conferas Laurentium a Brundusio, *Explanatio in Genesim*. Diss. 6, p. 84,10: “Quodsi ideo principium statuendi privatio est quia forme absentia necessaria est ut generatio fiat, tunc plane poterit ex quolibet quodlibet fieri: ex petra homo, ex trunco vitulus, ex ove leo nascetur”.

De eorum duplici responsione ad eius tertiam rationem

[79] Tertia ratio sua erat quod si essentia et esse differrent, essentia creature crearetur in esse sicut posterius in priori, magis quam econverso, quia sicut habetur[38] quarta propositione *De causis* «Prima rerum creatarum est esse», et in commento XVIIIe propositionis dicitur[39] quod esse est per creationem, creatura vero per informationem. Et ad hoc respondent adversarii dupliciter. Primo dicendo quod ibi 'Prima rerum creatarum est esse' quod non accipitur 'esse' pro esse actualis existentie sed pro esse communissimo, quod est commune ad esse essentie et esse existentie, et in illo creatur esse existentie sicut speciale in generali suo; sed comparando esse existentie ad essentiam, esse creatur in essentia et non econverso; et ideo argumentum non valet, quia procedit in equivoco de li 'esse'. Secundo respondent dicendo quod protanto dicitur quod prima rerum creatarum est esse, loquendo etiam de esse **[P27ra]** existentie, quia principalius creatur, quia actuale principalius producitur quam potentiale.

1-2 creature crearetur] creature *B* crearetur *PV* 2 magis] *P om. BV* 6 dicendo] *B* dicunt *PV* 11 argumentum] *BP* articulus *V* / li] *PV* le *B* 14 actuale principalius] *BP* actualius creatur quia *V*

Respondet Henricus ad eorum solutiones

[80] Et ipse primo improbat primam solutionem. Et dicit quod non fuit intentio sua probare quod esse non esset accidens sicut respectus est accidens, nec quod non faceret compositionem aliquam cum essentia, nec quod significaretur idem totaliter quia esse significat ipsum respectum, --- sed quod esse proprie non creatur sed essentia, si esse et essentia differant re absoluta, quia tunc esse secundum hoc erit accidens essentie, accidens autem non creatur nisi creatione subiecti. Et sic essentia principaliter creabitur et ex consequenti esse existentie quod primo informat essentiam et, mediante essentia, informat esse latissimum. Et ulterius deducit quod cum creatio substantie non dependeat ex creatione accidentis, sequitur quod creatio essentie non dependeat ex creatione ipsius esse et poterit creari sine ipso. Sed constat quod nichil potest creari nisi recipiendo esse a Deo. Ergo 'esse' non importat necessario nisi respectum ad creantem. Et si non importat nisi respectum ad creantem, primo ergo

38. *Liber de causis*, prop. IVa.
39. *Ibid*., *ad* prop. XVII(I)am, p. 174, 54-62. Conferas Thomam Aquinatem, *De potentiis*, q. 3, art. 1c: "Et inde est quod in *Libro de causis* dicitur quod esse eius est per creationem, vivere vero et cetera huiusmodi per informationem" necnon Aegidium Romanum, *Super De causis*, ad prop. XVIII, Fol. 82r.

fundatur in eo quod primo creatur. Hoc autem est esse latissimum, quod nichil presupponit et alia presupponunt ipsum. Non autem fundatur in essentia. Unde essentia determinata quinimmo talis informat esse latissimum essentialiter informatum prius ipso esse existentie actualiter. Et sic saltem actualiter essentia magis informat esse et recipitur in eo in creatione quam econverso. Et quia esse est respectus et 'essentia' dicit aliquid absolutum, magis creatur esse quam essentia.

1 primam] *BP om. V* 4 totaliter] *BPcV* realiter *P* / ipsum] *V om. BP* 6 tunc esse] tunc *P* esse *BV* 12-13 recipiendo] *BV* attingendo *P* 13 respectum] *BP* terminum *V* 14 et si ... creantem] *BP om. V* 15 esse] *BP om. V* 18 ipso] *BPcV om. P* / existentie] *V* essentie *BP*

[81] De secunda vero solutione dicit quod principalitas non attenditur in creatione penes terminum ad quem sicut in aliis productionibus, sed penes terminum a quo, quia creare est facere ex nichilo. Et ideo non creatur principalius quod est actualius sicut in aliis factionibus, sed quod est magis ex nichilo.

2 sicut ... productionibus] *BPcV om. P*

Arguit tertio principaliter

[82] Tertio principaliter ostendit quomodo adversarii improbant tres distinctiones quibus solvebat difficultates contra eum inductas. Prima distinctio est de potentiali obiective et potentiali subiective. Secunda distinctio est quod quedam essentia existit proprietate sue nature, quedam vero extrinseca participatione. Tertia est quod quedam differunt re, quedam vero intentione, et quedam ratione. Quando ergo arguitur contra eum quod potentiale et actuale differunt re et essentia est in potentia ad esse, respondet quod potentiale et actuale differre re verum est de potentiali subiective, qualis est materia respectu forme. Non autem verum est de potentiali obiective, qualis est essentia respectu esse.

3 potentiali] *PV* possibili *sic saepius B* 7 et essentia ... re] *BP om. V* 10 potentiali] *P* possibili *BV*

[83] Item. Quando arguitur contra eum quod si essentia est idem re cum esse: sicut essentia est ab eterno secundum eum, ita et esse, et sequeretur etiam quod essentia non posset non esse vel amittere esse, quia nichil potest amittere seipsum, --- solvit quod verum esset si essentia et esse sic essent idem quod essentia esset proprietate sue nature. Nunc autem non est ita, quia essentia creata est quadam extrinseca participatione. Item. Quando arguitur contra eum sic: Que sunt idem re sicut ens et unum vel ea quorum **[V38vb]** unum per se habet habitudinem ad aliud sicut homo ad risibile, unum non potest intelligi sub opposito alterius; sicut quod ens

non sit unum vel quod homo non sit risibile, licet unum possit intelligi, non cointellecto altero, et sic si idem re est essentia et esse, essentia non poterit intelligi non esse --- et tunc solvit quod verum est de hiis que ita sunt idem re quod sola ratione differunt. Sed de hiis que sunt idem re et differunt non solum ratione sed etiam intentione, sicut est de essentia et de esse, non est verum.

12 tunc] *BPcV* idem *P*

Obiciunt adversarii contra tres distinctiones

[84] Dicunt ergo adversarii contra primam distinctionem quod licet aliud sit potentiale subiective et aliud potentiale obiective, tamen unum non est sine alio, quia agens non facit potentiam esse potentiam vel actum esse actum, sed solum facit actum esse in potentia et potentiam esse sub actu re differente ab ea. Et sic facit compositum quod est potentiale obiective in quo est aliquid quod **[P27rb]** est potentiale subiective et actus additus. Et ipse dicit ad hoc quod Agens facit compositum non ex diversis rebus semper sed quandoque ex diversis intentionibus, sicut in proposito de esse et essentia. Et quod dicunt alii quod in illo composito est alterum potentiale subiective, dicit quod non est verum loquendo de subiecto alicuius forme absolute. Sed loquendo **[B219va]** large de subiecto respectus vel intentionis semper alterum eorum est subiectum. Nec oportet tale subiectum et illud cuius est subiectum re differre.

2 potentiale] possibile *sic saepius BPV* 5 potentiale] *Pc* possibile *sic saepius BPV* 6 subiective] *BPcV* obiective *P* 8 quandoque] *BV om. P* 10 potentiale] *PV* possibile *B*

[85] Et quando dicunt alii quod si esse et essentia sint idem re, facere essentiam esse est facere essentiam esse essentiam, ipse dicit quod non sequitur, quia esse, etsi non addat aliquod absolutum, addit tamen respectum, respectu cuius essentia est potentiale subiective, sicut et respectu creationis, licet respectu creantis sit potentiale obiective. Unde (ut dicit) non solum diversitas secundum rem sed etiam diversitas secundum intentionem et rationem variat veritatem propositionum. Nec est (ut dicit) oppositum in adiecto quod dicitur quod essentia est semper essentia et quod tamen corrumpatur corruptione proprie nature propter subtractionem Dei conservantis, in respectu ad quem habet esse. Et quod alii ultra dicunt quod causa quare semper illa est vera ‘Essentia est essentia’ et non illa ‘Existentia est existentia’, est differentia realis inter esse et essentiam, --- dicit quod non est verum, quia non oportet quod circa ea que sunt idem re quod de quocumque verificetur unum, et reliquum, vel quod quidquid verificetur de uno, et de reliquo. Et quod adducunt pro

simili de ente et uno, dicit quod non est simile, quia sola ratione differunt ens et unum.

2 esse est] *coni*. esse *B* est P esset *V* 5 obiective] *BPcV* subiective *P* 7 rationem] *Pc* respectum *BPV* 7 veritatem] *BPcV* virtutem *P* 12 causa quare] *BP* cum arguetur *V* / est] *BP om. V* / est essentia] *PV om. B* 12 existentia] *PV* essentia *B* 12 *prius* existentia] *BPV* semper *add. PV* 16 de ente et uno] *BP om. V*

[86] Secundo etiam improbant adversarii distinctionem qua dicitur quod quedam essentia est que habet esse ex proprietate sue nature, quedam vero que habet esse quadam extrinseca participatione – prima sicut essentia divina, secunda sicut essentia creata --, ita quod esse creature super essentiam addat respectum ad agens, quem potest quandoque habere et quandoque non habere. Contra quod alii arguunt sic quia: Solus respectus numquam per se acquiritur vel per se amittitur, sed solum quia acquiritur vel amittitur aliquod fundamentum eius absolutum; alioquin mutatio terminaretur ad solum respectum; quod est inconveniens.

2 essentia] *BP om. V*

[87] Et ad hoc ipse dicit quod istud dictum, scilicet quod respectus non acquiritur vel amittitur nisi quia acquiritur vel amittitur illud in quo fundatur, est falsum in omnibus relativis in quibus unum refertur ad aliud quia aliud refertur ad ipsum. Sicut patet de scientia et scibili, quia ad hoc quod scibile referat ad scientiam, non requiritur quod aliquid reale fiat in eo de novo. Nunc autem (ut dicit) creatura refertur ad Deum secundum rem, quia Deus secundum rationem refertur ad eam ut causa efficiens. Et ideo per actionem Dei potest ille respectus existentie creature quandoque esse et quandoque non esse. Nec ex hoc (ut dicit) sequitur quod respectus sit per se terminus creationis, sed essentia que sub respectu creatur. Unde etiam videmus quod respectus similitudinis acquiritur et amittitur in aliquo absque acquisitione vel amissione alicuius absoluti, mutato altero. In qua tamen mutatione ipse respectus similitudinis non est per se terminus.

10 creationis] *PV* actionis *B* 13 ipse respectus] *BP* et potentia respectu *V*

[88] Sed contra hoc arguunt adversarii quod si, Deo operante, homo et paries essent albi, non posset tolli relatio similitudinis inter eos nisi amota albedine. Sic (ut dicunt) non posset removeri respectus creature ad Deum nisi amoto aliquo absoluto a creatura. Et ad hoc dicit quod non est simile, quia relatio similitudinis inter parietem album et hominem album fundatur in albedine, et ideo, manente albedine, necessario manet et relatio. Sed respectus creature ad Deum fundatur in essentia non ut essentia est, sed ut est effectus Dei. Et ideo non oportet quod vel Deus se mutet vel quod aliquod absolutum a creatura tollatur ad hoc quod tollatur talis

respectus, sed sufficit quod suam actionem subtrahat, quia respectus **[V39ra]** non sequitur eam nisi ut est effectus Dei. Et hoc est facere essentiam, scilicet facere quod essentia **[P27va]** sit effectus Dei.

7 non ut] *BP* nec non *V* 10 respectus] *BP* effectus *V*

[89] Postea tertio ostendit quomodo adversarii improbant tertiam distinctionem, scilicet de differre re et intentione et ratione. Quam ipse sic probaverat quia: 'genus et differentia plus differunt quam diffinitio et diffinitum, que differunt solum ratione, et minus quam accidens et subiectum, que differunt re; ergo differunt medio modo, scilicet intentione'. Et adversarii dicunt quod non sequitur, quia in 'differre ratione' invenitur differre magis et minus. Et ideo non oportet quod si genus et differentia differant plus quam diffinitio et diffinitum, quod differant plus quam ratione. Et ipse ad hoc dicit quod differentia generis et differentie et differentia diffinitionis et diffiniti non solum differunt secundum magis et minus differre, sed etiam secundum alium modum differendi specie. Quod patet, quia genus et differentia faciunt compositionem, non autem diffinitio et diffinitum.

3-4 diffinitum] *BPV* et ipse ad hoc dicit quod *add. V* 8 quod] *BP* que *V* 12 non] *BP* sicut *V*

[90] Sed contra hoc dicunt adversarii quia: Alius et alius modus differendi existens cum unitate rei non facit nisi differentiam rationis, quia, re existente una, ratio hos modos adinvenit. Et ad hoc dicit quod modus differendi secundum rationem non dicitur quia ratio adinveniat ipsum sed quia perceptus a ratione est in natura rei. Et quandoque est in natura rei quod modi differant secundum magis et minus tantum; et tunc pertinent ad eundem modum differendi. Quandoque vero non solum differunt secundum magis et minus sed etiam plus, secundum scilicet alium modum differendi specie. Et sic se habet modus differendi quo differunt genus et differentia ad modum quo differunt diffinitio et diffinitum, quia diffinitio et diffinitum semper predicantur de se invicem, sed genus et differentia numquam predicantur de se invicem.

9 et ... differendi] *BP om. V*

[91] Et adversarii dicunt contra hoc quod non solvitur argumentum quo dicitur quod aliquid quod est idem re cum aliquo, non potest intelligi sub opposito illius. Nam genus, quod potest intelligi sub una differentia et sub eius opposita, non dicit unam rem; aliud enim est animal rationale et aliud irrationale. Et sic adhuc stat quod idem re non potest intelligi sub oppositis. **[B219vb]** Et ad hoc dicit quod licet genus non dicat unam rem numero vel specie, dicit tamen unum genere, quod quidem unum est idem re cum oppositis differentiis, differens ab eis intentione. Per quod (ut

dicit) solvitur argumentum. Et addit quod in essentia est maior unitas respectu esse et non esse quam in genere respectu oppositarum differentiarum, quia sicut idem album numero potest esse simile et dissimile, nulla re addita vel mutata in eo mutato altero extremo, quia respectus nec dicit aliam rem nec aliam realitatem a suo fundamento, ita eadem essentia numero potest esse et non esse, nulla realitate addita vel amota, propter respectum additum vel amotum.

7-8 idem re] *BV om. P*

[92] Sed adversarii ad hoc dicunt contra eum quod si aliquid quod est idem re cum alio, posset intelligi sub opposito eius, sequeretur per sillogismum expositorium quod oppositum predicaretur de opposito. Sicut si, demonstrato homine <et bove >, dicatur sic: 'Hoc animal est rationale; hoc animal est irrationale; ergo rationale est irrationale'. Et ipse dicit ad hoc quod quando dicitur quod illud quod est idem re cum aliquo, non potest intelligi sub opposito eius, quod verum est de eodem contracto, sed non est verum de eo quod est idem non contractum, sicut se habet genus respectu differentie.

8 *alterum* non] *BPV* est *add. B*

[93] Sed contra hoc dicunt adversarii quod non-contractum consimiliter se habet per accidens ad sillogismum expositorium, qui procedit ex singularibus. Et ipse ad hoc dicit quod licet non-contractum consimiliter se habeat per accidens ad sillogismum expositorium, tamen considerare non-contractum ad solvendum sillogismum expositorium cuius conclusio est impossibilis, non se habet per accidens, immo est necessarium. Sicut est in proposito quando dicitur 'Animal est irrationale et animal est rationale', si accipiantur utrimque pro eodem communi, verum est. Sed si accipiantur pro eodem contracto, altera necessario falsa est. Et similiter conclusio. Sed adversarii dicunt adhuc contra hoc quod 'animal non-contractum' non dicit unam rem. Et ideo quod animal potest esse rationale et irrationale non est propter differre sola intentione, **[P27vb]** sed propter differre re. Et ipse ad hoc dicit quod 'animal' dicit unam rem communem que est eadem re cum utraque differentiarum, et ideo potest intelligi sub utraque.

1 consimiliter] *B* considerari *PV* 3 consimiliter *B* considerari] *PV* 14 ideo] *BP* non *V*

Arguit quarto principaliter

[94] Quarto principaliter ostendit quomodo adversarii non respondent ad suas rationes, et quomodo improbant confirmationes earum adductas ab

eo contra solutiones datas ab adversariis. Fuit prima ratio sua talis quia: Sicut veritas, unitas, bonitas nichil addunt super essentiam rei, ita, ut videtur, nec entitas vel esse. Ad quod dicunt adversarii quod verum est de esse essentie, sed non **[V39rb]** de esse existentie. Sed contra hanc solutionem ipse dicit quod adversarii ponunt in hac solutione, illa scilicet quod esse sit quedam actualitas absoluta ipsius essentie re absoluta differens ab ea et est actualitas non educibilis de potentia essentie, quam actualitatem quantum est de se necesse est esse. Sed actus non educibilis de potentia, qui est necesse esse, ex se potest per se separatim esse et produci. Cum ergo secundum eos esse et per se et separatim non possit produci, impossibile est quod esse sit talis actualitas.

7 solutionem] *BV* positionem *P* 13 impossibile ... actualitas] *PV om. B*

[95] Sed ad hoc respondent adversarii quod esse ideo non potest per se produci quia hoc esset contra rationem 'factibilis', quia nichil fit nisi compositum. Sed ipse contra hoc dicit quod hoc est falsum, scilicet quod de ratione 'facti' sit quod sit compositum ex pluribus rebus absolutis, sicut patet in substantiis separatis, que non sunt ex pluribus composite. Et ideo si esse potest creari ut actualitas alterius: si sit res absoluta alia ab eo, multo plus potest creari ut propria actualitas sui ipsius. Nec requiritur in re facta super ipsum simplex absolutum nisi respectus. Sed contra hoc arguunt adversarii sicut prius, scilicet quod respectus nec amittitur nec acquiritur nisi per hoc quod amittitur vel acquiritur fundamentum eius. Et ipse respondet ad hoc sicut prius. Et ideo pertranseo.

1 sed ... produci] *V om. BP* 4 rebus] *BP om. V* 8 simplex *V* simpliciter *B* scilicet *P*

[96] Secunda ratio sua erat quod illud esse esset per aliud esse, sicut et essentia per esse, et illud per aliud, et sic in infinitum. Ad quod dicunt adversarii quod non oportet, quia: Sicut secundum positionem philosophorum forma quantum est de se est necesse esse, et quod possit non esse, hoc est quia recipitur in materia; materia vero per se est in potentia ad esse et non esse; et ideo non oportet formam esse per aliam formam sicut materia est per formam --- ita dicunt quod esse quantum est de se est necesse. Et quod possit non esse, hoc est quia est receptum in alio. Essentia vero est in potentia ad esse et non esse secundum se. Et ideo non oportet quod esse sit per aliud esse sicut essentia est per esse. Ipse vero dixerat contra hoc quod ponere quod esse creature sit necesse esse est periculosum, quia tunc esse creature esset quidam deus. Processus etiam in infinitum (ut dicit) non impeditur, quia si esse fit, oportet quod fiat recipiendo aliud esse. Aliter enim facere esse esset facere quod esse esset esse, quod falsum est. Et sic sequitur quod esse recipit esse in infinitum.

3 philosophorum] *PV* plurimorum *B* 10 est] *BV om. P*

[97] Adversarii vero ad hoc respondent quod non sequitur ex dictis eorum quod esse creature sit simpliciter necesse esse. Sed cum esse creature sit esse receptum, unde omne esse non habet quod accidat sibi corruptio; aliter omne esse esset defectibile, sed hoc accidit sibi unde tale est esse, scilicet esse receptum. Ipse vero dicit econtra quod ipsi ponunt quod esse creature et forma, si secundum se separatim essent, quod essent necesse esse, quod quidem imponunt (ut dicit) positioni philosophorum, que est heretica.

4 est] *Pc om. BPV* 5 ipse vero] *BP* item ratio *V*

[98] Arguit etiam contra **[B220ra]** dictum eorum sic: Sicut impossibile est illud quod per naturam suam est corruptibile fieri necesse esse vel incorruptibile, ita etiam impossibile est illud quod per naturam suam est incorruptibile et necesse esse, fieri corruptibile per hoc quod recipitur in alio, sicut patet in anima rationali. Et sic si esse creature ex se est necesse esse, impossibile est quod fiat corruptibile vel defectibile ex hoc quod recipitur in alio. Sed verum est (ut dicit) quod esse analogum commune Creatori et creature secundum se non est defectibile; aliter omne esse esset **[P28ra]** defectibile, ut dicunt adversarii, et in hoc bene. Sed tamen speciale esse contentum sub hoc analogo, secundum quod tale speciale esse et secundum se separatim acceptum et secundum quod receptum in alio, utroque modo est defectibile. Unde (ut dicit) illa distinctio bimembris est insufficiens qua dicunt quod esse creature potest dupliciter considerari, scilicet vel secundum quod esse, vel secundum quod receptum, quia 'esse receptum' non dicit speciale esse, sed modum.

4 fieri] *PV* fieret *B* 5 esse] *BV* essentia *P* 7 ut] *BP* quod *V* 7-8 commune creatori] *BP* modo creato *V* 9 bene] *BPV* dicunt *add. Pc* 11 et secundum quod receptum] *BP om. V* 15 *prius* esse] *BP* omne *V*

[99] Et ideo debent sic dicere quod esse creature potest dupliciter considerari, scilicet vel secundum quod est quoddam esse --- et sic non convenit ei quod sit quoddam corruptibile, quia tunc omne esse esset defectibile ---, vel secundum quod est esse tale, scilicet esse creature. Et hoc dupliciter, scilicet vel secundum se et separatim ab essentia, vel prout recipitur in alio. Et utroque modo esse creature est defectibile. Nec valet eis (ut dicit) si dicant quod esse creature, etsi esset separatum, esset defectibile, quia esset natum recipi, et per hoc quod esset natum recipi, haberet unde esset natum recipere defectibilitatem, numquam tamen deficeret nisi esset actu receptum. Et sic sequeretur quod aliquid quod esset natum corrumpi, numquam corrumperetur. Quod est contra philosophos.

2 quoddam] *V om. BP* 11 quod ... philosophos] *BPcV om. P*

[100] Et ideo propter ista adversarii dicunt aliter, scilicet quod licet esse creature sit simpliciter defectibile, tamen secundum quid, prout scilicet consideratur ut quid **[V39va]** intelligibile et abstractum a tempore, potest esse incorruptibile et indefectibile sicut et mundus intelligibilis semper est. Ipse vero excludit hoc, tum quia ipsi plane loquuntur de esse reali realis existentie creature, tum quia eque bene omnis materialis essentia isto modo esset indefectibilis et semper, scilicet in esse intelligibili, sicut forma vel esse.

4 mundus] *BP* intellectus *V* 6 existentie] *V* essentie *BP* / eque ... omnis] eque bene *BP* omnis *V*

[101] Tertia ratio sua fuit ista quod illud esse nec esset substantia nec accidens. Ad quod respondent adversarii quod esse non est in genere directe recipiendo predicationem generis; est tamen in genere Substantie indirecte, scilicet sicut principium substantie. Sed contra hoc ipse arguit quia: Unumquodque est in genere per essentiam et non per esse existentie; alioquin res non essent in genere nisi dum existerent. Quod reputat inconveniens. Ergo esse non est principium substantie vel rei existentis in genere Substantie. Nec per consequens est in genere Substantie sicut principium.

7-9 vel ... principium] *BP om. V*

[102] Ad quod dicunt adversarii quod licet esse non sit principium substantie ita quod per ipsum sit substantia, est tamen principium substantie prout est existens in effectu, sicut etiam cuprum licet non sit principium circuli secundum quod circulus, est tamen principium circuli cuprei secundum quod est cupreus.

[103] Sed ipse contra hoc arguit tripliciter. Primo quia: Non potest dici esse principium generis nisi sit principium rei secundum quod est in genere, sicut unitas est principium numeri quia sua re<du>plicatione facit numerum esse quantitatem, et punctus suo fluxu facit lineam esse lineam. Si ergo esse non est principium substantie create prout est in genere, non potest dici esse in genere Substantie sicut principium. Secundo sic quia: Sicut esse quod accidit substantie que est in genere, non simpliciter sed unde est existens, ita albedo que accidit substantie, est principium substantie unde est alba. Et tamen, hoc non obstante, albedo non est reducenda ad genus Substantie indirecte sicut principium. Ergo nec similiter esse. Tertio sic. Ex dicto adversariorum sequitur quod esse esset aliquid per essentiam, exceptis essentia in qua creatur et respectu ad creantem, quia sicut essentia est essentia absque creante, ita esse est esse absque creante. Sed esse tale est per se in genere et determinatum ad genus. Ergo esse est per se in genere et non per reductionem. Et ex hoc ulterius confirmat

rationem suam secundam quia: quod est per se in genere, et per se indiget recipere esse ad hoc quod creetur; ergo et esse. Et sic esse recipit esse infinitum.

2 esse] *V om. BP* / rei] *BPcV om. P* 4 quantitatem] *BPV ?pro* quantum 4 *alterum* lineam] *BPcV om. P* 12 exceptis] *P* excepta *V* existentis *B* / in] *BV* de *P*

Arguit quinto principaliter

[104] Postea quinto principaliter ostendit quomodo adversarii ostendunt ipsum male exponere quandam auctoritatem Boetii. Que quidem auctoritas[40] est illa «Diversum est esse et id quod est». Quam ipse exponebat accipiendo 'esse' pro Creatore et 'id quod est' pro creatura, et hoc quia Creator non est **[P28rb]** esse omnium formaliter sed causaliter. Et ipse dicit quod immo illa expositio est bona accipiendo 'esse' ibi pro esse omnium causali, quod est Deus. Alio modo (ut dicit) potest exponi de esse essentie ipsius creature, ut dicatur 'id quod est' illud quod directe est in genere, sicut homo vel humanitas, si dicatur esse quedam divina participatio secundum rationem cause formalis. Et tale esse determinatur per *id quo est*. Et sunt diversa non re, sed solum ratione. Vel potest tertio exponi de esse existentie quod convenit ipsi rei per creationem et per participationem divinam secundum rationem cause efficientis. Et (ut dicit) accidit tale esse ei quod est. Et differunt non re nec ratione tantum, sed intentione.

4 creatore] *BVc* creatione *P* creature *V* 7 causali] *B* tali *PV* 11 vel] *BPcV* et solum *P* 12 de] *PV om. B*

Arguit sexto principaliter

[105] Sexto principaliter ponit quomodo ostendunt adversarii quod creatura non posset annichilari nisi differrent in ea re esse et essentia. Et hoc triplici via. Prima via sumitur ex eius productione quia non esset producibilis. Quod patet sic quia: Omne quod incipit esse actu, habet aliquid preter actum per quod potest esse actu, quia cum semper actus sit actus, numquam **[B220rb]** actus incipit esse actu. Sed omnis creatura incipit esse actu. Ergo preter actum essendi habet aliquid aliud, scilicet essentiam, per quod potest incipere esse actu. Et oportet quod re differant, quia aliter non possent se amittere realiter, sed secundum rationem, quia nichil amittit seipsum secundum quod est idem secum. Et sic essentia realiter non posset non esse.

40. *De hebdomadibus*, p. 169,26-28 ed. Peiper.

1 principaliter] *PV om. B* 3 via] *BPV* tripliciter ostenditur creationem admitti non posse nisi differrent re essentia et esse *add. Vm* 7 aliud] *BPV* primo *add. V* 8 quod] *BV* quam *P*

[106] Et ad hoc respondet quod licet hec sit semper vera 'Actus est actus' prout actus in subiecto positus stat pro forma sive pro formali significato termini, cum hoc tamen bene stat quod actus incipit esse actu secundum quod 'actus' in subiecto positus stat pro supposito sive aliquo actu singulari, sicut patet quod anima rationalis, que est actus, incipit esse actu in corpore et possit incipere esse actu, si Deus vellet, absque hoc quod esset forma corporis actu. Sicut etiam hec est semper vera 'Homo est homo' pro formali significato termini, et hec etiam est vera 'Homo incipit esse homo' pro aliquo supposito hominis. Et quod addunt quod si non differrent nisi intentionaliter esse et **[V39vb]** essentia, non possent realiter separari, dicit quod verum est accipiendo separationem realem separationem unius rei ab alia re, sicut separatur albedo ab aliquo corpore. Sed vocando separationem realem que sequitur naturam rei prout distinguitur contra separari solo intellectu, sic realiter separatur esse ab essentia per sui corruptionem.

[107] Secunda via sumitur ex conservatione rerum quia: Quamdiu creatura coniungitur Deo sicut cause efficienti, est in ea quedam actualitas quam vocamus 'esse', quam perdit cum tollitur influentia Dei. Nec (ut dicunt) potest hoc esse solus respectus, qui per se nec acquiri nec amitti potest. Et ad hoc dicit, sicut frequenter supra dictum est, quod immo talis respectus per se et acquiri et amitti potest.

6 per se] *BV om. P*

[108] Tertia via sumitur ex defectibilitate creature quia: Unumquodque est defectibile ratione potentie et est permanens ratione actus. Sicut ergo in unoquoque differunt potentia et actus, sic se habet unumquodque ad posse deficere. Si ergo in creatura non differunt re potentia ab esse que est essentia et ipse actus essendi, creatura non poterit deficere secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem. Et ad hoc dicit quod verum est quod defectibilitas inest rebus ex potentialitate. Sed non oportet ad hoc quod realiter res deficiant quod realiter differant in eis potentia et actus, quia, sive ponantur convenire rei secundum idem sive secundum diversa, equaliter potest res deficere realiter.

2 permanens] *BPcV om. P* 4 deficere] *BPcV* differre *P* secundum rem *add. Pc* / ab] ad *BPV* 8 res ... realiter] *BV om. P*

Arguit septimo principaliter

[109] Septimo ponit quomodo ostendunt adversarii quod si in creatura non differrent re esse et essentia, non posset salvari quomodo creature procedant a Deo ex tempore et ex libertate arbitrii, sed necessitate nature, sicut umbra a corpore vel ymago a facie. Si enim, ut dicunt adversarii, creatura procederet a Deo ab eterno necessitate nature, ita quod creatura esset a Deo necessario ab eterno, cum tali processu creature a Deo posset **[P28va]** utcumque salvari quod idem esset esse et essentia, quia talis processus esset absque mutatione. Sed, ut dicunt, processus creature a Deo ex tempore non potest stare cum ydemptitate esse et essentie. Et hoc consequenter probant quatuor rationibus.

5 ita quod] *BP* inquantum *V* 7 utcumque] *BPcV* ut *P* 10 consequenter probant] *P* ostendunt *BV*

De prima adversariorum ratione

[110] Prima sumitur ex generali habitudine creature ad Deum sic. Quia creatura respicit Deum ut a quo est et ut a quo dependet et deficit, et ut a quo absque sui mutatione procedit et ut a quo continue indiget conservari, ex hiis arguitur sic ad propositum quia: Respectus creature producte a Deo et dependentis ab eo aut fundatur in essentia ex natura sua aut per aliquam rem additam. Si per rem additam, quam dicimus 'esse', habetur propositum. Si autem convenit sibi ex natura sua, tunc, quantum est de se, consequitur eam necessario ab eterno; vel si convenit sibi ex tempore, hoc erit propter mutationem Dei producentis; quod est inconveniens.

4 *alterum* aut] *BPV* convenit *add. B* 7 mutationem] *BPVc* imitationem *V*

[111] Nec potest dici, ut dicunt adversarii, non convenire creature ex se, sed mera Dei voluntate ipsum acquirit et perdit, quia respectus per se non potest acquiri vel perdi, ut sepe dictum est, nisi per hoc quod secundum rem absolutam mutatur alterum extremorum. Et ideo si esse non differret re ab essentia, ille respectus consequeretur essentiam ex sua natura, nec posset ei non convenire nisi mutato altero extremo, quia in productione in qua nichil additur supra naturam nisi respectus, necessario, aliquo coeterno interveniente, coeternum est productum producenti, sicut patet in Personis divinis. Et sic cum Deus sit immutabilis, oportet ponere illum respectum convenire creature per rem essentie additam.

1 dici] *Pc* dicere *BPV* 6 respectus] *BPV* non *add. V* 7 nisi] *BV om. P* 7-8 aliquo ... interveniente] *P om. BV* 8 coeternum] *BP* extremum *V*

[112] Ipse vero respondet ad omnia ista. Et primo dicit quod in hoc falsum dicunt adversarii, prima scilicet quod si creatura esset necessario ab eterno, quod posset esse a Deo creata, quia (ut dicit) hoc est impossibile, quia tale necesse esse est suum esse. Nec posset creari, quia non creatur nisi non ens ex se. Nec etiam tale posset esse dependens, quia suum esse amittere non posset. Nec posset esse deficiens, quia nichil deficit unde necessarium sed unde possibile, sicut (ut dicit) pertractavit alias. Secundo dicit quod non oportet plus ponere differentiam inter esse et essentiam ex hoc quod potest produci libertate arbitrii, quam si poneretur produci ex necessitate nature. Quod probat sic quia: Secundum Philosophum secundo *Phisicorum* si ars esset opus nature, eodem **[B220va]** modo faceret sicut natura, et econverso. Ergo si creatura potest produci absque reali differentia ipsius esse et essentie necessitate nature, ita poterit fieri ex libero arbitrio, quia dignius est ponere pauciora quam plura.

4 tale] *BPV* est *add. BP* / *prius* esse] *BPV* et *add. BP*

[113] Ad formam autem argumenti respondet. Quando queritur utrum ille respectus fundetur in essentia creature ex natura sua vel aliunde, dicit quod ille respectus ex natura sua fundatur in essentia creature secundum potentiam, sed secundum actum non fundatur in ea ex natura sua. Et ideo non oportet eam esse necessario ab eterno. Et tamen (ut dicit) ipsi natura est sufficiens fundamentum; nec tamen est fundamentum per aliquod additum, sed solum per agens. **[V40ra]** Et quando ultra dicitur quod ille respectus non potest acquiri de novo nisi aliqua mutatione prius facta vel in Deo vel in aliquo alio, dicit quod verum est et quod mutatio que est prius natura illo respectu, et est facta in esse creature, quia secundum eum esse creature prius est subiectum mutationis que dicitur creatio, quam terminus.

3 ex ... creature] *BPcV om. P* 4 secundum ... sua] *PV om. B* 5 ipsi] *BP om. V* 7 quando] *BPcV* quoniam *P*

[114] Et quod dicunt alii ultra quod solus respectus non acquiritur, dicit quod verum est etiam in proposito, quia acquiritur essentia sub respectu et respectus acquiritur in ipsa. Et quia actio Dei est separabilis a conservanda creatura vel creanda, ideo ille respectus potest separari. Non sic autem in productione divinarum Personarum. Nec oportet propter illum respectum ponere in creatura diversas res coniunctas, quia etiam quelibet earum haberet respectum ad Deum, quia quelibet earum crearetur.

De secunda ratione eorum

[115] Secunda via talis est quia: Creatura etsi sit similitudo divine nature ex natura sua qua determinatur ad genus; non tamen ex natura sua est similitudo Dei agentis, ergo per aliquod additum est similitudo Dei agentis. Et ad hoc dicit quod creatura prout est essentia, est similitudo divine nature ut cause formalis exemplaris. Sed ipsa eadem absque additione rei absolute est similitudo ut effectus Dei agentis, non ex natura sua que est essentia sed ex hoc quod est essentia producta.

2 tamen ex natura] *BP* ita essentia *V*

De tertia ratione eorum

[116] Tertia via talis est. Si creatura existeret per suam essentiam et non per rem additam, tunc equaliter compararetur essentia ad intellectum divinum speculativum, **[P28vb]** ad quem comparantur creature secundum rationem suarum essentiarum, et ad intellectum practicum, ad quem comparantur secundum suas existentias. Et sic sicut naturaliter sunt intellecte ab eterno ab intellectu Dei speculativo, ita fuissent naturaliter producte ab eterno ab intellectu Dei practico. Quod falsum est. Et ad hoc dicit quod 'creaturam existere per suam essentiam' dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo sic quod creatura scilicet existat per hoc quod est essentia; et sic est falsum creaturam existere per suam essentiam; et secundum istum sensum (ut dicit) procedit ratio adversariorum. Alio modo potest intelligi 'creaturam existere per suam essentiam' ita quod non existat per rem absolutam positivam additam ipsi essentie, sed per ipsam essentiam simplicem absque compositione nec prout est essentia sed prout est facta. Et sic (ut dicit) creatura existit per suam essentiam. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod eodem modo comparetur ad intellectum speculativum et practicum. Sed solum sequitur quod per illud absolutum refertur ad utrumque, ad unum vero ut ad causam exemplarem et ad aliud ut ad causam efficientem vel in actu vel in habitu.

13 positivam] *BP* positam *V* 16 ad intellectum] *PV om. B* 17 illud] *PV* idem *B*

De quarta ratione eorum

[117] Quarta via est quod si 'creatura' nichil diceret nisi naturam et respectum fundatum in ea, sicut in divinis suppositum solo respectu differt a natura, tunc essentie creature secundum se debetur ille respectus. Et ad hoc dicit quod essentie creature secundum se debetur ille respectus in

potentia, non in actu. Et in actu quandoque habet non per receptionem alicuius absoluti additi, sed per actionem Dei. Nam voluntate agentis habet illum respectum effective, sed fundamentaliter habet illum respectum a sola essentia, licet essentia non sit per se sufficiens fundamentum illius respectus prout est in actu.

3 a] *coni.* et *BPV*

Quod non oportet ponere compositionem realem ex esse et essentia in creatura

[118] Et sic finaliter concludit quod ad hoc quod salvetur creaturam esse productam de novo et libero arbitrio Dei, non oportet ponere eam compositam ex duabus rebus absolutis quarum una sit potentia et alia sit actus, et quod actualis respectus de novo fundetur in toto composito, mediante actu. Immo ad hoc sufficit differentia potentialis et actualis secundum intentionem. Idcirco vero essentia non est semper producta, quia ille respectus non fundatur in ea ex natura sua nisi potentialiter et fit actu per actionem divinam. Et quod alii dicunt quod respectus ille fundatur in coniunctione duorum, dicit quod non oportet, tum quia non solum coniunctio amborum dependet a mera voluntate Dei, sed etiam factio uniuscuiusque eorum, nisi aliquis velit dicere quod simplicia componentia sint facta a quodam alio ab eterno et quod coniunctio eorum fieret a Deo ex tempore; quod esset hereticum.

[119] Et ita non solum creat Deus compositum, sed etiam componentia. Et dato quod totum compositum fiat una productione, tamen in quolibet componentium fundatur proprius respectus ad Deum. Nec etiam propter hoc quod esse est esse ab eterno, et essentia essentia, oportet ponere compositum fieri, quia sicut essentia est essentia ab eterno et essentia est essentia et forma est forma et materia est materia, ita compositum est compositum. Unde nulla necessitas est ponendi compositionem realem ex esse et essentia in creatura. Nec tamen et creatura immaterialis attingit ad simplicitatem Dei, quia multe alie sunt compositiones preter hanc que conveniunt creature et non Deo, sicut compositio generis, speciei, differentie, vel compositio intention<al>is inter esse et essentiam et talia.

10 et non deo] *BP om. V* 10-11 speciei ... compositio] *BV om. P*

PARS ALTERA: QUID HERVEUS SENTIAT DE ISTIS QUESTIONIBUS

DE QUIBUSDAM GENERALIBUS PREMITTENDIS

[120] [V40rb] In hiis stant dicta istius hominis de differentia ipsius essentie et esse. Ad videndum ergo quomodo sit de esse et essentia in creaturis, oportet videre quid nomine ‘essentie’ importetur et quid nomine ipsius ‘esse’. Et postea videndum de essentia quomodo se habeant esse et essentia secundum ydemptitatem et diversitatem. Et ultimo quomodo stent ea que rebus attribuuntur in positione qua ponetur de ydemptitate eorum. Et **[B220vb]** hiis positis, descendetur ad questiones premissas.

7 questiones] *P* positiones *B* propositiones *V*

De positione Henrici

[121] Quantum ergo ad essentiam creature est positio istius hominis cuius dicta nunc recitata sunt, sicut patet ex antedictis, quod ‘essentia’ importat compositum quoddam ex respectu ad Deum sicut ad exemplar et natura existente in genere in quo talis respectus fundatur, sicut est animalitas vel humanitas vel aliquid tale. Et quia (ut dicit) talis respectus est extra omne genus, **[P29ra]** ideo esse essentie quod directe est iste respectus, non est in genere, sed illud super quod fundatur, puta animalitas vel aliquid tale. Nec essentia per consequens (ut ponit) quantum ad totum quod importat est in genere, sed quantum ad alteram partem tantum, scilicet quantum ad naturam in qua fundatur dictus respectus. Ulterius vero, quia (ut dicit) ille respectus est in rebus ab eterno, ideo ponit essentias rerum habere esse reale ab eterno; alioquin ille propositiones ‘Homo est homo’ et ‘Homo est animal’ et consimiles, que sunt vere ab eterno, non haberent super quod fundaretur veritas earum ab eterno. Item. Etiam sequeretur quod homo, animal et talia, rebus non existentibus, non significarent rem veram, sed figmentum sicut ‘chimera’, nisi creature antequam essent create haberent esse reale essentie.

16 essent] *BPcV om. P*

CAPITULUM I: QUOMODO MUTUO SE HABEANT ESSE ET ESSENTIA

QUID NOMINE 'ESSENTIE' IMPORTETUR ET QUID NOMINE IPSIUS 'ESSE'

Quod essentia creature non includit relationem ad Deum

[122] Istam autem positionem intendo reprobare quantum ad tria que principaliter in ea ponuntur. Primo ergo intendo eam improbare quantum ad hoc quod ponit quod essentia creature includat relationem realem ad Deum sicut ad exemplar. Et hoc primo ostendo ratione sumpta ex ratione 'relationis' in generali quia: Nulla relatio est de ratione vel integritate entis absoluti. Sed quedam essentie, sicut essentia substantie, quantitatis et qualitatis, nominant entia absoluta. Ergo nulla relatio potest esse de ratione istorum. Maior patet quia: Sicut opponitur ratio 'substantie' et 'accidentis', ita opponitur ratio 'absoluti' et 'relativi. Et ideo sicut impossibile est quod accidens sit de integritate substantie, ita impossibile est quod relatio sit de integritate entis absoluti. Minor etiam patet quia: Sicut infra iam probabitur, nichil nominat nisi quod pertinet ad genus Substantie. Et tale est 'absolutum'. Ideo etc.

5 integritate] *BPV* alicuius *add. P* 10 integritate] *BV* ratione *P* 11 relatio] *BV* respectus *P*

[123] Secunda ratio sumitur specialiter ex ratione huius relationis quam iste ponit ad Deum sicut ad exemplar, sic. Ens rationis non est de integritate entis realis extra animam existentis. Sed talis relatio ad exemplar quam iste ponit, est ens rationis. Essentie vero substantie, quantitatis, qualitatis sunt entia realia extra animam. Ergo impossibile est quod talis relatio sit de integritate essentie substantie, quantitatis vel qualitatis.

1 specialiter] *BP om. V*

[124] Maior patet ex sexto *Metaphisice* ubi Philosophus dividit[41] per opposita ens secundum animam sive ens rationis contra ens reale extra animam, et dividit ens extra animam in decem predicamenta. Et ideo unum non est de integritate alterius. Secunda etiam pars maioris, que dicit quod essentia substantie, quantitatis *etc*. dicit rem extra animam, patet ex eodem loco, quia ens extra animam quod Philosophus diviserat contra ens in anima, ipse postea dividit in substantiam, quantitatem *etc*. Primam autem partem minoris, scilicet quod illa relatio quam ipse ponit ad exemplar divinum, sit ens rationis, probo sic quia: Exclusa omni causalitate

41. *Metaph*. VI 2, 1026a33.

effectiva ab extra, ‘exemplar’ nichil plus importat nisi quod sit representativum alicuius conductivi in cognitionem eius sive ratio cognoscendi ipsum. Sed relatio representati ad representans et cognoscibilis ad rationem cognoscendi vel ad cognitionem ipsam est tantum relatio rationis, quia cognitum refertur tantum secundum rationem et ad ipsam cognitionem et ad ipsam rationem cognoscendi. Ergo relatio exemplati ad exemplar, exclusa omni causalitate effectiva, est ens rationis tantum. Illa autem relatio quam ipse ponit quod sit ipsum esse essentie --- sive quam ponit de constitutione essentie create --- est ad exemplar, exclusa ab eo omni causalitate effectiva, quia relatio cause efficientis pertinet ad esse existentie (ut dicit), et non ad esse essentie. Et ideo sequitur quod relatio quam ipse ponit esse de constitutione sive integritate essentie create, sit ens rationis.

10 ab extra] *BV* effectus ab esse *P* 20 ut ... essentie] *BP om. V*

[125] Tertio hoc idem ostenditur ex comparatione relationis ad suum fundamentum quia: Relatio est extra rationem sui fundamenti. Sed essentia cui respondet exemplar in Deo, est fundamentum relationis ad exemplar, quia illud quod representatur per essentiam, est fundamentum relationis que est ad exemplar. Ergo relatio ad exemplar est extra rationem et integritatem essentie create.

4 essentiam] *BV* exemplar *P* 4-5 quia ... exemplar] *BP om. V*

[126] Quarto ostendo idem ex comparatione essentie generaliter dicte ad essentiam specialem, sicut est animalitas vel humanitas vel aliquid tale, quia: Sicut animal se habet ad ens vel animalitas se habet ad essentiam **[V40va]** (quia sicut concretum **[P29vb]** ad concretum), ita abstractum ad abstractum. Sed animal includit totum quidquid est de ratione vel integritate entis quod dividitur in decem predicamenta, sicut inferius includit suum per se superius, licet ens non sit genus. Ergo et animalitas includit totum quidquid est de integritate essentie. Sed sicut ipsemet concedit, animalitas non includit huiusmodi respectum, ergo nec essentia.

3 vel] *B* ita *PV* 5 totum] *BV om. P*

[127] Quinto hoc idem ostendo ex diffinitione ipsam essentiam rei indicante quia: Diffinitio dicit sive indicat tantum illud quod est in genere. Sed secundum istum predictus respectus non est in genere. Ergo diffinitio non indicat talem respectum. Sed diffinitio secundum Philosophum indicat esse; et constat quod hoc non potest exponi nisi de esse essentie. Ergo nec essentia nec esse essentie est talis respectus nec ipsum includit.

Quod essentia creature bene est in genere secundum se totam

[128] Secundo intendo improbare illud quod ista positio secundo ponit, scilicet quod essentia creature non est in genere secundum se totam, sed secundum aliquid sui, et hoc propter talem respectum inclusum in essentia. Sciendum est igitur quod nullus debet negare quod 'ens' acceptum in sua generalitate **[B221ra]** et similiter essentia non sit in genere, quia talia non propter aliquem respectum quem important sed propter generalitatem suam qua communicant diversis generibus, non sunt in genere. Sed quod essentia in speciali, puta essentia hominis vel essentia leonis, non sit in genere propter talem respectum inclusum, est omnino falsum.

7 qua] *V* quam *BP*

[129] Et hoc patet aliquo modo ex nunc dictis. Primo quia: Sicut dictum est, 'animal' includit totum quidquid includit 'ens', et similiter 'animalitas' includit essentiam. Sed animal et animalitas sunt in genere secundum totum illud quod includunt. Ergo et essentia animalis secundum totum illud quod includit est in genere. Secundo quia: Sicut dictum est nunc, diffinitio secundum Philosophum[42] indicat esse; et constat quod hoc exponitur de esse essentie. Sed totum quod indicat diffinitio, est in genere, quia secundum Boetium[43] sola species diffinitur, que secundum totum quod habet est in genere. Ergo et esse essentie et natura in qua fundatur, totum est in genere. Tertio quia: Ille respectus aut est respectus realis, aut rationis. Si dicatur quod sit respectus rationis, tunc sequetur quod de constitutione entis realis qualis est essentia uniuscuiusque creature, sit ens rationis; quod est inconveniens.

8 que] *B* qua *V* quia *P*

[130] Si autem dicatur quod sit respectus realis, tunc arguo quia: Sicut omnis natura absoluta creata vel creabilis se habet ad genera absoluta, ita omnis respectus qui fundatur in natura absoluta creata vel creabili se habet ad genus relationis, quia non minus debet relatio realis creature esse determinata ad genus quam ipsa creatura. Sed omnis natura absoluta creata vel creabilis est in aliquo genere absoluto, scilicet substantia, quantitate vel qualitate. Ergo et omnis respectus realis fundatus in natura absoluta creata vel creabili est in genere relationis.

2 ad ... genera] *BV* ad genera *Pc om. P* 3 qui] *P om. BV* 5 absoluta] *BV om. P*

[131] Et sic sequitur quod ille respectus ad Deum sit in genere relationis. Et ulterius sequitur quod essentia si includat talem respectum, significet

42. *Metaph*. VII 5, 1031a12-13.
43. *De divisionibus*, 886A5sqq.

res diversorum generum, sicut si imponatur aliqua vox ad significandum hominem album vel hominem similem. Et ulterius etiam sequitur ex hoc quod quelibet essentia, non obstante quod includat talem respectum quantum ad totum quod est in ea, sit in aliquo genere, licet non in uno. Propter quod illa positio videtur michi satis frivola, tum quia talis respectus realis qualem iste ponit, non est simpliciter, tum quia si esset, non includeretur in ratione creature, tum quia esset in genere determinato sive genere relationis. Que omnia sunt contra predictam positionem.

6 in uno] *BPcV om.* P

Quod creatura non habet ab eterno esse reale essentie vel existentie

[132] Tertio intendo improbare tertium quod illa positio ponit, scilicet quod creatura quia habet exemplar in Deo ab eterno, habet ab eterno esse reale essentie, licet non existentie. Primo sic quia: Sicut exemplar divinum representat essentiam creature ab eterno et essentia creature respondet ei ut quoddam exemplatum vel representatum, ita representat existentiam eius ab eterno et existentia ipsi exemplari respondet ut representatum representanti. Sed secundum istum hominem ratio quare creatura habet esse reale essentie ab eterno, est quia ei respondet exemplar divinum eam representans ab eterno. Ergo pari ratione habet existentiam realem ab eterno.

4 essentiam] *BV* esse *P* 6 ipsi exemplari] *B* ista exemplari *P* ipsa exemplati *V* 8 reale] *BV om. P* / est] *BPVc om. V* 10 realem] *BPcV om. P*

[133] Sed forte ad hoc dicet quod ydea vel exemplar etsi representet existentiam rei, non tamen principaliter sed ex consequenti, sed essentiam representat principaliter; et ideo non oportet existentiam rei esse ab eterno. Sed hoc nichil est, tum quia non minus videtur ydea respondere rei quantum ad eius existentiam quam quantum ad eius essentiam, immo (ut videtur) plus, quia magis consideratur ut in actu secundum existentiam quam secundum essentiam; quod autem est magis in actu, magis videtur representabile intellectui; tum quia, dato quod secundario representaretur, si representari per exemplar divinum facit quod aliquod habeat esse reale, sequeretur quod saltem sicut essentia habet esse reale principaliter per hoc quod principaliter **[V40vb]** representatur, ita existentia haberet esse reale secundario per hoc **[P29va]** quod secundario representaretur, sicut etiam in factione substantie habentis accidens substantia principaliter fit, secundario vero fit accidens. Et ex hoc quod accidens secundario et ex consequenti fit, non potest dici quod non sit factum vel quod non sit aliquo modo, sed solum quod non sit principaliter et simpliciter sed secundario et ex consequenti.

1-4 sed ... eterno] *BV om. P* 5 rei] *BP* ei *V* / ut] *BV om. P* 6-7 consideratur ... est] *BV om. P* 8 secundario] *BV om. P* 14 vero fit] *BP om. V* 16-17 et simpliciter] *BP om. V*

[134] Secundo hoc idem ostendo sic quia: Illud quod est tantum ens secundum rationem, nullum esse reale habet; et illa <maior> plana est, quia ens rationis et ens reale extra ex opposito dividuntur et dictio exclusiva addita uni excludit reliquum. Sed illud quod non habet aliquod esse nisi esse representatum intellectui, quicumque sit ille intellectus, tantum habet esse rationis, ut supra ostensum est et de se patet. Ergo illud quod non habet nisi esse representatum intellectui, non habet aliquod esse reale. Sed illud quod habet solum exemplar vel ydeam in Deo, exclusa ab utroque omni causalitate effectiva, non habet nisi esse representatum, ut etiam ostensum est supra. Ergo creature ex hoc quod habent tantum in Deo exemplar vel ydeam representantem ab eterno, nullum esse reale vel essentie vel existentie habent ab eterno.

1 ostendo] *V* ostenditur *sic saepius BP* / tantum] totum *BPV* 3 extra] *B om. PV* 7 intellectui] *BV om. P* 7 vel] *BP ad V*

[135] Unde iuxta hoc notandum est quod hoc universaliter verum est de omni cognitione cuiuscumque cognoscentis quod nec ipsa cognitio nec aliquid ad ipsam pertinens manens infra limites cognitionis aliquod esse reale facit in cognito. Et ideo illud quod representat rem cognitam cognoscenti --- sive sit ipsa cognitio, sive conceptus, sive species --- licet possit dici largo modo exemplar vel ydea (accipiendo ‘exemplar’ vel ‘ydeam’ pro eo quod tantum est representativum rei), numquam tamen potest dici causa exemplaris eius nisi cum hoc quod <illud quod> est principium representativum vel principium cognoscendi, sit etiam principium effectivum rei cognite --- nisi forte dicatur causa exemplaris eius in esse cognito. Et tunc realiter loquendo magis est dicendum tale quid causa cognitionis quam causa rei cognite.

9 vel principium] *BP om. V* 11 quid] *BP om. V*

[136] Tertio ostendo idem sic. Omnis actio terminatur ad aliquod absolutum per illam actionem productum **[B221rb]** quod antequam per illam actionem produceretur, non habebat aliquod esse reale nisi in potentia; et illa maior est plana quantum ad primam partem, que dicit quod omnis actio terminatur ad aliquod absolutum per illam actionem productum, quia solus respectus numquam producit. Patet etiam quantum ad secundam partem, que dicit quod illud productum non habeat aliquod esse reale nisi in potentia antequam per illam actionem producatur, quia factibile non est in actu antequam fiat. Sed creatio est actio Dei creaturam producentis. Ergo creatio terminatur ad aliquod absolutum in creatura quod antequam produceretur per creationem, non habebat aliquod esse

reale in actu. Sed in creatura nichil est absolutum nisi essentia aliqua substantialis vel accidentalis. Ergo essentia creature non habebat aliquod esse reale in actu antequam crearetur.

7-8 aliquod esse reale] *BV* esse *P* 10 producentis] *BPV* creantis *Vc* 12-14 sed ... crearetur] *BPcV om. P*

[137] Quarto ostendo idem confirmando rationem immediate positam per sillogismum ducentem ad impossibile sic. Illud quod est in actu et realiter absque hoc quod a Deo creetur et manet absque hoc quod a Deo conservetur, nec per creationem a Deo producitur nec a Deo conservatur. Sed secundum istum hominem creatura quantum ad suum esse essentie realiter et in actu est ab eterno absque hoc quod Deus eam creet, et maneret in eodem esse si Deus desineret eam conservare. Ergo creatura quantum ad suam essentiam sive quantum ad suum esse essentie nec producitur a Deo per creationem preter actionem nec a Deo conservatur. Sed consequens est impossibile, ut statim probabo. Ergo et aliqua premissarum. Non maior, que dicit quod illud quod est in actu absque hoc quod a Deo creetur *etc*., quia impossibile est quod aliquid sit realiter et in actu quantum ad id quod est factibile absque hoc quod fiat. Et ideo si aliqua res est in actu quantum ad aliquid absque hoc quod creetur, impossibile est quod quantum ad illud illa res sit creabilis. Et per consequens impossibile est quod quantum ad illud **[P29vb]** sit creata vel per creationem producta. Relinquitur igitur quod minor sit falsa, que dicit quod creatura quantum ad esse essentie sit realiter et in actu ab eterno antequam creatura creetur.

4 conservatur] *BPcV* conservetur *P* 9 preter actionem] *V om. BP* 13 id] *P* id quantum ad *V* illud quantum ad *B* 15 illud] *BPcV* qui *P*

[138] Quod autem conclusio sit impossibilis, scilicet quod creatura quantum ad esse essentie sive quantum ad essentiam non creetur nec conservetur a Deo, probo sic quia: Omnis actio terminatur ad aliquod absolutum per illam actionem productum; ad solum enim respectum nulla penitus actio terminatur. Sed in creatura non est aliquod absolutum quod per creationem possit produci nisi essentia, saltem secundum istum hominem, qui non ponit esse differre ab essentia re absoluta. Ergo si creatura non est producibilis per creationem quantum ad suam essentiam, sequitur quod omnino creatura non sit creabilis nec possit omnino creari. Quod est manifestus error.

[139] Sed forte ipse dicet ad illa duo argumenta quod creatura quantum ad suam essentiam est per creationem **[V41ra]** facta sive producta non unde essentia, sed unde effectus Dei. Contra. Si essentia creature non unde essentia creature sed unde effectus Dei est producta vel creata, tunc

creatura non est producta nisi quantum ad id quod hoc quod dico ‘effectus Dei’ addit supra essentiam. Sed esse effectus Dei non addit supra essentiam nisi solum respectum. Ergo adhuc stat quod creatura non creetur nisi quantum ad solum respectum, et quod solus respectus sit terminus formalis creationis, ita quod non poterit dici creatura produci quantum ad essentiam nisi prout li ‘quantum’ dicit habitudinem subiecti mutationis ad mutationem non producti sed mutationem presuppositi. Quod est valde absurdum. Unde licet essentia unde essentia non sit producibilis vel producta, quia tunc essentia divina esset producibilis vel producta (quod falsum est), essentia tamen creature unde essentia creature est vel producta vel producibilis. Si autem aliquis ponat quod esse realiter differat ab essentia, adhuc sequitur quod unum non possit esse sine alio, quia unum se habebit ad aliud, scilicet esse ad essentiam sicut proprietas ipsum consequens, sicut scilicet vivere ad vitam, quorum unum non potest esse sine alio.

5 dico] *BPV* quod *add. P* 8 quantum ad] *BPcV om. P* 9 creationis] *BP om. V* 11 ad] *coni.* per *BPV* / producti] *BVc* produci *PV* / mutationem] *P* mutationi *BV*

[140] Quinto hoc idem patet per hoc quod sequeretur quod si essentie rerum essent ab eterno, quod etiam ipsa agentia naturalia non facerent nisi quosdam respectus, quia si essentia caloris est ab eterno, constat quod non est nisi in calefactibili, et hoc quantum ad suum esse reale essentiale. Et sic calefaciens non causabit calorem in calefactibili, cum calor ab eterno sit in calefactibili, sed causabit solum quendam respectum in composito ex utroque. Quod est nimis absurdum.

7 nimis] *BV* inconveniens *P*

[141] Sexto patet idem sic quia: Secundum eum sic se habet essentia, ens et esse sicut cursus, currens et currere. Sed quandocumque est unum illorum, est et aliud, quia quandocumque est cursus, et currere et currens (et econverso), licet unum non predicetur de reliquo. Ergo a simili licet essentia et esse non predicentur de se invicem, quandocumque tamen est unum, est et reliquum. Et sic si unum eorum esset ab eterno, et reliquum. Cum ergo secundum eum esse existentie non sit ab eterno, sequitur quod nec etiam essentia.

1 ens] *BP om. V*

[142] Alii vero dicunt quod essentia, ens, homo, animal et talia que sunt in generibus predicamentorum, significant ipsas res secundum quod sunt entia non prohibita sive entia in potentia (quod idem est). Et quod propter hoc quod res habent semper tale esse, scilicet esse in potentia, ideo tales propositiones sicut sunt ‘Homo est homo’ et ‘Homo est animal’ et consimiles sunt vere ab eterno. Sed hoc parum valet, quia sicut ille ‘Homo

est homo' et 'Homo est animal' semper sunt vere, ita et ille 'Homo in actu est animal in actu' et 'Homo in actu est homo in actu'. Et tamen fatuum esset dicere quod hoc totum quod dico 'homo (vel animal) in actu' significaret ens in potentia et non ens in actu.

2 non ... entia] *BP om. V* 8 *secundum* homo] *BP* animal *V* 9 homo ... actu] *BV* animal est animal *P*

Quid istis nominibus 'essentia', 'ens' et 'essentia creature' importetur

[143] Et ideo videtur michi aliter esse dicendum, scilicet quod 'essentia' generaliter dicta dicit illud quo formaliter ens est ens, abstrahendo **[P30ra]** ab ente et essentia tam creata quam increata, tam in actu quam in potentia. 'Ens' vero dicit quod habet essentiam sive creatam sive increatam, sive creatam in actu sive in potentia, abstrahendo ab omnibus, non sicut commune univocum sed commune analogum. 'Essentia vero creature' significat illud quo formaliter aliquid est ens creatum, abstrahendo ab esse in actu et ab esse in potentia (sicut dictum est prius), licet per prius significet illud quo aliquid est ens actu **[B221va]** quam illud quo aliquid est ens in potentia, quia potentia sciri et significari habet per analogiam ad actum, ita quod essentia creature vel ens creatum nullum respectum significet, licet necessario ad ipsam sequatur respectus qui est ad causam, nisi accipiatur 'essentia creata' vel 'ens creatum' pro relatione creature. Si tamen relatio dicatur esse aliqua essentia creata vel concreata, esse vero realis existentie, quantum michi videtur, non importat nisi essentiam et habitudinem ad aliquod habens vel notam predicandi quam omne verbum ex suo modo significandi importat que designatur per hoc verbum 'est' prout dicit veritatem propositionum sive convenientiam predicati cum subiecto. Unde esse aliquid nichil aliud est quam aliquid habere essentiam vel convenire alicui habere essentiam.

4 essentiam] *BP* esse sive essentiam *V* / sive creatam] *BP* super essentiam *V* 8 *prius* esse] *BP* ente *V* / *alterum* esse] *BP* essentia *V* 11 vel ens creatum] *BP om. V* 19 esse] *BPcV* est *P*

[144] Et hoc breviter persuadeo sic quia: Sicut lucere se habet ad lucem et calere ad calorem et currere ad cursum, ita esse ad essentiam, quia hincinde quod dicitur per unum per modum verbi, dicitur per aliud per modum nominis. Sed 'lucere' non importat nisi lucem et habitudinem ad aliquid habens notam predicandi quam significat hoc verbum 'est' prout dicit veritatem propositionum sive convenientiam predicati cum subiecto, quia lucere nichil aliud est quam habere lucem vel convenire sibi habere lucem sive convenire sibi esse illud quo lucens lucet. Ergo et similiter 'esse' non importat nisi essentiam et habitudinem sive notam predicandi

predictam. Sed tamen in hoc differt inter esse et lucere ex una **[V41rb]** parte et calere et currere et consimilia ex alia quia non dicitur quod calor caleat et quod cursus currat, sicut dicitur essentia esse et lux lucere, quia communiter loquendo 'calere' et 'currere' non accipiuntur nisi pro habendo calorem et cursum vel pro eo quod est 'esse subiectum caloris et cursus'. Et ideo soli subiecto habenti cursum et calorem convenit currere et calere, non autem calori et cursui. Esse vero dicitur et 'habere essentiam' et 'convenire sibi esse illud quo ens est'. Et similiter est de lucere. Et ideo non solum suppositum habens essentiam dicitur esse, sed etiam essentia et etiam ipsum esse.

5 est] *BP* inest *V* 9 notam] *BP* notitiam *V* 15 et cursus] *BP om. V* / soli] *BV om. P* 17 est] *BPcV om. P*

Quid importetur istis dictionibus 'existentia' et 'existere'

[145] Similiter autem quod dictum est de essentia et de esse existimandum est de existentia et de existere, quod scilicet differunt penes significare per modum nominis et significare per modum verbi. Unde quomodo differunt essentia et esse et existentia et existere, ita esse essentie et esse existentie. Sciendum ergo quod (sicut dictum est) 'essentia' significat illud quo aliquid formaliter est ens, 'esse' vero significat habere essentiam vel convenire sibi habere essentiam, sive convenire sibi quod sit id quo aliquid est ens. Et quia illa habitudo quam importat verbum ex suo modo significandi, contingit significari per modum nominis, ideo 'existentia' est impositum ad significandum ipsum habere essentiam, 'existere' vero importat ipsam talem habitudinem. Et ex significando existentiam est nomen, sicut ex modo significandi est verbum.

1 existimandum] *BP* respondendum *V* 3 quomodo] *BP* eodem modo *V* 9 contingit] *coni.* convenit *sic saepius BPV* 10 ipsum] *V* ipsam *BP*

Quid importetur istis dictionibus 'esse essentie' et esse existentie'

[146] Esse vero essentie et esse existentie sic differunt quia quandoque ipsum verbum infinitivi modi, sicut 'esse', 'vivere' et talia, indirecte ex suo modo significandi significant hoc quod est habere talem actum, puta vitam vel essentiam, aliquando accipiuntur pro ipso actu habito, sicut dicimus quod currere vel vivere est quidam actus. Cum tamen utendo proprie ipsa dictione tam quantum ad significandum quam quantum ad modum significandi vivere non sit ipse actus qui est vita sed habere vitam. Et sic --- etiam accipiendo hoc **[P30rb]** verbum 'esse', quod pro-

prie loquendo significat habere essentiam, pro ipso quod habetur, eo modo quo solemus dicere quod vivere vel esse est quidam actus --- illo modo dicitur esse essentie, quia tunc per ‘esse’ intelligimus quendam habitum qui est ipsa essentia. Et sic dicitur quod diffinitio indicat esse. Et quia ipsum ‘habere essentiam’ quod importetur in hoc verbo ‘esse’, ex suo modo significandi significatur per hoc quod dico ‘existentia’, ideo esse essentie et esse existentie differunt sicut habitus et actus pro quo ipsum verbum quod est ‘esse’ accipitur, et habere actum. Vel potest dici quod differunt secundum quod verbum aliquando accipitur ut verbum, aliquando modo nominis. Et satis redit in idem, hoc forte excepto quod ratione huius prepositionis ‘ex’ li ‘existentia’ vel li ‘existere’ importat esse in propria natura extra causam suam, ‘esse’ vero stat magis abstracte tam pro esse virtualiter in causa quam pro esse in propria natura. --- Et sic patet de primo, scilicet quid importetur istis nominibus.

9 essentiam] *BPV* accipitur *add. Vc* 15 habitus et actus] *V* actus et habitus *BP* 19 prepositionis] *BP* propositionis *V*

CAPITULUM II: QUOMODO STENT RES IN POSITIONE DE YDEMPTITATE

Secundo queritur quomodo sit de ydemptitate essentie et esse

[147] Quantum vero ad secundum, scilicet quomodo sit de ydemptitate dicta essentie et esse, patet in parte ex dictis, quia (sicut iam dictum est) ‘essentia’ significat id quo aliquid est ens, ‘esse’ vero significat habere essentiam, sed ‘ens’ significat ipsum habens <essentiam>. Et ideo ‘esse’ quantum ad id quod directe significat, non dicit aliquam rem in creatura existentem preter essentiam vel preter compositum ex pluribus essentiis, licet (sicut infra ostendetur) verum sit dicere quod esse non est essentia, sicut nec currere est cursus; et hoc propter illud quod importatur in ipso nomine ‘esse’ ex suo modo significandi.

3 id] *B* ut *PV* 5 rem in creatura] *V* naturam in creatura *B* rem increatam *P*

[148] Quod autem ‘esse’ non dicat aliquem actum absolutum additum super essentiam diversum ab essentia et a composito ex pluribus essentiis, ita quod sit quidam simplex actus diversus ab omni essentia faciens compositionem realem cum essentia creature, hoc ostendo duplici ratione. Quarum prima iam posita est quia: Sicut lux ad lucere, ita essentia ad esse. Sed <sicut> ‘lucere’ non dicit actum absolutum additum super lucem sed solum dicit lucem cum habitudine ad aliquod habens quod sibi competit ex modo significandi, sic etiam nec esse addit aliquid actu super essentiam sed dicit essentiam cum habitudine ad aliquod habens, modo quo frequenter est expositum.

[149] Secunda ratio talis est. In substantiis materialibus, que sunt nobis magis note, accipio illa per ordinem, scilicet materiam primam et formam substantialem et accidens et substantiam compositam (quam ex causa ultimo pono). Ista autem sic se habent quod ipsa materia secundum se nude **[B221vb]** considerata est pura potentia ad esse actuale. Et ideo non potest per se esse terminus productionis agentis alicuius, nec habere esse in actu ab aliquo agente nisi per aliquem actum additum ad essentiam suam et ab ea essentialiter diversum quo formaliter compositum ex ipsa et illo actu habet esse in actu in rerum natura. Forma vero substantialis materialis est quidam actus, sed non absolutus sufficiens subsistere per se et esse terminus actionis alicuius agentis, **[V41va]** sed indiget materia recipiente. Accidens vero indiget ente in actu in quo sit, saltem loquendo naturaliter. Substantia vero composita que perfecte est substantia, etsi indigeat partibus infra suam essentiam inclusis, puta materia et forma, tamen nullo extra se indiget ad hoc quod sit actu nisi agente. Quod patet per hoc quia in materialibus sola substantia composita dicitur simpliciter per se et non per aliud extra se ens, sicut est materia vel forma vel accidens. Et sic ad suum esse non indiget aliquo extra se nisi agente.

5 actuale] *BP om. V* / ideo] *BPV* actuale *add. V* 7 actum] *BPcV om. P* 10 absolutus] *PV* aptus vel B 11 et] *BPV* etiam non potest *add. Vc* 18 nisi] *BP* ab *V*

[150] Ex hoc sic arguitur. In materialibus substantia composita differt a forma, materia et accidentibus, quia ipsa non indiget aliquo extra essentiam per quod sit nisi agente, sicut materia, forma vel accidens indigent, ut dictum est. Et per hoc dicitur ens completum per se in comparatione ad alia. Sed illud quod est intra essentiam substantie complete sicut materia et forma, sunt essentie quedam et partes essentie substantie composite. **[P30va]** Ergo substantia completa ad hoc quod sit in rerum natura in actu, non indiget aliquo quod sit diversum ab essentia sua sive a partibus essentie. Sed constat quod substantia completa non potest esse sine esse. Ergo 'esse' non dicit aliquid diversum ab essentia substantie composite et partibus eius.

6 composite] *BPcV* complete *sic saepius P* 10 composite] complete *sic saepius BPV*

[151] Sed forte ad hoc dicet aliquis quod in hoc differt substantia completa ab aliis omnibus quod potest per se esse subiectum ipsius esse, alia autem non possunt esse per se subiectum ipsius esse; et in hoc est substantiam esse per se ens, et non alia. Sed hoc nichil est, quia esse subiectum alicuius actus per quod ipsum subiectum habet esse simpliciter et sine quo in rerum natura esse simpliciter non potest nisi eo dante sibi formaliter esse, est conditio eius quod est in potentia ad esse simpliciter. Hoc autem est materia, quam constat posse per se esse subiectum forme

substantialis, per quam formam habet esse in actu. Et sic sequeretur quod substantia completa non esset nisi materia prima. Et similiter etiam si substantia angeli non posset esse nisi per actum realiter diversum, respectu cuius esset potentia receptiva et sine quo formaliter dante sibi esse non posset esse, substantia angeli esset materia prima, utputa potentia ad esse simpliciter. Quod est inconveniens. Sequeretur etiam quod ille actus qui ponitur quod sit super esse, esset forma substantialis cuius est perficere materiam. Et per consequens etiam quod substantie separate essent composite ex materia prima et forma substantiali.

13 utputa potentia] *BPcV* interpretative dicitur *P* 15 cuius] *BP* quo *V* 16 etiam quod] B*P* si *V*

[152] Sed forte ad hoc dicetur quod materia prima est potentia ad esse actuale simpliciter quantum ad esse essentie, non autem quantum ad esse existentie. Sed hoc nichil est. Nam potentia ad esse simpliciter qua dicimus materiam potentiam ad esse substantiale, est potentia secundum quam aliquid per aliquod agens potest esse in rerum natura. Tale autem esse quo aliquid per aliquod agens dicitur posse esse in rerum natura, est esse existentie. Et ideo potentia pura ad esse simpliciter actualis existentie est potentia materie, et non alicuius entis in actu essentie vel quocumque actu.

2 simpliciter] *BPcV* similiter *sic saepius P* 4 potentiam] *BV* primam *P* 5-6 tale ... natura] *BP om. V*

[153] Et sic videtur michi quod ‘esse’ non dicat aliquam formam absolutam additam ad essentiam creature. Nec etiam, sicut alii dicunt, dicit respectum ad agens, licet sine tali respectu esse non possit quia: Sicut iste homo, qui ponit ‘esse’ dicere respectum, concedit, sic se habet esse et essentia sicut currere et cursus. Sed ‘currere’ non plus significat respectum ad agens quam ‘cursus’. Ergo nec ‘esse’ talem respectum significat, sicut nec ‘essentia’. Et ideo, ut michi videtur, differunt solum penes modum significandi per modum verbi et per modum nominis. Ratione cuius aliquid implicat unum eorum quod non implicat aliud, ut infra dicetur magis. --- Et sic patet de secundo.

2-3 dicit respectum] *BP* de respectu *V*

CAPITULUM III: QUOMODO RES SE HABEANT IN POSITIONE DE YDEMPTITATE

De tribus difficultatibus circa primum dictum quod essentia non habet esse reale ab eterno

[154] Nunc restat tertio satisfacere difficultatibus que sunt circa illa. Sunt autem precipue tres difficultates contra primum illud dictum, scilicet quod essentia non habet esse reale ab eterno. Prima est quia: Cum ille propositiones 'Essentia est essentia', 'Homo est homo' et consimiles sint vere ab eterno, sequeretur quod veritati earum nullum fundamentum ex parte rei responderet. Quod est inconveniens. Secundo sequeretur quod res non essent in predicamento nisi dum actu existerent, quod similiter, ut videtur, est inconveniens. Nam hec semper est vera 'Animal est substantia'. Per hoc autem est aliquid in genere substantie quod convenit sibi quod sit substantia. Et ideo animal et consimilia sunt in genere ab eterno. Tertio sequeretur quod hec nomina 'homo', 'animal' et talia, rebus non existentibus, non significarent rem veram, sed quedam figmenta sicut 'chimera' et 'hircocervus'.

2 difficultates] *BPV* prima *add. BP* 3 essentia] *BP* essentiam *V* 8 videtur] *BV* patet *P* 12 figmenta] *PcV* significata *BP*

[155] Sed si illa diligenter considerentur, non plus concludunt pro eis quam contra eos. Nam primum quod dicitur quod essentia est essentia ab eterno, non plus concludit essentiam habere esse reale ab eterno quam esse existentie, vel ipsum nichil, quia sicut illa fuit vera ab eterno 'Essentia est essentia', ita etiam ille 'Esse est esse' sive 'Existentia est existentia' et 'Nichil est nichil' sunt vere ab eterno, et similiter 'Esse in actu est esse in actu'. Et ideo istud argumentum est eque contra adversarium quantum ad esse vel existere, quod negat esse ab eterno, sicut est contra me quantum ad essentiam, quam nego **[P30vb]** esse ab eterno. Dico igitur quod veritas talium propositionum fundatur supra veritatem eorum que significantur **[V41vb]** per terminos ipsarum secundum quod uniformiter termini in subiecto et predicato accipiuntur. Et ideo verum est semper quod essentia est essentia et homo est homo et essentia in potentia est essentia in potentia et homo in potentia est homo in potentia et animal in potentia est animal in potentia et homo in actu est animal in actu. Sed si accipiantur difformiter, ut si dicatur quod essentia creature est essentia in actu ab eterno vel quod essentia que nunc est actu fuit essentia actu **[B222ra]** ab eterno, erunt false, et hoc quia essentie creature non habent esse reale actu ab eterno.

1 plus] *BV om. P* 1-2 pro ... eos] *Bc* intentum *P* intentum quam oppositum *V* 16 difformiter] *BP* differenter *V*

[156] Quod vero secundo adducitur pro inconvenienti, scilicet quod res non essent in predicamento nisi dum existerent, dico quod 'predicamentum' duo importat, scilicet <ipsum ordinem predicamentalem et> ipsas res que ordini predicamentali substernuntur, sicut hoc quod dico 'substantia', 'homo' et talia. Et quantum ad hoc predicamentum dicit rem veram esse extra animam existentem. Et ideo quantum ad rem ordini predicamentali substratam: sicut res se habet ad esse reale extra animam, sic se habet ad esse in genere, quia quantum ad hoc nichil aliud est aliquid esse in genere quam quod sit substantia; et similiter est de aliis predicamentis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc quando res actu existunt, sunt simpliciter in genere. Quando vero non existunt actu sed in potentia, sunt secundum quid in genere, sicut et esse in potentia est esse secundum quid respectu esse in actu. Ordo vero predicamentalis est ens rationis secundum quod animal est sub corpore et homo sub animali, et consimilia. Iste enim ordo sequitur rem secundum quod est obiective in intellectu, sicut hoc quod dico 'esse abstractum' et 'esse universale'. Et ideo sic se habent res ad istum ordinem sicut se habent ad sic ordinate intelligi. Et quia res possunt intelligi sive sint sive non sint, ideo iste ordo potest sequi rem, sive sit in rerum natura sive non sit.

6 esse] *PV om. B* 7 substratam] *BP* subiectam *V*11-12 quando ... genere] *BP om. V*

[157] Quod vero tertio dicitur quod sicut nec 'chimera', ita nec 'animal' significaret rem veram sed figmentum, rebus non existentibus, nisi essentia haberet esse reale ab eterno, dico quod dato quod essentia vel esse non habeant esse reale in actu ab eterno, adhuc non est simile de animali et chimera, etiam rebus non existentibus in actu, quia 'chimera', rebus non existentibus, non significat aliquid quod sit ens verum actu vel potentia, sed 'animal', etiam rebus non existentibus, significat illud quod est ens verum in potentia. Et ideo non significat figmentum sicut 'chimera'.

5 quia] *BP om. V*

De multis difficultatibus circa secundum dictum quod essentia creature et esse differunt penes modum significandi

[158] Circa vero secundum dictum, scilicet quod essentia creature et esse non differunt re sicut subiectum et actus additus ad ipsum, sed penes modum significandi, sunt multe difficultates que posite sunt in questionibus supra recitatis de esse et essentia. Quarum alique ponende sunt hic et solvende. Ad alias vero patebit discurrendo per questiones supraposi-tas.

5 solvende] *B* solvendum *P* solute *V* / vero] *BP* rationes *V*

De precipuis difficultatibus circa ydemptitatem esse et essentie

[159] Sunt autem quedam difficultates provenientes ex imperfectione creature. Prima est quia: Creatura propter imperfectionem suam non est suum esse subsistens, quia omne suum esse subsistens soli Deo convenit. Esset autem suum esse subsistens, si idem esset in ea esse et essentia, quia quedam creature subsistunt sicut substantie, non ergo idem est esse et essentia in creaturis. Secunda est quia: Esse secundum se est illimitatum. Si ergo creatura esset suum esse, nichil habens preter suum esse admixtum, tunc esse creature esset illimitatum, quod falsum est. Quedam alie difficultates sunt ex hoc quod creatura non semper est, sed est facta de novo, vel saltem factibilis, quia tunc si creatura esset idem cum esse, esse non posset separari ab essentia; et sic creatura non posset non esse, quod falsum est. Eadem difficultas potest sic formari quia: Nichil potest intelligi esse sub opposito eius quod est idem re cum ipso. Si ergo creatura et suum esse sunt idem re, creatura non poterit intelligi non esse vel sub non esse. Quod falsum est. Item. Dicimus quod semper essentia est essentia et quod esse semper est esse. Non tamen dicimus quod essentia semper sit. Hoc autem non esset, si esse esset idem cum essentia sicut essentia cum **[P31ra]** essentia et esse cum esse. Non ergo sunt idem.

5-6 quia ... essentia] *BV om. P* 7-8 si ... illimitatum] *BPcV om. P* 7 preter suum] *V* principaliter *BP* 9 creatura] *BP* essentia *V* 14 non esse vel] *BP* nisi esse *V* 15 semper] *BP om. V*

[160] Item. Nichil est in potentia ad seipsum; non enim dicimus quod albedo est in potentia ad albedinem. Sed essentia creature est in potentia ad esse. Ergo essentia creature non est suum esse. Item. Nichil est actu tale per illud per quod est in potentia tale. Sed creatura est per essentiam in potentia ad esse. Ergo essentia creature non est idem cum suo esse. Item. Nichil est actu per illud per quod potest esse et non esse. Sed creatura per essentiam potest esse et non esse. Ergo non est in actu per essentiam, est autem actu per esse. Ergo esse creature non est idem re cum essentia. Item. Quod incipit esse actu habet aliquid preter actum per quod incipit esse actu, quia cum actus semper sit actus, actus numquam incipit esse actu. Ergo preter actum essendi oportet ponere in creatura aliquam potentiam quam dicimus essentiam. Et oportet quod illa differant re, quia sicut differunt, ita possunt se amittere. Et ideo si sola ratione differrent, numquam realiter essentia amitteret esse vel inciperet esse actu.

7 per] *BP om. V* 8 actu] *P om. BV* 9 essentia] *PV* esse *B* 10-11 quia ... actu] *BP om. V* 13 amittere] *B* advertere *PV*

[161] Item. Sicut materie acquiritur forma in generatione, ita essentie acquiritur esse in creatione. Sed materia differt re a forma, alioquin peri-

ret generatio. Ergo esse differt ab essentia realiter, alioquin periret creatio. Item. Sicut materia se habet ad privationem et formam, ita, ut videtur, et essentia ad esse et non esse. Sed materia differt realiter a forma et privatione. Ergo essentia realiter differt ab esse **[V42ra]** et non esse. Item. In omni mutatione subiectum mutationis debet differre re ab utroque termino mutationis. Sed termini mutationis sunt esse et non esse, et subiectum est essentia. Ergo essentia re differt ab esse et non esse.

6-8 item in omni ... et non esse] *BP om. V*

[162] Item. Nullum agens facit aliquod potentiale esse actu nisi imprimendo illi potentiali vel seipsum vel aliquem alium actum diversum ab illo potentiali. Sed Deus non imprimit se essentie creature que est possibilis esse. Ergo imprimit sibi aliquem actum diversum ab ea. Quem dicimus 'esse'. Et sic idem quod prius. Item. Nullum agens facit quod idem sit idem ut quod essentia sit essentia vel quod esse sit esse. Et ideo omne agens agit causando unum in alio sicut actum in potentia, et unum sub alio sicut potentiam sub actu differente re a potentia. Cum ergo Deus creet creaturam in esse, sequitur quod creare sit facere potentiam que est essentia, sub actu qui est esse, et facere actum qui est esse, in potentia que est essentia. Et sic idem quod prius. --- Ille videntur precipue difficultates circa hanc materiam.

2 potentiali] *coni.* possibili *sic saepius BPV* 2-4 ab illo ... diversum] *BP om. V* 5 esse] ergo etc. *add. Pc* 6 ut] *PV* vel B / *prius* sit] idem et quod essentia sit *add. V*/ *alterum* quod] *BV om. P* 7 actum] *B* actus *PV* 8 differente] *B* differentem *PV* 11 precipue] *V* precise *B* principaliter *P* 12 circa] *BPcV* esse *P*

Quomodo eorum diversitas intelligenda est

[163] Ad primum ergo istorum dicendum quod licet 'esse' non dicat aliquam naturam absolutam additam ad **[B222rb]** essentiam creature, adhuc tamen non sequitur quod creatura vel substantia creata (puta homo vel animal) sit suum esse.

De termino concreto et de abstracto

[164] Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod omnis terminus concretus --- sive sit substantivus, sicut 'homo' et 'animal', sive adiectivus, sicut 'album' et 'coloratum' --- licet ex suo directo et explicito significato non significet nisi naturam substantialem vel accidentalem, que est animalitas vel color vel aliquid tale (que termini predicti significant concretive), ex modo tamen significandi important implicite omnia illa que possunt esse habita a subiecto vel supposito huiusmodi naturas habente. Unde 'homo',

quod idem est quod ‘habens humanitatem’, ex suo modo significandi importat omne illud quod a supposito humane nature potest haberi. Et propter hoc concretum in genere substantie non excludit accidentia ex suo modo significandi, immo importat ea implicite. Sed abstractum ea ex suo modo significandi excludit.

3-4 non significet] *PV om. B*

Quod ‘esse’ dupliciter potest accipi

[165] Ulterius sciendum quod ‘esse’ dupliciter potest accipi, sicut superius dictum est. Uno modo pro ipso actu habito; secundum quod dicimus quod esse est quidam actus, qui actus est ipsa essentia sicut actus qui est currere est cursus; et vocatur, ut dictum est, esse essentie. Alio modo potest haberi pro ipso habere actum implicando notam verbalem et habitudinem ad aliquod habens. Tunc dico quod accipiendo primo modo ‘esse’, scilicet pro actu qui est essentia et dicitur esse essentie, creatura concretive dicta, sicut **[P31rb]** homo vel animal, non est suum esse, quia nec est sua essentia in abstracto accepta. Homo enim non est sua humanitas; et hoc est quia ex suo modo significandi importat implicite aliud ab humanitate, quidquid videlicet a supposito nature humane potest haberi. Sed essentia creature abstracte dicta bene est tale esse, scilicet esse essentie modo quo expositum est supra. Sed si accipiamus ‘esse’ secundo modo, tunc essentia creature nec in abstracto nec in concreto potest dici tale esse, quia esse sic dictum dicit habitudinem ad aliquod habens. Est enim (sicut dictum est) idem quod habere essentiam, sicut currere idem est quod habere cursum. Et ideo sicut cursus vel currens non est currere, ita essentia nec abstracte nec concrete est esse sic dictum, quia esse sic dictum dicit ipsam essentiam, et habitudinem ad aliquod habens importat ex suo modo significandi. Et quia in solo Deo non est aliqua compositio ex pluribus essentialiter differentibus, que sunt vel materia et forma vel subiectum et accidens, in omnibus autem aliis a Deo est aliqua compositio plurium essentiarum, ideo in solo Deo verum est quod ipse est sua quiditas et suum esse; unde Deus est sua deitas et suum esse. In aliis autem omnibus, in quibus preter naturam substantialem sunt alia diversa habita, non est ita. Unde homo non est sua humanitas. Nec per consequens suum esse, ut dictum est.

5 notam] *PV* notitiam *B* 6 habens] *PV* agens *B* 9 nec] *PV* aliud *B* 12 essentia ... dicta] *BP* creatura abstracta] *V* 12 bene] *BP* sive *V* / esse] *BP om. V* 13 essentie] *PV* creature *B* 15 *prius* esse] *BP om. V* 18 sic dictum] *BV* sicut dictum est *P* 21 que sunt] *PV om. B* 22 accidens] et per consequens nec plurium essentiarum *add. Pc* 24 deitas] *P* divinitas *B* quiditas et sua divinitas *V* 25 omnibus] *P om. BV*

Quod 'illimitatio' dupliciter potest accipi

[166] Ad secundum dicendum quod 'illimitatio' dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo secundum predicationem. Et isto modo quodlibet universale respectu sui singularis potest dici illimitatum. Et sic esse commune Creatori et omni creature potest dici illimitatum. Et talis illimitatio etiam termino universali significanti rem creatam potest convenire. Alia est illimitatio secundum perfectionem qua aliquid perfectiones repertas in entibus non secundum gradum determinatum sed absque determinato gradu habet. Et loquendo de tali illimitatione: quando dicitur quod esse est illimitatum, dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo quod ipsi esse communiter dicto per se et in eo quod huiusmodi conveniat esse illimitatum, sicut animali convenit sensibile. Et sic falsum est quod esse sit illimitatum, quia tunc nullum esse posset dici esse limitatum, sicut nullum animal potest dici esse insensibile. Alio modo illimitatum potest convenire ipsi esse communiter dicto non per se sed ratione alicuius esse analogice contenti sub eo, sicut dicitur quod animal est rationale ratione hominis. Et sic verum est quod esse est illimitatum ratione esse divini.

3-4 et sic ... illimitatum] *BPcV om. P* 4 etiam] *BV* in *P* 5 universali] *BPVc* vel *V* 10 dici esse] dici *P* esse *BV* / nullum] *BPVc* om. *V*/ insensibile] *BPcV* sensibile *P* 12 dici esse] dici *P* esse *BV* 15 dicitur quod] *V om. BP* 16 hominis] contenti sub eo *add. P*

[167] Et cum hoc stat quod esse creatum in eo quod esse creatum, circumscripto omni diverso re ab eo, est limitatum. Unde sicut color in eo quod color non est congregativus nec disgregativus, sed color talis in eo quod talis est congregativus et color talis in eo quod talis est disgregativus, circumscripto omni diverso re a colore, ita esse communiter dictum in eo quod esse nec limitatum est nec illimitatum. Sed tale esse in eo quod tale esse est illimitatum, puta esse divinum. Et tale esse, puta creatum in eo quod tale esse est limitatum, circumscripto omni diverso re ab ipso esse.

3 nec disgregativus] *BP om. V* 3-4 in eo quod talis] *BPVc om. V* 7 puta esse divinum] *V om. BP*

[168] Sciendum **[V42rb]** etiam quod illud quod est suum esse, est illimitatum, quod quidem soli Deo convenit, ut dictum est. Sed hoc non est quia 'esse' et 'essentia' dicant diversas res absolutas. Sed hoc ideo est quia in eo quod est suum esse, non est compositio ex pluribus essentiis substantialibus vel accidentalibus, utpote habens omnem perfectionem suam in unico aliquo simplici. Et ideo cum in unoquoque inveniantur ea que pertinent ad diversa genera, sicut in substantiis immaterialibus invenitur subsistere, velle et intelligere et iustum vel iniquum esse, in materialibus autem planum est quod in unoquoque inveniantur plura pertinen-

tia ad diversa genera, inde est quod illud quod habet omnem perfectionem suam in unico simplici, habet et essentiam et esse illimitatum et non determinatum ad aliquod genus vel speciem entis, quia quod sic est determinatum, non se extendit nisi ad ea que sunt illius generis vel speciei. Illa vero que non habent in unico simplici omnem suam perfectionem sed per unam essentiam habent **[P31va]** illud quod pertinet ad unum genus et per aliam illud quod pertinet ad aliud, habent essentiam limitatam ad genus et speciem et habent in uno subiecto plures essentias, que pluralitas impedit quod aliquid sit suum esse. Et ideo illud de quo non predicatur suum esse, habet esse limitatum. Sed quod non predicetur suum esse de eo non est propter pluralitatem diversorum que sint esse et essentia, sed propter pluralitatem diversarum essentiarum.

2 soli] *BP om. V* 5 vel accidentalibus] *BPcV om. P* 6 aliquo] *B om. PV* 10 illud quod] *PV om. B* 17 solo subiecto] solo *V* subiecto *BP* 20 propter] *PV om. B* / diversorum ... pluralitatem] *BPVc om. V*

De verificatione 'Hoc non est illud' oppositis conditionibus occurrentibus

De actu et potentia

[169] Ad tertium dicendum quod quando dicitur 'Hoc non est illud', <illud> non solum verificatur per hoc quod unum eorum potest separari ab alio manente **[B222va]** sicut albedo potest separari ab homine, sed et per hoc quod idem potest accipi cum oppositis conditionibus, sicut albedo in potentia pro eodem tempore non est albedo in actu. Nec similiter essentia in potentia est essentia in actu. Et sic negare esse de essentia quando dicitur 'Essentia non est' non est nisi negare essentiam in actu de essentia in potentia, quia 'esse simpliciter' precipue stat pro habere essentiam in actu vel pro esse illo quo aliquid est ens actu. Unde et si uniformiter acciperetur essentia et esse, ita quod acciperetur essentia in potentia cum esse in potentia et essentia in actu cum esse in actu, semper esset verum quod essentia esset.

3 albedo] *PV* anima *B* 4 idem] *V* illud *BP* 5 potentia] dicitur essentia in actu sic negare esse de aliquo *add. B* 5-6 nec ... actu] *BV om. P* 7 non est nisi] *V om. BP* 9 ens] *BPcV om. P*

[170] Per idem patet ad quartum, quia oppositum esse in actu non potest stare cum essentia in actu, nec oppositum esse in potentia potest stare cum esse in potentia. Sed oppositum esse in actu bene potest stare cum essentia in potentia, quia etiam oppositum essentie in actu potest stare cum essentia in potentia.

1 per] *PV* vel *B* / quartum] *PV* hoc *B*

[171] Ad quintum dicendum quod verum est quod sicut essentia semper est essentia, ita esse semper est esse. Et universaliter dico quod quandocumque est essentia, est et esse eo modo quo essentia est. Sed non dicimus quod essentia semper sit. <Et hoc> non propter diversitatem esse ad essentiam, sed propter diversitatem esse in actu ad esse in potentia et essentie in actu ad essentiam in potentia; non quod essentia intelligatur ut potentia receptiva ipsius esse et esse ut actus eius. Immo et esse et essentia ambo dicuntur esse in potentia per comparationem ad potentiam agentis.

1 est] *BP om. V* 2 universaliter] *B* plus *PV* 2-3 quandocumque] *PV* quomodocumque *B* 7-8 et ... potentia] *BP om. V*

[172] Ad sextum dicendum quod licet idem quandoque sit in potentia et quandoque in actu, nichil tamen proprie est in potentia ad seipsum eodem modo per terminum ipsum significantem importatum, quia albedo vel lux non est in potentia ad albedinem vel lucem, bene tamen idem est in potentia ad seipsum prout diversimode significatur ratione alicuius importati per unum terminum quod non importatur per alium. Et illo modo et dicitur quod lux antequam sit, est in potentia ad lucendum, quia est in potentia ad seipsam acceptam cum habitudine ad aliquod habens. Et ita essentia est in potentia ad seipsam cum habitudine ad aliquod habens. Est enim essentia in potentia ad hoc quod sit essentia habita ab aliquo. Et sic est in potentia ad esse.

1 idem] *BV* essentia *P* 3 significantem] *BP om. V* 7 dicitur] *BP* dicere *V* / est] *Pc om. BPV* 8 est] *PV om. B* / habens] *V om. BP*

[173] Ad septimum dicendum quod licet idem quandoque sit in potentia et quandoque in actu et possit esse potentiale et actuale (sicut albedo quandoque est potentialis et quandoque actualis), numquam tamen per idem est aliquid in potentia et in actu formaliter, ita quod li ‘per’ importet rationem quare aliquid sit in potentia. Et quando dicitur ultra quod creatura est ens in potentia per essentiam, dico quod si intelligatur per li ‘per essentiam’ quod essentia sua sit sibi ratio essendi in potentia, falsum est; immo per potentiam activam agentis est in potentia. Si vero sit sensus quod per essentiam idest quantum ad suam essentiam sit in potentia, verum est. Et isto modo est etiam in potentia per esse, idest quantum ad suum esse.

2 potentiale] *V* possibile *BP* 3 potentialis] *V* possibilis *BP* 7 in potentia] *BV om. P*

[174] Ad octavum dicendum quod nichil est actu formaliter per illud per quod potest esse et non esse, licet possit esse actu formaliter per illud per quod potest esse et non esse. Bene tamen aliquid est actu per aliquid effective per quod potest esse et non esse quando fit ab agente per liberum

arbitrium. Et quando dicitur quod creatura per essentiam suam potest esse et non esse: si intelligatur ita quod essentia sua sit sibi ratio quod possit esse et non esse, dico quod falsum est; immo ratio quare potest esse et non esse, est potentia agentis quod **[P31vb]** agit per liberum arbitrium. Si autem intelligatur quod **[V42va]** creatura per essentiam, idest quantum ad essentiam possit esse et non esse, verum est. Et ita etiam quantum ad esse est in potentia ad esse in actu et non esse.

2 alterum per] *V om. BP* 3-4 bene ... non esse] *BPcV om. P* 11 est ... ad esse] *BV om. P*

[175] Ad nonum dicendum quod illud quod incipit esse actu, habet aliquid quod sit causa eius in aliquo genere cause per actum illum per quem incipit esse actu, ita quod illud sit ratio quare quandoque non est actu et postea incipit esse actu, et quod illud sit aliud ab actu quo res est formaliter. Et sic est in proposito. Nam preter essentiam creature qua formaliter est actu, est alia causa eius, scilicet potentia activa Dei per quam potest incipere esse actu, quia etiamsi incipiat esse actu quantum ad suam essentiam, sua tamen essentia non est sibi ratio quod incipiat esse actu vel quod possit incipere esse actu. Sed tamen non oportet quod illud quod incipit esse actu, preter illum actum habeat causam materialem per quam actioni subiectum possit incipere esse actu. Et quando dicitur quod actus semper est actus, dico quod licet actus semper sit actus accipiendo uniformiter hincinde ‘actum’, tamen actus in potentia non quod est actus in actu.

10 quam actioni] *B* quam *P* quem actum *V* 10 in] *PV* et *B* 13 hincinde] *BP* hic et inde *V*

[176] Nec debet esse mirum apud aliquem quod dicitur actus in potentia, nam actus creatus bene dicitur actus in potentia; et est quandoque in potentia. Et quando dicitur quod oportet quod potentia illa per quam res potest incipere esse actu et actus ille differant re, dico quod verum est. Et sic est in proposito. Nam potentia Dei agentis et esse sive essentia creature differunt re, et unum potest amittere aliud sic quod unum potest esse, non existente alio. Et etiam ipsa essentia amittit esse inquantum amittit quod sit essentia in actu.

4 differant] *BP* differat *V* 6 unum] *Pc* non *P om. BV*

[177] Ad decimum dicendum quod maior est falsa, quia non sic acquiritur in creatione esse ipsi essentie sicut materie acquiritur forma, sed sicut albedini in potentia acquiritur quod sit albedo in actu vel sicut ei quod est in sola potentia agentis acquiritur esse in propria natura in actu. Unde hec propositio est vera ‘Quod est ab alio causante, habet esse acquisitum’, quamcumque sit idem esse cum essentia. Ad undecimum dicendum quod similiter maior est falsa, quia materia vere est subiectum transmutationis que est a termino in terminum. Sed creatio qua creatur tota substantia rei,

non habet subiectum, sed solum obiectum. Nec est mutatio habens terminos a quo et ad quem secundum rei veritatem sed solum secundum falsam ymaginationem, ut patet[44] in tractatu *De eternitate mundi*. Item. Per hoc patet ad duodecimum, quia patet quod supponit falsum, scilicet quod creatio habeat subiectum et terminos proprie a quo et in quem. Quod falsum est.

1 maior] *BV* minor *P* 5 hec ... vera] *V* hoc ipso *BP* 8 a termino] *BPcV* actio *P*

De potentiali subiective et obiective

[178] Ad tertium decimum dicendum quod verum est illud dictum de potentiali subiective, non autem de potentiali obiective. Quid autem dicat 'potentiale subiective' et 'potentiale obiective' patet ex antedictis. Ad quartum decimum dicendum quod licet agens non faciat quod essentia sit essentia accipiendo uniformiter hincinde 'essentiam', bene tamen facit quod essentia in potentia sit essentia in actu. --- Multa sunt **[B222vb]** alia preter ista. De quibus patebit infra.

5 essentiam] *BP om. V* 7 preter ista] *BP om.V* / de] *PV om. B*

CAPITULUM IV: DESCENDITUR AD QUINQUE QUESTIONES PREMISSAS

Ad q. Iam UTRUM ESSE CREATURE REALITER DIFFERAT AB ESSENTIA EIUS

Quod esse creature non differt ab essentia eius nisi penes modos significandi

[179] Ad nonam ergo questionem primi *Quolibet*, qua iste homo querit utrum esse creature realiter differat ab essentia eius, patet ex antedictis quod non, nisi penes modos significandi. Et illud quod ex tali modo implicatur sicut supra deductum est, patet etiam ex dictis ad argumenta in questione posita.

Ad 1: utrum essentia creature realiter differat ab eius esse *add. in summo margine Vm* 4 deductum] *BV* dictum *P*

[180] Ad auctoritates autem Boetii *De hebdomadibus* potest dici quod ipse intelligit ens et esse (vel essentiam et esse) differre in creaturis propter hoc quod aliquid includitur in uno eorum ex suo modo significandi quod non includitur in alio. Quod autem iste homo dicit de participatione,

44. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibetum* III, *De aeternitate mundi*, cap. 2.

scilicet quod esse creature ideo dicitur participatum quia est ab efficiente extrinseco, dico quod, licet ad hoc quod est esse ab extrinseco efficiente sequatur quod tale esse habeat esse participatum, **[P32ra]** non tamen videtur michi quod in hoc consistat ratio participationis.

De triplici modo participandi

[181] Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod tripliciter potest aliquid participare aliud. Uno modo sicut subiectum participat formam. Et tunc participans et participatum differunt essentialiter et sunt idem subiecto, sicut homo participat albedinem. Et sic creatura non participat esse nisi inquantum una creatura est subiectum alterius creature, vocando creaturam tam substantiam quam accidens.

[182] Alio modo dicitur concretum participare naturam abstractam, et hoc quia concretum significat per modum totius et per modum habentis, abstractum vero significat per modum partis et per modum habiti. Et sic dicitur Sortes vel homo participare humanitatem. Et illo modo creatura concretive dicta, ut homo, dicitur participare humanitatem et esse. Et sic etiam potest dici creatura participare essentiam et esse. Sed essentia abstracte significata illo modo non proprie diceretur participare esse. Et si dicatur participare esse, hoc est ratione habitudinis importate per hoc verbum ‘est’, quod non importat ‘essentia’ ex suo modo significandi, ut dictum est supra. Et propter hoc in toto libro Boetii *De hebdomadibus* notabiliter semper dicitur quod *id quod est* participat esse; non autem dicitur quod essentia participet esse. Et participans illo modo differt a participato penes modum significandi concreti et abstracti.

1 dicitur] *BV* differt *P* 2 significat] *BP* stat *V* 4 homo] *BPV* vel animal *add. BPV* 7 non] *BP om. V* 7-8 et si ... esse] *BP om. V* 11 est] semper *add. P* 12 essentia] *BPcV* existentia *P*

[183] Tertio modo dicitur aliquid participare aliud quia habet illud diminutive respectu alterius quod habet illud perfecte, sicut calor aeris potest dici calor participatus respectu caloris ignis non quia calor aeris non sit in subiecto sicut calor ignis, sed quia **[V42vb]** calor ignis plenius habet naturam caloris quam calor aeris. Et isto modo esse creature est esse participatum, idest esse diminutum respectu esse divini. Et illo modo creatura participat esse communiter dictum, quia esse commune et etiam ens commune convenit ei diminute respectu Dei. Nec differt in illo modo participandi participans a participato nisi sicut inferius a suo communi, quod quidem commune in uno invenitur perfectius quam in alio. Hic autem accipio ‘esse in’ prout superius est in inferiori, non modo quo accidens est in subiecto. Et ideo fieri ab alio non est formalis ratio quod

aliquid sit participatum illo modo, licet ad unum sequatur aliud. Sed magis est ratio huius habere esse diminutum respectu alterius.

5 aeris] *BcPV* ignis *B* 11 esse in] *BPcV* esse participatum *P* / modo] *Vc om. BPV* 9 a] *BP* cum *V* 12 in] *BP om. V* 14 ratio] *BP om. V*

[184] Istis ergo duobus modis ultimis potest dici creatura participare esse. Et de istis duobus modis ultimis participandi possunt exponi omnes auctoritates Boetii in libro *De hebdomadibus* in quibus dicit ens creatum participare esse. Advertendum etiam quod ad istum ultimum modum participandi sequitur etiam primus modus quo subiectum participat formam realiter a se differentem, quia omnis talis substantia (ut infra ostendetur) participat aliquod accidens additum essentie.

2 omnes] tres *add. V* 5 modus] participandi *add. BP*

Rationes Henrici refutantur

[185] Prima autem ratio istius hominis licet (ut credo) intendat veritatem, quantum tamen ad formam arguendi nichil valet, nisi plus dicatur, quia non concludit nisi quod creatura est ens per essentiam. Et ex hoc non habet intentum, quia adversarius concedet sibi quod sicut planta vel animal est vivens et per vitam que est anima et per operationem vite vel anime --- quod idem est, que operatio dicitur 'vivere', que tamen sunt duo diversa ---, ita creatura dicitur ens et per essentiam et per esse, et tamen sunt diversa.

1 intendat] *PV* concludat *B* 3 ens] *BP* essentia *V* 6 vivere] *BP* superior *V*

[186] Secunda ratio, qua dicitur quod nulla creatura est ens per se, bene valet, dummodo deducatur et accipiatur 'ens per se' pro substantia completa que nullo indiget extra essentiam suam nisi efficiente ad hoc quod sit in actu.

2-3 completa] *B* composita *PV* 3 indiget] *BcVP om. B*

[187] Tertia ratio parum valet, quia iste processus non valet nisi quando secundum quod indiget esse eodem modo per aliud sicut primum. Nunc autem adversarius dicet quod esse non eodem modo indiget esse **[P32rb]** per aliud sicut essentia, sicut etiam forma non eodem modo indiget esse per aliud sicut materia. Et ideo non oportet quod forma sit per aliam formam, licet oporteat quod forma sit per efficiens quantum ad formam creatam. --- Quarta ratio satis videtur concludere.

2 quod] *P* illud *BPc* illud quod *V* 4 essentia] indiget esse per aliud *add. Pc* 4-5 sicut ... materia] *BPVc om. V* 5-6 quantum ... creatam] *BPcV om. P* 6 quarta ... concludere] *BV om. P*

De esse essentie et esse existentie

[188] Quod dicit postea quod esse essentie est respectus ad exemplar divinum et quod respectus ad causam efficientem sit esse existentie, nichil est; et falsum est, ut potest patere ex dictis. Quod dicit postea quod esse essentie predicatur de essentia propter inseparabilem concomitantiam, non valet, quia inseparabiliter concomitantur se homo et humanitas, nec tamen predicantur de se invicem. Et quod dicit quod esse existentie non predicatur de essentia quia differt ab ea intentione, nichil est de illa differentia intentionis de qua loquitur, ut infra patebit. Et quod dicit quod esse existentie quia includit esse ab aliquo alio effective, non predicatur de essentia, similiter nichil est, quia non plus includit de hoc esse quam essentiam, quia (sicut probatum est supra) creatio per se terminatur ad essentiam creature. Quomodo autem differunt esse essentie et esse existentie et quare unum predicatur de essentia et non aliud, dictum est supra.

2 sit] *BP* sicut est *V* 3-4 nichil ... essentie] *BP om. V* 6 existentie] *BPcV* essentie *P* 9 aliquo alio] *sic saepius* aliquo *V* alio *BP* / includit] *BV om. P* / de hoc] *BP om. V* 13 essentia] *BP* esse *V*

Ad Henrici argumenta in oppositum facta

[189] Quod vero dicit ad primum argumentum quod non sequitur quod aliquod esse creature sit esse subsistens quia est esse participatum ab alio, nichil est, quia si esse participatum ab alio impediret aliquid esse subsistens, tunc nulla res creata, sive sit substantia sive **[B223ra]** accidens, esset subsistens; quod falsum est quantum ad substantias. Si vero hoc protanto dicat quia scilicet esse creature est quidam respectus ad Deum, sive sit esse essentie sive esse existentie, et ideo non subsistat, falsum dicit, quia nullum esse ipsius creature est respectus nisi esse accidentale quod est in genere relationis. Quod dicit ad secundum, etiam non valet, quia sicut dictum est, ratio participati vel limitati non consistit in hoc quod est habere relationem ad aliud vel sicut ad exemplar vel sicut ad efficiens. Quod dicit ad tertium, totum falsum est, sicut supra ostensum est. Et similiter quod dicit ad auctoritates Boetii. Et ideo omnia aliter sunt solvenda sicut supra soluta sunt.

2 aliquod] *BV om. P* / est esse] est *BP* esse *V* 8 accidentale] *BPV* accidens *Pc*

Ad q. IIam UTRUM ALIQUA ESSENTIA SE HABEAT PER INDIFFERENTIAM AD ESSE ET NON ESSE

Quod secundum quosdam res habet triplex esse

[190] Ad nonam questionem tertii *Quolibet*, qua querit utrum aliqua essentia se habeat per indifferentiam ad esse et non esse, dicunt quidam --- qui sunt alterius opinionis ab isto homine, cuius solutio ad hanc questionem iam posita est --- quod res habet triplex esse. Unum in suis principiis. Et secundum istud esse est determinata ad non esse simpliciter, quia res quando est solum in suis principiis, est solum in potentia. Ens autem in potentia non est simpliciter. Et ideo res quando est tantum in suis principiis, non est indifferens ad esse et non esse, sed est determinata ad non esse. Aliud vero est esse rei prout est in propria natura. Et similiter (ut dicunt) secundum hoc non est res indifferens ad esse et non esse, immo est determinata ad esse. Tertium vero esse est esse in intellectu sive esse cognitum. Et secundum istud esse **[V43ra]** (ut dicunt) est res indifferens ad esse et non esse, quia, habita scientia de re, potest considerari et actu sciri, sive sit sive non sit. Et ideo secundum istud esse est indifferens ad esse et non esse.

3 cuius] *BPV* quod eius *Pc* 4 iam posita] *BP* in oppositum *V* 5 *secundum* esse] *BP* essentia *V* 6 *alterum* solum] *BP* saltem *V* 7 non est simpliciter] *P* est simpliciter non *B* est simpliciter non ens *V*

[191] Sed hoc non valet, quia nichil dicitur indifferens ad opposita sic quod cum uno eorum simul et pro eodem tempore possit habere vel habeat aliud, sed per hoc quod cum habet unum, aliud pro alio tempore sibi non repugnat, sed potest sibi convenire. Sicut animal non dicitur indifferens ad sanitatem vel egritudinem quia possit prout est sanum simul cum sanitate habere [potest] egritudinem pro eodem tempore, sed quia habenti sanitatem non repugnat habere postea egritudinem. Et ideo nulla res accepta cum reduplicatione alterius oppositorum, (sicut quando dico *animal* **[P32va]** secundum quod sanum (vel egrum> et *res* secundum quod in principiis tantum vel in potentia), est indifferens ad utrumque oppositorum, licet absolute accepta sit indifferens ad utrumque oppositorum. Sed eidem essentie numero que est tantum in suis principiis, etsi secundum quod est in principiis tantum sibi non competat habere esse simpliciter in actu, tamen sibi absolute considerate non repugnat esse in actu realiter pro alio tempore, nichil ad hoc faciente intellectu. Ergo essentia realiter (sive secundum esse reale) est indifferens ad esse et non esse absque hoc quod ratio aliqualiter ad hoc operetur.

3 habeat] *P* habet *BV* 5-6 quia ... egritudinem] *BP om. V* 12 sed] licet *add. P* 17 ratio] *PV om. B* / aliqualiter] *BV* quicquam *P*

[192] Item. Quod aliquid possit sciri et considerari actu, sive sit sive non sit, non facit quod res cognita sit indifferens ad esse et non esse, sed solum ex hoc ponitur quod cognitio intellectualis rei est indifferens ad hoc quod respiciat rem existentem vel non existentem et ex hoc etiam ponitur quod res secundum quod cognita sive secundum quod est in intellectu sit indifferens ad esse et non esse. Sed essentia creature non solum secundum quid vel secundum esse cognitum ponitur indifferens ad esse et non esse, sed secundum id quod est realiter. Alioquin secundum id quod est non posset realiter quandoque esse et quandoque non esse. Ergo essentia creature secundum suum esse reale extra animam est indifferens ad esse et non esse.

2 quod] *PV* cum *B* 3 intellectualis] *V* actualis *BP* 6 essentia] *V* esse *BP* 10 essentia] *PV* esse *B*

[193] Item. Quod in esse reali non est indifferens ad esse et non esse, necessario est determinatum ad alterum. Et sic vel est necesse esse vel impossibile esse. Sed esse creature non est necesse esse, quia soli Deo convenit quod sit necesse esse. Nec etiam est impossibile esse, quia tunc numquam esset; quod falsum est. Ergo essentia creature in esse reali, circumscripto esse rationis, est indifferens ad esse et non esse.

5 essentia] *V* esse *sic saepius BP* /esse] naturali *add. V*

De Hervei propria positione

[194] Et ideo predicta positio que ponit quod essentia creature non est realiter indifferens ad esse et non esse, sed tantum secundum esse rationis, non videtur michi bona. Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod essentia creature secundum esse reale est indifferens ad esse et non esse.

De duplici indifferentia ad esse et non esse

[195] Sed indifferentia ad esse et non esse potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo quod essentia manens in actu proprie nature cum utroque modo sit in re subiectum essendi et postea subiectum non essendi, ita quod in re maneat sub utroque successive, sicut corpus est indifferens ad albedinem et nigredinem. Et illo modo essentia que est substantia, est indifferens ad esse et non esse actuale, et essentia que est materia, est indifferens ad esse et non esse alicuius determinate forme substantialis. Sed tota creatura non potest esse sic indifferens ad totale actuale esse et non esse, quia: Illud cuius nichil manet, non potest secundum aliquid sui manens esse subiectum alicuius. Sed, annichilata creatura sive amoto totali esse crea-

ture, nichil ipsius manet. Ergo creatura secundum aliquid sui manens non potest esse subiectum sui totalis non esse. Et sic creatura quantum ad totale esse non est indifferens isto modo ad esse et non esse quod maneat sub utroque sicut utrumque subiectum.

6-7 actuale ... non esse] *BV om. P* 11 manet] *BPVc om. V*

[196] Non enim oportet subiectum propositionis esse subiectum in esse reali extra eius quod per predicatum significatur. Dicimus enim quod homo vel asinus generatur et corrumpitur, nec tamen homo vel asinus est subiectum generationis vel corruptionis, immo sola signata materia. Unde quando dicimus quod homo est corruptus, non est sensus quod homo manens sit subiectum ipsius corrupti esse, quia hoc esset impossibile, sed significamus quod tam homo quam suum esse est per corruptionem a rerum natura ablatus et destructus. Et sic etiam quando dicimus essentiam non esse, non intelligimus per hoc essentiam manere ut subiectum non essendi, quia impossibile est quod totale non-esse habeat subiectum reale. Sed intelligimus per hoc quod nec etiam ipsa essentia maneat in rerum natura nisi in potentia.

2 quod per] *BPc* quod *P* per quod *V* / dicimus enim] *BPVc om. V* 4 sola signata] sola *PV* signata *B* 8 essentiam] *V* creaturam *BP* 9 non esse] *BPVc* esse non *V*

[197] Et ideo est alius modus indifferentie quo aliquid dicitur indifferens ad aliqua opposita, quia scilicet illud quod per utrumque oppositorum importatur sibi potest competere nec necesse est determinatum ad alterum, quod quidem importatum per opposita non est esse subiectum utriusque oppositi. Sicut si dicatur **[P32vb]** quod homo est indifferens ad hoc quod sit corruptus vel non corruptus, non importatur per hoc **[B223rb]** quod est ‘esse corruptum’ ipsum esse subiectum esse corruptionis, sed ipsum esse terminum a quo ipsius corruptionis, cuius essentia et esse sunt ablata per corruptionem. Et isto modo est essentia indifferens ad esse et non esse, loquendo de esse actuali, **[V43rb]** quia scilicet illud quod per utrumque istorum importatur potest sibi competere absque omni opere rationis. Nec determinat sibi necessario <ad> alterum. Potest enim sibi competere esse et prout in concreto significatur (ut cum dicitur homo vel animal inquantum potest actu habere essentiam) et prout etiam in abstracto significatur inquantum potest esse illud quo aliquid est ens, sicut quando dicitur quod animalitas potest esse in actu, Deo producente.

Ad 1: utrum aliqua essentia se habeat per indifferentiam ad esse et non esse *add. in summo margine Vm*

Quid importetur per dictionem 'non esse'

[198] Item. Etiam quod importatur per 'non-esse' potest sibi competere. Illud autem quod importatur per totale non-esse est non habere aliquam entitatem realem actualem. Quod quidem sibi convenit inquantum Deus potest eam non producere et productam non conservare. Ratio autem istius indifferentie quantum ad ea que a solo Deo fiunt per creationem, est tantum potentia agentis Dei, qui agit libero arbitrio, non necessitate determinatus ad agere vel non agere. Quantum autem ad ea que fiunt a Deo mediantibus aliis causis, potest esse ratio talis indifferentie tam materia quam agens. Sic ergo essentia creature est realiter indifferens ad esse et non esse, non quia 'non esse' dicat aliquod esse reale, sed est negatio esse realis, ita quod licet negatio non sit ens reale sed rationis, negatum tamen, scilicet esse rei create, est ens reale. Et propter hoc dicitur illa indifferentia esse secundum esse reale quia tam affirmatum quam negatum est ens reale.

6 tantum] *BV om. P* 9 sic] sicut *BPV* 10 sed ... rationis] *BV om. P* 13 quia] quod *BPV*

[199] Sed quomodo potest esse quod esse negatur ab essentia cum sit idem cum ea, vel saltem de necessitate consequatur eam ? Et ad hoc dico quod si accipiantur uniformiter 'essentia' et 'esse', numquam unum potest vere negari de alio, sicut nec esse potest negari de essentia. Unde necessario essentia in actu habet esse (sive est) in actu et essentia in potentia habet esse in potentia. Sed accipiendo unum in actu et aliud in potentia, bene potest unum negari de alio. Et similiter accipiendo unum secundum preteritum et aliud secundum presens vel futurum. Unde essentia in potentia simpliciter non est, quia non est essentia in actu. Similiter essentia que est tantum in preterito vel tantum in futuro, non est presens. Veritas autem istarum propositionum quibus dicitur 'Essentia non est' (vel consimile), non fundatur directe super diversitatem essentie et esse, sed super diversitatem actus et potentie vel super diversitatem diversorum temporum existentium vel possibilium secundum quod illud quod est in potentia, non est in actu et illud quod est in uno tempore, non est in alio.

Refutatur obiectio quedam

[200] Et si contra predicta dicatur quod cum non-esse non possit stare cum essentia, sicut nec cum esse, quia esse et essentia saltem sunt inseparabilia et sic, ut videtur, non potest esse quod essentia sit indifferens ad esse et non esse ---, dicendum ad hoc quod non-esse in actu non stat cum essentia in actu, bene tamen stat cum essentia in potentia. Et ideo

bene dictum est quod essentia non est indifferens ad esse et non esse in actu, sicut subiectum manens sub utroque oppositorum, sed sicut illud quod sibi non determinat illud quod importatur per alterum oppositorum quin sibi possit convenire illud quod importatur per aliud. Quod quidem alterum oppositorum non importat quod illud cui attribuitur sit eius subiectum, ut dictum est. Et ideo hic li 'non esse' non potest stare cum essentia, uniformiter accipiendo 'essentiam' et 'esse'. Unde bene concludit quod essentie non convenit non esse sicut subiecto manenti in actu sub non esse. Sed non concludit quod ei non conveniat non esse sicut ei quod significatur non manere et nullam entitatem actualem habere, sicut convenit homini quod sit corruptus, ut supra dictum est.

9-10 quin ... oppositorum] *BP om. V* 10 non] *BP* et ideo *V* 12 unde bene] unde *BP* bene *V* 13 non] *BPcV* tantum *P* 15 actualem habere] *BP* actualiter inherere *V*

Ad argumenta Henrici respondetur

[201] Quod autem iste homo dicit primo quod essentia habet esse in re extra et habet esse in intellectu quod vocatur 'esse **[P33ra]** rationis', verum est. Sed quod dicit postea quod essentia abstrahit ab utroque esse, videtur michi falsum et secundum veritatem et secundum suam positionem. Secundum quidem veritatem, quia licet esse essentie abstrahat ab esse in actu et esse in potentia et ab essentia in hoc singulari signato vel in illo et ab esse in hoc tempore tantum vel in illo quod totum pertinet ad esse reale, quod tamen abstrahit ab omni esse reali et in actu et in potentia et in hoc tempore et in illo et in hoc singulari et in illo, ita quod esse essentie conveniat alicui, circumscripto omni esse reali, sicut esse animal convenit alicui, circumscripto omni homine a quo abstrahit animal --- est falsum, quia de ratione essentie (ut dictum est supra) est quod sit illud quo aliquid est ens, accipiendo 'ens' quod dividitur in decem predicamenta. Sed ens quod dividitur in decem predicamenta, est ens reale divisum contra ens in anima sive ens rationis, ut patet[45] sexto *Metaphisice*. Et ideo essentia sive esse essentie non abstrahit ab omni esse reali.

14-15 sed ... divisum] *BV* quod est reale divisum *P*

[202] Similiter hoc est falsum secundum positionem suam, scilicet quod esse essentie abstrahat ab utroque esse quia: Ex positione sua sequitur quod non abstrahit ab esse rationis, quia nichil abstrahit ab aliquo quod est de ratione sua. Sed secundum positionem suam de ratione essentie est esse rationis. Ergo etc. Probatio minoris quia: Ipse ponit quod in hoc quod est 'habere exemplar in Deo' consistit ratio esse essentie. Sed hoc est esse

45. *Metaph.* VI 2, 1026a33.

rationis, ut ostensum est supra et ut ipse concedit hic, quia ipse dicit hic quod essentia numquam est sine esse in re vel esse in intellectu, quia numquam est quin sit in intellectu divino. Et sic esse in intellectu divino secundum eum distinguitur hic contra esse reale. Et per consequens sequitur quod esse reale in intellectu divino **[V43va]** sit esse rationis. Sequitur ergo quod de ratione esse essentie sit esse rationis. Et sic patet minor. Et sequitur conclusio intenta, scilicet quod et falsum ponit et contradicit sibi.

3 ab ... abstrahit] *BP om. V* 6 ratio] *BV* in *P*

[203] Quod dicit postea quod creatura secundum suum esse essentie, quod competit sibi per hoc quod habet exemplar in Deo, non ita determinat sibi esse quin possit non esse, Deo non conservante, nec ita determinat sibi non esse quin possit esse, Deo efficiente --- dico quod quantum ad hoc quod dicit quod ratio esse essentie consistit in hoc quod est 'habere exemplar in Deo' falsum dicit, ut probatum est supra. Quantum vero ad hoc quod dicit quod creatura secundum esse essentie non ita determinat sibi esse actuale quin possit non esse (et econverso): si li 'secundum' importet habitudinem subiecti manentis cum utroque opposito (sicut iste homo videtur intendere), falsum dicit, quia nichil potest esse subiectum ipsius totalis non-esse, ut supra dictum est. Sed si li 'secundum' non importet habitudinem subiecti manentis sed obiecti factibilis quandoque manentis et quandoque non manentis, Deo quandoque faciente et quandoque non faciente, verum est.

9 manentis] *BP* indifferentis *V* 11 totalis] *BP* esse vel *V*

[204] Quod autem dicit ad argumentum quod accipiendo 'non sapere' pro non considerare ita quod **[B223va]** actu suo se habet ad esse et non esse actualis existentie, sicut sapientia ad sapere et non sapere, falsum est, supposito quod esse nullam rem absolutam addat super essentiam, sicut ipse concedit. Et credo verum esse quod actus considerandi differt re ab habitu qui est sapientia, sicut est in quolibet alio habitu. Et ideo in hoc non dicit verum. Argumentum autem ad aliam partem qua dicitur quod quidquid est scitur et quod scientia vera est de rebus <tam existentibus quam rebus>non existentibus, non concludit creaturam, rebus non existentibus in actu, habere in actu esse reale essentie. Sed tantum concludit propositiones que ponuntur in scientiis, rebus non existentibus, esse veras. Ad quarum veritatem, ut supra dictum est, non plus requiritur esse essentie quam esse existentie, nec minus esse existentie quam esse essentie. Et ideo non concludit quod esse essentie, rebus actu non existentibus, plus maneat quam esse existentie.

2 pro] *BPVc* quod *V*

Ad q. IIIam UTRUM SI ESSE ET ESSENTIA ESSENT IDEM POSSET SALVARI CREATIO

Quod creatio potest salvari si esse et essentia sunt idem

[205] Ad septimam questionem decimi *Quolibet*, qua querit utrum si esse et essentia essent idem, posset salvari creatio, dico quod sic, ponendo esse et essentiam esse idem modo quo supra **[P33rb]** expositum est. Tum quia creatio non indiget subiecto in quod agat causans; tum quia potentiale obiective quale est illud quod creatur, non indiget compositione plurium quorum unum sit formaliter actus et aliud potentia, sed solum requirit quod sit in potentia activa agentis; tum quia si subiectum necessario requireret potentiam subiectivam et actum re differentem et informantem, non posset reddi ratio quare illa duo non essent due essentie. Et sic potentia et actus non differrent sicut essentia et esse, sed sicut due essentie sicut materia et forma, et esse esset habere tales essentias, quia (ut dictum est) *esse* idem est quod *habere essentiam*.

1 septimam] tertiam *BPV* 4 potentiale] possibile *sic saepius BPV* 8 subiectivam] *PV om. B* 9-11 et sic ... due essentie] *BP om. V*

[206] Ad tria autem prima argumenta posita in hac questione in arguendo superius est solutum. Similiter ad dicta adversariorum quibus dicunt quod si idem est esse et essentia, non potest salvari quod esse creature sit quid participatum nec potest salvari quod essentia non sit, patet ex supradictis ubi sunt solute difficultates circa unitatem esse et essentie apparentes, et in solutione octave questionis primi *Quolibet.*

[207] Quod vero dicunt ultra quod tolleretur ens per accidens sive quod substantia non participaret accidens, si esse et essentia non differrent, quia, amota participatione essendi, amovetur omnis participatio accidentis --- dico quod, sicut in solutione octave questionis primi *Quolibet* dictum est, quod creatura dupliciter participat esse. Uno modo sicut concretum, ut homo vel animal dicitur participare abstractum sicut humanitatem vel animalitatem. Et quia in omni substantia creata est aliquod accidens diversum ab essentia sua, ideo esse participatum sic non predicatur de participante, cuius termini non differunt nisi penes modum significandi. Alio modo, ut dictum est in eodem loco, participat creatura esse, quia esse habet diminutum et imperfectum respectu esse divini, utputa non habens in essentia sua omnem plenitudinem et perfectionem essendi.

2 substantia] *BP* subiecto *V* 8 ab] *BP* sub *V* 9 cuius ... differunt] *V* cum tamen non differant *BP* 12 non] *BP* vero *V*

[208] Tunc dico quod ex illo modo ultimo participandi quo substantia creata dicitur participare tam esse quam essentiam, quia scilicet et suum esse et sua essentia est quid diminutum et imperfectum, ideo ex hoc sibi competit quod non habet omnem perfectionem suam per suam unicam essentiam. Unde per aliam essentiam competit sibi subsistere et per aliam calefacere vel iustum esse, et sic de aliis. Et ideo substantia creata est in potentia ad alias essentias accidentales. Et sic participat accidens. Et ulterius ex hoc sequitur quod in creatura differt habens et habitum, et sequitur participatio abstracti a concreto. Et sic ad hoc quod creatura participet accidens, in qua participatione differunt essentialiter participans et participatum, sufficit quod substantia creata participet naturam entis sive essentiam, vel esse per hoc quod habet illam diminutam et imperfectam respectu esse divini. Nec ad hoc **[V43vb]** requiruntur in creatura aliqua diversa que sint essentia et esse.

3 essentia] *BV* substantia *P* 5 aliam] *BP* unam *V* 13 divini] *BP* dei *Vc om. V*

[209] Ex hoc etiam patet ad illud quod ultra dicunt de esse in genere quia ad hoc quod creatura sit in genere, sufficit quod sit in se essentia diminuta non potens habere in una sola essentia perfectiones diversorum generum. Et ideo creatura habens plures essentias quantum ad unam est determinata ad unum genus et quantum ad aliam ad aliud genus.

[210] Ad illud de analogia dicendum quod analogia decem predicamentorum in ente vel in essentia vel in esse non est analogia vel communicantia in aliquo eodem numero, sed in aliquo communi quod convenit pluribus quorum unum dependet ab alio, ita quod accidens et substantia non analogiantur in ente vel essentia quia eorum sit tantum unum esse vel una essentia, sed quia esse unius dependet ab esse alterius, et similiter essentia ab essentia. Vel si dicatur quod illa analogia est per comparationem ad unum esse numero, dicetur quod hoc verum est protanto quia omnia accidentia, licet quodlibet habeat proprium **[P33va]** esse, tamen referuntur ad esse substantie, quod est unum; quod quidem esse est aliquo modo commune omnium accidentium inquantum omnia accidentia ab eo dependent. Et sic etiam omnia accidentia sicut referuntur ad unum esse, ita et ad unam essentiam.

1 illud de analogia] *BP* analogum *V* 2 communicantia] *B* convenientia *PV* 3 numero] *P* uno *B* modo *V* 8 esse] *BV om. P* 10 est unum quod] *PV om. B* 11 eo] *PV* esse *B*

[211] Quod autem iste homo repetit de positione sua de ydemptitate esse et essentie supra est improbatum.

De tribus argumentis adversariorum

[212] Primum autem argumentum de tribus argumentis adversariorum, quod est contra positionem suam et meam, solutum est supra. Et ipse hoc satis solvit. Sed quod dicit in solvendo quod si esse differret re ab essentia, esset in generatione duplex transmutatio, una scilicet materie ad formam et alia compositi ad esse, credo esse falsum. Alia autem duo argumenta sunt solum contra positionem suam propter suum respectum fantasticum quem ponit. Quod ergo dicit ad secundam rationem quod esse creature est ad aliud existere si ita tenet, falsum est, quia esse creature non est respectus ad Deum nec est per respectum ad Deum, licet non sit sine respectu ad Deum, ita quod creatura nec effective nec formaliter habet esse per respectum, sed effective per ipsum **[B223vb]** Deum, et non per respectum ad ipsum. Et formaliter est per essentiam suam. Et essentiam suam iam factam consequitur quidam respectus ad Deum.

3 generatione] *BP* genere *V* 6 solum contra] *BP* soluta secundum *V* 7 fantasticum] *BP om. V* / ergo dicit] *BP* contradicit *V* / rationem] *BP* ipsam *V* 8 ad aliud] *B* aliud ab *P* aliud *V* / si ita tenet] *V* sicut habet *BP* 11 habet] *BV om. P* / effective] est *add. P* 13 quidam] *P om. BV*

[213] Similiter quod dicit ad tertium, scilicet quod non est simile de materia, que est potentiale subiective ad extensionem, et de essentia, que est potentiale ad esse obiective, non sufficit, quia in omni potentiali quod reducitur in actum per aliquam actionem, oportet dari aliquod absolutum per illam actionem productum. Et oportet illam actionem terminari non ad solum respectum. Cuius oppositum sequitur ex dictis suis, quia si essentia creature in esse reali actuali est ab eterno, actio Dei creantis ex tempore non potest terminari nisi ad respectum vel ad compositum ex essentia et respectu, ita tamen quod respectus sit formalis terminus, ita quod Deus non faciet simpliciter essentiam sed faciet quod essentia prius ens sit de novo creata, quia non fit per aliquam actionem quod actioni presupponitur.

2sqq. potentialis] *coni.* possibilis *BPV* 2 ad] *BP* accipiendo *V* 4 reducitur] *BV* redditur *P* 7 creantis] *BP om. V* 9 essentia et respectu] *BP* esse et essentia *V*

[214] De eis autem que postea dicit defendendo suas rationes, prosequendum est. Quantum autem valeant sue rationes, ostensum est in solutione octave questionis primi *Quolibet*. Quod ergo primo dicit respondendo adversario dicenti quod si esse et essentia non differrent re absoluta, creatura esset tante actualitatis quod sufficeret esse per seipsum, scilicet quod hoc non est verum, quia creatura indiget ad suum esse respectu ad Creatorem, --- nichil valet, quia creatura nec formaliter nec effective est per quemcumque respectum, licet non possit esse sine respectu. Sed vera

solutio est quod licet ens esset per hoc sufficiens ad hoc quod esset per suam essentiam formaliter, non tamen simpliciter et universaliter esset sufficiens esse per essentiam, quia indigeret esse per aliud effective. Quod quidem aliud non est respectus, sed Creator ipse per quem effective est creatura.

9 ens] *V om. BP* 12 per quem effective] *BPcV* sed effectu *P*

[215] Quod dicit secundo improbando responsionem adversarii dicentis quod essentia quantum est de se necesse est esse, et quod non possit non esse, hoc est quia recipitur in potentiali quod est essentia. Et ideo non indiget esse per aliud esse sicut indiget essentia, quod scilicet istud dictum est periculosum, quia scilicet sequeretur quod esse creature esset quasi quoddam necesse esse, et per consequens quod esset quoddam divinum esse --- non videtur sufficere, quia adversarius non intendit dicere quin Deus possit facere quod esse creature non sit absolute loquendo, sed quod Deus non posset facere quod esse creature non esset nisi per hoc quod potest separare ipsum a potentia que est essentia. Et ideo non sequitur ex dicto adversarii quod esse creature sit quidam Deus. Tamen non videtur michi adversarius in hoc bene dicere, quia non videtur michi quod illud quod est per aliud effective, ad hoc quod annichiletur vel amittat esse quod necessarium sit ipsum amittere coniunctionem ad aliquod subiectum in quo esset vel ad aliquam formam vel actum sub quo esset. Sed sufficit quod amittat coniunctionem ad agens **[P33vb]** modo quo effectus coniungitur **[V44ra]** sue cause. Ad quam coniunctionem non videtur michi necessarium esse coniunctionem alicuius subiecti cum aliquo actu.

2 non] *V om. BP* 3 recipitur] *BP* requiritur *V* 6 quasi quoddam] quasi *B* quoddam *PV* / necesse] *BP* divinum *V* 7 divinum] *BP* necesse *V* 13 per aliud] *BP* ab alio *V* 17 modo] *P* materie *B* in *V* 19 subiecti] *BP om. V*

[216] Quod dicit postea improbando responsionem adversarii ad tertiam rationem suam, quod scilicet esse existentie non est in genere sicut nec esse essentie propter illam relationem importatam --- nichil est, ut supra patuit. Et quando dicit[46] commentum Boetii quod *id quod est* et *esse* non sunt in eodem genere, potest dici quod ibi accipit ‘esse’ pro esse divino et ‘quod est’ pro creatura. Vel forte intelligit per li ‘quod est’ concretum adiectivum, sicut calidum et frigidum, et per li ‘esse’ abstractum, sicut caliditas et frigiditas. Secundum autem quosdam concretum adiectivum non est directe in genere. Similiter quod dicit quod si esse esset forma substantialis, res non essent in genere nisi existerent, et quod hoc est inconveniens --- dico quod res quando non existunt actu, non sunt sim-

46. Cfr. Gilbertum Porretanum, *In Boethii De hebdomadibus*, pp. 193,66-194,77.

pliciter in genere sed secundum quid, ut supra patuit. Tamen verum est quod in genere Substantie nichil potest esse aliud principium causale rei intrinsecum nisi forma aliqua vel materia. Principium autem aliud nisi causale non videtur michi ponendum in genere Substantie. Quod autem Averroys et Avicenna dicunt[47] problema de esse existentie esse problema de accidente, potest esse quod hoc dicant propter modum significandi verbalem.

8 quosdam] *BP* quod est quoddam *V* 9 forma] *BP* formaliter *V* 13 nichil] *PV om. B* / aliud] *P om. BV* 14 aliqua] *V om. BP* 16-17 de ... esse] *BP* ex necessitate esse preter quod hoc *V*

[217] Quod vero dicit repetendo iterum suam positionem, ostensum est supra satis esse nichil. Argumenta autem duo sequentia sunt contra suam positionem ratione illius respectus, non sunt contra meam nisi quantum ad hoc quod ibi dicitur quod essentia creature est incorruptibilis vel immutabilis. Quod falsum est accipiendo 'mutationem' largo modo, sicut supra ostensum est. Quod ergo dicit ad primum quod respectus ille non fundatur in creatura ex proprietate sue nature sed per actionem Dei, nimis est frivolum, quia in re facta numquam per actionem agentis fundatur respectus nisi per hoc quod per illam actionem producitur aliquod absolutum quod prius non erat, in quo talis respectus fundetur. Constat enim quod actio Dei non est fundamentum respectus creature ad ipsum, est tamen causa respectus creature ad ipsum inquantum est causa alicuius absoluti in quo fundatur ille respectus. Si autem essentia, ut ipse ponit, semper est absque hoc quod ab aliquo fiat, actio Dei creantis non terminatur ad aliquod absolutum in creatura. Quod est nimis absurdum.

4 essentia] *BP* esse *V* 4-5 incorruptibilis vel immutabilia] *BP* incorruptibile vel immutabile *V* 8 numquam] *BP* utrumque *V*

[218] Quod dicit postea ad secundum quod esse addit super essentiam respectum ad agens et quod propter hoc differunt intentione et possunt negari de invicem, totum truffa est. Nec per hoc solvitur argumentum quod assumit, quia nichil potest esse simpliciter in rerum natura per solum respectum ad agens, immo respectus omnis sequitur rem iam factam et preexistentem, et ideo res absoluta non est per respectum, sed econverso.

[219] Quod dicit postea quod genus et differentia, sicut animal et rationale, differunt plus quam diffinitio et diffinitum et quod modus quo differt genus et differentia est alius modus specie a modo quo differunt diffinitio et diffinitum, quia differentia facit compositionem cum genere, non sic autem diffinitio cum diffinito, et item differentia non predicatur de genere,

47. Averroes, *In Arist. Metaph*., ad V 9, 1017b27 sqq.; Avicenna, *Metaph*., cap. I, 6.

nec econverso, diffinitio autem et diffinitum predicantur de invicem, et quod propter hoc oportet genus et differentiam nec re nec sola ratione differre sed medio modo, scilicet intentione aliqua **[B224ra]** re anime, et sic etiam de esse et essentia --- hoc nichil valet. Primo quia: Dato quod modus quo differunt genus et differentia sit alius specie a modo quo differunt diffinitio et diffinitum, non tamen ex hoc sequitur quin utrumque differre re sit secundum rationem tantum, quia sicut in differre re sunt multi modi differendi (quia aliter differt homo et albedo sua, aliter vero differunt homo et asinus, et tamen utraque est differentia realis), ita etiam licet aliter differant diffinitio et diffinitum quam genus et differentia, uterque tamen modus differendi potest esse secundum rationem tantum. Secundo quia: Dicit quod genus et differentia faciunt compositionem; si intelligit secundum rem, falsum dicit, quia impossibile est compositionem **[P34ra]** esse realem nisi ex pluribus rebus. Genus autem et differentia non dicunt diversas res, quia iam differrent realiter; quod ipse negat, sicut et negandum est. Si autem intelligat quod faciant compositionem secundum rationem tantum, concedendum est. Sed ex tali compositione non sequitur nisi differentia rationis.

[220] Quod dicit quod differentia non predicatur de genere, hoc accipit a seipso, quia Philosophus numquam hoc dedit sibi. Immo differentia formali predicatione predicatur de genere, ut hec 'Animal est rationale' est bona et formalis predicatio, quia terminus denominative acceptus a forma qualis est hoc quod dico 'rationale' predicatur formaliter de termino significante aggregatum qualis est hoc quod dico 'animal'. Sed bene vult Philosophus quod genus non predicatur de differentia, non quin propositio in qua attribuimus genus differentie (sicut quando dico 'Rationale est animal') sit vera, sed quia ibi non est formalis predicatio. Sicut etiam Porfirius dicit[48] quod superiora predicantur de inferioribus, inferiora vero de superioribus minime, non quin ita sit verum quod animal est homo sicut econverso homo est animal quia hoc necessario sequitur per conversionem, sed quia non est ibi ita formalis predicatio in una sicut in alia.

3 est] animal *add. V* 4 terminus] *BPcV* tam *P* 6 qualis] *BP* quale *V* 7 non quin] *coni.* nisi quin *BPV* 11 non quin] *coni.* non quia *BPV*

[221] Et ideo propter hoc non debet poni quod genus **[V44rb]** et differentia differant plus quam ratione, sicut nec ponitur de superiori et inferiori. Nec etiam potest per hoc salvare quod esse negetur de essentia, quia si accipiatur 'animal' pro hoc animali signato quod est homo vel Sortes, non potest plus negari de tali animali signato esse rationale quam esse

48. *Isag.* 7, 3-4 (p. 13, 2-3).

animal. Et sic saltem de hac essentia signata, puta de essentia Sortis non posset negari quin hoc esse actu sibi competeret.

3 hoc] *BP* quodam *V* 5 *prius* esse] animal *add. V*

Ad positionem Henrici circa questionem principalem

[222] Quod autem dicit postea ad questionem propositam, scilicet quod esse non convenit essentie ex proprietate sue nature, quia addit ad essentiam respectum et quod propter hoc quod ille respectus non competit sibi ex proprietate sue nature, potest salvari quod creetur --- totum istud est nichil et satis supra improbatum ubi ostensum est quod impossibile est aliquid fieri vel mutari secundum solum respectum. De hoc autem quod dicit quod si esse differret re ab essentia, non crearetur esse nec compositum ex esse et essentia sed sola essentia, patebit infra, questione tertia undecimi *Quolibet*.

2-4 quia ... nature] *BV om. P*

[223] Quod autem dicit quod secundum viam suam esse propriissime creatur et quod alia non ita proprie creantur sed fiunt per informationem intentionalem de ipso esse, ita quod intentio ipsius esse est proprie creata et alie intentiones fiunt de illa per informationem intentionalem --- istud dicere est truffa mirabilis, scilicet quod factione reali de qua hic loquimur, fiat una intentio eiusdem rei de alia, ita quod in generatione hominis realis fiat aliter homo quam animal --- istud est bene mirabile, et est contra Aristotilem quarto *Metaphisice* ubi dicit[49] quod idem est fieri hominem et hominem unum vel entem. Et quod dicit quod ‘esse’ dicit habitudinem ad Deum et quod hoc est communissimum et quod specificatur per illud in quo talis habitudo fundatur, puta per animalitatem vel humanitatem --- totum est frivolum, ut satis patet ex antedictis.

7 realis] *BP* realiter *V*

[224] Quod autem commentum dicit[50] quod forma specialis inest mediante generali, dico quod ille ordo est intelligendus non secundum rem vel secundum productionem realem, sed tantum secundum rationem. Et quod dicit quod secundum quosdam vegatativum virtute nature fit postea sensitivum, dico quod dicere quod illud quod est tantum vegetativum manens incorruptum fiat postea anima sensitiva, est magis insania a quocumque diceretur.

1 commentum] *BV* commentator *P*

49. *Metaph.* IV 2, 1003b26-28.
50. Gilbertus Porretanus, *In Boethii De hebdomadibus*, p. 229, 24-230,34.

Quod dicit Henricus solvendo ad tria argumenta predicta

[225] Quod postea dicit solvendo ad primum argumentum sequens satis potest concedi. Quod vero dicit ad secundum quod potest negari esse de essentia quia differunt abinvicem intentione, sicut rationale potest negari de sensibili, nichil est, quia sensibile et rationale sola ratione differunt nec unum potest negari de alio prout sunt in eodem sive prout sunt idem re, sicut sensibile quod est homo, non plus potest esse non rationale quam non sensibile, sicut alii arguunt contra eum, et bene. Et quod dicit quod sensibile contractum ad hominem, non **[P34rb]** differt a rationali nisi ratione, sed sensibile non contractum differt plus quam ratione, scilicet intentione, nichil est, quia sensibile, sive accipiatur ut contractum sive accipiatur ut non contractum, numquam differt a rationali nisi ratione, nisi 'contractus' accipiatur pro aliquo quod est aliud re a rationali. Unde illa 'Sensibile non est rationale' numquam verificatur nisi pro sensibili alio re a rationali. Item. Etiam omnibus istis sibi concessis, adhuc nichil valet ei, quia saltem de hac essentia Sortis numquam vere poterit dici quin habeat hoc esse existentie in actu. Solutio autem vera ad istud argumentum adversarii supra posita est.

10-11 contractum ... ut] *BP om. V*

[226] Quod autem dicit solvendo ad tertium quod materia est tantum subiectum et non terminus generationis, sed essentia est et subiectum et terminus respectu creationis, nichil est, quia creatio non requirit subiectum, ut dictum est. Et quod dicit quod creatura est composita ex duobus secundum intentionem, scilicet ex essentia et esse quod super essentiam addit respectum ad efficiens, truffa est supra reprobata. Et quod dicit quod illa essentia ut est indifferens ad esse et non esse, est subiectum creationis sed ut est aliquid creati est terminus, ita posset **[B224rb]** dicere adversarius de materia, scilicet quod prout est aliquid generati una cum forma est terminus aliquomodo generationis.

8 creati] *BV* creatum *P*

De tribus signis in instanti creationis

[227] Et quod dicit quod sunt tria signa in instanti creationis et quod in primo abicitur non esse ab essentia et in secundo est mutatio a non esse in esse et in tertio erit acquisitio ipsius esse, totum est fantasticum. Ymaginatur enim quod essentia preexistens creationi sit subiectum ipsius non esse, quod falsum est. Quod autem dicit de istis signis, Domino concedente, diffuse tractabitur suo loco.

3 erit] *P* est *BV* 6 diffuse] *BV* de istis *P*

De quadam ratione adversarii circa creationem

[228] Quod dicit postea ad rationem adversarii probantis quod creatio passio sit ipsius esse, videlicet quod creatio et esse non eodem modo perficiunt essentiam, quia creatio perficit eam prout est in potentia sed esse perficit eam prout est in actu, non videtur sufficere, quia idem est quod acquiritur enti in potentia dum fit et quod est acquisitum in factione. Et sic etiam aliqui dicunt (et est positio Commentatoris[51]) quod motus et forma acquisita per motum sunt idem re. Quod dicit ad secundum quod terminus motus non est idem re cum motu, vocando 'terminum motus' formam acquisitam per motum, hoc est contra eum, qui ponit quod septem predicamenta ultima nullam realitatem absolutam addunt super tria prima. Et sic actio et passio **[V44va]** et motus ipse non dicent aliam rem a forma acquisita per motum pertinentem ad aliquod priorum trium generum. Quod dicit ad tertium potest satis sustineri, nisi quantum ad hoc quod dicit essentiam in creatione esse mediam inter privationem et actum, quia privatio presupponit subiectum. Si essentia autem creature antequam fieret non habebat subiectum, nec etiam ipsum esse, ut dictum est, esset subiectum creationis.

10 super] *PV* ut *B* 11 dicent] *BP* differunt *V* 12 ad aliquod] *P om. BV*

Ad primam Henrici rationem ad principale factam

[229] Quod dicit ad primam rationem ad principale factam quod potentiale obiective est per se formaliter in potentia et per se formaliter in actu absque alio secundum aliam et aliam intentionem, falsum est, quia potentiale obiective, etsi quantum ad illud quod est sit potentiale, tamen *id quod est* non est sibi ratio quod sit in potentia, sed solum potentia agentis. Et ideo non potest proprie dici per se esse in potentia, si li 'per' dicat rationem essendi in potentia.

1 ad principale] *BV* principalem *P* 1 sqq. potentiale] possibile *sic persaepe BPV*

Quod dicit Henricus respondendo replicationi adversarii

[230] Quod postea dicit respondendo replicationi adversarii, quod scilicet creare essentiam non est facere quod essentia sit essentia vel facere essentiam sub actu differenti re ab ea, sed est facere essentiam sub actu differente intentione ab ea, hoc nichil est, quia illa que realiter sunt idem, impossibile est realiter vere fieri quantum ad unum illorum quin fiat

51. Averroes, *In Arist. Physicorum*, ad 1, 200b30sqq.

quantum ad reliquum. Et ideo simpliciter est dicendum quod creare essentiam non est facere eam sub aliquo, sed facere eam in se simpliciter. Replicatio autem adversarii supra soluta est.

1 replicationi] *BV* reduplicationi *P* 3 sub ... essentiam] *BV om. P* 5 vere] *BV om. P* 7 sub ... eam] *BPVc om. V*

[231] De hoc autem quod dicit quod sequeretur ex positione adversarii essentias rerum esse necessarias et non possibiles, non intromitto me adpresens. Quod dicit ad aliud argumentum satis est bene dictum. Quod dicit ad auctoritates Boetii exponendo eas et dicendo quod 'esse' potest ibi accipi pro abstracto et 'quod est' pro concreto bene dictum est. Quantum autem ad hoc quod dicit quod 'esse' potest ibi accipi pro Creatore et 'quod est' pro creatura, satis posset sustineri. Et commentum[52] etiam videtur ita exponere. Sed quod dicit quod etiam illa dicta Boetii **[P34va]** possunt exponi secundum diversitatem intentionum inter esse et essentiam, ut sepe dictum est, reputo nichil.

7 commentum] *BV* commentator *P* 8 illa ... boetii] *BPcV* differentia *P*

[232] Quod dicit postea respondendo adversario, qui dicit quod multa sunt in entibus que non possunt salvari posito quod esse et essentia sint idem, primo de hoc quod dicit ad primam rationem patuit prius. Quod autem dicit ad secundum, quod quando dicitur quod essentia participat esse, idem non participat seipsum sed creatura participat Deum, --- etego dico quod etiam idem potest dici participare seipsum secundum diversos modos significandi vel secundum diversas rationes acceptum, sicut homo dicitur participare humanitatem et creatura, puta homo vel animal potest dici participare esse commune sibi et Deo inquantum illud commune diminute est in creatura respectu Dei, ita quod esse participatum a creatura est idem re cum ea, sed illud per comparationem ad quod dicitur ut participatum, dicitur Deus. Quod dicit ad tertium de ista differentia intentionis, nichil est, quia nec talis differentia est. Quomodo autem stet cum ydemptitate esse et essentie participatio accidentis dictum est prius. Quod dicit ad quartum suffecisset, si posuisset pro 'intentione' 'ratione'. Quod dicit ad quintum quod dato quod esse accidentis et esse subiecti sive substantie essent plura, adhuc potest manere analogia entis per comparationem ad esse divinum inquantum substantia magis participat esse divinum quam accidens --- etego dico quod, etiam circumscripto per intellectum illo ordine ad esse divinum, adhuc stat analogia entis inter substantiam et accidens, inquantum esse et essentia unius dependet ab esse et essentia alterius. Et sic unum habet attributionem ad aliud. Quod dicit ad sextum sufficit.

10 ea] *BP* eo *V*

52. Gilbertus Porretanus, *In Boethii De hebdomadibus*, p. 193, 54-58.

Ad quest. IVam: UTRUM SIT IDEM ESSE EXISTENTIE SUBIECTI ET ACCIDENTIS

Quod 'esse subiecti et esse accidentis esse idem' dupliciter potest intelligi

[233] Ad octavam questionem eiusdem *Quolibet*, qua querit utrum sit idem esse existentie subiecti et accidentis, dico quod 'esse subiecti et esse accidentis esse idem' dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo sic videlicet quod esse subiecti quod est etiam esse existentie et esse subsistentie (quod quidem est unum), ipsum sit et esse substantie et aliquomodo esse omnium accidentium, sicut illorum que ab eo dependent, ita quod istud esse unum existens sit aliquomodo esse omnium accidentium in eodem supposito, et quod preter istud esse quodlibet accidens addat suum proprium esse accidentale; et ille sensus est verus. Alio modo potest intelligi quod sit unum esse substantie et omnium accidentium sic quod nullum esse substantiale vel accidentale sit in aliquo supposito nisi unum, quod quidem est esse suppositi et esse subsistentie; et ille intellectus est falsus.

1 octavam] quartam *BP* sextam *V* 4 sqq. subiecti] substantie *BPV* 7 existens] *BP* esse communis *V* 11 vel accidentale] *BPcV om. P* 11-12 unum quod quidem] *P* unumquodque *BV*

[234] Et hoc breviter persuadeo. Primo sic quia: Sicut se habet lux ad lucere et albedo ad albere, ita essentia ad esse. Sed, sicut supra ostensum est, esse et essentia sunt idem re. Ergo sicut **[B224va]** in eodem supposito sunt plures essentie, substantie scilicet et accidentis, ita et plura esse. Secundo sic quia: Sicut lux ad lucere et albedo ad albere, ita essentia ad esse. Sed lucere et albere non sunt idem. Ergo nec esse diversarum essentiarum sunt idem. Item. Secundum beatum Augustinum[53] sic habet se esse ad essentiam sicut sapere ad sapientiam. Quod intelligo esse verum, accipiendo 'sapere' pro habere sapientiam. Accipiendo autem 'sapientiam' pro habitu et 'sapere' **[V44vb]** pro actu esset falsum. Sed plurium sapientiarum non potest esse idem sapere, quomodocumque accipiatur 'sapere'. Ergo nec plurium essentiarum potest esse idem esse sive unum solum esse.

1-2 se habet ... sicut] *P om. BV* 5-6 essentia ad esse] *PV* esse ad essentias *B* 7 sunt] *BP* est *V*

[235] Tertio sic. Si ponitur esse differre re ab essentia, sic se habebit esse ad essentiam sicut operatio ad potentiam. Sed plurium potentiarum non est una sola operatio. Ergo nec plurium essentiarum potest esse unum solum esse. Item. Si esse est aliud ab esse et non est in uno supposito nisi

53. De *Trinitate* VII, 1.

unum esse, oportet quod illud esse sit formalius et actualius omni forma existente in illo supposito. Et sequitur quod esse unum substantie informabit omnes essentias existentes in eodem supposito et ipsum esse non informabitur ab aliquo. Sed hoc est falsum. Ergo falsum est quod in uno supposito non sit nisi unum esse.

1 ponitur ... differre] *P* potentia essentie differret *BV* 4 si] *PV* non *B* / non] *PV* si *B* 5 forma] *BP* essentia *V* 6 unum substantie] unum *V* substantie *BP*

[236] Probatio assumpte quia: Esse non potest informare aliquid nisi mediante essentia a qua fluit. Si ergo esse fluens a substantia debeat informare accidens, hoc erit mediante substantia. Et sic substantia **[P34vb]** informabit accidens, et non econverso; quod est inconveniens. Quod autem esse fluens a substantia non possit informare aliquid nisi mediante substantia a qua fluit probo quia: Quando aliqua perfectio respicit aliquid ut suum primo et per se perfectibile, non potest aliquid informare vel perficere nisi mediante illo; sicut figura, que habet pro primo et per se perfectibili quantitatem, numquam potest aliquid perficere nisi mediante quantitate. Sed esse fluens ab aliqua essentia habet pro primo et per se perfectibili ipsam essentiam a qua fluit; et hoc concedunt et adversarii. Ergo esse fluens ab essentia substantie non potest aliquid informare vel perficere nisi mediante substantia.

2 a substantia] *BPcV* ab essentia *P* 9 numquam] *BV* non *P*

Ad quatuor argumenta in oppositum facta

[237] Ad primum ergo in oppositum dicendum quod accidens dicitur entis non quia accidens non addat proprium esse preter esse subiecti, sed hoc protanto dicitur quod tam esse quam essentia accidentis dependet ab aliquo ente in actu, cuius esse, ut dictum est, est aliquomodo esse accidentis, licet accidens addat proprium esse.

2 preter esse subiecti] *BP* subiecto *V* 4 cuius] *BP* eius *V*

[238] Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut una essentia perficit aliam et una essentia participat aliam, ita est et de *esse* quantum ad *id quod est*, quia idem sunt realiter. Et quando dicitur quod esse est actualius quod sit in creatura: si intelligatur quantum ad rem, dico quod non est actualius esse quam essentia. Si autem intelligatur quantum ad modum significandi quia scilicet ‘esse’ significat verbaliter et magis per modum actus, verum est. Dato etiam quod esse esset actualius quam essentia, adhuc non sequitur quod unum esse non possit perficere aliud, quia licet esse generaliter dictum sit actualius quod sit in creatura, unum tamen esse potest esse

actualius alio, sicut licet rosa sit pulcherrima florum, una tamen rosa est pulchrior alia.

1-2 et una ... aliam] *BV om. P* 6 quia scilicet] *PV* quod illud *B* / verbaliter et magis] *PV* universaliter et vage *B*

[239] Quod autem dicitur a Boetio quod esse nullo participat, dico quod hoc dicitur vel propter modum significandi in abstracto, qui quidem modus excludit denominationem accidentium informantium (non enim dicitur quod humanitas sit alba vel nigra), vel propter notam verbalem quam 'esse' (sicut et alia verba) preter suum principale significatum ex suo modo significandi importat, ratione cuius note quia est ens rationis, excluditur ab hoc verbo 'esse' participare quicquam. Et ita diceretur de albere vel lucere vel quocumque tali.

1 a] de *BPV* / nullo] *BPcV* nichil *P* 8 albere] *BV* albedine *P*

[240] Ad tertium dicendum quod in illa auctoritate Philosophi[54] sexto *Topicorum* 'res' stat pro re communi omnibus generibus, ita quod est sensus quod unicuique rei uniuscuiusque generis respondet unum esse, et substantia et accidens sunt plures tales res. Et ideo et habent plura propria esse. Et sic magis concluditur oppositum quam propositum. Argumentum autem procedebat ac si 'res' staret ibi pro supposito. Et dato etiam quod 'res' staret ibi pro supposito, potest dici quod unius talis rei est unum esse simplex substantiale. Et ex hoc non sequitur quin cum eo sint plura esse accidentalia.

3 uniuscuiusque] *PV* unius *B* 4 plura] *V om. BP* 6 supposito] vel *add. P*

[241] Ad quartum dicendum quod eorum que simpliciter sunt unum numero, est unum esse. Sed eorum que sunt unum per accidens, sicut sunt entia diversorum generum, non est unum esse tantum, licet esse unius possit dici esse alterius et econverso. Et sic aliquomodo possunt dici habere unum esse.

Ad argumentum in alteram partem factum

[242] Ad argumentum autem ad alteram partem posset adversarius dicere quod Deus creat illud novum esse, licet hoc non sit multum probabile.

2 illud] *B* ibi *PV* / novum] individuale *add. V* / probabile] *BPVc om. V*

54. *Topica* VI 4, 141a35-36.

Ad argumenta adversarii

[243] Ad primum argumentum adversarii dicendum quod non est simile de extensione et de esse, quia 'extensio' nominat aliquod speciale quod non potest plurificari in eodem numero, sed 'esse' et 'essentia' non nominant sic aliquod speciale, immo aliquod commune possibile plurificari in eodem numero. Unde sicut non oportet quod si humanitas vel animalitas non possunt plurificari in eodem, quod propter hoc qualitas vel aliquid tale non posset plurificari in eodem, ita non oportet quod si extensio non potest plurificari in eodem, quod propter hoc esse, vel essentia, non possit plurificari in eodem.

1 dicendum] *BP* dicunt *V* 7 oportet] *BV* sequitur *P* 7-8 si ... quod] *BPcV om. P*

[244] Ad secundum patet per dicta in precedenti questione. Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut in uno subiecto sunt plura *existere* sive *esse*, ita et plura entia vel existentia, accipiendo 'ens' et 'existens' pro enti communi substantie et accidenti. Nec hoc est inconveniens, tum quia non consuevit dici 'existens' masculine vel feminine nisi de substantivo. Ideo non conceditur quod sint plures existentes nisi sumantur cum aliquo substantivo, ut si dicatur quod sunt plures res existentes.

5 existens] *BPcV om. P* / substantivo] *BP* supponente *V*

[245] Quod autem iste homo repetit de esse essentie et de distinctione esse essentie ab esse existentie nichil est, ut sepe patuit. Sed quod dicit de esse existentie **[B224vb]** et de **[P35ra]** esse subsistentie satis bene dictum est. Similiter quod dicit ad questionem propositam, scilicet quod in quolibet subiecto sunt tot esse existentie quot esse essentie, licet non sit nisi unicum esse subsistentie, verum est. Sed quod addit quod hoc quod dixerat de esse subsistentie verum est, supposito quod tale esse non detur nisi ab ultima forma, nichil est, quia secundum cursum nature nulla forma substantialis potest dare esse nisi esse subsistentie; nec potest esse forma substantialis que non det vel nata sit dare tale esse, ut patuit alias.[55]

5 quolibet subiecto] *P* qualibet substantia *BV* / quot esse essentie] *BP om. V* 6 nisi unicum] *P* unum *BV* 9 substantialis] *PV* sola *B* / subsistentie] *BV* existentie *P* 10 non] *BV om. P*

De rationibus Henrici ad questionem propositam

[246] Prima ratio sua ad propositam questionem est satis probabilis. Ad secundam posset adversarius respondere sibi dupliciter. Primo quia non

55. Hervaeus Natalis, *De formis*, e.g. cap. 209. Idem, *De unitate formae substantialis in eodem supposito*, e.g. cap. 266.

est simile de materia et forma substantiali et de subiecto et accidente, quia forma substantialis est magis ens quam materia et ideo communicat suum esse materie, sed substantia licet sit subiectum accidentis, tamen magis est ens quam accidens; et ideo substantia communicat suum esse accidenti et non econverso. Et propter hoc quod substantia communicat suum esse accidenti, fit unum ex substantia et accidente. Secundo posset dicere quod ad hoc quod fiat unum ex subiecto et accidente, sufficit quod accidens communicet subiecto suum esse essentie. Similiter ad tertiam rationem responderet adversarius quod illud argumentum procedit de esse essentie a quo esse ens dicitur ens quod est idem cum uno, bono et vero. Et idem diceret ad sequentem deductionem.

10 accidens] *BP om. V* / subiecto] *V* substantie *BP* / essentie] *BP om. V* 11 responderet] *V* diceret *BP* 12 esse ens] esse *BP* ens *V* / *alterum* ens] *BP* existens *V*

[247] Ad quartum vero et quintum diceret quod Deus in conversione panis creat novum esse accidentium remanentium. Et idem faceret, si separaret naturam humanam a divino supposito. Unde sicut ipse ponit quod Deus eodem miraculo assumpsit naturam humanam et fecit eam incorruptibilem, licet illa incorruptibilitas quam ipse ponit sit quedam fictio, ita diceret adversarius quod Deus eodem miraculo facit et quod substantia panis convertatur in corpus Christi et quod accidentia remaneant et novum esse habeant. Ad sextum diceret quod licet in Christo non sit aliquod esse existentie creatum, non tamen sequitur quod non habeat aliquod esse creatum, quia habet esse essentie creatum.

5 licet] *BPcV om. P*

[248] Septimum vero simpliciter solvendum est, quia falsum iudicio meo supponit. Dicendum ergo quod si accipiatur ‘esse relatum’ pro relatione esse subsistentie quo subsistit Persona divina, non est esse relativum nisi quatinus essentia est relatio, immo est esse absolutum. Sed si accipiatur ‘esse relatum’ pro esse absoluto determinato per relationem facientem illud cuius est formaliter incommunicabile, sic est esse relativum. Unde sciendum quod sicut indivisio quantitatis facit formaliter individuum (secundum illos qui ponunt quod individuatio in materialibus fit per quantitatem) non quantum ad hoc quod subsistat sed quantum ad hoc quod sit incommunicabile, ita relatio in divinis constituit suppositum non quantum ad hoc quod subsistat, quia hoc habet ab essentia, sed quantum ad hoc quod sit incommunicabile. Ad octavum diceret adversarius quod licet in Christo sint duo *vivere* (accipiendo ‘vivere’ pro vivere essentiali), sicut etiam sunt in eo duo esse essentie, non tamen sunt in Christo duo *vivere* accipiendo ‘vivere’ pro actu existendi viventis. Et ita omnes rationes

istius hominis indigerent ad hoc quod valerent quod probaretur quod esse essentie et esse existentie non differant.

3 relativum] *coni.* relatum *BPV* 6 relativum] *coni.* relatum *BPV* 7 sicut] *BV* sic *P* 10 incommunicabile] *BP* communicabile *V* 15 ita] quod *add. BV*

[249] Quod vero dicit in eo quod addit, scilicet quod essentia divina quia non habet esse distinctum a subsistentiis Personarum, non dat aliquod esse subsistentie Personis divinis credo, est falsum et erroneum, quia trium Personarum non sunt plura esse subsistentie --- nisi aliquis velit equivocare 'esse subsistentie' pro persona ipsa subsistente --- sed unum tantum, licet sint plures persone. Hoc autem esse dat essentia a qua habent Persone quod subsistant. Et in isto esse sunt constituta plura supposita pluribus relationibus, non quia relationes constituant ea quantum ad subsistere, sed quantum ad esse incommunicabile, ut dictum est.

2 dat] *BPcV* habet *P* 3 credo est] *P* est aperte *B* omnino esse *V* 5 persona] *BP* natura *V* 6 esse] *BPcV om. P*

Quod Henricus dicit ad tria argumenta adversarii

[250] Quod autem dicit ad primum argumentum ab adversario factum, scilicet quod preter extensionem **[P35rb]** quantitatis et materia et accidentia habent proprias extensiones, falsum dicit, quia in uno subiecto numero non potest esse nisi una extensio. Et quod dicit quod alie sunt partes materie et alie sunt partes quantitatis, verum est. Sed partibilitas sive extensio qua et materia et quantitas sunt partibiles, non est alia et alia. Et **[V45rb]** ideo solvendum est aliter sicut prius solutum est. Quod dicit ad secundum quod analogia entis accipienda est comparando entia ad Deum, etego dico quod et sic et aliter, ut supra ostensum est, potest accipi. Quod dicit ad tertium satis videtur michi probabile.

5 verum] *PV* falsum *B* 7 prius] *P* supra *BV*

Ad quatuor argumenta principaliter facta ad questionem

[251] Similiter quod dicit ad primum argumentum factum principaliter ad questionem, videtur michi bene dictum. Quod vero dicit ad secundum: quantum ad hoc quod dicit quod secundum suam viam omne esse essentie fundatur in essentia ex relatione ad Deum, dico quod quantum ad hoc reputo suam viam nichil esse. Et ratio huius sepe dicta est. Sed quod dicit quod unum esse potest participare aliud modo quo expositum est, bene dictum est. Quod dicit ad tertium quod illud verbum Philosophi de sexto *Topicorum* intelligitur de esse subsistentie, dico quod verum esset, si 'res'

staret ibi pro supposito. Sed verius credo quod ‘res’ stat ibi pro re communi substantie et accidenti, et quod ‘esse’ intelligatur ibi stare pro quocumque esse existentie. Quod vero dicit quod esse subsistentie est quod diffinitio indicat, dico quod diffinitio proprie indicat esse essentie quod est commune et esse subsistentie et esse existentie. Et hoc ipsemet dixit supra, octava questione primi *Quolibet*. Quod dicit ad quartum non videtur michi bene dictum, quia licet subiectum et accidens possint dici esse unum ens per accidens: quia ‘ens’ significat concretive, non tamen in abstracto, possunt dici unum esse vel una essentia. Et ideo solvendum est ut supra.

1 similiter] *BP* sed *V* 3 omne esse] omne *P* esse *BV* 5 sed] *PV* supra *B* 5-6 quod ... dictum est] *PV om. B* 7 ad tertium] *BP om. V* 13 existentie] *PV* essentie *B* 16 *prius* ens] *V* esse *B om. P*

[252] Quod autem dicit adversarius quod in eo in quo sunt plures forme, adveniente ultima forma, precedentes desinunt dare tale esse, reputo frivolum, quia nec plures forme substantiales de quibus est hic sermo, possunt esse in eodem nec, si essent, sequeretur quin quelibet earum daret esse. Similiter quod iste dicit quod quedam illarum plurium daret esse inchoative et diminutum et ultima daret **[B225ra]** completum, reputo falsum, quia secundum cursum nature quot sunt forme substantiales in aliquo, tot sunt esse completa simpliciter sive tot sunt esse subsistentie.

2 adveniente ... forma] *PV* addite ultime forme *B* 2 tale] *V om. BP* 4 quin] *BPcV om. P* 4 earum] *BPcV om. P* 5 plurium] *BP* formarum *V* 6 inchoative] *PV* incommunicabile *B*

Ad quest. Vam: UTRUM IN CREATIONE COMPOSITI EX MATERIA ET FORMA EDUCIBILI DE POTENTIA MATERIE FORMA DEBEAT MAGIS DICI CREARI QUAM MATERIA

Quod proprie loquendo nec materia nec forma creatur

[253] Ad tertiam questionem undecimi *Quolibet*, qua querit utrum in creatione compositi ex materia et forma educibili de potentia materie forma debeat magis dici creari quam materia, dico quod proprie loquendo in creatione compositi materialis nec forma nec materia proprie creatur, sed compositum. Et hoc ostendo sic quia: In omni factione illud dicitur proprie fieri cui proprie convenit esse, illud autem cui non convenit esse proprie sed est illud quo aliquid est, proprie non debet dici fieri, sed dicitur aliquid fieri tale, sicut albedini non competit proprie esse sed est illud quo aliquid est album. Et ideo non dicitur proprie albedo fieri, sed proprie dicitur aliquid albedine fieri album. Sed materie et forme materiali non competit proprie esse, sed soli substantie composite, quantum

ad res materiales, sed sunt illud quo substantia composita est. Et ideo proprie loquendo in creatione compositi nec materia nec forma proprie dicitur fieri vel creari, sed sunt proprie illud quo aliquid fit sive creatur tale.

8 dicitur] *BV* dico *P* / proprie] *BP om. V* 9 aliquid] *BP om. V* 14 proprie] *PV* propria *B*

[254] Et si dicatur contra hoc quod hoc non potest esse, quia creare est aliquid, nullo presupposito, producere, compositum autem presupponit partes; igitur etc., dico quod 'nichil presupponere' potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo quod nichil presupponatur ipsi facto, sicut pars presupponitur toti. Et sic nichil presupponere non est de ratione 'creationis', quia proprie loquendo in hoc nichil presupponitur creationi, sed ipsi creato, quia non presupponitur actioni quod per eam producitur. Producitur autem per **[P35va]** creationem compositi tam partes quam compositum, et una actione. Et ideo quod compositum creatum presupponat partes ex quibus componitur, non tollit quin compositum proprie creetur, quia ex hoc non ponitur creationi aliquid presupponere. Alio modo potest intelligi 'nichil presupponi' quia scilicet nichil presupponitur actioni ut subiectum in quod agens agat. Et sic de ratione 'creationis' est nichil presupponi ordine nature, et precipue quod nichil presupponatur a quo per se dependeat effectus ipsius agentis in esse. Et sic etiam nichil presupponi convenit productioni compositi quando totum quantum ad utramque partem producitur. Et per hoc patet ad rationem.

8 creationem] *BV* actionem *P* 11 creationi] *P* creare *B* creatio *V* 15 ipsius] *BP* illius licet *V*

Quod proprie loquendo solum compositum creatur

[255] Si autem aliquid ordine nature presupponeretur actioni agentis ut subiectum in quod agens ageret quod non esset productum per illam actionem agentis, quantumcumque non preexisteret tempore, non esset creatio, sed eductio de potentia subiecti et quedam generatio naturalis. Sicut si totus mundus cum omnibus suis partibus simul fieret a Deo, in eodem instanti in quo mundus fieret sol causaret lumen in aere qui preexisteret ordine nature actioni solis sicut subiectum in quod sol ageret ut productum per actionem eius, licet non preexisteret tempore. Et illa illuminatio non esset proprie creatio, immo esset generatio lucis vel magis proprie illuminati, et esset **[V45va]** eductio de potentia aeris. Sic ergo proprie solum compositum creatur, materia vero et forma quibus compositum est, fiunt (sive creantur) secundario et ex consequenti et minus proprie.

3 quantumcumque non] *PV* nec *B* 4 quedam] *BP* idem *V* 5 simul] *BP om. V* 6 sol] non *add. V necnon del. Vc* 8 ut] *coni*. non *BV* nisi *P* 9 lucis] *BV* luminis *P* 10 illuminati] vel magis proprie illuminarum *add. V* 12 secundario] *BP* postremo *V*

Utrum materia an forma verius creetur

[256] Et tunc quantum ad illa duo quando queritur quid eorum verius creatur, dico quod cum creatio duo includat, scilicet quod sit quedam factio per quam aliquid habet esse actu factum vel productum, et cum hoc includat nichil presupponere ut subiectum in quod agens agat quantum ad hoc quod est quedam factio que habet terminari ad aliquod ens actu factum sive productum per ipsam, magis debet dici creari forma quam materia. Et ratio huius est quia illi plus convenit fieri quod per factionem habet plus de actualitate sive entitate. Et hoc patet, quia de ratione 'factionis' est terminari ad aliquod ens actu per eam productum. Sed forma habet plus de actualitate sive de entitate actuali per actionem que est creatio quam materia. Et ideo creatio magis convenit forme unde est quedam factio, quam materie. Quod vero ad hoc quod est 'nichil presupponere', aliquomodo magis convenit creari materie quam forme, quia etsi nichil secundum rem in creatione compositi presupponatur actioni qua producitur forma, tamen secundum rationem intelligendi ipsa eadem productio prout terminatur ad materiam, preintelligitur sibi ipsi prout terminatur ad formam, quia semper forma materialis presupponit materiam ut subiectum in quolibet esse et fieri.

5 factio] *BP* actio *V* 6 debet dici] *BP* dicitur *V* 9 factionis] *BP* forme *V* / productum] *BV* productam *P* 12 factio] aliquando *add. Pc* 16 preintelligitur ... materialis] *BP om. V*

Ad argumentum in oppositum

[257] Ad argumentum in oppositum patet per dicta quia procedit sua via.

1 sua via] *BP* suis viis *V*

De Henrici refutatione positionis adversarii

[258] Modo restat prosequi illud quod iste homo dicit. Et primo ad primum articulum, in quo ponit adversarius sex esse in rebus que non possunt salvari sine differentia reali esse et essentie. Ad primum ergo quod ponit adversarius, patuit supra. Solutio autem istius fundata super differentiam rationum non valet fabam, ut ostensum est supra. Similiter ad secundum patuit supra.

1 prosequi illud] *BP* improbare *V* 5 fabam] *P* salva veritate *B om. V*

[259] Quod autem iste dicit ad secundum, quod scilicet essentia participat esse sicut potentia participat actum: si intelligat quod ita sit secundum differentiam realem actus et potentie, falsum est. Si autem intelligat hoc secundum differentiam rationis, verum est. De differentia autem intentionis quam iste ponit, nichil est. **[P35vb]** Similiter ad tertium patuit supra, excepto uno verbo quod hic dicitur, scilicet quod essentia creature constituit alium et alium gradum in entibus secundum quod habet plus vel minus de esse. Et ego dico quod ita constituit alium et alium gradum entium in habendo plus vel minus de esse. Unde essentiam habere esse non est habere aliud re, sed aliud ratione, nisi inquantum una essentia valet aliam. Solutio autem istius hominis satis esset bona, nisi fundare super illam differentiam intentionis, que nichil est.

6 excepto] *PV* ex uno *B* 9 essentia] *BV* esse *PV* 9-10 sicut ... esse] *B om. PV* 10 essentiam] *BP om. V* / esse] *BP* esset *V* 11 valet] *B* habet *PV* 12 fundare] *B* fundaretur *PV*

[260] Quod dicit adversarius iuxta hoc, scilicet quod unum elementum non diceretur esse materialius alio nisi materia re differret a forma; ergo nec una creatura diceretur potentialior alia nisi re differret in creatura potentia et actus, que sunt esse et essentia ---, dico quod non est simile de materia elementari quantum ad hoc quod aliquid dicatur secundum eam materialius vel minus materiale, <quia> circumscripto omni diverso re ab ea, de primo aspectu <non est> magis potentialis vel minus potentialis, quia materia, saltem elementaris, non nominat aliquid in quo inveniantur diversi gradus. Circumscripto tamen omni diverso re ab ea secundum quod dicitur aliquid magis vel minus perfectibile vel imperfectius, ipsa materia, circumscripto omni diverso re ab ea, nominat aliquod commune in quo inveniuntur diversi gradus in **[B225rb]** quibus potest inveniri perfectius et imperfectius, sicut patet de potentia intellectiva et volitiva et de multis aliis. Solutionem autem istius hominis pertranseo, quia non videtur michi magna vis in ea facienda.

1 iuxta] in quarto *add. V* 3 nec] *BPcV om. P* 7 de primo] *BP* et de potentia *V* / aspectu] *coni.* respectu *BPV* 8-9 inveniantur] *PV* inerunt *B* 9 tamen omni] *P* tamen *V* omni *B* 10 perfectibile] *V* perfectius *BP* / imperfectius] *BP* imperfectibile *V* 11 ipsa materia] *coni.* ipso vero *P* primo vero *B* ipsa potentia *V* / nominat] *PV* denominat *B* 12 inveniuntur] *PV* inerunt *B* 13 imperfectius] *BV* minus perfectum *P* 14 pertranseo] *P* pretermitto *BV*

[261] Ad quartum etiam patuit supra. Et iste etiam hic satis bene dicit. Ad quintum similiter patuit supra. Solutio autem istius hominis qua nititur salvare creationem per illum sepe dictum respectum, nichil valet.

[262] Quod autem dicit sexto adversarius quod omnis creatura est mutabilis secundum substantiam, dico quod si li ‘secundum’ importet habitu-

dinem eius quod acquiritur per mutationem, quod istud dictum sic simpliciter falsum est nec habet veritatem nisi in creatura generabili et corruptibili, et hoc quantum ad formam que de novo materie potest acquiri, quia proprie loquendo mutari est idem subiectum manens in pluribus nunc aliter se habere in uno et aliter in alio secundum susceptionem eius quod per mutationem acquiritur. Sed impossibile est quod sit aliquod subiectum in rerum natura quod prius sit tempore et postea per mutationem ei acquiratur substantia immaterialis ut sibi insit vel etiam tota substantia materialis, quia tota substantia rei subiectum habere non potest. Et ideo impossibile est creaturam esse mutabilem secundum totam substantiam proprie loquendo, si li 'secundum' importet habitudinem eius quod acquiritur per motum sive mutationem. Si vero li 'secundum' importet habitudinem subiecti, verum est, quia omnis creatura potest esse subiectum alicuius mutationis secundum se per susceptionem alicuius novi accidentis. Sed hoc nichil facit ad propositum. Si autem loquamur de mutatione largo modo, vocando mutationem creationem ipsam vel habere esse de novo ab alio qualitercumque, tunc illud **[V45vb]** dictum est verum. Sed ad mutationem sic dictam non requiritur differentia inter esse et essentiam.

1 sexto] *BPcV* ergo *P* 3 acquiritur] *BP* accipitur *V* 5 materie] *BP* nec (?*pro* nature) *V* 8 sit] *V* fit in *P* simul *B* 13 eius ... habitudinem] *BPVc om. V*

De tribus rationibus adversarii in secundo articulo factis

[263] Postea prosequendum est de secundo articulo. In quo ostendit quomodo adversarius solvit tres rationes suas in quibus ostenderat quod si differret esse realiter ab essentia, non posset salvari creatio ipsius esse. Quantum autem ad istum articulum dico quod licet esse et essentia non differant re, ut ostensum est, tamen non videtur michi quod si differrent re, dumtamen concurrerent necessario ad constitutionem unius rei per se factibilis, sicut intendit adversarius, quin posset salvari creatio quia utrumque crearetur ex consequenti creato composito, sicut dictum est de materia et forma in creatione substantie materialis.

1 postea] *PV* preterea *B* 1-2 quomodo] *PV om. B* 2 solvit] *PV* solum *B* 4 non] *BV om. P* 5-6 ut ... re *BV om. P* 7 quin] *BV om. P* / creatio quia] *P* quod *BV*

[264] Ad rationem autem suam **[P36ra]** primam quam adducit contra hoc, dico quod (sicut dictum est prius) non est de ratione 'creationis' quod factio per eam nichil presupponatur sicut partes presupponuntur toti composito et una pars alii in toto sicut materia forme. Sed est de ratione sua quod nichil presupponatur actioni que est creatio sicut subiectum in quod

agens agat. Et ideo licet esse presupponat essentiam, retenta ypothesi de differentia esse et essentie: quia tamen essentia non presupponitur actioni qua producitur compositum ex esse et essentia, vere diceretur esse compositum principaliter creari et esse et essentia ex consequenti. Et ratio prima quam adducit adversarius ad cassandam primam rationem suam, bona est et tenet eandem sententiam cum eo quod nunc dictum est et supra in principio huius questionis.

4 alii] *V* aliam *B* alia *P* / toto] *BP* creato *V* 8 esse] *P* et *BV*

[265] Quod ergo iste dicit quod licet simul tempore creato composito fiat materia et forma, secundum tamen ordinem nature prius fit materia et secundo educitur forma de potentia materie --- dico quod falsum est, si intendat quod secundum rem sit ordo inter factionem forme et factionem materie, quia tam materia quam forma quam compositum ex eis producitur una factione, et eiusdem ad seipsum non est ordo realis. Sed verum est quod creatio potest habere ordinem rationis ad seipsam secundum quod respicit unum et secundum quod respicit aliud, ut supra expositum est in principio huius questionis. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quin utrumque vere creetur.

2 secundum] *BP* sed *V* / ordinem] *BP* ordine *V* / prius] *BPcV* plus *P* 5 *secundum* quam] *PV* qua *B* / ex] *BP om. V* 7 creatio] non *add. V*

Quod dupliciter potest intelligi forma educi de potentia materie

[266] Et quod ipse dicit contra hoc quod Deus relinquit nature quod suum est et natura materie hoc habet quod de ea talis forma sit educibilis, dico quod adpresens dupliciter potest intelligi forma educi de potentia materie. Uno modo quia ipsa forma in suo esse et fieri dependet a potentia materie, ita quod nec esse nec fieri potest nisi inquantum aliquid est ea actu quod ex ipsa sicut ex actu et ex materia sicut ex potentia resultat, ita quod dependere in suo fieri a potentia materie, non presupponente actioni agentis sit formam educi de potentia materie, non quod aliud sit fieri forme et aliud fieri materie sed idem penitus, uno eorum non potente creari sine alio. Et educi sic et creari non repugnant. Immo sunt idem et eadem productio quando tale compositum creatur, ita quod non est intelligendum quod in creatione talis compositi sint duo fieri, quorum unum sit creatio et aliud eductio forme. Immo est unum fieri quo utrumque producitur cum dependentia unius ad alterum, materia quidem cum dependentia ad formam ut ad actum sub quo necesse habet produci, forma vero cum dependentia ad potentiam materie in qua habet necesse produci, ita quod ipsum creari est tale educi. Et tunc dico quod natura materie habet quod

in creatione compositi sic educatur forma de potentia eius. Sed non sequitur ex hoc quin forma creetur, quia tale educi est creari.

2 hoc] non *V* om. *BP* 16 ita quod] *P* vel quod *B* in quo *V* 17 educi *BP* producet *V* / et tunc] *BP* tamen *V*

[267] Alio modo potest dici educi forma de potentia materie – et hoc magis proprie – quia ipsa dependet a potentia materie, scilicet presupponendo non solum forme sed actioni agentis ut subiectum, in quod presuppositum actioni agentis agens agat, sive presupponatur ordine nature tantum sicut in instanti creationis mundi sol causat lumen in aere presupposito ordine nature sue actioni utpote non per eam producto, sive presupponatur ordine temporis sicut materia generabilium et corruptibilium presupponitur actioni agentium naturalium. Et quod sic educitur de potentia materie, non creatur, immo repugnat sibi creari. Et tunc dico quod natura materie in creatione compositi non habet quod sic educatur de potentia eius. Et ideo non oportet quod Deus hoc relinquat sibi quod nichil fieri posset nisi fierent contradictoria.

5 causat] *BV* creat *P* 6 ordine] *PV* ordo *B* 11 hoc] *BP* hanc *V* / quod] *B* quia *PV*

[268] Et sic patet ad rationem suam. Cui autem **[P36rb]** eorum magis conveniat creari, retenta ypothesi, patet ex eo quod dictum est supra de creatione forme et materie in composito.

De secunda ratione adversarii

[269] Quantum vero ad secundam rationem adversarii contra primam rationem istius, dico quod formam --- que dependet ab aliquo subiecto ita quod nec esse nec fieri potest nisi per hoc quod informat tale subiectum --- non educi de potentia talis subiecti altero duorum predictorum modorum est impossibile. Sed verum est quod potest produci absque hoc quod producatur de potentia **[B225va]** naturali illius subiecti sicut si fieret ex trunco vitulus, necessario tamen **[V46ra]** educeretur de potentia obedinali altero predictorum duorum modorum. Voco autem potentiam naturalem subiectum acceptum in habitudine ad dispositiones naturales mediantibus quibus est transmutabile ab agente naturali, sicut si accipiatur materia in habitudine ad calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum. 'Potentiam autem obedinalem'[56] voco subiectum acceptum sine habitu-

56. Conferas Lambertum de Monte, *De anima* III, Fol. 72vb, 35-37: "Duplex est potentia. Quedam est potentia naturalis. […]. Alia est potentia obedientialis, que sumitur per ordinem ad potentiam activam supernaturalem, scilicet divinam, cui omnia obediunt". Videas autem Hervaei *De materia et forma*, cap. 4: "Nunc autem non est ita [sc. formam actu convenire materie], quia sic esse actu non convenit sibi nisi supernaturali obedine".

dine ad tales dispositiones secundum quod sine eis ab agente divino est transmutabile, sicut quando ex trunco statim fit vitulus. Et talis productio magis accedit ad naturam creationis quam generatio naturalis inquantum minus presupponit in passo sive in eo quod mutatur quam generatio. Non tamen habet ita perfectam rationem creationis sicut quando totum, nullo presupposito, producitur. Nec etiam forma posset fieri in subiecto, si subiectum tempore forme preexisteret sine mutatione illius subiecti, quia mutari est aliter se habere nunc et prius. Impossibile est autem aliquod subiectum tempore preexistens suscipere de novo aliquam formam quin aliter se habeat nunc quam prius.

1-2 primam rationem] *BV* positionem *P* 2 formam] OV forma B / que] *PV om. B* 3 nisi] *BP om. V* 6 naturali] *PV* nature *B* 7-8 obedinali] *coni.* obeditali *V* obiectali *BP* 12 obedinalem] *BP* obeditalem *V* 19 illius] *BV* unius *P*

[270] Sed in hoc est advertendum quod quando forma dependet a subiecto, quod <si> ei illa tempore presupponitur, talis forma non solum producitur mutato subiecto sed etiam per mutationem subiecti, quia mutatio subiecti necessario requiritur et est causa aliquo modo talis forme. Sed si forma non dependeat a tali subiecto, tunc non debet dici quod fiat per mutationem talis subiecti, si li 'per' importet causalitatem, quia mutatio non est necessaria ad productionem alicuius forme nisi inquantum dependet a subiecto. Sed si li 'per' importet concomitantiam, tunc de omni forma que fit in subiecto preexistente ei tempore, potest dici fieri per mutationem subiecti. Et sic dico quod si essentia per impossibile fieret absque esse et postea fieret esse in existentia, supposito quod esse dependeat ab essentia, necesse esset educi de potentia, saltem obedinali ipsius essentie. Et fieret etiam per mutationem ipsius essentie.

6 per] *PV* cum *B* 12 obedinali] *sic BPV*

[271] Et ideo quantum ad illa simpliciter que ponit in illa ratione, simpliciter male dicit adversarius. Et quod iste dicit quod si esse non educeretur de potentia ipsius essentie, posset habere esse separatum, verum dicit, si de nulla potentia essentie nullo dictorum modorum educeretur, quia tunc non dependeret ab essentia. Sed non est verum quod illud quod non educitur de potentia naturali alicuius, possit esse sine illo de cuius naturali potentia non educitur. Quod vero dicit quod creatio est aliqua mutatio, dico quod loquendo de perfecta creatione que est totalis productio totius rei, proprie non est mutatio, ut patuit prius. Quod autem dicit quod anima non fit sine mutatione materie verum est simpliciter sicut iacet.

8 creatione] *BP* mutatione *V* 11 iacet] *BV* patet *P*

De tertia ratione adversarii

[272] Quantum vero ad tertiam rationem adversarii ad idem, dico quod minor, scilicet quod nichil potest produci per se nisi compositum, est falsa quantum ad substantias separatas, que etsi non producantur absque compositione subiecti et accidentis, tamen per se productum non est ipsum compositum ex subiecto et accidente, sed sola forma. Sed supposito quod nichil posset per se creari nisi compositum, tunc dico quod proprie compositum crearetur et partes ex consequenti et neutra partium generaretur. Et secundum unam rationem conveniret magis creari **[P36va]** uni parti et secundum aliam rationem alii, ut supra dictum est. Ratio autem istius nichil plus concludit nisi quod potentie magis convenit creari secundum quod de ratione 'creationis' est nichil presupponere, non autem secundum quod de ratione 'creationis' est quod sit quedam factio.

6-7 tunc ... neutra] *BPcV om. P* 8 uni] quam alteri *add. P* 9 ratio] *BV* positio *P* 11-12 est ... creationis] *BP om. V*

De distinctione circa creationem et factionem

[273] Quod autem dicit quod creatio distinguitur ab aliis factionibus penes terminum a quo et ideo magis accipitur ratio creationis penes terminum a quo quam penes terminum ad quem nichil est, quia creatio proprie loquendo nec habet terminum a quo nec habet terminum ad quem, sed tantum obiectum productum cui non convenit esse terminum ad quem nisi aliqua mutatio preexistens ante ipsum terminetur ad ipsum, quod in creatione non contingit. Et quod dicit quod magis accipienda est ratio creationis ab eo in quo differt ab aliis, dico quod eque est de ratione creationis illud in quo convenit cum aliis, quod scilicet sit quedam factio per quam aliquod factum habet esse in actu, sicut illud in quo differt ab eis; quod est nichil presupponere. Et adhuc essentialius sibi convenit primum quam secundum, sicut essentialius convenit simitati curvitas, in qua convenit cum aliis, quam nasus per quam differt ab aliis curvitatibus. Sed verum est quod quando aliquid convenit cum aliis in uno reali sicut in materia et differt ab eis in alio reali sicut per formam, illud in quo differt magis pertinet et constituit rationem rei quam illud in quo convenit. Notandum etiam quod hoc quod est 'nichil presupponere' in creatione non dicit habitudinem ad terminum a quo, sed negat habitudinem ad materiam presuppositam.

3-4 terminum ... habet] *BP om. V* 5 obiectum] *BV* terminum *P* 6 ante] *BV* ad *P* / ad ipsum] *BV om. P* 7 dicit quod] *BV om. P*

Ad secundam Henrici rationem circa creationem ipsius esse

[274] Ad secundam autem rationem istius hominis circa creationem ipsius esse, retenta ypotesi superius posita, patet ex supradictis, quia in creatione talis compositi quodammodo est eductio actus, et talis eductio non repugnat creationi, sed est ipsa creatio; et quodammodo non est **[V46rb]** ibi eductio prout eductio repugnat creationi. Adversarius autem non deberet negare simpliciter eductionem, sed deberet distinguere ut dictum est. Quod autem dicit adversarius quod actus non educitur de potentia materie nisi preexistat tempore ipsi actui, falsum est, ut patuit supra.

1 secundam autem] *BP* secundum dicendum ad *V*

[275] Quod autem iste homo dicit quod in generatione naturali verum est quod actus non educitur de potentia nisi potentia sit prior tempore ipso actu, falsum est, saltem quantum ad generationem naturalem accidentis, sicut patuit in exemplo supraposito de sole, qui potuit illuminare aerem in primo instanti creationis utriusque.

5 primo] *V om. BP*

[276] Quod vero dicit quod si Deus totum lapidem simul produceret et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam, materia crearetur et forma supernaturaliter generaretur, dico quod si intendat per hoc ponere ibi duas factiones secundum rem quarum una sit creatio materie et alia supernaturalis generatio forme, falsum est, quia totum una actione producitur. Si autem intendat per hoc quod illa factio una existens esset et creatio et generatio supernaturalis propter talem dependentiam facti ex subiecto, scilicet forme a materia, quod non contingit in creatione substantie immaterialis, concedatur sibi. Sed nichil ad suum propositum habet ex hoc, quia talis generatio supernaturalis quam ponit, est ipsa creatio.

1 produceret] *PV* productum *B* 3 ibi] *PV om. B* 4 secundum rem] *BP* scilicet in *V* 6 una] *BPcV om. P* 8 a] *BP* tam *V* / quod] *BV* que *P* 8-9 immaterialis] *PV* naturalis *B* 9 sibi] *BP* prima *V*

[277] [B225vb] Et ideo non sequitur ex hoc quod potest sic forma generari quin creetur. Non enim curandum est de verbis ubi constat de re. Nec est simile de factione qua fit totus lapis quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam et de factione qua fieret de trunco vitulus, quia in prima nichil presupponitur actioni agentis, nec potentia obedientialis nec potentia naturalis, in secunda vero presupponitur actioni agentis materia prout est in potentia obedientiali.

2 creetur] *PV* creatio *B* 4 qua fieret] *BP om. V* / prima nichil] *BP* illis *V* 5-6 actioni ... naturalis] *BP om. V* 7 obedientialis] obedinali *BV* obedibili *P*

[278] Similiter quod dicit de forma corporeitatis in Christo, non est simile **[P36vb]** creationi lapidis, sicut nec de trunco, si fieret in instanti vitulus de eo, quia utrobique presupponitur actioni agentis potentia obedientialis. Utrum autem sit ponere talem formam corporeitatis in Christo quam ille ponit, alias[57] discussum est.

[279] Quod autem concludit finaliter quod si essentia non solum esset in potentia receptiva ad esse sed etiam informativa eductionis esse et essentia crearetur, nescit quid loquitur, quia idem est esse in potentia informativa et receptiva (et econverso), quia nichil aliud est per materiam aliquid informari quam formam in ipsa sicut in per se subiecto recipi. Unde formam recipi in aliquo sicut in per se subiecto et illud informari idem penitus est nisi quod 'recipi' se habet in plus quam 'informari' (vel formari'), quia non solum aliquid recipitur in aliquo sicut in subiecto, sed etiam sicut in loco. Sed verum est quod ad hoc quod dicatur aliqua forma educi de potentia materie, super illud quod est 'recipi in materia sicut in subiecto' requiritur dependentia forme a materia, ut dictum est. A quo autem acceperit 'esse educi de potentia essentie', quia non explicat, non curo.

1 quod si essentia] *BV om. P* / esset in] *BP* essentialiter *V* 2 eductionis esse] *BV* educeretur essentia *P* 4 aliquid] *P om. BV* 5 formam] *BP om. V* 6 idem] *BPc* nichil *V om. P*

Ad tertiam eius rationem super Librum de causis fundatam

[280] Ad tertiam rationem suam fundatam super duas auctoritates *Libri de causis*, dico quod ipse procedit ex falso intellectu earum. Nam in prima auctoritate,[58] qua dicitur quod prima rerum creatarum est esse, non accipitur ibi 'esse' prout distinguitur contra 'essentiam' vel re vel ratione, sed accipitur ibi 'esse' vel pro primo gradu entium creatorum qui constituitur in Intelligentiis, et tale esse est prius aliis, non sicut materia vel potentia passiva est prior actu qui est in ea (vel econverso) sed sicut causa efficiens est prior suo effectu, quia secundum philosophos Intelligentie sunt cause aliarum rerum que sunt post eas, scilicet materialium omnium que tenent ultimum gradum in entibus. Vel accipitur ibi 'esse' pro esse communi omnibus entibus non prout distinguitur re vel ratione ab essentia sed prout distinguitur contra alias perfectiones magis speciales, puta contra vitam et sensum et talia. Et tunc esse dicitur prius, sicut communius dicitur prius, non autem sicut potentia in factione compositi dicitur prior actu existente in ea.

1 tertiam] *BPcV* secundam *P* 2 earum] *P* illarum auctoritatum *PV* 5-6 intelligentiis] *BP* intellectu *V* 10 omnibus] *V om. BP*

57. Hervaeus, *De formis*, cap. 64 et passim; *De unitate formae substantialis in eodem supposito*, e.g. cap. 123sqq; 524 et passim.
58. *De causis*, prop. IVa.

[281] Quod autem dicit in secunda auctoritate[59] quod esse est per creationem et vita vel aliquid tale per informationem, non est intentio auctoris quod in aliquo eodem, puta in animali, sit esse per creationem et vita vel aliquid tale per informationem – et hoc esset ridiculum--, sed est intentio sua dicere quod si aliquid fiat in eo quod ens, quod oportet ipsum fieri ex totaliter non ente, hocest nullo presupposito actioni agentis. Et hoc est creare. Sed si aliquid fiat non secundum quod ens sed secundum quod tale ens, puta secundum quod homo vel animal, non oportet quod fiat ex totaliter non-ente, sed fit ex aliquo ente presupposito, quia quod fit in eo quod animal, non excludit omnem entitatem, sed solum entitatem actualem animalis. Et ideo tale fit per informationem alicuius subiecti presuppositi actioni agentis. Ex hoc autem non habetur quod, creato composito, una pars fiat per creationem et alia per generationem.

2 informationem] quia hoc esset ridiculum *add. P* 3-4 in aliquo ... ridiculum] *BV om. P* 6 ente] *BV* existente *P* 11 actualem] *BV om. P*

[282] [V46va] Unde meo iudicio nec iste nec adversarius in expositione illarum auctoritatum vadunt ad intentionem auctoris. Qui noluit exponere illas auctoritates comparando esse ad essentiam vel esse commune ad esse existentie et esse essentie secundum prius et posterius.

1 meo] *BPcV* in eo P 2 noluit] *V* volunt *BP*

De ceteris eius refutationibus

[283] Quod autem iste homo dicit improbando solutionem adversarii ad rationem suam, quod scilicet si essentia et esse re differrent, quod esse esset accidens essentie, dico quod verum est vocando illud esse 'accidens' alicui quod differt re ab eo. Et isto modo etiam forma substantialis accidit materie, nec tamen, secundum quod quidam dicunt, materia potest creari sine forma substantiali. Et sic etiam nec essentia posset creari sine esse. **[P37ra]** Sed vocando 'accidens' illud quod est de genere accidentis et sine quo res potest esse sive a quo non dependet in suo esse, diceret adversarius quod falsum est esse accidere essentie. Nec ipse ex hiis que hic dicit probat oppositum.

3 accidens *BP om. V* accidere *Vc* 6 sine ... substantiali] *PV* sicut forma substantialis *B* / essentia] *PV* esse B 8 potest esse] *BP om. V* 9 esse accidere] *BP* de esse *V* / hiis que] *BP* intellectu *V*

[284] Quod dicit ulterius quod sequitur ex illa positione quod esse mediante essentia informaret esse latissimum, quod est commune ipsi esse essentie et esse existentie, nichil est, quia ille informationes non

59. *De causis,* prop. XVIIa, 174,54-62.

accipiuntur secundum eandem rationem, quia informatio qua esse informat essentiam si sint re diversa, est secundum esse reale quo actus informat realiter potentiam sibi correspondentem. Sed informatio qua essentia vel esse informat esse latissimum, est secundum esse rationis tantum, secundum quod inferius dicitur informare suum superius et contrahere ipsum.

5 quo] *B* per quod *V* nichil aliud est quam quod *P*

[285] Quod autem deducit ultra quod si 'esse' dicit respectum ad creantem, ut credit se conclusisse quod ille respectus primo fundatur in esse latissimo quod primo creatur, et secundario essentia informat illud esse latissimum, et sic essentia accidentaliter erit in esse existentie et informabit ipsum, et non econverso ---, nichil est, quia si 'esse latissimum' stet pro aliquo communi ipsi esse essentie sive ipsi nature (quod idem est) et esse existentie, tunc inter illa nulla erit informatio realis, de qua fiebat sermo ab adversario, sed solum secundum rationem secundum quod inferius dicitur informare et contrahere suum superius. Et in tali informatione essentia non informabit esse (nec econverso), sed ambo informabunt suum superius quod est esse latissimum, sicut 'rationale' non informat 'irrationale' (nec econverso), sed ambo informant 'animal'. Si autem 'esse latissimum' accipatur pro fundamento respectuum qui sunt ad Deum, quorum unus est ad Deum ut ad exemplar et facit esse essentie (ut dicit iste homo) et alius est ad Deum ut ad causam efficientem et facit esse existentie secundum istum hominem, tunc adhuc unum non informabit aliud (nec econverso), quia unus respectus non informat alium, sed ambo informabunt tertium **[B226ra]** in quo fundantur.

2 ut] *BP* tunc *V* / credit] *V* cum dicit *BP* / conclusisse] *BPVc* exclusisse *V* 3-5 illud ... informabit] *BP om. V* 4 accidentaliter] *BP* actualiter *V* 5 si] *BP om. V* 6 esse] *BP om. V* 6-7 sive ... est] *P* quod idem est *B om. V* / nature] *BP* existentie *V* 7 esse] *BP* sive ipsi *V* / existentie] quod idem est *add. V* 14 unus] *BV* unum *P* / et] *BP* prout *V* 15 alius] *BV* aliud *P*

[286] Item. Hoc est contra eum quia: Ponit quod <esse creature est quidam> respectus ad agens, quem dicit esse fundatum in essentia. Respectus autem magis debet dici informare fundamentum quam econverso. Ideo etc. Nec etiam est verum quod dicit, scilicet quod prius creetur illud quod est communius, ita quod esse latissimum, idest communissimum, primo omnium creetur et deinde alia, quia si prius sit superius ipso inferiori secundum ordinem rationis, non tamen secundum realem ordinem qui est in rerum factione, unum est prius alio ita quod factio unius ordine reali nature vel temporis precedat factionem alterius.

1 <esse ... quidam>] *coni*. 2 quem] V quod BP / dicit] quod *add. V* 2 fundatum] *BP* fundatur *V* 2-3 respectus] *BPcV* hoc *P* 3 autem] *Vc om. BPV* 7 realem] *BV* naturalem *P*

[287] Ad illud autem quod dicit contra secundam solutionem adversarii, scilicet quid principaliter creatur, vel esse vel essentia, supposito quod sint diversa re sicut materia et forma, patuit supra.

2 quid] *B* quod *PV* / esse vel] *BP* essentialius *V*

De tribus distinctionibus ab Henrico in tertio principali positis

[288] De tertio autem principali, quantum scilicet ad tres distinctiones quas ponit, dico quod prima qua distinguit inter potentiale obiective et potentiale subiective, satis videtur michi concedenda. Secunda autem qua distinguit inter essentias, scilicet quod quedam essentia est que existit proprietate sue nature, quedam que non existit proprietate nature sue, intelligendo sic quod quedam essentia est que ita habet existere ex proprietate nature sue quod nullo alio indiget per quod sit secundum aliquod genus cause, et quedam que indiget aliquo alio per quod existat secundum aliquod genus cause, --- vera est, quia prima essentia est essentia divina, secunda vero essentia est omnis essentia creata. Sed intelligendo sic sicut ille homo frequenter exponit, scilicet quod quedam essentia existit ex proprietate sue nature non indigens relatione ad suum esse, quedam vero non existit ex proprietate sue nature sed indiget respectu per quem sit ---, falsum est, quia respectus in nullo genere cause potest esse causa alicuius essentie absolute.

2-3 *bis* potentiale] *coni*. possibile *BPV* 5 existit] *BPcV* subsistit *P* 6 ita] *BV om. P* 8 aliquo alio] aliquo *V* alio *BP* / cause] *P* esse *BPcV* 9 cause] *PV* esse *BPc* / vera] *P* verum *B om. V* / est quia] *BP om. V* / prima] vero *add. V* 14 cause] *PV* esse *B*

[289] Tertiam autem distinctionem qua ponitur quoddam differre medium inter differre re et differre ratione, scilicet differre intentione, reputo frivolam, quia: Omnis differentia est secundum aliquod esse. Sed omne esse vel est **[P37rb]** esse rei, vel est esse rationis. Ergo omnis differentia est vel secundum esse reale, vel secundum esse rationis. Sed que differunt secundum esse reale differunt re. Que vero differunt secundum esse rationis tantum, differunt tantum ratione. Ergo omnis differentia vel est secundum rem, vel secundum rationem tantum. Nec est ponere medium. Supra autem ostensum est rationem istius qua **[V46vb]** probat hanc mediam differentiam, nullam esse.

De eius adhibitione prime distinctionis

[290] Quod ergo dicit respondendo secundum primam distinctionem ad rationem adversarii, scilicet quod potentiale et actuale non oportet dif-

ferre re loquendo de potentiali obiective, verum dicit. Et quod replicat contra hoc adversarius quod potentiale obiective non potest esse sine potentiali subiective quod sit pars facti, quia agens non facit actum esse actum *etc.,* --- non valet, quia licet agens non faciat quod actus sit actus, uniformiter accipiendo 'actum' et ex parte subiecti et ex parte predicati, quia semper idem est idem, tamen agens facit quod actus qui erat tantum in potentia agentis, sit in se actus in actu in rerum natura extra potentiam agentis. Quod autem iste homo dicit, nichil est, quia ad hoc quod aliquid sit factibile, nichil facit compositio que fit in eo vel ex diversis intentionibus, vel ex absoluto et respectu. Nec sufficit ad hoc quod essentia non existens sit in rerum natura extra, existens additio respectus, ut supra patuit.

1 respondendo] *BV om. P* 1-2 ad ... adversarii] *BV om. P* 2 potentiale] possibile *sic saepius BPV* 8 *alterum* idem] *BP om. V* / qui] *PV* quod *B* 13 *prius* existens] *BV* subsistens *P* / extra] *BP om. V* esse *add. P* 13-14 ut ... patuit] *BPVc om. V*

[291] Quod autem dicit quod essentia est semper essentia: si intelligatur sic quod essentia semper habeat esse reale essentie in actu et non solum in potentia et quod ipsa quantum ad suum esse essentie quandoque non fuerit et quandoque sit non futura, --- hoc est impossibile, ut superius dictum fuit. Unde licet verum sit semper dicere quod essentia in actu est essentia in actu et essentia in potentia est essentia in potentia, non tamen verum est quod essentia que nunc est in actu, sit vel fuerit in preterito et futuro semper in actu. Et ideo quia essentia que nunc est in actu, quia potest esse pro alio tempore non essentia in actu, ideo essentia potest corrumpi et amittere esse actu. Sed si esse essentie cuiuslibet esse, inquantum actuale reale, manet semper in omni tempore in tota eternitate, ut iste homo ponit, impossibile esset essentiam corrumpi per subtractionem cuiuscumque <actionis> agentis, quia oportet per substractionem actionis agentis non solum respectum subtrahi ipsi rei factibili, sed etiam aliquod absolutum ad quod actio agentis terminabatur.

1 dicit] BP dicitur V 9 *prius* essentia] *BV* esse *P* 9-10 ideo ... actu] *BP om. V* 9 essentia] *BV om. P* 11 manet] *BP* in tantum *V* / tempore] esset *add. Vc* 12 essentiam] *PV om. B*

[292] Quod autem dicit adversarius quod ratio quare essentia non semper est existens, sive quare non semper existit, est differentia realis esse et essentie, dico quod falsum est. Sed causa est diversitas actus creati et potentie active creantis et diversitas temporum, ut supra expositum fuit.

3 causa] *PV* cum *B*

De eius adhibitione secunde distinctionis

[293] Illud vero quod adversarius dicit contra secundam distinctionem secundum expositionem istius hominis, secundum quam illa distinctio, ut supra dictum est, nulla est, quia supponit falsum, scilicet quod per respectum fit essentia creature. Et bene procedit contra eum ratio adversarii. Et quod ipse dicit, scilicet quod dictum adversarii quo dicit quod non acquiritur de novo nec amititur respectus nisi per acquisitionem vel amissionem alicuius absoluti, non est verum in illis relativis in quibus unum refertur ad aliud quin illud aliud refertur ad ipsum --- etego dico quod in hoc adversarius dicit verum et ipse dicit falsum. Licet enim alterum correlativorum possit referri de novo, ipso non mutato secundum aliquod absolutum, tamen quod aliquid de novo referatur ad aliud, nulla mutatione facta in aliquo illorum secundum aliquod absolutum, est impossibile, sicut patet in exemplo posito ab eo. Licet enim scibile referatur de novo ad aliquem scientem, scibili non mutato, hoc tamen impossibile est fieri, nulla mutatione facta in sciente secundum absolutum quod est scientia. Unde et exemplum quod adducit adversarius contra eum de pariete et homine albis, bonum est.

1-2 quod ... hominis] *BP* ratio *Vc om. V* 6 respectus] *P om. BV* 8 unum] *BPV* relativum *add. P* 11 de novo] *BV om. P* 10 secundum] *BV* sed *P*

[294] Et quod iste dicit quod non est simile de relatione hominis albi ad parietem album et de relatione essentie create **[P37va]** ad Deum, quia scilicet similitudo hominis et parietis quando sunt albi, fundatur super albedinem, sed relatio creature ad Deum non fundatur super essentiam ut essentia est sed ut est effectus Dei, --- nichil dicit, quia quando dicit quod essentia ut effectus Dei est fundamentum talis relationis, aut intelligit per li 'effectus' quod reduplicat aliquod absolutum, aut aliquam relationem. Si intelligit per li 'effectus' aliquod absolutum, ergo relatio creature **[B226rb]** ad Deum non potest acquiri nec amitti nisi illo absoluto acquisito vel amisso; et sic habetur propositum. Si autem per li 'effectus' includit preter essentiam aliquam relationem creature ad Deum, constat quod illa relatio erit relatio ad Deum sicut ad causam efficientem. Et sic sequitur quod relatio que est creature ad Deum sicut ad causam efficientem, sit una cum essentia fundamentum sui ipsius, quod est absurdissimum. Et ideo suum dictum nullum est.

9 nisi] in *add. V* 11 includit] *V* intelligit *BP* 13-14 et sic ... efficientem] *P om. BV* 15 suum dictum] *BP* fundamentum *V*

De eius adhibitione tertie distinctionis

[295] Tertiam vero distinctionem, qua iste homo ponit medium modum differendi inter differre re et differre ratione, reputo nullam, ut supra dixi. Et adversarius bene ostendit rationem suam ad hoc probandum adductam nullam esse. Et quod iste dicit quod iste modus quo differunt genus et differentia, est alius modus specie a modo quo differunt diffinitio et diffinitum, que tantum ratione differunt, nichil est, quia ex hoc non sequitur quin differre quo differunt genus et differentia, sit differre ratione tantum, sicut etiam modus quo **[V47ra]** differt albedo ab homine est alius modus specie a modo quo differt homo ab asino, qui differunt realiter; et tamen non sequitur quin differentia hominis et albedinis sit secundum rem. In differre enim tam re quam ratione sunt multi gradus differentes secundum speciem.

1 qua] *B* quam *PV* 4 *alterum* iste] *P om. BV* 9 specie] *Pc* substantie *P om. BV*

[296] Quantum etiam ad aliud dicit adversarius veritatem, scilicet quod alius et alius modus differendi qui stant cum unitate rei, sive sint alius et alius specie, sive sint secundum maius et minus in eadem specie, totum pertinet ad differentiam rationis. Non enim omnis differentia rationis est eiusdem speciei. Nec refert quantum ad hoc utrum illi modi unus vel plures modi sint, sive ex hoc quod ratio eos adinveniat, sive ex hoc quod natura eadem re nata sit respondere diversis conceptibus mentis. Sicut idem re respondet conceptui finis et principii et conceptui sapientie et bonitatis, et sic de aliis.

5 unus vel] *V om. BP* 7 natura … re] *V* nulla re *BP* 8 finis et principii] *V* secundario et principali *B* sensus et principii *P*

[297] Similiter bene dicit adversarius in hoc quod dicit quod argumentum suum nec per illam distinctionem nec per simile de genere et differentia solvitur, quia genus quod stat cum oppositis differentiis, non dicit unam rem, sed plures indeterminate. Et ideo quod genus potest stare cum opposito alterius suarum differentiarum, ideo est quia indeterminate dicit rem aliam ab illa differentia. Et quod iste dicit quod genus dicit unam rem genere, nichil valet, quia unitas generis vel speciei non est unitas secundum rem, sed secundum rationem. Et ideo quando genus, puta animal, stat cum aliqua differentia et cum eius opposito, ut cum dicimus quod animal est rationale et animal est irrationale, in utraque acceptione non stat pro eodem animali secundum rem. Et ideo non est sensus quod illud quod est idem re cum rationali, possit intelligi sub opposito eius, scilicet sub irrationali, quia animal quod est rationale, non est idem re cum irrationali, sed ratione tantum, quia ydemptitas rationalis et irrationalis est

secundum genus, que est tantum ydemptitas rationis. Et ideo responsio istius nulla est.

3 stat] *BP* comstat *V* 4 ideo] *BP om. V* 5-6 ideo ... differentia] *BPVc om. V* 6 aliam ... rem] *BPcV om. P* 7 genere] *BP om. V* 9 cum eius opposito] *PV* quod eius oppositum *P* 11 sensus] *B* verum *PV*

[298] Item. Etiam totum istud nichil valet sibi, scilicet quod idem animal genere non contractum potest stare cum oppositis, quia ipse concedit quod saltem animal contractum ad rationale (puta hoc animal quod est rationale, ostenso homine) non potest intelligi sub opposito rationalis quod est idem re cum eo. Ergo a simili essentia Sortis contracta ad hoc esse actuale Sortis non poterit intelligi sub opposito eius, ita quod verum erit dicere quod essentia Sortis numquam caret esse actuali Sortis.
[299] Et ex hoc patet quod quidquid dicit hic contra predictum argumentum ad defensionem suam de hoc quod aliquid quod est idem cum aliquo, sicut animal et rationale, potest accipi ut contractum vel ut non contractum, --- nichil valet sibi, quia **[P37vb]** adversarius accipit ‘essentiam contractam’ <ut contractam> ad hoc esse actuale.

3 ad] *P* de *BV*

[300] Quod autem dicit quod sicut idem album potest esse simile et non simile, ipso non mutato secundum aliquod absolutum, sic etiam eadem essentia respectu eiusdem esse potest dici esse et non esse, ipsa creatura non mutata secundum aliquod absolutum, --- nichil valet, quia impossibile est quod album quod est simile, sit non simile respectu eiusdem correlativi, nisi vel ipso vel altero correlativo mutato secundum aliquod absolutum. Et sic etiam est impossibile si esse est respectus (ut iste dicit, quod tamen falsum est) quod creatura existens sit non existens, nisi ipsa vel altero correlativo mutato secundum aliquod absolutum. Et ideo cum alterum correlativum mutari non possit, quia est Deus, oportet quod a creatura auferatur aliquod absolutum, si de existente debeat fieri non existens.

6 correlativi] *BP om. V* 7-11 et sic ... absolutum] *BP om. V*

[301] Quomodo autem solvatur ad argumentum adversarii sustinendo secundum viam suprapositam ydemptitatem esse et essentie, supra patuit.

De quarto principaliter posito

[302] De eo vero quod quarto principaliter ponit, quomodo scilicet adversarius rationibus suis respondet et earum confirmationes improbat, prosequendum est. Quod ergo primo dicit quod si esse, ut dicit adversarius solvendo primam rationem suam, est actualitas diversa ab essentia et non

educta de potentia essentie, ipsum esse poterit fieri sine essentia, --- dico quod si ‘educi de potentia essentie’ accipiatur pro dependere ab essentia in suo fieri et in suo esse (ut supra dictum est), tunc si esse non educatur isto modo de potentia essentie, esse posset fieri absque essentia. Sed si accipiatur ‘educi de potentia essentie’ pro dependere a potentia essentie ut presupposita actioni agentis, non oportet quod si esse sic non educitur de potentia essentie, quod propter hoc possit fieri sine essentia, quia non oportet quod si agens in agendo non indiget materia presupposita quin actus productus ab eo indigeat materia presupposita et principaliter materia presupposita ab eo ut in qua fieri ei competit, quam tamen agens non presupponit, sed producit simul cum actu. Quod autem dicit adversarius respondendo isti et quod dicit iste replicando **[B226va]** contra adversarium, narrationes sunt absque aliqua probatione. Et ideo pretermitto.

10 non] *BP om. V* 11 sine] *BPVc om. V*

[303] Quod vero iste imponit adversario, scilicet quod dixerat quod quia esse essentie necesse est esse, ideo non indiget existere per aliud, sicut essentia indiget existere per esse, --- dico quod si intendat adversarius dicere per hoc quod esse creature simpliciter sit necesse esse, manifeste falsum diceret; nec credo quod hoc intendat. Si autem **[V47rb]** intendat dicere quod esse non habet per quod possit non esse nec quod sit factibile nec defectibile nisi per hoc quod est tale esse quod habet perficere potentiam et in possibili recipi, sic secundum suam viam probabiliter dicit, licet non credam suam viam habere veritatem. Ad rationem autem istius hominis non oportuisset plus dicere <quam> quod sicut materia est per formam nec oportet quod forma sit per aliam formam, ita essentia, que est materia ipsius esse, est actu per esse, nec oportet propter hoc quod esse sit per aliud esse.

1 dixerat] *P* dicat *BV* 2 essentie] *BV* creature *P* 2-3 sicut ... esse] *BP om. V* 3 si] *V* non *BP* 6 dicere] *BP* querere *V*

[304] Quod autem iste dicit quod esse creature non solum unde receptum sed etiam unde tale esse (scilicet unde esse creature) est, est defectibile, nichil est, quia intentio adversarii non est quod esse creature unde esse creature abstrahat ab hoc quod est esse receptum et quod recipi ei adveniens faciat ipsum esse possibile, sicut iste ymaginatur et prout procedit sua ratio. Sed est intentio adversarii quod esse creature unde esse creature includit esse receptum, sicut anima humana includit rationale. Unde secundum adversarium idem est considerare esse creature unde esse creature non esse receptum et considerare animam humanam secundum quod humanam non esse rationalem. Et ideo ratio sua qua dicit quod illud quod est per se incorruptibile non potest esse corruptibile per hoc quod recipi-

tur in alio, procedit ac si esse creature unde esse creature non includeret **[P38ra]** esse receptum, sed recipi sibi adveniens faceret ipsum esse corruptibile. Quod est falsa ymaginatio.

1 unde] *V* una *B* nude *P* 2 *prius* unde] *V* unum *BPc* nude *P* / *alterum* unde] *PV* per *add. B* ex *add. V* / *secundum* est] *P om. BV* 9-10 secundum quod humanam] *P om. BV* 10 esse] *BP* est *V*

[305] Et quod dicit quod 'esse receptum' non dicit speciale esse sed modum essendi, falsum dicit, quia licet 'recipi' dicat habitudinem ad aliquid diversum ab ipso esse in quo esse recipitur, tamen ipsum esse creatum sive ipsum esse factibile secundum adversarium ex natura sua est essentialiter sive per suam essentiam fundamentum talis habitudinis, ita quod sicut 'esse factibile' dicit esse speciale, ita et 'esse receptum', licet li 'receptum' importet habitudinem ad aliquid aliud ab esse, loquendo secundum positionem adversarii. Nec istud dico quod credam quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit factum vel factibile factione que est creatio, requirantur plura quorum unum sit potentia receptiva et aliud actus receptus. Sed ita dixi ut ostenderem quod iste non improbat sufficienter dicta adversarii nec vadit ad mentem eius. Defensio autem ultima quam imponit adversario, si adversarius sic eam intelligit ut ipse imponit, nimis frivola est.

4 creatum] *BV* creature *P* / natura] *BP* materia *V* 8 *prius* quod] *BP* quia *V* 9 factibile] de *add. V*

[306] Responsio autem adversarii ad tertiam rationem istius, scilicet quod esse est in genere substantie per reductionem sicut principium, non videtur michi bene dictum, quia non video quod per reductionem aliquid sit in genere Substantie per reductionem ut principium, nisi vel materia vel forma substantialis, ut supra dictum est.

2 esse] non *add. P*

[307] Argumentum autem istius contra responsionem adversarii fundatum super hoc quod inconveniens sit res non esse in genere nisi quando existunt, non videtur michi bonum, quia habet pro inconvenienti quod non est inconveniens, quia, ut supra dictum est, res non sunt simpliciter in genere nisi quando existunt. Responsio etiam adversarii, supponentis idem fundamentum cum isto, scilicet quod res sint simpliciter in genere, rebus non existentibus, nulla est. Et satis probabiliter improbat eam iste in secundo argumento quod adducit contra eum.

1 fundatum] *BP* fundatur *V* 6 idem fundamentum] *PV om. B* 7 eam] *BPV* eum *Pc*

[308] Sed primum et tertium argumentum istius hominis ad idem nichil valent. Primum quidem non valet quia non oportet quod illud quod est

in aliquo genere per reductionem sicut principium, sit principium causale rei illius generis, sicut punctus non est principium causale rei que est linea, nec est verum quod punctus fluat et per hoc causet lineam, sed est sua falsa ymaginatio. Tertium vero non valet quia sicut semper esse est esse et essentia est essentia, sive absque creante sive qualiter aliter et sunt diversa per essentiam, ut supponit adversarius, ita etiam materia et forma substantialis sunt diversa per essentiam et semper materia est materia et forma est forma, nec tamen materia vel forma est in genere nisi per reductionem. Et sic dicet adversarius quod similiter non oportet quod esse sit in genere nisi per reductionem, quamcumque esse sit esse semper et quamcumque esse sit diversum realiter ab essentia.

3 causale] *PV* tale *B* 6 sua falsa] *P* sua *B* falsa *V* 8-9 ut ... essentiam] *BP om. V* 11 similiter] *BP* simpliciter *V* 12 quamcumque ... et] *BP om. V*

De quinto principaliter posito

[309] Quantum vero ad hoc quod iste quinto principaliter intendit ostendere quod bene exposuerat auctoritatem Boetii dicentis quod diversum est *esse* et *quod est:* quantum ad primam expositionem quam ponit utrumque potest sustineri, quia illa expositio videtur esse commenti[60]. Sed secunda expositio et tertia quas hic ponit, omnino sunt false, ut supra patuit.

1 iste quinto] iste *BP* quinto *V* 2 dicentis ... *alterum* est] *BP om. V*

De sexto principaliter posito

[310] Restat nunc ulterius prosequi de sexto principali, quo vult adversarius ostendere non posse creaturam annichilari nisi differrent re esse et essentia. Ad primum igitur argumentum adversarii patuit supra in solutione difficultatum. Quod autem iste homo dicit, non videtur michi bene dictum, quia sive accipiatur 'actus' pro actu creato in communi (quod forte vocat ipse formam termini rei sive formale significatum eius), sive accipiatur **[V47va]** pro actu singulari, dumtamen uniformiter accipiatur 'actus' et ex parte subiecti et ex parte predicati, semper actus est actus et semper hic actus est hic actus. **[P38rb]** Et tamen actus incipit esse actu et incipit esse actus, accipiendo difformiter 'actum' hincinde, quia actus qui est solum in potentia activa agentis, incipit esse actu si fit de novo. Et sic actus per hoc quod est actu de novo fit in propria natura. Quod vero dicit de separatione reali esse ab essentia, nichil est, quia non ostendit

60. Gilbertus Porretanus, *In Boethii De hebdomadibus*, pp. 194,93-195,7.

quomodo separatio realis esse ab essentia --- prout separatio realis distinguitur contra separari solo intellectu --- conveniat ipsi esse et essentie **[B226vb]** quando dicitur quod essentia non est.

2 re] *V om. BP* 6 termini rei] *coni*. termini *BV* rei *P*/ formale] *BPcV om. P* 10 difformiter] *BP* differenter *V* 11 si] *BP om. V* 12 natura] *BV* materia *P* et si ipse intendat per hoc ponere ibi duas factiones secundum rem quarum una sit creatio materie et alia supernaturalis generatio forme, falsum est quia totum una actione producitur si illa factio una existens esset propter talem dependentiam facti ex subiecto scilicet forme a materia quod non contingit in creatione substantie immaterialis concedatur sibi *add. B* [*conferas autem nostram sectionem 276tam supra*] 13 nichil ... ostendit *BPcV om. P* 14 quomodo ... essentia] *BV om. P*

[311] Secunda autem ratio adversarii non probat nisi quod creatura non habet esse actuale nisi prout coniungitur Deo ut cause efficienti conservanti. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod 'esse' dicat aliquam aliam rem ab essentia. Nam esse non tollitur ab essentia quasi quedam alia res ab essentia que tollatur ab ipsa essentia manente. Sed esse tollitur ab essentia sicut aliqua res tollitur sibi ipsi aliter considerate. Nam et esse et essentia tollitur ipsi creature inquantum ipsa in sola potentia agentis manens nichil est actu. Quod autem iste dicit de suo respectu patuit frequenter supra nichil esse.

3 aliquam aliam] aliquam *P* aliam *BV* 8 respectu] ut *add. P* 9 esse] *BV* est *P*

[312] Ad tertiam vero rationem adversarii dico quod <quia> omnis defectibilitas rerum provenit ratione potentie, scilicet quia sunt possibiles vel respectu potentie passive vel respectu potentie active, non oportet quod, sicut procedit ratio adversarii, omnis defectibilitas rerum qua possunt deficere ab aliqua actualitate eis debita sit per potentiam passivam, sed vel per potentiam passivam vel per activam, sed aliter et aliter. Nam secundum potentiam passivam tam illud in quo est potentia quam actus quem potentia respicit utrumque est defectibile. Sed secundum potentiam activam illud in quo est talis potentia, non est necessario secundum eam defectibile, sed illud quod est obiectum eius sit per eam factibile. Ex hoc enim ipso quod aliquid non potuit esse nisi per hoc quod est obiectum factibile alicuius potentie active, circumscripta omni compositione reali, est defectibile.

1 omnis] *BP om. V* 8 respicit] *BPcV* respiciens *P* 9 eam] *V* eque *B* esse *Pc om. P* 10 defectibile] esse *add. P* / eius] *BV om. P* / factibile] *BP* defectibile *V* 11 potuit] *V* potest *BP* / alicuius ... active] *BP om. V* 12 alicuius] *B* alterius *P*

[313] Quod autem iste homo dicit non videtur michi bene dictum, quia dato quod idem sit potentiale et actuale, credo tamen quod ad hoc quod aliquid possit deficere ab actu quem habet vel habere potest, requiritur quod re differant potentia qua dicitur potentiale et actus quo dicitur

actuale. Et sic est in proposito. Nam potentia qua dicitur creatura possibilis fieri, est potentia Dei activa; actus vero quo est formaliter, est essentia sua quando est a Deo facta. Et illa re differunt.

2 potentiale] *V* possibile *BP* 3 requiritur] *BP om. V* 4 potentiale] *V* possibile *BP*

De septimo principaliter posito de salvatione creationis

[314] Quantum vero ad rationes adversarii que septimo ponuntur ad ostendendum quomodo non posset salvari quod creatura procederet a Deo de novo nisi differunt re esse et essentia, dico ad primum quod respectus creature ad Deum sicut ad causam efficientem fundatur in essentia creature ex natura sua, nec tamen eam consequitur ille respectus in actu ab eterno, quia nec esse nec essentia creature secundum positionem meam est actu ab eterno, sed in sola potentia Agentis. Argumentum autem bene procederet contra illum qui poneret quod creatura haberet ab eterno esse reale essentie extra potentiam Agentis.

5 eam] *BPcV* esse *P* 7 meam] in esse *add. V* 8 poneret] *BV* ponit *P* / haberet] *BV* habet *P*

[315] Quod autem dicit iste homo quod si creatura necessario esset ab eterno, non posset esse a Deo efficiente, dico quod si Deus ageret necessitate nature, sicut philosophi posuerunt, non repugnaret creature esse necessario ab eterno et cum hoc quod esset causata a Deo. Sed verum est quod quia ipse agit omne quod agit ex eius libero arbitrio, nichil potest esse necessario ab esse ab eterno, quia ipse nichil agit existens necessario, sed libero arbitrio.

4 necessario] *BPcV* effici *P* / hoc] quod *add. BV* 4 causata] *V* creata *P* creatura *B*

[316] Et quod ipse dicit quod existens necessario ab eterno eo ipso non posset esse factum ab aliquo, quia videlicet quod est necessario ab eterno est necesse esse, --- dico quod verum est quod tale est necesse esse. Nec tamen ex hoc sequitur quin sit factum, quia non est necesse esse ex se, sed ex alio, et ideo potest habere <esse> per causam. Et quando probat quod non, quia non fit nisi quod non est, dico quod ad hoc quod aliquid fiat per tale **[P38va]** fieri quod est sine successione, non requiritur ipsum quandoque non esse et quandoque fieri, sed sufficit ipsum non habere esse a se sed ab alio, ut alias[61] ostendi.

5 <esse> per] *coni.* per *V om. BP* 8 ipsum] *BV om. P*

[317] Et quod dicit ultra quod tale ens non esset dependens quia non posset amittere suum esse, non valet, quia ad hoc quod aliquid sit

61. *De aeternitate mundi*, cap. 2.

dependens, non oportet quod amittat vel possit amittere suum esse. Sed sufficit quod illud esse non habeat a se sed ab alio; quod quidem aliud, supposito quod necessario det esse, <et habeat esse a se et non ab alio>, ideo illud cui datur esse a tali agente, non potest amittere esse, et tamen dependet a dante.

1 ens] *coni.* esse *Pc om. BPV* 4 quod ... aliud] *BPcV* sed quod alio *P* 7 a dante] BP ab aliquo V

[318] Et quod dicit ultra quod tale non posset esse defectivum sive deficiens, quia scilicet quod est esse necessarium ab eterno, non potest deficere, --- dico quod aliquid deficere adpresens dupliciter potest dici. Uno modo secundum durationem temporis, sicut illud dicitur deficere quod quandoque non est; **[V47vb]** et sic quod necessario est ab eterno, nec est nec potest esse deficiens. Alio modo potest aliquid dici deficiens secundum quantitatem perfectionis secundum quod una forma est deficiens respectu alterius forme et omnis essentia est deficiens respectu essentie divine. Et isto modo esset creatura deficiens, dato quod esset necessario ab eterno.

2 est esse] est *BV* esse *P*

[319] Aliud autem quod dicit quod non plus oportet poni creaturam compositam ex hoc quod potest fieri a Deo libero arbitrio quam si fieret ab eo necessitate nature, satis videtur michi probabile.

2 potest] *BV* ponitur *P*

[320] Quod autem dicit quod respectus creature ad Deum ut ad causam efficientem fundatur in essentia creature ex sua natura secundum potentiam sed non secundum actum, videtur michi quod dicat falsum, quia ille respectus fundatur in essentia creature ex natura sua et secundum potentiam antequam fiat et secundum actum postquam est facta. Sed verum est quod natura creature non exigit quod ille respectus fundetur in ea actu ab eterno, quia nec natura sua exigit quod sit facta ab eterno. Et quod dicit quod illius respectus in actu fundamentum sufficiens est essentia creature sive ipsa natura creature, verum dicit. Et nichil requiritur preter hoc nisi agens. Quod quidem agens non exigitur ut fundamentum illius respectus vel ut pars fundamenti, sed ut causa efficiens fundamenti.

1 quod ... quod] *BV* eoquod *P* 3-5 sed non ... potentiam] *BV om. P* 8 illius] *BP* alius *V* 10 exigitur] *P* requiritur *BV*

[321] Quod autem ultra dicit respondendo adversario quod solus respectus non acquiritur de novo nisi facta mutatione prius natura in essentia, dico quod hoc est contra eum. Quando enim dicit quod mutatio ordine nature precedit in essentia illum respectum, quero utrum ibi mutatio fiat

in essentia ut in subiecto presupposito **[B227ra]** in quo solus respectus acquiritur sicut mutatio fit in homine sicut in subiecto mutationi presupposito quando homo dealbatur; cuius quidem dealbationis terminus non est homo qui est subiectum eius sed albedo. Et si sic, sequitur quod solus respectus sit terminus actionis divine, quod est inconveniens. Aut est mutatio in essentia sicut in eo quod est secundum illud quod est per mutationem acquisitum, quod quidem non preexistit mutationi cum per eam acquiratur. Et si sic, est mutatio in essentia et essentia non fuit antequam crearetur, et hoc quantum ad esse essentie. Et si sic, esse essentie non fuit ab eterno, quod est contra eum.

2 natura] *BV om. P* 4 ibi] *BP om. V* 5 solus] *Pc* plus *P* solum *BV* / mutationi] *P om. BV* 7 terminus] *BP* ens *V* 8 albedo] *BP* dealbatio *V* 9 actionis] *BP* creationis *V* 10 secundum ... est] *BP om. V*

[322] Quod autem actio Dei sit separabilis a conservanda creatura non facit ad hoc quod solus ille respectus possit adesse et abesse ipsi essentie manenti, sed facit ad hoc quod tam essentia quam respectus quandoque sint et quandoque non sint. Si autem esse reale essentie esset ab eterno, oporteret quod necessario consequeretur eam ille respectus ab eterno (sicut relationes divine consequuntur ab eterno essentiam divinam) vel quod ille respectus inesset de novo per aliquid absolutum eidem additum, quia, posito sufficienti fundamento, necessario sequitur respectus, dummodo in alio correlativo non deficiat illud quod dicitur esse correspondens.

2 solus ille] solus *PV* ille *B* 2-3 possit ... manenti] *BPcV om. P* 7 eidem] *B* sibi *PV*

Ad secundum argumentum adversarii

[323] Ad secundum argumentum adversarii dico quod sicut creatura per naturam suam est similitudo divine nature formaliter loquendo, ita etiam per naturam suam est formaliter loquendo similitudo Dei agentis, effective vero habet quod sit et quod sit similitudo Dei in actu per virtutem divinam eam creantem effective. Effectus enim non est per aliud similitudo nature agentis et per aliud similitudo ipsius agentis, quia per illud est effectus **[P38va]** similitudo ipsius agentis quod accipit <naturam suam> ab agente. Constat autem quod effectus ratione producentis substantiam rei accipit naturam suam a sua causa efficienti. Et ideo per naturam suam effectus est similitudo sue cause agentis, nisi forte loquatur de assimilatione qua effectus assimilatur sue cause agenti in agendo. Et tunc effectus assimilatur cause per hoc quod agit ad productionem alicuius alterius sicut et causa sua egit ad productionem sui ipsius. Sed sic assi-

milari nichil ad propositum. Unde patet quod et illud quod dicit adversarius et illud quod dicit iste nichil est, quia creatura ex natura sua qua est formaliter, est similitudo nature divine et Dei agentis, non per aliquod absolutum additum (ut ponit adversarius cuius dictum nunc est improbatum) nec per aliquod respectivum (ut iste ponit), quia proprie similitudo numquam attenditur penes respectum sed penes aliquam formam absolutam.

4 et quod sit] *BP om. V* 10-11 agentis ... cause] *BP om. V*

Ad tertium argumentum adversarii de intellectu practico et speculativo in Deo

[324] Ad tertium argumentum adversarii dico quod si accipiatur distinctio intellectus practici et speculativi in Deo penes ipsas res intellectas, ita quod dicatur intellectus speculativus secundum quod respicit res que a Deo non sunt factibiles, intellectus vero practicus dicatur secundum quod respicit res a Deo factibiles, sic dico quod nichil est in creatura quod respiciat intellectum Dei speculativum, quia nichil est in creatura, nec esse nec essentia, quod a Deo non sit factibile, sed omnia respiciunt intellectum practicum.

4-5 non ... deo] *BP om. V* 5 sic dico] *P* sequitur *BV*

[325] Si autem accipiatur distinctio intellectus practici et speculativi in Deo penes modum intelligendi res, et hoc quidem magis proprie ita quod dicatur intellectus practicus non solum secundum quod qualitercumque considerat res factibiles sed secundum quod considerat eas disponendo quod sic vel sic faciat eas et ordinando suam considerationem ad earum productionem, intellectus vero speculativus dicatur secundum quod considerat non solum res factibiles sed etiam res scibiles non ordinando considerationem suam ad factionem earum sed considerando speculative quid est de ratione uniuscuiusque earum et quomodo sunt possibiles fieri (sicut etiam potest fieri ab intellectu creato, qui non est causa rerum creatarum), --- tunc dico quod creatura secundum esse quod est in ea realiter, comparatur utrique intellectui, sive sit esse sive sit essentia. Ita quod tam intellectui practico quam speculativo ex equo comparatur esse sicut et essentia, et econverso, sed aliter et aliter et ex parte rei intellecte et ex parte intellectus.

6 productionem] *PV* perfectionem *B* 7 res] non *add. PV* / scibiles] *B* factibiles *PV* 9 quid] *BP* quod *V* 10 sicut ... fieri] *BP om. V* 11 esse] *PV* omne *B* 12-13 sive ... intellectui] *BP om. V* 12 comparatur] *PV* operatur *B* ad *add. Pc*

[326] Ex parte quidem rei intellecte quia res creata comparatur ad intellectum speculativum, non ut fienda tali tempore determinato, in quo secundum intellectum practicum ordinat Deus determinate producere, sed secundum rationes suas universales abstrahendo eam ab omni differentia temporis et non minus quantum ad esse quam quantum ad essentiam, puta secundum quod considerat quod tam esse quam essentia talis rei est talis nature. Et hec sunt de sua ratione et possunt sic et sic fieri. Ad intellectum vero practicum comparatur ut fienda tali tempore, disponendo eam tali tempore determinate producere non solum quantum ad esse sed etiam quantum ad essentiam.

1 intellecte] *BV* create *P* 2 fienda] *P* facienda *BV* 3 determinate] *BP om. V* 5 temporis] *BV* intellectus *P* / non] *BP* ideo *V* 7 sua] *PV* tali *B* / fienda] *BP om. V* 8 tali tempore] *BV om. P* 9 determinate] *B* determinato *PV*

[327] Ex parte vero intellectus est differentia quia ad intellectum speculativum comparatur ut ad representans eam[62] secundum rationes suas universales, scilicet qualis nature sit et que sint de ratione sua, ut dictum est. Ad intellectum vero practicum comparatur sicut ad causam suam effectivam disponentem eam producere determinato tempore et eam producentem secundum dispositionem sue sapientie et beneplacitum sue voluntatis. Et quia divina essentia necessario ab eterno omnes rationes rerum representat, ea vero que disponit facienda determinatis temporibus, ab eterno quidem disponit, sed non necessario disponit, quia hoc subiacet suo libero arbitrio. In producendo vero sic se habet quod non producit ea ab eterno sed ex tempore.

2 eam] *V* ea *B* eas *P* 3 que sint] *V* quod sit *B* quod sunt *P* 5 determinato tempore] *PV* determinate in *B* / eam] *PV* ea *B* 10 vero] *V* ut *B* non *P*

[328] Et ideo res **[P39ra]** creata necessario et ab eterno respicit intellectum speculativum Dei ut cognita et representata modo quo expositum est. Sed secundum intellectum practicum disponentem eam producere respicit quidem ab eterno sed non necessario, quia Deus potuisset aliter producere vel disponere de rebus producendis quam disposuerit. Accipiendo tamen hic in sensu diviso ‘intellectum ut practicum’ prout est producens sive principium producendi actu, non respicit necessario nec ab eterno, sed ex tempore.

2 ut] *BP* non *V* 3 secundum] *V om. BP* / eam] *BP om. V* 5 producere vel] *V om. BP*

[329] Sic ergo dico ergo ad formam argumenti quod causa quare creatura comparatur ad intellectum speculativum Dei necessario et ab eterno ut cognita --- non autem necessario respicit intellectum practicum ut facta

62. *sc*. rem creatam [*videas sect. 326tam necnon 328vam*].

vel fienda ---, est non diversitas realis esse et essentie, quorum unum respiciat intellectum practicum et aliud intellectum speculativum, quia utrumque respicit utrumque. Sed causa est **[B227vb]** quod eadem aliter et aliter (ut expositum est) comparatur ad utrumque intellectum. Quod autem iste homo dicit nichil est. Nam creatura per suam essentiam sive per hoc quod habet essentiam in actu formaliter existit, per virtutem vero divinam est effective. Et extra illa duo nichil habet per quod existat.

5 respiciat] *V* respicit *BP*

Ad quartum argumentum adversarii

[330] Ad quartum argumentum adversarii dico quod 'creatura' solam essentiam sive naturam creatam dicit. Nec dicit aliquod additum absolutum nec etiam aliquem respectum preter eam, loquendo de creaturis que sunt in generibus absolutis, sicut Substantia, Quantitas, Qualitas (ut homo, bos, linea, albedo et talia); ea enim que sunt in genere Relationis respectum significant, sive ille respectus dicatur esse essentia quedam creata, sive non. Et dico ulterius quod sola essentia creature est sufficiens fundamentum illius respectus qui est ipsius creature ut effectus ad Deum ut ad causam. Nec tamen ille respectus est necessario ab eterno, quia nec essentia creature, que est eius fundamentum, est necessario ab eterno.

1 dico] *PV om. B* / creatura**]** *V* creat *B* crearet *P* 1-2 *an textus corruptus ?* 9-10] quia ... eterno] *BP om. V*

[331] Quod autem iste homo dicit quod essentia creature est sufficiens fundamentum ipsius respectus creature ad Deum, <bene dicit>. Quod autem preter essentiam creature ad hoc quod sit ille respectus in actu, requiritur actio Dei sive quod Deus agat, hoc non est quia requiratur actio Dei ut fundamentum, sed quia requiritur ut causa fundamenti quod est essentia; qua non existente, nec respectus potest esse.

6 qua non existente] *BV* que non est ex necessitate *P*

[332] Contradicit etiam iste homo sibi quando dicit quod sola essentia est fundamentum illius respectus et quod essentia ut essentia non est sufficiens fundamentum illius respectus, quia si essentia non est sufficiens fundamentum illius respectus, requiritur aliquid aliud preter essentiam quod cum essentia sit sufficiens fundamentum illius respectus, si ille respectus debeat inesse, quia nullus respectus inest alicui nisi habito sufficienti fundamento in quo debet fundari respectus. Et si aliquid preter essentiam requiritur cum essentia ad hoc quod sit fundamentum sufficiens illius respectus, sequitur quod iam non sola essentia, sed essentia et aliquid aliud preter essentiam **[V48rb]** erit fundamentum illius respec-

tus. Et sic sequitur ex dictis suis quod sola essentia et non sola essentia sit fundamentum predicti respectus. Et similiter posset deduci quod essentia sit sufficiens et non sufficiens fundamentum eiusdem respectus.

2 ut essentia] *P om. BV* 3-4 quia ... respectus] *BP om. V* 4-5 si ille respectus] *BPcV om. P* 8-10 sufficiens ... fundamentum] *BPcV om. P* 11 et sic sequitur] *BPcV om. P* / sola essentia et] *BP om. V*

[333] Quod autem iste dicit concludendo ulterius quod ad hoc quod Deus producat creaturam de novo et libero arbitrio, non requiritur in ea compositio plurium, dico quod in hoc bene dicit. Quod autem dicit quod ad hoc quod creatura sit producibilis libero arbitrio, sufficit differentia inter potentiale et actuale secundum intentionem, dico quod si posuisset ‘rationem’ loco ‘intentionis’, satis bene dixisset. Sciendo tamen quod licet in creatura sit idem realiter potentiale et actuale, potentia tamen qua dicitur potentialis et actus quo est formaliter actu, non est idem re, ut supra dictum est.

5 potentiale] *V* possibile *BP* / secundum intentionem] *BV om. P* 7 licet] *BP* si *V* / potentiale] *V* possibile *BP* 8 potentialis] *V* possibilis *BP*

[334] Quod vero ultra dicit quod non oportet fundari respectum creature ad Deum ut ad causam efficientem in coniunctione plurium, dico quod in hoc verum dicit. Sed illud quod ad ostendendum hoc adducit non valet, hoc videlicet quod cum Deus non solum faciat compositum sed quodlibet etiam componentium, quod propter hoc sequatur quod preter respectum compositi etiam quodlibet simplicium habeat proprium respectum ad Deum, quia si ita esset, sequeretur quod nichil esset factibile nisi esset ex pluribus rebus **[P39vb]** simplicibus compositum, sicut <ex eo quod> in substantiis materialibus simplex non est factibile sed compositum, non sequeretur quod quodlibet illorum simplicium haberet proprium respectum, et preter respectum totius compositi. Immo sicut una actione fiet totum compositum principaliter et partes ex consequenti, ita uno respectu referentur tam totum compositum quam partes, compositum quidem principaliter, partes ex consequenti.

5 sequatur] *BP* sequebatur *V* 7 si] *BPcV om. P* / ita] *BP* vera *V* / sequeretur quod] *P* per *B* quod *V* 12 principaliter] *BPcV om. P* 12-14 ita ... consequenti] *BP om. V* 12 respectu] *B om. P* 13 referentur] *B* referuntur *P* / *prius* compositum] *B om. P*

[335] Quod autem ultra dicit usque ad finem, sicut iacet satis est probabile et verum (ut credo), excepto eo quod repetit de differentia intentionis inter esse et essentiam.

2 et verum] *BP om. V* / credo] et verum *add. V* / repetit] *BV* interponit *P* / differentia] rationis et *add. P* 3 inter] *BPcV* in *P*

ANNEXUM: DE MATERIA ET FORMA

ARGUMENTUM

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De tribus Henrici rationibus (2)
De triplici esse materie (3-4)
De Hervei propria opinione (5)
Primo arguitur ex consideratione ipsius esse simpliciter (6-7)
Quod 'dici in potentia ad esse simpliciter in actu' dupliciter dicitur (8)
De materia que est in potentia subiectiva ad esse simpliciter (9-10)
Secundo hoc idem ostenditur (11-13)
Tertio hoc idem ostenditur (14)
Quarto hoc idem ostenditur (15-16)
Quinto hoc idem ostenditur (17)
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Ad argumentum in oppositum (21)
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Epilogus (33).

SIGLA

B = Bordeaux, Bibliothèque municipale, cod. 147 saec. XIV *init*.
P = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, cod. 3157 saec. XIV *init*.
V = Vatican Library, *Vat. lat*., 859, saec. XIV *init*.

Bc, **Pc**,**Vc** = manus quae correxit **B**,**P**,**V**
Bm, Pm, Vm manus in margine **B,P,V**

] = scripsi(t), scripserunt
… = usque ad
<…> = supplevi
(*!*) = (sic!)
add. = addit, addunt
om. = omittit, omittunt
coni. = conieci, coniciendo
coll. = collato, collatis

TRACTATUS DE MATERIA ET FORMA

UTRUM MATERIA POSSIT ESSE SINE FORMA

Status questionis

[1][B228ra;P3rb;V48rb] Predicto primo *Quolibet* questione decima querit utrum materia possit esse sine forma.[1] Et arguit primo quod sic quia: Accidens virtute divina potest existere per se sine subiecto. Ergo multo magis potest materia virtute divina per se existere sine forma, quia minus est remota a subsistendo quam accidens. CONTRA. Quod subsistit est in actu. Sed materia nullum esse actu habet nisi a forma cum sit in pura potentia. Ergo non potest subsistere sine forma.

3 existere] *BVm* subsistere *P* 4 potest] *P om. B* / existere] *BVm* subsistere *P* 4 quia] *PVm* quod *B* non *add. PVm* 6 sed] *PVm om. B*

De tribus Henrici rationibus

[2] Et ad illam questionem respondet quod virtute divina potest materia esse sine aliqua forma. Quamvis autem iuxta modum suum multa verba inutilia dicat, vis sue probationis consistit in hiis tribus rationibus. Prima est quia: Materia potest esse sine eo quod non est causa eius. Sed forma etsi sit forma materie, tamen secundum Commentatorem[2] non est causa formalis materie. Ergo materia potest esse virtute divina sine forma. Secunda est quia: Non minus potest Deus conservare materiam quam creare. Sed Deus creavit materiam per seipsam. Ergo per seipsam sine forma vel quocumque alio potest eam conservare. Tertia est illa quia: Illud quod preexistit alicui ordine nature, non dependet ab eo cui preexistit, et per consequens potest esse sine eo. Sed materia ordine nature preexistit forme, sicut probatur per Augustinum libro XIII *Confessionum* cap. XXXIII, ubi dicit[3] materiam esse de nichilo factam, sed speciem

1. I, 10: Utrum materia possit existere per se sine forma.
2. Re vera Avicennam, *Metaphysica* VI, 1.
3. *Confessiones* XIII, cap. 33.

mundi, per quam (ut iste dicit) intelligit formam, dicit esse factam de informi materia, et totum simul. --- In hoc stat vis suarum rationum.

3 hiis] *B om. PVm* / rationibus] *BP om. Vm* 3-4 prima est] *B om. PVm* 8 *bis* seipsam] *BVm* seipsum *P* 9 potest ... conservare] *BP om. Vm* 13 dicit] *BVm* dixit *P* 15 in ... rationum] *BP om. Vm*

De triplici esse materie

[3] Ad rationem in oppositum dicit quod illud argumentum procedit ex defectu philosophie non determinantis omnem modum essendi. Dicit ergo quod materia habet triplex *esse*. Unum esse simpliciter et aliud esse specialiter, prout est scilicet quedam capacitas forme; tertium esse, quod similiter est speciale, est prout est fulcimentum compositi. Primum esse (ut dicit) habet materia, sicut et quelibet alia res, quadam denominatione extrinseca ab esse divino. Secundum esse habet a propria natura, sicut etiam quelibet alia res habet a propria natura quod sit talis res. Quod ostendit per commentatorem Boetii *De hebdomadibus*, qui dicit[4] quod quando dicitur quod homo est absolute, hoc intelligunt theologi quadam extrinseca denominatione ab esse divino. Sed quando dicitur quod homo est corpus vel animal, hoc intelligunt theologi convenire sibi ex propria natura, puta corporeitate vel animalitate. Tertium autem esse (ut dicit) habet a forma inquantum est pars compositi in actu. Ad formam autem argumenti dicit quod licet materia non habeat nec possit habere esse in actu tertio modo dictum sine forma, tamen secundum primum modum et secundum potest habere esse in actu proprie nature in rerum natura sine omni forma.

6 habet] *BP om. Vm* 10 dicitur] *PVm* dico *B* 11 extrinseca] *BPcVm om. P* / dicitur] *PVm* dico *B* 15 habere] *PVm om. B*

[4] Sed contra hoc statim arguit sic quia: Si materia potest esse actu et habere propriam actualitatem sine forma, quamcumque illa actualitas sit imperfecta, sequitur quod materia et forma substantialis non faciunt unum in actu simpliciter, sed per accidens, et quod forma substantialis adveniens enti in actu sit accidens. Quod est inconveniens. Et ad hoc dicit quod hoc verum esset, si esse actu sine forma conveniret materie a natura sua. Nunc autem non est ita, quia sic esse actu non convenit sibi nisi supernaturali obedine. Et in hiis stat virtus suorum dictorum.

4 in actu] *BPc om. PVm* 4-5 et quod ... accidens] *BP om. Vm* 5 enti] *P om. B* 6 verum] *Pc* enim *P om. B* 8 et ... dictorum] *BP om. Vm*

4. Gilbertus Porretanus, *In Boethii De hebdomadibus*, p. 193, 54-58.

De Hervei propria opinione

[5] Ad illam autem questionem ego dico quod non videtur michi quod materia aliquo modo possit esse in actu in rerum natura absque omni forma. Et hoc ostendo sex rationibus. Prima sumitur ex consideratione ipsius esse simpliciter et ex consideratione potentie ad esse simpliciter secundum quod materia dicitur potentia ad esse **[P39va]** simpliciter.

4 ipsius esse] P ipsius B esse Vm

Primo arguitur ex consideratione ipsius esse simpliciter

[6] Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod 'esse simpliciter' potest accipi quatuor modis. Uno modo secundum quod esse simpliciter distinguitur contra esse contractum. Et illo modo esse commune omnibus entibus dicitur esse simpliciter. Et de tali esse simpliciter non est hic sermo, quia constat quod quando dicitur quod materia est in potentia ad esse simpliciter, non intelligitur de esse communi omnibus entibus prout stat in sua communitate, sed solum de esse substantiali. Alio modo dicitur esse simpliciter secundum quod res habet omne esse simpliciter sibi debitum, sive substantiale sive accidentale. Et adhuc de isto esse simpliciter nichil ad propositum, quia non solum materia sed etiam forma in esse substantiali completo potest esse in potentia ad tale esse inquantum deficit ab aliquo esse actuali sibi debito. Tertio modo dicitur esse simpliciter in actu, sive sit esse substantiale sive accidentale, ita quod esse in actu dicitur esse simpliciter et esse in potentia esse secundum quid. Et adhuc esse simpliciter illo modo non pertinet ad propositum nostrum, quia etiam esse actuale et accidentale dicitur esse simpliciter isto modo.

2 secundum quod esse] *BP* ut *Vm* 3 illo modo] *BP* sic *Vm* 4-7 quia ... communitate] *BP om. Vm* 7-8 esse simpliciter] *BP om. Vm* 9 accidentale] *PVm* actuale *B* 9-10 esse ... propositum] *BP* non est hic sermo *Vm* 11 *secundum* esse] *BPcVm om. P* 12 actuali] *BVm* accidentali *P* 15 nostrum] *BP om. Vm* 15-16 etiam ... accidentale] *BPcVm om. P*

[7] Quarto modo dicitur esse simpliciter prout esse substantiale actuale dicitur esse simpliciter respectu esse accidentalis actualis. Dicitur autem esse substantiale actuale esse simpliciter respectu esse accidentalis actualis, quia est primum esse in actu quod res quecumque in rerum natura potest habere. A quo esse omne aliud esse dependet, ita quod tale esse non potest habere subiectum quod sine ipso possit esse, quia in hoc differt esse substantiale ab accidentali quia etiamsi compositum ex substantia et accidente non possit esse aliquo modo in rerum natura sine aliquo accidente, tamen subiectum accidentis potest esse sine accidente. Et dato quod subiectum accidentis non potest esse nec est sine accidente ipsum

concomitante, quia quedam accidentia necessario consequuntur suum subiectum, tamen subiectum non habet esse ab accidente nec dependet ab eo, sed econverso. Ad tale autem esse simpliciter dicitur materia esse in potentia.

1 dicitur ... simpliciter] *BVm om. P* / esse] *BVm* est *P* 2 esse ... actualis] *PVm* ad esse actuale *B* 2-4 dicitur ... actualis] *BP om. Vm* 5-6 a quo ... habere] *BVm om. P* 6 quod] *PVm* quia *B* 7 accidentali] *PVm* actuali *B* 8 aliquo ... natura] *BVm om. P* / modo] *Bc om. B* 8 *secundum* aliquo] *P om. BVm* 9 tamen ... accidente] *PVm om. B* 10 accidente] *PVm* ut a quo dependeat tamquam a causa *add. Vm* 9-11 et dato ... concomitante] *PVm om. B* 11-13 quia ... econverso] *BP om. Vm* 11 accidentia necessario] *BPc om. P*

Quod 'dici in potentia ad esse simpliciter in actu' dupliciter dicitur

[8] Potest autem aliquid dici in potentia ad esse simpliciter in actu dupliciter. Uno modo quia est in sola potentia agentis nullam penitus realem entitatem habens in rerum natura in actu. Et isto modo solum non potest intelligi materia in potentia ad esse simpliciter, quia isto modo substantia composita et substantia angeli est in potentia **[B228rb]** ad esse simpliciter antequam creatur. Constat autem quod aliter materia est in potentia ad esse simpliciter quam substantia composita vel angelus. Et ideo oportet dicere quod materia est in potentia subiectiva ad esse simpliciter.

1 aliquid] *BPcVm om. P* 2 potentia] secundo (*?an* falso) *add. Vm* / realem] *PVm om. B* 4-5 quia ... simpliciter] *BVm om. P* 6-7 antequam ... angelus] *BP om. Vm* 7 ad esse simpliciter] *B om. P* 8 subiectiva] *BcPVm* substantia *B*

De materia que est in potentia subiectiva ad esse simpliciter

[9] Ex hiis arguo sic dupliciter. Primo quia: Materia que est in potentia subiectiva ad esse simpliciter, aut dicitur esse in potentia subiectiva ad esse simpliciter, quia scilicet est in potentia susceptiva alicuius actus per quem actum una cum ipso est simpliciter in actu nec aliquod esse actuale sine ipso potest habere, aut quia est ita in potentia subiectiva ad esse simpliciter, quod, si est potentia susceptiva alicuius actus per quem habet esse simpliciter modo quo expositum est, sine quo tamen potest esse in actu simpliciter. Si primo modo, tunc habetur propositum, scilicet quod materia non potest esse sine actu cuius est susceptiva, qui quidem actus est forma. Si secundo modo, tunc sequitur quod illud esse ad quod materia est in potentia, non est esse simpliciter de quo dictum est, quia esse simpliciter quod convenit substantie in compositione ad accidens quod dicitur esse secundum quid, est primum esse quod res potest habere in rerum natura et sine quo subiectum eius esse non potest, ut deductum est.

Si ergo materia posset esse sine omni forma vel actu ad quem est in potentia subiectiva, nullus actus alius a materia daret sibi esse simpliciter sed esse secundum quid. Et per consequens omnis forma que est in materia, esset accidens; quod est inconveniens. Relinquitur ergo primum, scilicet quod materia est in potentia subiectiva ad actum alium a se sic quod sine illo alio actu nullo modo potest esse in rerum natura.

2-3 aut ... simpliciter] *BP om. Vm* / *prius* esse] *P om. B* 2 in] *P om. BVm* 4 cum ipso] *Pc* cum uno *P* compositio *B* 3-4 per ... ipso] *BP* sine quo nullum esse actuale Vm 5 quia] *Vm om. BP* / ita in] *B* in *P om. Vm* / subiectiva] *P* susceptiva *Vm* activa *B* 5-6 ad ... alicuius] *BP om. Vm* 7 quo ... est] *BP* exposito *Vm* 9-10 non ... materia] *BP om. Vm* 9 qui] *BcP om. B* 11 in] *PVm om. B* 11-13 non est ... quid est] *BP om. Vm* 15 vel ... quem] *BP* ad quam *Vm* 16 subiectiva] *PVm* substantia *B* 19 sic] *BPcVm* secundum *P* 20 illo alio actu] *coni.* alio actu *Vm* illo actu *B* illo *P*

[10] Secundo sic quia: Sicut se habet potentia effectiva ad dandum esse effective, ita actus quo aliquid actu formaliter est ad dandum esse formaliter. Sed illud quod est in potentia obiectiva ad esse simpliciter respectu alicuius agentis, non potest habere aliquod esse sine illo agente dante sibi esse effective. Ergo nec illud quod est in potentia <subiectiva> ad esse simpliciter habendum formaliter per aliquem actum, potest aliquo **[P39vb]** modo esse in rerum natura sine illo actu respectu cuius dicitur esse in potentia ad esse simpliciter. Sic autem se habet materia respectu eiusdem forme. Igitur materia non potest esse sine forma aliqua.

1 secundo sic] *BVm* ergo sequitur *P* 2 ita] se habet *add. Vm* 2 quo ... est] *BP om. Vm* / aliquid actu] *coni.* aliquis actus *B* aliquid *P* 7 esse] *BVm om. P* 9 eiusdem] *P om. BVm*

Secundo hoc idem ostenditur

[11] Secundo hoc idem ostendo ex consideratione eius quo quid dicitur esse simpliciter actu formaliter sic quia: Omne quod advenit ei quod includit actum quo natum est esse simpliciter, est accidens, quia tale non potest dare esse simpliciter sed secundum quid; quia nulla res potest dare alicui quod sine ipsa iam habet. Sed omne factum in actu a quocumque agente includit aliquem actum quo est actu simpliciter, quia nichil potest esse factum in actu quin habeat esse simpliciter, quia omne esse actu presupponit esse actu simpliciter. Sed impossibile est aliquid esse actu simpliciter nisi includat illud quo formaliter est actu simpliciter, quia omne factum preter suam causam efficientem includit aliquem actum quo est actu formaliter. Ergo si materia sine omni forma potest fieri a Deo, quidquid advenit materie erit accidens, nec dabit esse simpliciter. Quod est inconveniens. Ergo materia non potest esse sine omni forma.

2-3 ei quod includit] *BP* enti includenti *Vm* 3 est ... simpliciter] *BP om. Vm* 4-5 quid quia nulla] *Vm* quid nulla enim *B* quod *P* 5 in actu] *Vm om. BP* 5-6 a quocumque... aliquem] *BP* est ens includens *Vm* 7-8 quia ... simpliciter] *BP om. Vm* / actu] *BP om. Vm* 8-9 sed ... simpliciter] *BP om. Vm* 9 nisi ... simpliciter] *BVm om. P* 9 quo] *Vm* quod *B* 9-11 quia ... formaliter] *BP* quod non potest esse *Vm* 10 efficientem] *B om. P* 12-13 nec ... forma] *BP om. Vm*

[12] Sed forte ad hoc dicet quod ille rationes concluderent si materie conveniret ex natura ipsa habere talem actum, nunc autem non convenit sibi ex sua natura, sed virtute divina. Sed hoc non valet, quia: Quod convenit alicui rei, nullo sibi addito, per comparationem ad proprium agens a quo solo habet produci, sibi convenit ex propria natura. Sed si materia fieret sine omni forma, constat quod per essentiam suam conveniret sibi quod esset actus quo formaliter esset actu simpliciter et per comparationem ad ipsum agens, quia solus Deus potest materiam producere. Ergo hoc conveniret sibi ex natura sua.

2 ipsa] *Vm* sua *BP* 4 addito] et *add. B* sed *add. P* 5 solo] *PVm om. B* 6 constat quod] *BP om. Vm* 6-7 conveniret] *BP om. Vm* 7 simpliciter] *BP om. Vm*

[13] Preterea. Licet oppositum eius quod convenit alicui naturaliter, non tamen essentialiter, et quandoque non convenit sibi per essentiam suam formaliter (sicut esse deorsum convenit gravi, quod quidem esse deorsum est diversum ab esse gravis) possit sibi convenire formaliter virtute divina, tamen oppositum eius quod convenit alicui per essentiam suam (sicut rationale convenit homini), nec supernaturaliter nec qualitercumque potest sibi non convenire. Sed potentia subiectiva ad esse simpliciter et actus respectu cuius dicitur talis potentia, sunt opposita, saltem quantum ad hoc quod unum non potest esse aliud. Cum ergo materia sit essentialiter potentia subiectiva respectu actus quo aliquid habet esse simpliciter, impossibile erit quod sit actus quo aliquid est actu simpliciter. Sed si materia esset in rerum natura actu sine omni forma, esset per essentiam actus quo aliquid est actu simpliciter, ut deductum est supra. Impossibile est igitur quacumque virtute materiam esse in rerum natura sine omni forma.

1 alicui] *PVm om. B* 1-2 non ... essentialiter] *Vm om. BP* 2 et quandoque] *P* quando *B* 2-7per essentiam ... non convenire] *BP* essentialiter poterit quocumque modo sibi supernaturaliter sicut esse deorsum convenit gravi naturaliter non tamen essentialiter tamen oppositum eius quod convenit alicui essentialiter sicut rationale convenit homini non potest sibi competere nec supernatutaliter nec qualitercumque *Vm* 3 quod quidem] *P* et quod *B* 5 oppositum] *BPc* propositum *P* 7 non] *P om. B* 10 essentialiter] *BP om. Vm* / respectu ... habet] *BP* ad *Vm* 11 erit] *Vm* est *BP* 13 ut ... supra] *BP om. Vm* 15 omni] *P om. BVm*

Tertio hoc idem ostenditur

[14] Tertio hoc idem ostendo comparando esse simpliciter ad esse secundum quid quia: Sicut se habet illud quod est in potentia subiectiva ad aliquem actum quo est secundum quid, ad esse secundum quid per illum actum, ita se habet illud quod est in potentia subiectiva ad aliquem actum quo est simpliciter, ad esse simpliciter ad illum actum. Sed illud quod est in potentia ad aliquem actum quo est secundum quid, non potest habere illud esse secundum quid sine illo actu, sicut homo non potest habere esse album sine albedine. Ergo a simili illud quod est in potentia ad aliquem actum quo est simpliciter, nullo modo potest habere esse simpliciter in rerum natura sine illo actu. Sic autem est materia in potentia ad formam. Et ideo nullo modo potest habere esse simpliciter in rerum natura sine omni forma.

1 hoc ... ostendo] *BP* arguo *Vm* 1-12 sicut ... omni forma] *BP* sicut potentia subiectiva ad esse secundum quid ad illum actum quo est secundum quid ita potentia subiectiva ad esse simpliciter ad omnen actum quo est simpliciter. sed quod est in potentia ad esse secundum quid non potest esse in actu scilicet realiter esse sine actu tali sicut homo non potest habere esse album sine albedine. Ergo a simili nec materia que est in potentia ad esse simpliciter sine illo actu qui dat esse simpliciter ipsa ex mutua dependentia que est inter materiam et formam: sic<ut> forma materialis dependet a materia ut a potentia in qua recipitur et sustentatur ita etiam materia dependet a forma ut a terminante eius potentiam et causa faciente ad sumendum ab aliquo agente esse in actu. Alioquin materia esset substantia completa sed non dependeret a forma in essendo sed a solo agente. Sed sicud ab adversariis et a multis aliis probabiliter tenetur forma materialis nulla virtute potest esse sine materia nec materia sine forma. ex hiis sic arguo *Vm* 11 simpliciter] *P om. B*

Quarto hoc idem ostenditur

[15] Quarto hoc idem ostendo ex mutua dependentia que est inter formam et materiam. Sciendum est ergo primo quod non est ita ymaginandum sicut iste ymaginatur, scilicet quod materia prius in creatione compositi fiat et deinde forma ordine nature, quia materie nec esse nec fieri per se et principaliter competit. Hec enim se consequuntur, quod scilicet cui competit per se fieri, ei competit per se esse, et econverso. Immo materia in suo esse et in suo fieri dependet a forma et non econverso, quia si materia non dependeret in suo esse nec in suo fieri ab **[P40ra]** aliqua forma sed solum ab agente, **[V48rb lin. 23a]** tunc materia esset simpliciter per se ens. Et per consequens esset substantia perfecta et omnis actus ei adveniens esset accidens. Et inde est quod, sicut alias dixi, nec materia proprie et principaliter fit nec forma, sicut nec materie nec forme **[B228va]** competit per se et simpliciter esse, sed compositum tantum fit, cui in

materialibus solum competit per se et simpliciter esse, sed materie et forme et fieri et esse ex consequenti convenit. Et sicut mutuo ex se dependent, ut dictum est, ita mutuo secundum diversas considerationes se precedunt et presupponunt.

3 prius] *B* primo *P* 6-7 immo ... econverso] *P om. B* 13-14 sed ... esse] *PV om. B* 13 tantum] *V om. P* 17 se] *BP om. V*

[16] Ex hiis sic arguo. Sicut forma materialis dependet a materia ut a potentia in qua recipitur et sustentatur, ita etiam materia dependet a forma ut a terminante eius potentiam et eam faciente habilem ad habendum ab aliquo agente esse in actu; alioquin enim, ut dictum est, materia esset substantia completa. Sed sicut ab adversario et a multis aliis probabiliter tenetur, forma materialis non potest quacumque virtute esse sine materia. Ergo nec materia sine forma.

2 in qua] *BP* materie *V* 3 faciente] *BP* facientem *V* 5 completa] *BPcV* composita *P* 5-6 probabiliter tenetur] *BP* probatur *V* 6 non] *PV* nisi *B*

Quinto hoc idem ostenditur

[17] Quinto ostendo ex quodam simili quod dato quod materia non dependeret a forma, sicut nec quantitas a figura, quod adhuc probabiliter sequitur quod non possit esse sine forma, quia, ut videtur, sicut quantitas ad diversas figuras, ita suo modo se habet materia ad diversas formas quantum ad posse esse sine invicem. Quinimmo (ut videtur) minus potest materia esse sine forma quam quantitas sine figura inquantum plus dependet materia a forma (ut de se patet) quam quantitas a figura. Sed quantitas non potest esse sine figura, quia quantitatem finitam et determinatam necessario consequitur aliqua figura; quantitas autem infinita esse non potest. Ergo a simili, immo (ut videtur) multo minus potest esse materia sine forma per quamcumque virtutem.

3 quantitas] se habet *add. V* 5 quinimmo ut videtur] *PV* immo *B* 6 inquantum] *BP* sed multo *V* 8 determinatam] *V* terminatam *BP* 9 consequitur] *V* sequitur *BP* 10 potest esse] *PV om. B*

Sexto hoc idem ostenditur

[18] Sexto hoc idem ostendo ex quodam dicto adversarii. Ipse enim in questione qua querit utrum Christus potuerit assumere naturam irrationalem, ponit quod nullum ens potest esse quin oporteat quod competat sibi posse operari secundum modum illius esse ita quod si habeat esse naturale, oportet quod habeat potentiam per quam possit operari natura-

liter, si autem habeat esse supernaturale, oportet quod habeat potentiam per quam possit operari supernaturaliter. Ponit etiam in multis locis quod in omni operante est principium activum sue operationis. Si ergo materia potest esse per se solam sine aliqua forma, sequitur quod materia per se ipsam sit potentia activa sive principium activum alicuius operationis vel naturalis vel supernaturalis sibi secundum illud esse debite. Sed hoc est falsum, quia materia nullius operationis potest esse principium effectivum, nec cuiuscumque effectus nec in composito existens nec per se. Quod in composito materia nullius sit principium activum patet. Ex hoc etiam sequitur quod nec per se, quia est pars compositi. Et si tollat ab aliquo esse suppositum agens, non tamen tollit ab eo **[V48va]** esse principium activum. Et ideo si materia non potest esse principium activum in composito, nec etiam poterit hoc sibi convenire per se existenti.

1 idem] *BV om. P* 4 posse] *BV om. P* / si] *BP om. V* 6-7 si autem ... supernaturaliter] *BP om. V* 8 operante] *PV* operatione *B* 11 supernaturalis] *BPcV om. P* 13 *prius* nec] etiam *add. BP* 15 est] *PVc* esse *BV* 16 ab eo] *BPcV* omni *P* 17 non potest] *BPVc om. V*

[19] Item. Etiam cum sit pura potentia in genere potentie subiective, non videtur quod possit esse actus quo aliquid agat. Item. Etiam non est facile fingere qualis sit illa operatio cuius talis materia possit esse principium activum vel per etiam qualecumque principium. Si ergo materia, ut deductum est, non potest per se sine omni forma operari, sequitur secundum dictum adversarii quod nec possit esse per se sine omni forma.

4 etiam] *PV om. B* / qualecumque] *BV* qualitercumque *P* 4 materia] *BP* esse materie *V* 5 omni] *PV om. B*

[20] Item. Talis materia in nullo loco qualicumque erit, quia nec per essentiam, quia materie per essentiam non debetur locus, nec per operationem quam habeat non potest existere, ut dictum est. Item. Non pertinebit in aliquo ad genus rerum corporalium, quia tunc esset saltem per accidens **[P40rb]** in loco, quod tali materie non competit. Nec ad genus rerum immaterialium, cum sit materia nec sit angelus, ita quod non video ubi possit poni talis materia nisi inter ydeas Platonis.

1 loco] *BcPV* modo *B* / qualicumque] *PV* qualitercumque *B* / quia] *BPcV* que *P* 3 non] *BP om. V* 5 materie] *BP* modo *V* 7 ubi] *V* ut *BP*

Ad argumentum in oppositum

[21] Ad argumentum in oppositum dicendum quod licet quantitas in comparatione ad agens naturale sit magis remota a subsistendo quam materia, quia quantitas ex sua naturali aptitudine nec est subsistens nec pars subsistentis, materia vero ex natura sua habet quod sit pars subsistentis, per

comparationem tamen ad agens supernaturale quantitas est minus remota a subsistendo (vocando ‘subsistere’ per se existere) quam materia, quia materia preter potentialitatem suam non includit aliquem actum ex natura sua quo aliquid formaliter possit esse simpliciter in actu per quodcumque agens (ut ostensum est). Quantitas autem includit actum quo formaliter aliquid potest esse simpliciter in actu vel in habendo quando fit virtute agentis naturalis vel per se stando, ut quando fit virtute divina.

2 naturale] *BV* naturalis *P* 4 materia ... subsistentis] *BP om. V* 6 existere] *PV* subsistere *B* 7 preter] *coni.* propter *BPV* / potentialitatem] *V* potentiam BP / aliquem actum] *BP* aliquid *V* 10 aliquid] *BP om. V* / simpliciter] *P om. BV* 11 naturalis] *BP om. V* / quando] *BP om. V*

Ad rationes Henrici ad questionem principalem factas

[22] Ad primam autem rationem istius hominis dicendum quod licet forma proprie loquendo non sit causa formalis nisi compositi cuius substantiam intrat et cui principaliter debetur esse et habere causam, sicut etiam nec materia proprie est causa materialis forme sed magis compositi cuius substantiam intrat, aliquo modo tamen et convertibiliter sunt sibi invicem cause et ex se invicem dependent in consequenti. Unde notandum quod illud argumentum non plus concludit materiam posse esse sine forma, quia scilicet forma non est causa formalis eius, quam formam materialem posse esse sine materia, quia proprie materia non est causa materialis eius. Et tamen (ut credo) iste homo non concederet formam materialem posse esse sine materia.

3 sicut] *BP* sic *V* 4 materialis] *PV* formalis *B* 6 in consequenti] *PV* scilicet materia et forma *B* 8-10 quam ... eius] *BP om. V*

[23] Ad secundum dicendum quod sic Deus potest conservare materiam sicut creat eam. Et quando dicitur in minori quod Deus creat materiam per seipsam absque alio, dicendum quod verum est quod etiam Deus facit absque alio factore vel causa efficiente concurrente cum eo **[B228vb]** ad eius creationem. Et illo modo etiam per seipsum creat formam absque alio, sed non creat eam absque alio a quo dependeat sicut ab actu suam potentialitatem formaliter terminante.

3 seipsam] *BV* seipsum *P* 5 etiam] *B om. PV* 7 terminante] *BPcV* determinante *P*

[24] Ad tertium dicendum quod illud argumentum procedit ex falsa ymaginatione istius hominis, qui credit materiam non dependere a forma in suo esse et fieri aliquo modo sed tantum econverso. Nunc autem non est ita. Immo et forma dependet a materia et econverso et in esse et in fieri. Et secundum hoc mutuo se precedunt secundum diversas considerationes.

Et ideo non possunt fieri sine efficiente causa aliquo modo invicem. Licet enim utrumque a solo Deo dependeat sicut a causa efficiente, tamen aliquo modo dependent ex seinvicem.

3 fieri] *PV* non *B* / econverso] *PV* econtra *B* 5 hoc] etiam *add. PV* 6 fieri ... invicem] *B* sine invicem esse *P* fieri sine invicem *V*

[25] Ex premissis patet quod solutio quam ipse dat ad argumentum quod ipsemet facit contra se, non valet.

1 premissis] *BV* predictis *P*

[26] Quod autem dicit ad argumentum factum principaliter ab opponente ad questionem: licet faciat in dicto suo magnam tragediam verborum, nimis frivolum est, quia quod dicit quod res alio habet esse et alio habet esse tale, falsissimum est, et precipue loquendo de re simplici qualis esset materia nuda, quam ipse ponit posse esse per se.

1-2 quod ... questionem] *BP om. V* 2 suo] *BV om. P* / verborum] *BV om. P* 3 esse] *BP* essentiam *V* / *alterum* alio] *PV om. B* 4 tale] *BP om. V*

Quod eadem res dupliciter dicitur per aliud esse materialiter: effective vel formaliter

[27] Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod sicut sunt plures cause eiusdem rei, ita et eadem res potest <dupliciter> dici per aliud esse materialiter. Uno modo effective (sicut omnis creatura tria habet esse a Deo vel mediate vel immediate). Et illo modo res bene habet ab eodem esse et esse tale. Res enim habet esse a Deo effective et esse tale, quia si res non haberet esse tale a Deo determinate, aliquid esset positivum in creatura cuius Deus non esset per se causa efficiens; quod falsum est. Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse per aliud formaliter, sicut homo est homo per humanitatem sive per animam rationalem. Et sic eadem res habet eodem esse et esse tale. Eodem enim formaliter homo est ens et tale ens, sicut eodem est aliquid quale et album.

2 materialiter] *BP* materie *V* 3 sicut] *BP* et ideo *V* / creatura] *PV* causa *B* 4-5 et illo ... deo] *BPcV om. P* 6 positivum] *V* positum *B* potissimum *P* 7 per se] *PV om. B* / efficiens] *P* effectiva *BV* 8 *alterum* homo] *BV om. P* 9 rationalem] *BPcV* substantialem *P* 10 *prius* eodem] modo *add. V* / *alterum* ens] speciale *add. P*

[28] Verumtamen verum est quod compositum dependet **[P40va]** in suo esse ab aliquo a quo non habet quod sit tale ens speciale, quia res materiales non determinantur ad speciem per materiam, sed per formam. Sed quantum ad formam et naturam compositam, sicut est humanitas, omne compositum eodem est ens simpliciter et ens tale tam **[V48vb]** formaliter quam effective. Et multo plus de ente simplici, ita scilicet quod ab eodem

formaliter et etiam effective; et precipue quantum ad primum agens habet res esse simpliciter substantiale et esse tale substantiale. Sed verum est quod formaliter et effective potest res habere esse substantiale simpliciter ab uno agente et esse tale accidentale ab alio.

1 verum est quod] *BV om. P* 4 omne] *BP* esse *V* 5 simpliciter] *BP* similiter *V* 6 scilicet] *BP* simpliciter *V*

[29] Quando ergo dicit quod materia habet esse simpliciter a Deo, dico quod si dicatur 'esse simpliciter' idest per se esse et principaliter, sicut competit substantie complete, sic esse simpliciter (ut deductum est), nec a Deo nec ab alio qualitercumque potest sibi convenire. Si autem vocetur 'esse simpliciter' pro esse in effectu non contracto ad determinatam naturam, tale esse simpliciter habet materia a Deo effective et a seipsa ut est quedam essentia formaliter, vocando 'formale' illud in quo unumquodque distinguitur essentialiter ab alio. Et etiam ab eisdem habet esse tale determinatum ab uno effective et ab alio formaliter, ut dictum est, excepta determinatione, que fit per formam. Quam determinationem (sive quod esse determinatum) habet materia per aliquid diversum a sua essentia, scilicet per formam, sicut quodammodo subiectum habet determinatum esse per formam actualem, nisi quod in hoc differt quod subiectum non dependet in suo esse a forma acccidentali determinate sicut materia dependet a forma substantiali, a qua (ut dictum est) dependet materia in suo esse etiam simpliciter non sicut a causa efficiente, sed sicut a terminante eius potentialitatem, ut dictum est.

3 complete] *BP om. V* 4 sibi convenire] *P* habere *BV* 5 pro] *BP* idem quod *V* 6 effective] *V* efficiente *BP* 7 formale] *BP om. V* 9 effective] *PV* efficiente *B* / excepta] *PV* extrinseca *B* 12-13 sicut ... formam] *PV om. B* 14 accidentali] *V* actuali *BP*

[30] Et quando dicit ultra quod secundum esse, scilicet esse quandam capacitatem forme, habet a seipsa, dico quod verum est formaliter; et etiam ab alio, scilicet a Deo non formaliter sed effective. Et quando dicit quod illa duo prima esse potest habere sine forma, dico quod falsum est, sicut ostensum est supra.

2 forme] *B* formarum PV 4 prima] *BP om. V*

Quod 'fulcimentum compositi' dupliciter dicitur

[31] Quod autem dicit ultra quod esse fulcimentum compositi habet a forma, dico quod si intelligat per 'fulcimentum compositi' illud quod est natum constituere cum forma ipsum compositum, tunc idem erit iudicium de hoc tertio esse et de secundo, quia idem est esse capax sive capacitas forme et esse natum cum forma constituere compositum. Et sic sequitur

quod si non potest habere illud tertium esse sine forma, nec etiam poterit habere secundum esse sine forma; quod est contra eum. Si autem per ‘esse fulcimentum compositi’ intelligit existere in actu in composito ut pars eius, dico quod esse sic fulcimentum compositi non habet effective a forma, sicut nec esse simpliciter. Formaliter autem et hoc esse et alia habet tam a forma quam a seipsa, licet aliter et aliter, quia et esse simpliciter et esse capacitatem forme et fulcimentum compositi habet a seipsa inquantum ipsa per essentiam est quedam essentia potentialis et capacitas et fulcimentum. Sed a forma habet sicut a terminante potentialitatem suam sine qua non potest esse actu, ut deductum est.

1 habet] esse *add. V* 3 cum forma] *BP* per formam *V* / erit] *P* est *BV* / iudicium] *PV* iudicandum *B* 5 cum] *PV* quod *B* 6 habere] *BV om. P* 7 habere] *V om. BP* / esse] *PV om. B* 8 *alterum* in] *BPVc om. V* 11 quia et] *BP* et quia *V* 12 forme] *B* formarum *PV*

Quod forma substantialis non differre ab accidentali videatur

[32] Secundum autem ymaginationem istius hominis videtur forma substantialis non differre ab accidentali. Si enim illud quod est receptivum forme substantialis non dependet ab ea in suo esse actuali sive in suo esse in effectu simpliciter, sed tantum quantum ad hoc quod est esse informatum ea (quod forte intelligit per hoc quod est ‘esse fulcimentum compositi’), isto etiam modo potest dici quod subiectum dependet ab accidente, quia subiectum licet quantum ad id quod est non dependeat a forma accidentali, dependet tamen ab ea quantum ad hoc **[B229ra]** quod est esse informatum ea. Constat enim quod substantia quantum ad hoc quod est **[P40vb]** esse album, dependet formaliter ab albedine, nec sine albedine hoc potest sibi competere.

1 autem] *coni*. enim *PV om. B* 2 si] *BP* solum *V* 4 tantum] *BP* tamen *V* 7 id] *BV* ibi *P* 9 ea] *BPcV* ab ea *P*

Epilogus

[33] Et ideo quidquid sit de veritate huius questionis, videtur michi quod iste homo nichil dicat.

EXPLICIT *deest ab BVP*

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INT 8.9.4; in eadem substantia, quotquot ponantur accidentia vel forme, non est nisi unicum esse: *DEE* 47; accidens virtute divina potest existere per se sine subiecto: *DMF* 12; sicut ex forma substantiali et materia fit unum simpliciter, ita ex forma accidentali et substantia fit unum per accidens: *DEE* 51; non est simile de materia et forma substantiali et de subiecto et accidente: *DEE* 246; conversa substantia panis in corpus Christi, accidentia manent: *DEE* 46; 54

accidentalis
sicut ex forma substantiali et materia fit unum simpliciter, ita ex forma accidentali et substantia fit unum per accidens: *DEE* 51; esse substantiale actuale/esse accidentale actuale: *DMF* 7; essentie accidentales: *DEE* 208; subiectum licet quantum ad id quod est non dependeat a forma accidentali, dependet tamen ab ea quantum ad hoc quod est esse informatum ea: *DMF* 32; see also s.v. *coincidental*

actualis
esse actuale (*opp*. esse potentiale): *DEE* 19; esse substantiale actuale/esse accidentale actuale: *DMF* 7; ratio actualis existentie in hoc consistit quod sit actualiter Dei effectus: *DEE* 6; essentia Sortis numquam caret esse actuali Sortis: *DEE* 298; non habere actualem existentiam sapiendi: *DEE* 12; 201; unumquodque dicitur existens formaliter, si large accipiamus 'formam' pro quolibet actuali: *INT* 7.3.1, n. 119

actualitas
twofold actualitas: *INT* 3.1; 3.1; 3.1.2; 6.1.4, n. 88; 7.5, n. 148; 'actualitas' as indiscriminately used for the state of being actual and the act of actualization: *INT* 3.1.1, n. 17; actualitas sive entitas: *DEE* 256; quedam actualitas quam vocamus 'esse': *DEE* 107

actuality
'actuality' vs. 'factualness': *INT* 3.1.2; 6.1.4, n. 81

actualization
prior to its actualization no essence has an ontological status beyond its being included in God's mind: INT 8.9.7

actus
actus (*opp*. potentia): *INT* 6.2.2; *DEE* 53; 67ff.; 170-176; 313; *DMF* 8ff.; actus quem dicimus 'esse': *DEE* 162; in actu/in habitu: *DEE* 116; quod est potentiale obiective, secundum aliam et aliam intentionem est in potentia et in actu: *DEE* 39; potentia sciri et significari habet per analogiam ad actum: *DEE* 143; accipiendo sapientiam pro habitu et sapere pro actu: *DEE* 234; actus considerandi differt re ab habitu qui est sapientia, sicut est in quolibet alio habitu: *DEE* 204; quandoque ipsum verbum infinitivi modi (sicut 'esse', 'vivere' et talia) indirecte ex suo modo significandi significant hoc quod est habere talem actum (puta vitam vel essentiam), aliquando accipiuntur pro ipso actu habito: *DEE* 146; 'actus' dupliciter accipitur: *DEE* 310; 'esse' non dicit aliquem actum absolutum additum super essentiam diversum ab essentia et a composito a pluribus essentiis: *DEE* 148; omnis creatura incipit esse actu: *DEE* 105; forma generis est media inter potentiam et actum: *DEE* 68; eductio actus non repugnat creationi: *DEE* 274; unumquoque est defectibile ratione potentie et est permanens ratione actus: *DEE* 108; 'Actus est actus' semper est vera: *DEE* 106

addere
aliquid additum: *DEE* 3; 19; 23; 26

adiacere
de 'est' secundo et tertio adiacente: *INT* 8.9.6

adiectivus
omnis terminus concretus, sive sit substantivus sive adiectivus [...] tam implicite quam explicite significat: *DEE* 164

adversarius
indicating Giles of Rome: *INT* passim; *DEE* 14 and passim

affirmatio
de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio: *DEE* 11
agere
'Agens' = 'Deus'
albedo
sicut se habet lux ad lucere et albedo ad albere, ita essentia ad esse: *DEE* 234
albere
sicut se habet lux ad lucere et albedo ad albere, ita essentia ad esse: *DEE* 234
amethektos
Greek *amethektos* = 'imparticipabilis' ('unshare-able'): *INT* 4.1; 4.2; 4.3; 5.4
analogia
analogia (entis): *DEE* 17; 45; 47f.; 59; 70; 98; 210; 232; analogia entis inter ens participatum et ens non participatum: *DEE* 70; analogy of being and participation: *INT* 6.3.4; 8.6.6; 8.8.1; potentia sciri et significari habet per analogiam ad actum: *DEE* 143
analogiari
substantia et accidens analogiantur: *DEE* 210
analogus
(*opp*. univocus): *DEE* 143; analogus decem predicamentis: *DEE* 48; on participation and analogous being: *INT* 8.8.1
ancient
ancient thought: *INT* 1.1; ancient semantics: *INT* 1.1; 7.4.3; 7.4.3, nn. 138-139; 8.9.5, n. 177; 8.9.7; parallellism postulate in ancient and medieval thought: *INT* 4.3, n. 51; 7.6
angelus
substantia angeli est in potentia ad esse simpliciter antequam creatur: *DMF* 8
anima
decem predicamenta prout actu existunt extra animam: *DEE* 48; evolutionary view of creation: quod quidam ponunt, scilicet sensitivum secundum rem educi de vegetativo, ita quod illud quod est a principio solum anima vegetativa, actione nature pertingit ad hoc quod sit sensitiva successive: *DEE* 32
animal
'animal' includit totum quicquid includit 'ens' et similiter 'animalitas' includit essentiam: *DEE* 129
animalitas
'animal' includit totum quicquid includit 'ens' et similiter 'animalitas' includit essentiam: *DEE* 129
ante
metaphysical use of 'ante': *INT* 5.4, n. 64
arbitrium
ex libertate arbitrii: *DEE* 109; 112; ex libero arbitrio: *DEE* 112; 118; 314; de novo et libero arbitrio: *DEE* 333; producibilis libero arbitrio: *DEE* 333; per liberum arbitrium: *DEE* 174; subiacere libero arbitrio: *DEE* 327; qui agit libero arbitrio: *DEE* 198; 315; 319; producere libero arbitrio: *DEE* 315; 327; 333
arbor
arbor porphyriana: *INT* 5.2, n. 56
ars
opp. opus nature: *DEE* 112
articulus
articulus damnatus: *DEE* 75
autonymous
autonymous use of terms: *INT* 6.14, n. 82; 7.4.3
axiom
ontological axiom: *INT* 6.1; 6.14; 6.1.5

Being
Being(ness): *INT* 1.1; 1.2; 8.1.1; 8.1.2; 8.2; passim; *id quod est* [Greek *to eon*] as 'share of beingness': *INT* 5; Divine Being: *INT* 7.1; 8.9.7; passim; matter has a single mode of being owing to an extrinsic denomination from divine Being: *INT* 9; Great Chain of Being: *INT* 5.1; hierarchy of being: *INT* 5.1; triple conception of 'being': *INT* 6.1; 6.1.1; 'being' as 'having an essence': *INT* 8.9.7; esse participatum as immanent share of beingness: *INT* 5; finite/infinite being: *INT* 8.9.7; compositional structure of finite, created being: *INT* 2; 3.1; on participation and analogous being: *INT* 8.8.1; on matter's threefold

mode of being: *INT* 9; a thing's be-ing (*esse*) = its essence in its relationship to its subject-substrate: *INT* 8.9.7; infinite/finite being: *INT* 8.9.7; 'rationate being' ('ens rationis'): *INT* 7.3.2; 7.4.2; substantial/coincidental being: *INT* 8.7.3; difference between existential and substantial being: *INT* 8.7.2; 8.7.4; being and unity: *INT* 5.2; trancendent notions of 'being' and 'one': *INT* 6.2.3; being/non-being: *INT* 8.9.2; on twofold non-being: *INT* 8.5.2; indifference to being and non-being: *INT* 8.5.1; 8.5.3; 8.5.4; 8.5.6; --- see also s.vv. *ens, esse, essentia*

bonitas
veritas, bonitas, unitas nichil addunt super essentiam rei: *DEE* 23; 94

bonus
esse verum, bonum, unum: *DEE* 3

Categorization
focalization and categorization: *INT* 4.3, n. 45; 7.4.4, n. 141

catholic
Catholic faith: *INT* 1; 1.3; 8.6; 8.9.7

causa
Causa Prima: *INT* 2.2; 4.1; 5.3;; God as exemplar and efficient cause: *INT* 8.9.7; secundum philosophos Intelligentie sunt cause aliarum rerum que sunt post eas: *DEE* 280; de pluribus causis eiusdem rei: *DMF* 27ff.; forma proprie loquendo non est causa formalis nisi compositi: *DMF* 22; materia proprie non est causa materialis forme sed magis compositi: *DMF* 22; li 'per' importat habitudinem cause efficientis: *DEE* 39; 'ex causa' = 'ex proposito': DEE 149

causality
diverse opinions about causality: *INT* 6.2.1

causation
causation and participation in Giles of Rome: *INT* 3.2; 5.2; causation and participation in Proclus: *INT* 4

chimera
sicut 'chimera', ita nec 'animal' significat rem veram sed figmentum, rebus non existentibus: *DEE* 157

Christian
Christian ontology: 1.3; 3.1.2; 5.1; 5.2

Christus
utrum Christus potuerit assumere naturam irrationalem: *DMF* 18

cognitio
de omni cognitione cuiuscumque cognoscentis nec ipsa cognitio nec aliquid ad ipsam pertinens manens infra limites cognitionis aliquod esse reale facit in cognito: *DEE* 135; relatio representati ad representans et cognoscibilis ad rationem cognoscendi vel ad cognitionem ipsam est tantum relatio rationis: *DEE* 124; 'exemplar' nichil plus importat nisi quod est representativum alicuis conductivi in cognitionem eius sive ratio cognoscendi ipsum: *DEE* 124; the cognition issue: *INT* 8.9.7; esse intentionale et cognoscitivum: *INT* 7.3.2, n. 125; on the irrelevance of an essence being cognized or not being cognized: *INT* 8.5.5

cognoscere
de principio cognoscendi: *DEE* 135; relatio representati ad representans et cognoscibilis ad rationem cognoscendi vel ad cognitionem ipsam est tantum relatio rationis: *DEE* 124; de omni cognitione cuiuscumque cognoscentis nec ipsa cognitio nec aliquid ad ipsam pertinens manens infra limites cognitionis aliquod esse reale facit in cognito: *DEE* 135; illud quod representat rem cognitam cognoscenti: *DEE* 135; 'exemplar' nichil plus importat nisi quod est representativum alicuis conductivi in cognitionem eius sive ratio cognoscendi ipsum: *DEE* 124; illud quod representat rem cognitam cognoscenti: *DEE* 135; res secundum quod cognita vs. res secundum quod est in intellectu: *INT* 8.5.5, n. 166

cognoscibilis
relatio representati ad representans et cognoscibilis ad rationem cognoscendi vel ad cognitionem ipsam est tantum relatio rationis: *DEE* 124
cognoscitivus
esse intentionale et cognoscitivum: *INT* 7.3.2, n. 125
coincidental
substantial/coincidental being: *INT* 8.7.3
communis
commune analogum (*opp*. commune univocum): *DEE* 143; esse communissimum quod est commune ad esse essentie et esse existentie: *DEE* 79; cfr. 284ff.
completus
substantia completa: *DEE* 150; 186; esse substantiale completum: *DMF* 6
compositio
compositio intentionalis inter esse et essentiam: *DEE* 119; compositio generis, speciei, differentie: *DEE* 119; genus et differentia faciunt compositionem: *DEE* 89; in creatura ex essentia et esse naturali non est aliqua compositio: *INT* 7.4.2; on composition as division's counterpart: *INT* 7.4.5
compositional
compositional structure of finite, created being: *INT* 2; 3.1; compositional structure and distinction of the components: *INT* 7.3.2, n. 127; 7.4.1; 7.4.1, n. 136; 8.7; the compositional structure of things explained in terms of the diversity of intentions: *INT* 7.4.2, n. 136
compositum
'esse' non dicit aliquem actum absolutum additum super essentiam diversum ab essentia et a composito a pluribus essentiis: *DEE* 148; de composito creato: *DEE* 52; 65ff.; nichil fit nisi compositum: *DEE* 95; Agens facit compositum non ex diversis rebus semper, sed quando que ex diversis intentionibus, sicut de *esse* et *essentia*: *DEE* 84; in materialibus substantia composita differt a forma, materia et accidentibus: *DEE* 150ff.; de composito ex forma et materia: *INT* 6.2.1; quod proprie loquendo nec materia nec forma creatur, sed compositum: *DEE* 253ff.; forma proprie loquendo non est causa formalis nisi compositi: *DMF* 22; materia proprie non est causa materialis forme sed magis compositi: *DMF* 22; 'fulcimentum compositi' dupliciter dicitur: *DMF* 31; de duplici transmutatione in generatione, scilicet materie ad formam et compositi ad esse: *DEE* 212;
conceptio
communis conceptio *def.*: *INT* 6.1.4
conceptus
de diversitate conceptuum: *INT* 7.4.2; semantics of terms and conceptual engineering: *INT* 8.9.7
concretivus
creatura concretive dicta: *DEE* 165; concretive significare: *DEE* 164
concretus
abstract/concrete terms: *INT* 8.3.1; differre secundum abstractum et concretum: *DEE* 43; participatio abstracti a concreto: *DEE* 208; omnis terminus concretus, sive sit substantivus sive adiectivus [...] tam implicite quam explicite significat: *DEE* 164
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Parisian condemnation of 1277: *INT* 6, n. 67
conductivus
'exemplar' nichil plus importat nisi quod est representativum alicuius conductivi in cognitionem eius sive ratio cognoscendi ipsum: *DEE* 124
coniunctivus (modus)
use of coniunctivus imperfecti: *INT* 5.2, n. 57; 5.3, n. 60
consecutio
posthabitio (Greek *methexis*) or 'consecutio': *INT* 4.2, n. 3
conservare
conservare/creare: *DMF* 2; 23
considerare
actus considerandi differt re ab habitu qui est sapientia, sicut est in quolibet alio habitu: *DEE* 204;

contractus
esse simpliciter (*opp*. esse contractum): *DMF* 6ff.; abstractum *opp*. commune: *DEE* 93; idem animal genere non contractum potest stare cum oppositis: *DEE* 298
conversio
de conversione panis: *DEE* 247
corporeitas
forma corporeitatis: *DEE* 78;
corpus
umbra a corpore necessitate nature procedit: *DEE* 109
corrumpere
quod aliquid quod est natum corrumpi numquam corrumpitur est contra philosophos: *DEE* 99
corvus
nigredo separatur a corvo: *INT* 6.3.2
courtesy
use of the plural as a common courtesy in academic debates: *INT* 6.1, nn. 68f.; 8.6.1, n. 167
creare
esse est prima intentio creata; alie vero intentiones, sicut *animal* et *homo*, non creantur proprie sed fiunt de illo esse per informationem: *DEE* 31; intentio ipsius esse est proprie creata et alie intentiones fiunt de illa per informationem intentionalem: *DEE* 223; essentia creata est quadam extrinseca participatione: *DEE* 83; quod proprie loquendo nec materia nec forma creatur, sed compositum: *DEE* 253ff.; de composito creato: *DEE* 52; 65ff.; esse de novo creatum: *DEE* 54; de triplici constitutione essentie create: *DEE* 9; materia potest creari sine forma substantiali: *DEE* 283; neither form nor matter properly created but their compound: *INT* 8.8; compositional structure of finite, created being: *INT* 2; 3.1
creatio(n)
INT 1.3; 3.1.2; 5.1; 5.4; 6. 6.2.4; 6.2.5; 6.3; 6.3.5; 7.2.1; 7.2.2; 8.8.2; 8.9.3; 8.9.7; see also s.v. *respectus*; the 'essence/existence' issue as intimately related to the problem of creation: *INT* 6.2.5, n. 97; 8.9.7; creation vs. natural generation: *INT* 8.9.5; 8.9.7; the utmost important question about saving creation: *INT* 8.6; 8.6.5; 8.6.6; 8.6.7;
de ratione 'creationis': *DEE* 73; 254; 264; 272; motus (*opp*. creatio): *DEE* 38; creatio passio est ipsius esse: *DEE* 228; creatio est aliqua mutatio: *DEE* 75; creatio non est mutatio habens terminos a quo et ad quem secundum rei veritatem, sed solum secundum falsam ymaginationem: *DEE* 177; per impressionem ab alio, scilicet per creationem Dei creantis: *DEE* 5; creatio est productio, nullo presupposito: *DEE* 65; 'nichil presupponere' in creatione non dicit habitudinem ad terminum a quo, sed negat habitudinem ad materiam presuppositam: *DEE* 273;
de distinctione circa creationem et factionem: *DEE* 273; per creationem/per informationem: *DEE* 281; creatio sicut et quelibet productio, est ad esse: *DEE* 65; creatio passiva est perfectio ipsius essentie ut receptivi: *DEE* 36; eductio actus non repugnat creationi: *DEE* 274; salvare creationem: *DEE* 13ff.; 30ff.; 109; 118; 205-232; 261ff.; 314ff.; de tribus signis in instanti creationis: *DEE* 227; *opp*. emanatio: philosophorum opinio qui ponunt quod ex quadam necessitate nature creature procedant a Primo Principio: *INT* 6.2.5; --- evolutionary view of creation: quod quidam ponunt, scilicet sensitivum secundum rem educi de vegetativo, ita quod illud quod est a principio solum anima vegetativa, actione nature pertingit ad hoc quod sit sensitiva successive: *DEE* 32
Creator
respectus ad Creatorem: see s.v. *respectus*
creatura
'creatura' solam essentiam sive naturam creatam dicit: *DEE* 330; creatura est similitudo divine nature ex natura sua, non tamen ex natura sua est similitudo Dei agentis: *DEE* 115; essentia creature est quid diminutum: *DEE* 17; 44; 67;

esse creature est quid participatum: *DEE* 206; esse creature est esse receptum: *DEE* 97; esse creature secundum quid, prout scilicet consideratur ut quid intelligibile et abstractum a tempore, potest esse incorruptibile et indefectibile sicut et mundus intelligibilis semper est: *DEE* 100; 'creaturam existere per suam essentiam' dupliciter potest intelligi: *DEE* 116; quod creatura habeat ab eterno esse reale essentie vel existentie: *DEE* 132ff.; in creatura ex essentia et esse naturali non est aliqua compositio: *INT* 7.4.2; creatura concretive dicta: *DEE* 165; esse creature realiter differt a sua essentia: *DEE* 1-7; creatura per essentiam est in potentia ad existendum: *DEE* 14; potentiale in creatura: *DEE* 17; omnis creatura incipit esse actu: *DEE* 105; materia est pars essentie creature: *DEE* 4; ex libertate arbitrii et ex tempore creature a Deo procedunt: *DEE* 109; proper nature of creatural being: *INT* 8.1.1; collection of created substances as 'numbers': *INT* 5.3

currere
sic se habet essentia, ens et esse sicut cursus, currens et currere: *DEE* 141; 153; *INT* 6.1.1; 8.1.1; 8.1.2; actus qui est currere, est cursus: *DEE* 165; secundum cursum nature: *DEE* 245; 252

cursus
sic se habet essentia, ens et esse sicut cursus, currens et currere: *DEE* 141; actus qui est currere, est cursus: *DEE* 165

Defectibilitas
defectibilitas inest rebus ex potentialitate: *DEE* 108; unumquoque est defectibile ratione potentie et est permanens ratione actus: *DEE* 108; omnis defectibilitas rerum provenit ratione potentie: *DEE* 312

deficere
'aliquid deficere' dupliciter potest dici: *DEE* 318; nichil deficit unde necessarium, sed unde possibile: *DEE* 112

denominatio
matter has a single mode of being owing to an extrinsic denomination from divine Being: *INT* 9

denominativus
terrminus denominative acceptus: *DEE* 220; omnis terminus concretus, sive sit substantivus sive adiectivus [...] tam implicite quam explicite significat: *DEE* 164

desipere
'non sapere' privative accipitur pro 'desipere'; 'non sapere' negative accipitur pro non habere actualem existentiam sapiendi: *DEE* 12; 201

Deus
Deus est sua entitas et suum esse: *DEE* 165; Deus est sua deitas (divinitas) et suum esse: *DEE* 165; esse creatum est quidam deus: *DEE* 215; respectus ad Deum, see s.v. *respectus*

differentia (*predicabile*)
differentia formali predicatione predicatur de genere: *DEE* 220; diffinitio proprie indicat esse essentie quod est commune et esse subsistentie et esse existentie: *DEE* 251; potentiale quod est genus, differt a suo actuali quod est differentia: *DEE* 14; sicut genus se habet ad oppositas differentias et materia ad formam et privationem, ita essentia ad esse et non esse: *DEE* 14; compositio generis, speciei, differentie: *DEE* 119; genus et differentia faciunt compositionem: *DEE* 89

differentia
de differentia reali esse et essentie: *DEE* 258ff.; differentia intentionis, see s.vv. *differre*, *intentio*--- see also s.v. *distinctio(n)*

differre
differre intentione (*opp*. re, ratione): *DEE* 5; 29; 34; 45; 67ff.; 82ff.; 89ff.; 104; 219-221; 225f.; 229-232; 289; 295-300; 335; *INT* 6.1.1; 7.4.4; differre ratione (= 'to differ conceptually') vs. secundum rem: *INT* 3.1.2; 6.1.2; differre secundum rationem tantum: *INT* 7.4.4; differre realiter: *DEE* 1-7 and

passim; differre inter rem et rem: *INT* 2.2; 7.3.1, n. 118; differre intentionaliter: *DEE* 106; in eis que intentione differunt sunt gradus: *INT* 7.4.2; differre intellectualiter = secundum rationem = 'to differ conceptually': *INT* 6.3.2; differre penes modum significandi: *DEE* 5; 145ff.; 158ff.; 232; 239; differens ad esse et non esse: *DEE* 2; see also s.vv. *intentio*, *intentionalis*

diffinire
sola species diffinitur: *DEE* 129;

diffinitio
def. *DEE* 127; diffinitio proprie indicat esse essentie quod est commune et esse subsistentie et esse existentie: *DEE* 146; 251

diminutivus
aliquid dicitur participare aliud quia habet illud diminutive respectu alterius quod habet illud perfecte: *DEE* 183;

diminutus
essentia creature est quid diminutum: *DEE* 17; 44; 67; esse diminutum: *DEE* 252; esse participatum et diminutum: *DEE* 67

distinctio
de distinctionibus Henrici: *INT* 8.8.3; *DEE* 84-93; de distinctione circa creationem et factionem: *DEE* 273; compositional structure and distinction of the components: *INT* 7.3.2, n. 127; 7.4.1; 7.4.1, n. 136; 8.7 --- triple distinction, 'realis' ('secundum rem'), 'ratione' ('secundum rationem'), 'intentione' ('secundum intentionem'): *INT* 6.1; 6.2.3; 6.4; 7;7.3; 7.3.1; 7.3.1, n. 123; 7.3.2, 7.3.2, n. 127; Aegidian real distinction (between essence and existence): *DEE* 14ff., passim; *INT* 3.1.1; 6.1.3; 7; 7.3.1, n. 118; 7.6; Proclus in favour of the real distinction: *INT* 6.2.2, n. 92; real distinction in Thomas of Sutton: *INT* 3.1; 6.4; 7.5; 7.5, n. 149; Henry of Ghent's rejection of it: *INT* 8.4; Harvey's rejection of the Aegidian real distinction: *INT* 8.3; 8.4; Ghentian distinctio intentionis: *INT* 6.1.2; 6.2.3; 6.3, n. 101; 6.3.2; 7.3.1; 7.3.2; 8.6.4; 8.6.8; never properly understood by Giles of Rome and others (e.g. Harvey): *INT* 6.2.3; 7.4.6; 8.6.8; see also s.vv. *intentio*, *intentionalis*

diversitas
quomodo esse et essentia se habeant secundum ydemptitatem et diversitatem: *DEE* 120ff.

divinitas
Deus est sua deitas (divinitas) et suum esse: *DEE* 165

divinus
esse divinum: *DEE* passim; *DMF* 3; similitudo divini esse: *DEE* 2; in divinis suppositum solo respectu differt a natura: *DEE* 117; matter has a single mode of being owing to an extrinsic denomination from divine Being: *INT* 9; virtus divina: *DMF* 9ff.

division
on composition as division's counterpart: *INT* 7.4.5; see also s.v. *distinctio(n)*

Educere
educi de potestate essentie: *DEE* 31; 78; 279; 302; educi de potentie materie: *DEE* 266; 269; 279

eductio
eductio de potentis subiecti: *DEE* 255; eductio forme: *DEE* 266; eductio actus non repugnat creationi: *DEE* 274; essentia informativa eductionis esse: *DEE* 279

effectivus
potentia subiectiva/effectiva: *DMF* 9ff.; 19

effectus
de li 'effectus': *DEE* 294; 323; ratio actualis existentie in hoc consistit quod sit actualiter Dei effectus: *DEE* 6

elementum
unum elementum dicitur materialius alio: *DEE* 260

emanation
Neoplatonic emanation (*opp*. Christian creation): *INT* 1.3; 4; 4.1; 4.2; 5.3; 5.5; 6.2.4; 6.2.5; 8.9.7; philosophorum opinio qui ponunt quod ex quadam necessitate nature creature procedant a

Primo Principio: *INT* 6.2.5; unequivocally rejected by Giles of Rome: *INT* 5.5

ens

'ens' significat indivisionem: *INT* 6.1.3; ens et unum sola ratione differunt: *DEE* 85; esse dicitur et 'habere essentiam' et 'convenire sibi esse illud quo ens est': *DEE* 144; nichil aliud requiritur enti cum est in potentia nisi motor: *DEE* 53; sic se habet essentia, ens et esse sicut cursus, currens et currere: *DEE* 141; accidens non est nisi quia est entis: *DEE* 61; accipiendo 'ens' et 'existens' pro enti communi existentie et accidenti: *DEE* 244; ens simpliciter/ens secundum quid: *DMF* 14; entia prohibita sive entia in potentia (quod idem est): *DEE* 142; sicut opponitur ratio 'substantie' et 'accidentis', ita opponitur ratio 'absoluti' et 'relati': *DEE* 122; nulla relatio est de ratione vel integritate entis absoluti: *DEE* 122; ens rationis non est de integritate entis realis extra animam existentis: *DEE* 123; analogia (entis): *DEE* 17; 45; 47f.; 59; 70; 210; 232; analogia entis inter ens participatum et ens non participatum: *DEE* 70; ens quod est commune essentiale ad decem predicamenta: *INT* 6.1.3; 'animal' includit totum quicquid includit 'ens' et similiter 'animalitas' includit essentiam: *DEE* 129

entitas

Deus est sua entitas et suum esse: *DEE* 165; Deus relinquit nature quod suum est: *DEE* 74; 266

epistrophê

Neoplatonic *epistrophê* (Greek = 'reversio'): *INT* 4.2, n. 40

esse

quedam actualitas quam vocamus 'esse': *DEE* 107; actus quem dicimus 'esse': *DEE* 162; esse participatum et diminutum: *DEE* 67; esse in intellectu, quod vocatur 'esse rationis': *DEE* 201; creatio passio est ipsius esse: *DEE* 228; res habet duplex esse reale: esse in suis causis et esse in seipso: *INT* 7.4.6, n. 146; *esse* [Greek *to einai*] as First Principle: *INT* 1.2; 8.1.2; *id quod est* [Greek *to eon*] as 'share of beingness': *INT* 5; 'esse ratum' vs. 'esse reatum': *INT* 8.9.6, n. 184; the theological and philosophical interpretations of 'esse': *INT* 8.6.9, n. 172; de 'est' secundo et tertio adiacente: *INT* 8.9.6; 'ipsum esse'= the notion 'being' by itself: *INT* 6.1.4; quid nomine 'essentie' importetur, quid nomine ipsius 'esse': *DEE* 120ff.; 'esse' et 'essentia' non nominant aliquod speciale: *DEE* 243; sicut sapientia ad sapere, ita essentia ad esse: *DEE* 8; 'esse'= 'existere': scientia habetur de rebus creatis sive sint sive non sint: *DEE* 8; omne quod est, ideo est quia unum est et suum esse consistit in unitate: *DEE* 46; unius rei unum est esse: *DEE* 46; per 'esse' intelligimus quendam habitum qui est ipsa essentia: *DEE* 146; esse exponi potest pro ipsa subsistentia sive quiditate rei: *DEE* 43; esse subsistens: *DEE* 1; sicut se habet lux ad lucere et albedo ad albere, ita essentia ad esse: *DEE* 234; esse dicitur et 'habere essentiam' et 'convenire sibi esse illud quo ens est': *DEE* 144; esse non est in genere directe recipiendo predicationem generis: *DEE* 101; esse non potest dici principium generis nisi sit principium rei secundum quod est in genere: *DEE* 103; ratio essendi: *DEE* 10;'esse' non dicit aliquem actum absolutum additum super essentiam diversum ab essentia et a composito a pluribus essentiis: *DEE* 148;'esse' (*opp.* 'id quod est'): *DEE* 1; 15; 25, passim; Deus est sua entitas et suum esse: *DEE* 165; nulla res est suum esse: *DEE* 1; 46: esse de novo creatum: *DEE* 54; esse non est forma substantialis: *DEE* 25; esse est idem re quod essentia: 23ff., passim; esse est prima intentio creata; alie vero intentiones, sicut *animal* et *homo*, non creantur proprie sed fiunt de illo esse per informationem: *DEE* 31; intentio ipsius esse est proprie creata et alie intentiones fiunt de illa per informationem intentionalem: *DEE* 223;

Agens facit compositum non ex diversis rebus semper, sed quando que ex diversis intentionibus, sicut de *esse* et *essentia*: *DEE* 84; distinctio realis inter esse et essentiam: *DEE* 14ff., passim; *esse* addit super essentiam respectum alterius intentionis ad essentiam; *DEE* 71; esse est quoddam accidens essentie non reale sed intentionale: *DEE* 71; quomodo esse et essentia se habeant secundum ydemptitatem et diversitatem: *DEE* 120ff.; in creatura ex essentia et esse naturali non est aliqua compositio: *INT* 7.4.2; compositio intentionalis inter esse et essentiam: *DEE* 119; fieri per informationem intentionalem de ipso esse: *DEE* 31; 223; quod esse esset accidens essentie: *DEE* 283ff.; difficultates circa unitatem esse et essentie apparentes: *DEE* 206; esse fit in essentia sicut gratia fit in anima: *DEE* 32; esse non potest informare aliquid nisi mediante essentia a qua fluit: *DEE* 236; esse educi de potentia essentie: *DEE* 78; 302; sic se habet essentia, ens et esse sicut cursus, currens et currere: *DEE* 141; differens ad esse et non esse: *DEE* 2; totale non-esse: *DEE* 196; 198; 203; 281; li 'non-esse' non potest stare cum essentia, uniformiter accipiendo 'essentiam' et 'esse': *DEE* 200; aut per li 'non-esse' negatur omnis ratio essendi, aut solum negatur esse actualis existentie: *DEE* 10; de duplici indifferentia ad esse et non esse: *DEE* 8; 11; 190ff.; esse et non esse non communicant in aliquo reali extra intellectum: *DEE* 14; essentia potest intelligi sub non esse: *DEE* 29; quod non participat esse, non potest participare accidens: *DEE* 71; in eadem substantia, quotquot ponantur accidentia vel forme, non est nisi unicum esse: *DEE* 47; esse creature realiter differt a sua essentia: *DEE* 1-7; creatio sicut et quelibet productio, est ad esse: *DEE* 65; omne esse fundatur in essentia ex relatione ad Deum: *DEE* 61 (see also s.v. *respectus*); si accipiatur 'esse relatum' pro relatione esse subsistentie quo subsistit Persona divina, non est esse relativum nisi quatinus essentia est relatio, immo est esse absolutum, sed si accipiatur 'esse relatum' pro esse absoluto determinato per relationem facientem illud cuius est formaliter incommunicabile, sic est esse relativum: *DEE* 248; essentia Sortis numquam caret esse actuali Sortis: *DEE* 298; de duplici transmutatione in generatione, scilicet materie ad formam et compositi ad esse: *DEE* 212; de triplici esse: *DEE* 48-57; 190-199; *INT* 6.1.1; 8.7.2; 'esse' dupliciter potest accipi: uno modo pro ipso actu habito [...] et vocatur 'esse essentie', alio modo pro ipso habere actum implicando notitiam verbalem et habitudinem ad aliquod habens: *DEE* 165; *INT* 8.9.7; de duplici esse, sc. esse essentie et esse existentie: *def*. *DEE* 5; 48; 188; 245; *INT* 6.1; 8.1.2; 8.2; 8.3.2; 8.4.2; 8.9.7; esse existentie et esse subsistentie, quod quidem est unum: *DEE* 233; essentia sive esse essentie non abstrahit ab omni esse reali: *DEE* 201f.; esse simpliciter (*opp*. esse contractum): *DMF* 6ff.; esse simpliciter potest accipi quatuor modis: *DMF* 6; esse communissimum quod est commune ad esse essentie et esse existentie: *DEE* 79; 251; 284ff.; esse divinum: *DEE* passim; similitudo divini esse: *DEE* 2; esse purum: *DEE* 2; esse verum, bonum, unum: *DEE* 3; esse illimitatum: *DEE* 1; 'esse latissimum' dupliciter dicitur: *DEE* 285ff.; esse latissimum quod nichil presupponit et alia presupponunt ipsum: *DEE* 80; esse actuale (*opp*. esse potentiale): *DEE* 19, passim; 'esse receptum' non dicit speciale esse, sed modum essendi: *DEE* 305; esse separatum: *INT* 3.2; 3.3; esse diminutum: *DEE* 252; esse intentionale et cognoscitivum: *INT* 7.3.2, n. 125; materia habet respectum ad esse extensum: *DEE* 19; esse subsistens: *DEE* 1; quod in eo in quo sunt plures forme, adveniente ultima forma, precedentes desinant dare esse (sub-

sistens): *DEE* 252; see also s,v, *being*; --- for 'esse essentie/esse existentie' see also svv. *essentia/existentia;* --- distinction between essence and *esse* [= existence'], see s.v. *distinctio*

essentia

quid nomine 'essentie' importetur, quid nomine ipsius 'esse': *DEE* 120ff.; 'esse' et 'essentia' non nominant aliquod speciale: *DEE* 243; essentia sive quiditas rei: *DEE* 8; essentia ut *ex quo est* et *quod est*: *DEE* 48; essentia et quiditas rei qua est *id quod est*: *INT* 7.4.3, n. 140; 'creatura' solam essentiam sive naturam creatam dicit: *DEE* 330; 'tota essentia' (in Giles of Rome): *INT* 3.1, n. 14; per 'esse' intelligimus quendam habitum qui est ipsa essentia: *DEE* 146; esse est quoddam accidens essentie non reale sed intentionale: *DEE* 71; de differentia reali esse et essentie: *DEE* 258ff.; *esse* addit super essentiam respectum alterius intentionis ad essentiam; *DEE* 71; sicut sapientia ad sapere, ita essentia ad esse: *DEE* 8; in creatura ex essentia et esse naturali non est aliqua compositio: *INT* 7.4.2; sicut se habet lux ad lucere et albedo ad albere, ita essentia ad esse: *DEE* 234; li 'non esse' non potest stare cum essentia, uniformiter accipiendo 'essentiam' et 'esse': *DEE* 200; 'esse' non dicit aliquem actum absolutum additum super essentiam diversum ab essentia et a composito a pluribus essentiis: *DEE* 148; Agens facit compositum non ex diversis rebus semper, sed quando que ex diversis intentionibus, sicut de *esse* et *essentia*: *DEE* 84; quid istis nominibus 'essentia', 'ens' et 'essentia creature' importetur: *DEE* 143ff.; essentia est essentia ab eterno: *DEE* 154ff.; 'essentia est essentia': *INT* 6.3.1; 'essentia est existentia': *INT* 6.3.1; esse dicitur et 'habere essentiam' et 'convenire sibi esse illud quo ens est': *DEE* 144; esse est idem re quod essentia: 23ff., passim; distinctio realis inter esse et essentiam: *DEE* 14ff., passim; quomodo esse et essentia se habeant secundum ydemptitatem et diversitatem: *DEE* 120ff.; compositio intentionalis inter esse et essentiam: *DEE* 119; quod esse esset accidens essentie: *DEE* 283ff.; de differentia reali esse et essentie: *DEE* 258ff.; ratio 'essentie' consistit in hoc quod ei in Deo respondet exemplar: *DEE* 6; 9; essentia sive esse essentie non abstrahit ab omni esse reali: *DEE* 201f.; sicut genus se habet ad oppositas differentias et materia ad formam et privationem, ita essentia ad esse et non esse: *DEE* 14; de triplici constitutione essentie create: *DEE* 9; de materia et essentia: *DEE* 213; materia est potentiale subiective, essentia vero est potentiale obiective: *DEE* 42; unumquodque est in genere per essentiam et non per esse existentie: *DEE* 101; prior to its actualization no essence has an ontological status beyond its being included in God's mind: *INT* 8.9.7; sic se habet essentia, ens et esse sicut cursus, currens et currere: *DEE* 141; esse fit in essentia sicut gratia fit in anima: *DEE* 32; esse non potest informare aliquid nisi mediante essentia a qua fluit: *DEE* 236; esse educi de potentia essentie: *DEE* 78; 302; omne esse fundatur in essentia ex relatione ad Deum: *DEE* 61 (see also s.v. *respectus*); si accipiatur 'esse relatum' pro relatione esse subsistentie quo subsistit Persona divina, non est esse relativum nisi quatinus essentia est relatio, immo est esse absolutum, sed si accipiatur 'esse relatum' pro esse absoluto determinato per relationem facientem illud cuius est formaliter incommunicabile, sic est esse relativum: *DEE* 248; essentia creata est quadam extrinseca participatione: *DEE* 83; educi de potestate essentie: *DEE* 31; 78; 279; 302; essentia signata, puta essentia Sortis: *DEE* 221; essentia Sortis numquam caret esse actuali Sortis: *DEE* 298; creatio passiva est perfectio ipsius essentie ut receptivi: *DEE* 36; de duplici

esse, sc. esse essentie et esse existentie: *def*. *DEE* 5; 48; 188; 245; esse latissimum quod est commune ipsi esse essentie et esse existentie: *DEE* 284; quid importetur istis dictionibus ‘esse essentie’ et ‘esse existentie’: *DEE* 146ff.; essences of things exist from eternity in their cause, God: *INT* 8.1.1; esse essentie quod est commune et esse subsistentie et esse existentie: *DEE* 79; 251; 284ff.; de esse essentie subiecti et accidentis: *DEE* 233; 259; essentie accidentales: *DEE* 208; veritas, bonitas, unitas nichil addunt super essentiam rei: *DEE* 23; 94; esse creature realiter differt a sua essentia: *DEE* 1-7; essentia potest intelligi sub non esse: *DEE* 29; materia est pars essentie creature: *DEE* 4; quod creatura habeat ab eterno esse reale essentie vel existentie: *DEE* 132ff.; quotquot sunt esse essentie in Christo, tot sunt esse existentie: *DEE* 51; --- see also s.v. *being;* --- the ‘essence vs. existence’ debate around 1300: *INT* 7; 7.1-7.5; never a major subject with Thomas Aquinas: *INT* 7.3.1, n. 120; distinction between essence and existence, see s.v. *distinction*

essentialis
ens quod est commune essentiale ad decem predicamenta: *INT* 6.1.3;

exemplar
def. ‘exemplar’ nichil plus importat nisi quod est representativum alicuis conductivi in cognitionem eius sive ratio cognoscendi ipsum: *DEE* 124; ratio ‘essentie’ consistit in hoc quod ei in Deo respondet exemplar: *DEE* 6; 9; ydea sive exemplar: *DEE* 5; respectus ad Deum ut exemplar: 121ff.; 285; habitudo ad Deum sicut ad exemplar: *DEE* 48; 110; 223; relatio exemplati ad exemplar est ens rationis tantum: *DEE* 124; God as exemplar and efficient cause: *INT* 8.9.7; ‘animal’ includit totum quicquid includit ‘ens’ et similiter ‘animalitas’ includit essentiam: *DEE* 129

exemplatum
relatio exemplati ad exemplar est ens rationis tantum: *DEE* 124

existentia
quid importetur istis dictionibus ‘existentia’ et ‘existere’: *DEE* 145ff.; ‘essentia est existentia’: *INT* 6.3.1; accipiendo ‘ens’ et ‘existens’ pro enti communi existentie et accidenti: *DEE* 244; whether a subject-substrate’s existential being does coincide with its accident’s: *INT* 8.9.4; de duplici esse, sc. esse essentie et esse existentie: *def*. *DEE* 5; 48; 188; 245; quid importetur ists dictionibus ‘esse essentie’ et ‘esse existentie’: *DEE* 146ff.; *esse* quo res dicitur ‘existens’ non est forma aliqua, stricte loquendo: *INT* 7.3.1, n. 119; the ‘essence/existence’ issue as intimately related to the problem of creation: *INT* 6.2.5, n. 97; 8.9.7; ratio actualis existentie in hoc consistit quod sit actualiter Dei effectus: *DEE* 6; quod creatura habeat ab eterno esse reale essentie vel existentie: *DEE* 132ff.; esse essentie quod est commune et esse subsistentie et esse existentie: *DEE* 79; 251; 284ff.; esse existentie et esse subsistentie, quod quidem est unum: *DEE* 233; unumquodque est in genere per essentiam et non per esse existentie: *DEE* 101; problema de esse existentie esse problema de accidente: *DEE* 216; aut per li ‘non esse’ negatur omnis ratio essendi, aut solum negatur esse actualis existentie: *DEE* 10; non habere actualem existentiam sapiendi: *DEE* 12; 201; in Christo non est nisi unicum esse existentie: *DEE* 47; quotquot sunt esse essentie in Christo, tot sunt esse existentie: *DEE* 51; existence as a positive and absolute [= ‘unrelated’, against Henry of Ghent] reality in Sutton: *INT* 6.4; a thing’s being in existence by extrinsic participation vs. by its proper nature: *INT* 8.8.3; --- distinction between essence and existence, see s.v. *distinction*

existential
difference between existential and substantial being: *INT* 8.7.2; 8.7.4; see also s.vv. *ens, esse, essentia*
existere
the prefix 'ex-' in 'existere': *INT* 8.1.2, n. 162 (otherwise in *DEE* 146); *esse* quo res dicitur 'existens' non est forma aliqua, stricte loquendo: *INT* 7.3.1, n. 119; non consuevit 'existens' dici masculine vel feminine nisi de substantivo: *DEE* 244; unumquodque dicitur existens formaliter, si large accipiamus 'formam' pro quolibet actuali: *INT* 7.3.1, n. 119; quid importetur istis dictionibus 'existentia' et 'existere': *DEE* 145ff.; vocando 'subsistere' 'per se existere': *DMF* 21; creatura per essentiam est in potentia ad existendum: *DEE* 14; 'creaturam existere per suam essentiam' dupliciter potest intelligi: *DEE* 116; accidens virtute divina potest existere per se sine subiecto: *DMF* 12; sicut 'chimera', ita nec 'animal' significat rem veram sed figmentum, rebus non existentibus: *DEE* 157; res non sunt simpliciter in genere nisi quando existumt: *DEE* 207; accipiendo 'vivere' pro vivere essentiali (*opp.* pro actu existendi viventis): *DEE* 248; --- distinction between essence and existence, see s.v. *distinction*
extensio
'extensio' nominat aliquid speciale quod non potest plurificari in eodem numero: *DEE* 243; in una substantia est nisi una extensio: *DEE* 47; de extensione materie: *DEE* 58; 250; non est simile de extensione et de esse: *DEE* 243; partibilitas sive extensio qua et materia et quantitas sunt partibiles: *DEE* 250
extensus
materia habet respectum ad esse extensum: *DEE* 19
extrinsecus
participatio extrinseca: *DEE* 5; 82ff.
evolution
evolutionary view of creation: quod quidam ponunt, scilicet sensitivum secundum rem educi de vegetativo, ita quod illud quod est a principio solum anima vegetativa, actione nature pertingit ad hoc quod sit sensitiva successive: *DEE* 32; dicere quod simplicia componentia sint facta a quodam alio ab eterno et quod coniunctio eorum fieret a Deo ex tempore esset hereticum: *DEE* 118

Facies
ymago a facie necessitate nature procedit: *DEE* 109
factibilis
'esse factibile' dicit esse speciale: *DEE* 305
factio
de ratione 'factionis' est terminari ad aliquod ens actu per eam productum: *DEE* 256; de distinctione circa creationem et factionem: *DEE* 273; dicere quod simplicia componentia sint facta a quodam alio ab eterno et quod coniunctio eorum fieret a Deo ex tempore esset hereticum: *DEE* 118
faith
Catholic faith: *INT* 1; 1.3; 8.6; 8.9.7
fantasticus
quod dicit totum est fantasticum: *DEE* 227; respectus fantasticus quem ponit (sc. Henricus): *DEE* 212
femininus
non consuevit 'existens' dici masculine vel feminine nisi de substantivo: *DEE* 244
fieri
nichil fit nisi compositum: *DEE* 95; fieri per informationem intentionalem de ipso esse: *DEE* 31; 223; de novo fieri: *DEE* 87; fieri sub forma: *DEE* 41
figmentum
sicut 'chimera', ita nec 'animal' significat rem veram sed figmentum, rebus non existentibus: *DEE* 157; res quedam proprie dicta et non figmentum: *DEE* 48

figura
minus potest materia esse sine forma quam quantitas sine figura: *DMF* 17
finite
infinite/finite being: *INT* 8.9.7; compositional structure of finite, created being: *INT* 2, 3.1
fluere
esse non potest informare aliquid nisi mediante essentia a qua fluit: *DEE* 236
fluxus
punctus suo fluxu facit lineam esse lineam: *DEE* 103
focalization
focalization and categorization: *INT* 4.3, n. 45; 7.4.4, n. 141
footnote
'footnote' in medieval texts: *INT* 7.3.2, n. 128
forma
ultima et perfectior forma sive perfectior intentio: *DEE* 47; forma dat esse: *INT* 2.2; species mundi per quam intelligit formam: *DMF* 2; forme constitutive: *INT* 7.4; fieri sub forma: *DEE* 41; forma partis vs. forma totius: *INT* 2.3; 3.1.2; 3.2, n. 27; unumquodque dicitur existens formaliter, si large accipiamus 'formam' pro quolibet actuali: *INT* 7.3.1, n. 119; *esse* quo res dicitur 'existens' non est forma aliqua, stricte loquendo: *INT* 7.3.1, n. 119; materia re differt a forma et privatione: *DEE* 14; utrum materia possit esse sine forma: *DMF* 1-33; minus potest materia esse sine forma quam quantitas sine figura: *DMF* 17; materia aliquo modo potest esse in actu in rerum natura absque omni forma: *DMF* 5; mutua dependentia que est inter formam et materiam: *DMF* 15-17; in materialibus substantia composita differt a forma, materia et accidentibus: *DEE* 150ff.; res materiales non determinantur ad formam per materiam, sed per formam: *DMF* 28; forma materialis dependet a materia ut a potentia in qua recipitur et sustentatur: *DMF* 16; dator formarum: *INT* 5.3; creation of matter and form: *INT* 8.9.5; quod proprie loquendo nec materia nec forma creatur, sed compositum: *DEE* 253ff.; forma habet verius esse quam materia: *DEE* 65; forma educibilis de potentia materie: *DEE* 65ff.; 253ff.; dupliciter dicitur forma educi de potentia materie: *DEE* 266ff.; forma proprie loquendo non est causa formalis nisi compositi: *DMF* 22; sicut genus se habet ad oppositas differentias et materia ad formam et privationem, ita essentia ad esse et non esse: *DEE* 14; forma generis est media inter potentiam et actum: *DEE* 68; forma corporeitatis: *DEE* 78; forma substantialis subsistens: *DEE* 4; threefold status of forms: transcendent, immanent, and mental: *INT* 5.1; ontological status of transcendent Forms: *INT* 3.3; Forme separate in Plato: *INT* 5.5; sicut ex forma substantiali et materia fit unum simpliciter, ita ex forma accidentali et substantia fit unum per accidens: *DEE* 51; subiectum licet quantum ad id quod est non dependeat a forma accidentali, dependet tamen ab ea quantum ad hoc quod est esse informatum ea: *DMF* 32; forma proprie loquendo non est causa formalis nisi compositi: *DMF* 22; materia proprie non est causa materialis forme sed magis compositi: *DMF* 22; de duplici transmutatione in generatione, scilicet materie ad formam et compositi ad esse: *DEE* 212; esse non est forma substantialis: *DEE* 25; materia potest creari sine forma substantiali: *DEE* 283; in eadem substantia, quotquot ponantur accidentia vel forme, non est nisi unicum esse: *DEE* 47; quod in eo in quo sunt plures forme, adveniente ultima forma, precedentes desinant dare esse (subsistens): *DEE* 252; quedam capacitas forme: *DEE* 30; forma materialis, saltem ordine nature, presupponit materiam: *DEE* 65; non est simile de materia et forma substantiali et de subiecto et accidente: *DEE* 246; secundum philosophos omnis forma, quantum est de se, semper et necessario

est: *DEE* 24; secundum positionem philosophorum forma, quantum est de se, est necesse esse: *DEE* 96; neither form nor matter properly created but their compound: *INT* 8.8
formalis
forma proprie loquendo non est causa formalis nisi compositi: *DMF* 22
frivolus
positio frivola: *DEE* 131; 217; 252; 289; 305; *DMF* 26; quod dicit totum est frivolum: *DEE* 223
fulcimentum
'fulcimentum compositi' dupliciter dicitur: *DMF* 31
fundamentum
relatio est extra rationem sui fundamenti: *DEE* 125

Generatio
de duplici transmutatione in generatione, scilicet materie ad formam et compositi ad esse: *DEE* 212; generatio supernaturalis: *DEE* 78; 276; creation vs. natural generation: *INT* 8.9.5; *DEE* 161; 275
genus
esse non est in genere directe recipiendo predicationem generis: *DEE* 101; esse est in genere Substantie per reductionem sicut principium eius: *DEE* 25; 103; 306; 308; esse non potest dici principium generis nisi sit principium rei secundum quod est in genere: *DEE* 103; genera absoluta, sicut Substantia, Qualitas, Quantitas: *DEE* 330; unumquodque est in genere per essentiam et non per esse existentie: *DEE* 101; res non sunt simpliciter in genere nisi quando existunt: *DEE* 207; forma generis est media inter potentiam et actum: *DEE* 68; differentia formali predicatione predicatur de genere: *DEE* 220; potentiale quod est genus, differt a suo actuali quod est differentia: *DEE* 14; sicut genus se habet ad oppositas differentias et materia ad formam et privationem, ita essentia ad esse et non esse: *DEE* 14; compositio generis, speciei, differentie: *DEE* 119; genus et differentia faciunt compositionem: *DEE* 89
gratia
esse fit in essentia sicut gratia fit in anima: *DEE* 32

Habere
quandoque ipsum verbum infinitivi modi (sicut 'esse', 'vivere' et talia) indirecte ex suo modo significandi significant hoc quod est habere talem actum (puta vitam vel essentiam), aliquando accipiuntur pro ipso actu habito: *DEE* 146
habitudo
habitudo ad Deum sicut ad exemplar: *DEE* 48; 110; 223; li 'per' importat habitudinem cause efficientis: *DEE* 39; li 'secundum' importat habitudinem subiecti manentis in utroque opposito: *DEE* 203; li 'secundum' importat habitudinem eorum que acquiruntur per motum sive mutationem: *DEE* 262
habitus
in actu/in habitu: *DEE* 116; per 'esse' intelligimus quendam habitum qui est ipsa essentia: *DEE* 146; accipiendo sapientiam pro habitu et sapere pro actu: *DEE* 234; actus considerandi differt re ab habitu qui est sapientia, sicut est in quolibet alio habitu: *DEE* 204
hereticus
positio heretica: *DEE* 97; dicere quod simplicia componentia sint facta a quodam alio ab eterno et quod coniunctio eorum fieret a Deo ex tempore esset hereticum: *DEE* 118
historian
on the historian's modus operandi: *INT* 7.6 *ad fin*.
hoc
de verificatione 'Hoc non est illud': *DEE* 169
hoc aliquid
hoc aliquid (Greek *tode ti*) = 'individual thing': *INT* 6.2.3
homo
'homo' idem est quod 'habens humanitatem': *DEE* 164

humanitas
‘homo’ idem est quod ‘habens humanitatem’: *DEE* 164
hylomorphism
hylomorphism as Aristotle’s fundamental ontological doctrine: *INT* 2; 2, n. 4

Id quod est
essentia et quiditas rei qua est *id quod est*: *INT* 7.4.3, n. 140; *to eon* [= *id quod est*] as share of beingness: *INT* 5
illimitatio
‘illimitatio’ potest dupliciter accipi: *DEE* 166-168; *INT* 8.3.2
illimitatus
esse illimitatum: *DEE* 1; quid illimitatum: *DEE* 1
imparticipabilis
‘unshareable’: *INT* 4.1; 4.2; 4.3; 5.4
impositio
nomina prime/secunde impositionis: *INT* 7.3.2, n. 130
impressio
per impressionem ab alio, scilicet per creationem Dei creantis: *DEE* 5
inchoativus
esse inchoative: *DEE* 252; inchoative dare: *DEE* 64
incommunicabilis
si accipiatur ‘esse relatum’ pro relatione esse subsistentie quo subsistit Persona divina, non est esse relativum nisi quatinus essentia est relatio, immo est esse absolutum; sed si accipiatur ‘esse relatum’ pro esse absoluto determinato per relationem facientem illud cuius est formaliter incommunicabile, sic est esse relativum: *DEE* 248;
incompletive
incompletive (quia inchoative) dare: *DEE* 64
incorruptibilis
incorruptibilis et indefectibilis: *DEE* 100
indefectibilis
incorruptibilis et indefectibilis: *DEE* 100
individuatio
individuatio quantitatis facit formaliter individuum: *DEE* 248
individuum
individuatio quantitatis facit formaliter individuum: *DEE* 248
indivisio
‘ens’ significat indivisionem: *INT* 6.1.3; ‘unum’ significat indivisionem: *INT* 6.3.1
infinitivus
quandoque ipsum verbum infinitivi modi (sicut ‘esse’, ‘vivere’ et talia) indirecte ex suo modo significandi significant hoc quod est habere talem actum (puta vitam vel essentiam), aliquando accipiuntur pro ipso actu habito: *DEE* 146
infinitus
quantitas infinita esse non potest: *DMF* 17; infinite/finite being: *INT* 8.9.7; *mare* and *pelagus* as metaphors of infinity: *INT* 5.2, n. 59; infinitum pelagus perfectionis: *INT* 7.1.1
informare
esse non potest informare aliquid nisi mediante essentia a qua fluit: *DEE* 236; subiectum licet quantum ad id quod est non dependeat a forma accidentali, dependet tamen ab ea quantum ad hoc quod est esse informatum ea: *DMF* 32
informatio
per creationem/per informationem: *DEE* 31; 223; 281; informatio intentionalis: *DEE* 223
informativus
essentia informativa eductionis esse: *DEE* 279; potentia informativa et receptiva: *DEE* 279
informis
materia informis: *DMF* 2
instans
de tribus signis in instanti creationis: *DEE* 227
integritas
nulla relatio est de ratione vel integritate entis absoluti: *DEE* 122; ens rationis non est de integritate entis realis extra animam existentis: *DEE* 123

intellectualis
intellectus rationalis vel intellectualis: *INT* 7.4; differre intellectualiter = secundum rationem = 'to differ conceptually': *INT* 6.3.2; the proper nature of the intellectual domain: *INT* 7.4.2; see also s.vv. *cognition, cognoscitivus*
intellectus
esse et non esse non communicant in aliquo reali extra intellectum: *DEE* 14; res secundum quod cognita vs. res secundum quod est in intellectu: *INT* 8.5.5, n. 166; esse in intellectu, quod vocatur 'esse rationis': *DEE* 201; ordo predicamentalis sequitur rem secundum quod est obiective in intellectu: *DEE* 156; in intellectu/in re extra: *DEE* 9, passim; intellectus speculativus/practicus in Deo: *DEE* 324ff.; intellectus rationalis vel intellectualis: *INT* 7.4; 'secundum intellectum tantum'= 'only according to intellective apprehension': *INT* 3.1.2
intelligentia
secundum philosophos Intelligentie sunt cause aliarum rereum que sunt post eas: *DEE* 280; intelligentia/intelligere: *INT* 6.1.1
intelligere
penes modum intelligendi res: *DEE* 325; penes ipsas res intellectas: *DEE* 324; intelligentia/in- telligere: *INT* 6.1.1
intelligibilis
mundus intelligibilis: *DEE* 100: quid intelligibile et abstractum a tempore: *DEE* 100; intelligible species: *INT* 8.9.7, n. 186
intentio
on the complex term 'intentio': *INT* 7.3.2; 'intentio'= 'intus tentio': *INT* 7.3.2, n. 132; 'intentio' = 'propositum': *DEE* 80; intentio auctoris: *DEE* 281f.; intentio adversarii: *DEE* 304; --- 'intentio' (cfr. 'ratio', 'notio', 'nota') = 'ontic aspect', 'aspect of being(ness)', both qua real and qua cognized: esse est prima intentio creata; alie vero intentiones, sicut *animal* et *homo*, non creantur proprie sed fiunt de illo esse per informationem: *DEE* 31; perfectior forma sive perfectior intentio: *DEE* 47; intentio ipsius esse est proprie creata et alie intentiones fiunt de illa per informationem intentionalem: *DEE* 223; quod est potentiale obiective, secundum aliam et aliam intentionem est in potentia et in actu: *DEE* 39; Agens facit compositum non ex diversis rebus semper, sed quando que ex diversis intentionibus, sicut de *esse* et *essentia*: *DEE* 84; *esse* addit super essentiam respectum alterius intentionis ad essentiam; *DEE* 71; secundum diversitatem intentionum: *DEE* 43; 231; 290; 'prima/secunda intentio': *INT* 7.3.2; ultima et perfectior forma sive perfectior intentio: *DEE* 47; --- differre re, ratione, intentione: 5-7; 28-30; 34f.; 41; 45; 66-68; 82f.; 85; 89; 91; 93; 104; 118; 188; 218-221; 225f.; 229-232; 259; 289; 295-300; 333-335; differentia intentionis: *DEE* 5; triple distinction, 'realis' ('secundum rem'), 'ratione' ('secundum rationem'),'intentione' ('secundum intentionem'): *INT* 6.1; 6.2.3; 6.4; 7;7.3; 7.3.1; 7.3.1, n. 123; 7.3.2, 7.3.2, n. 127; diversitas secundum intentionem et rationem variat veritatem propositionum: *DEE* 85; separare realiter, ratione, intentione: *INT* 6.3.2; in eis que intentione differunt sunt gradus: *INT* 7.4.2; secundum intentionem (tantum): *DEE* 47, passim; Ghentian distinctio intentionis: *INT* 6.1.2; 6.2.3; 6.3, n. 101; 6.3.2; 7.3.1; 7.3.2; 8.6.4; 8.6.8; never properly understood by Giles of Rome and others: *INT* 6.2.3; the compositional structure of things explained in terms of the diversity of intentions: *INT* 7.4.2, n. 136
intentionalis
compositio intentionalis inter esse et essentiam: *DEE* 119; fieri per informationem intentionalem de ipso esse: *DEE* 223; esse est quoddam accidens essentie non reale sed intentionale:

DEE 71; informatio intentionalis: *DEE* 223; esse intentionale et cognoscitivum: *INT* 7.3.2, n. 125; differre intentionaliter: *DEE* 106; intentional distinction ('distinctio secundum intentionem') in Henry of Ghent: *INT* 8.8.3; see also svv. *differre, intentio*

ipse
'ipsum nichil' = 'precisely nothing at all': *DEE* 155

irrationalis
utrum Christus potuerit assumere naturam irrationalem: *DMF* 18

Lapis
facere lapidem ex nichilo: *INT* 6.2.1; totum lapidem simul producere: *DEE* 78; 276; see also s.v. *creatio*

latus
'esse latissimum' dupliciter dicitur: *DEE* 285ff.; esse latissimum quod est commune ipsi esse essentie et esse existentie: *DEE* 284; esse latissimum quod nichil presupponit et alia presupponunt ipsum: *DEE* 80

libertas
mera libertas Agentis: *INT* 6.2.4; see also s.v. *creatio*

linea
punctus suo fluxu facit lineam esse lineam: *DEE* 103

lucere
sicut se habet lux ad lucere et albedo ad albere, ita essentia ad esse: *DEE* 234; *INT* 6.1.1

lux
sicut se habet lux ad lucere et albedo ad albere, ita essentia ad esse: *DEE* 234; *INT* 6.1.1

Manutentia
manutentia Creatoris: *DEE* 22

mare
mare as metaphor of infinity: *INT* 5.2, n. 59

masculinus
non consuevit 'existens' dici masculine vel feminine nisi de substantivo: *DEE* 244;

materia
de materia et forma: *DMF* 1-33; de materia prima: *DEE* 149-152; de triplici esse materie: *DMF* 3; on matter's threefold mode of being: *INT* 9; matter has a single mode of being owing to an extrinsic denomination from divine Being: *INT* 9; materia vel subiectum [='subject-substrate']: *INT* 2.2, n. 10; materia nichil presupponit in sua factione: *DEE* 65; 'nichil presupponere' in creatione non dicit habitudinem ad terminum a quo, sed negat habitudinem ad materiam presuppositam: *DEE* 273; materia habet triplex esse: *DMF* 3; de materia et forma potentia in qua recipitur et sustentatur: *DMF* 16; *INT* 2; 9; *DEE* 65ff.; 96, passim; forma materialis dependet a materia ut a potentia in qua recipitur et sustentatur: *DMF* 16; in materialibus substantia composita differt a forma, materia et accidentibus: *DEE* 150ff.; whether matter can be without form: *INT* 9; *DMF* 1-33; mutua dependentia que est inter formam et materiam: *DMF* 15-17; minus potest materia esse sine forma quam quantitas sine figura: *DMF* 17; materia informis: *DMF* 2 materia aliquo modo potest esse in actu in rerum natura absque omni forma: *DMF* 5; de materia et essentia: *DEE* 213; materia est potentiale subiective, essentia vero est potentiale obiective: *DEE* 42; materia re differt a forma et privatione: *DEE* 14; sicut ex forma substantiali et materia fit unum simpliciter, ita ex forma accidentali et substantia fit unum per accidens: *DEE* 51; de extensione materie: *DEE* 58; 250; materia est in potentia ad extensionem: *INT* 6.2.2, n. 93; materia habet respectum ad esse extensum: *DEE* 19; partibilitas sive extensio qua et materia et quantitas sunt partibiles: *DEE* 250; materia proprie non est causa materialis forme sed magis compositi: *DMF* 22; sicut genus se habet ad oppositas differentias et materia ad formam et privationem, ita essentia ad esse et non

esse: *DEE* 14; forma materialis, saltem ordine nature, presupponit materiam: *DEE* 65; forma materialis dependet a materia ut a potentia in qua recipitur et sustentatur: *DMF* 16; materia presupposita: *DEE* 273; materia potest creari sine forma substantiali: *DEE* 283; quod proprie loquendo nec materia nec forma creatur, sed compositum: *DEE* 253ff.; de duplici transmutatione in generatione, scilicet materie ad formam et compositi ad esse: *DEE* 212; materia verius creatur quam forma: *DEE* 65; materia est pars essentie creature: *DEE* 4; forma educibilis de potentia materie: *DEE* 65ff.; 253ff.; *INT* 8.9.5; dupliciter dicitur forma educi de potentia materie: *DEE* 266ff.; non est simile de materia et forma substantiali et de subiecto et accidente: *DEE* 246; res materiales non determinantur ad formam per materiam, sed per formam: *DMF* 28; creation of matter and form: *INT* 8.9.5; neither form nor matter properly created but their compound: *INT* 8.8; 8.9.5; Harvey on matter and form: *INT* 9

materialis
unum elementum dicitur materialius alio: *DEE* 260; materia proprie non est causa materialis forme sed magis compositi: *DMF* 22; res materiales non determinantur ad formam per materiam, sed per formam: *DMF* 28; in materialibus substantia composita differt a forma, materia et accidentibus: *DEE* 150ff.

medieval
four chief rules of ancient and medieval semantics: *INT* 7.4.3; 7.4.3, nn. 138f.; 8.9.5, n. 177; parallellism postulate in ancient and medieval thought: *INT* 4.3, n. 51; 7.6; apparent doctrinal sterility of medieval altercations: *INT* 7.6

mens
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meta
on the use of the Greek prefix *meta-*: *INT* 4.2; 4.3, n. 46

metaphysics
Harvey's own metaphysics of being: *INT* 8.9.7; see also s.v. *ontology*

methexis
Greek *methexis* = participatio: *INT* 4.2, n. 43; Greek *metechesthai*: *INT* 4.2; *to metechon*: *INT* 4.1; 4.2, 4.2, n. 42; 4.3; *to metechomenon*: *INT* 4.1; 4.2; 4.2, n. 42; 4.3; see also s.v. *posthabitio*

modus
'esse receptum' non dicit speciale esse, sed modum essendi: *DEE* 305; penes modum intelligendi res: *DEE* 325; differre penes modum significandi: *DEE* 5; 145ff.; 158ff.; 232; 239; ex suo modo significandi importare: *DEE* 165; see also s.v. *significare*; --- modus infinitivus: quandoque ipsum verbum infinitivi modi (sicut 'esse', 'vivere' et talia) indirecte ex suo modo significandi significant hoc quod est habere talem actum (puta vitam vel essentiam), aliquando accipiuntur pro ipso actu habito: *DEE* 146

motor
nichil aliud requiritur enti cum est in potentia nisi motor: *DEE* 53

motus
motus (*opp*. creatio): *DEE* 38; motus est idem re cum termino per motum acquisito: *DEE* 37; subiectum motus non est idem re cum termino eius: *DEE* 37; li 'secundum' importat habitudinem eorum que acquiruntur per motum sive mutationem: *DEE* 262

mundus
si totus mundus cum omnibus suis partibus simul fieret a Deo: *DEE* 255; mundus intelligibilis: *DEE* 100; species mundi per quam intelligit formam: *DMF* 2

mutare
mutari est idem subiectum manens in pluribus nunc aliter se habere in uno et aliter in alio: *DEE* 262

mutatio
creatio est aliqua mutatio: *DEE* 75; creatio non est mutatio habens terminos a quo et ad quem secundum rei veritatem,

sed solum secundum falsam ymaginationem: *DEE* 177; li 'secundum' importat habitudinem eorum que acquiruntur per motum sive mutationem: *DEE* 262

Natura
in divinis suppositum solo respectu differt a natura: *DEE* 117; necessitate nature: *DEE* 109; secundum cursum nature: *DEE* 245; 252; Deus relinquit nature quod suum est: *DEE* 74; 266; ars/opus nature: *DEE* 112; 'creatura' solam essentiam sive naturam creatam dicit: *DEE* 330; preexistere ordine nature: *DEE* 255ff.; a thing's being in existence by extrinsic participation vs. by its proper nature: *INT* 8.8.3; evolutionary view of creation: quod quidam ponunt, scilicet sensitivum secundum rem educi de vegetativo, ita quod illud quod est a principio solum anima vegetativa, actione nature pertingit ad hoc quod sit sensitiva successive: *DEE* 32; utrum Christus potuerit assumere naturam irrationalem: *DMF* 18

naturalis
transmutatio naturalis: *DEE* 16; 35; operari naturaliter: *DMF* 18

negatio
de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio: *DEE* 11

negativus
'non sapere' privative accipitur pro 'desipere'; 'non sapere' negative accipitur pro non habere actualem existentiam sapiendi: *DEE* 12; 201

Neoplatonism
INT 1.2; 1.3; 2.2; 4; 4.1; 4.2; 4.3; 5.1; 7.6; evolution of Platonism to Neoplatonism: *INT* 3.3; Giles of Rome's cautious use of Platonism and Neoplatonism: *INT* 5.5

Neoscholastic
Neoscholastic historians of medieval philosophy: *INT* 2

Neothomism
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nichil
'ipsum nichil' = 'precisely nothing at all': *DEE* 155

nomen
verbum aliquando accipitur ut verbum, aliquando modo nominis: *DEE* 146 (se also s.v. *significare*); nomina prime/secunde impositionis: *INT* 7.3.2, n. 130

nota
nota predicandi quam omne verbum ex suo modo significandi importat: *DEE* 143ff.

novus
acquirere de novo: *DEE* 113; 262; 293; 321; creare de novo: 54; 213; de novo facere: *DEE* 159; de novo fundare: *DEE* 118; de novo fieri: *DEE* 87; 310; de novo inesse: *DEE* 322; procedere de novo: *DEE* 314; producere de novo: *DEE* 118; 333; de novo referre: *DEE* 293; suscipere de novo: *DEE* 269

numerus
original meaning of 'numerus': *INT* 2.2, n. 7; 'facere numerum'= 'to make up a duality': *INT* 7.3.1, n. 118; unitas est principium numeri, quia sua replicatione facit numerum esse quantitatem: *DEE* 103; eorum que simpliciter sunt unum numero, est unum esse: *DEE* 241; collection of created substances as 'numbers': *INT* 5.3

obedientialis
DEE ad 269

obedinalis
potentia obedinalis sive supernaturalis: *DEE* 269f.; 277f.; 'potentiam autem obedinalem' voco subiectum acceptum sine habitudine ad tale disponens secundum quod sine eis ab agente divino est transmutabile, sicut quando ex trunco statim fit vitulus: *DEE* 269

obedo
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obiectivus
de duplici potentiali, sc. subiective et obiective (vel terminative): *DEE* 20-22; *INT* 8.8.3; ordo predicamentalis

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The One (Greek *To HEN*): *INT* 4.3; being and unity: *INT* 5.2; trancendent notions of 'being' and 'one': *INT* 6.2.3
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operari
operari naturaliter: *DMF* 18
operatio
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oppositum
li 'secundum' importat habitudinem subiecti manentis in utroque opposito: *DEE* 203

Panis
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partibilitas
partibilitas sive extensio qua et materia et quantitas sunt partibiles: *DEE* 250
participare
'participare'= 'partem capere': *INT* 5; 'participare' construed with different cases: *INT* 5; 6.14, n. 87; esse participatum et diminutum: *DEE* 67; quod non participat esse, non potest participare accidens: *DEE* 71; nichil participat seipso: *DEE* 17; esse creature est quid participatum: *DEE* 206; idem potest dici participare seipsum secundum diversos modos significandi vel secundum diversas rationes acceptum: *DEE* 232; analogia entis inter ens participatum et ens non participatum: *DEE* 70; participatum vs. imparticipabile: *INT* 5.4; aliquid dicitur participare aliud quia habet illud diminutive respectu alterius quod habet illud perfecte: *DEE* 183; esse participatum et diminutum: *DEE* 67; esse participatum as immanent share of beingness: *INT* 5
participatio
triplex modus intelligendi participationem: *DEE* 2; *INT* 8.4.1; ratio 'participationis': *DEE* 180ff.; fit participatio cum aliquid iam est: *DEE* 1; participatio abstracti a concreto: *DEE* 209; participatio extrinseca: *DEE* 5; essentia creata est quadam extrinseca participatione: *DEE* 83; participation in Boethius: *INT* 6.1.4; causation and participation in Proclus: *INT* 4.2 causation and participation in Giles of Rome: *INT* 3.2; 5; 5.4; participation in Henry of Ghent: INT 6.1; explained as respectus ad Creatorem: 6.1.3; 8.9.1; a thing' being in existence by participation vs. by its proper nature: *INT* 8.8.3; on participation and analogous being: *INT* 8.8.1
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passivus
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pelagus
pelagus as a metaphor of infinity: *INT* 5.3, n. 59; infinitum pelagus perfectionis: *INT* 7.1.1
per
li 'per' importat habitudinem cause efficientis: *DEE* 39;
periphrastic
'quod' used in periphrastic constructions, e.g. 'in eo quod est'[= Greek *hêi on*]: *INT* 6.1.4; 'participat eo quod est esse'[Greek *metechei tou einai*]: *INT* 6.1.4; 6.1.5; periphrastic construction in Boethian ontology: *INT* 6.1.4, n. 82
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unumquoque est defectibile ratione potentie et est permanens ratione actus: *DEE* 108;
persona
Persone divine: *DEE* 57; 249; si accipiatur 'esse relatum' pro relatione esse subsistentie quo subsistit Persona divina, non est esse relativum nisi quatinus essentia est relatio, immo est esse absolutum, sed si accipiatur 'esse relatum' pro esse absoluto determinato per relationem facientem illud cuius est formaliter incommunicabile, sic est esse relativum: *DEE* 248
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positio philosophorum que est heretica: *DEE* 97; philosophorum opinio qui ponunt quod ex quadam necessitate nature creature procedant a Primo Principio: *INT* 6.2.5; *DEE* 315; secundum philosophos Intelligentie sunt cause aliarum rerum que sunt post eas: *DEE* 280; secundum philosophos omnis forma, quantum est de se, semper et necessario est: *DEE* 24; secundum positionem philosophorum forma, quantum est de se, est necesse esse: *DEE* 96; quod aliquid quod est natum corrumpi numquam corrumpitur est contra philosophos: *DEE* 99; --- Philosophus = Aristoteles, passim; --- the theological and philosophical interpretations of 'esse': *INT* 8.6.9, n. 172
Platonism
INT 1.2; 5.1; 6.1.4; 7.1; 7.1, n. 116; evolution of Platonism to Neoplatonism: *INT* 3.3; Giles of Rome's cautious use of Platonism and Neoplatonism: *INT* 4.3; 5.5; Middle Platonism: *INT* 3.3
plural
use of the plural as a common courtesy in academic debates: *INT* 6.1, nn. 68f.; 8.6.1, n. 167
plurificare
'extensio' nominat aliquid speciale quod non potest plurificari in eodem numero: *DEE* 243
posthabitio
posthabitio (Greek *methexis*) or 'consecutio': *INT* 4.2, n. 3
potentia
potentia (*opp*. actus): *DEE* 53; 67ff.; 108; 170-176; 313; *DMF* 8ff.; unumquoque est defectibile ratione potentie et est permanens ratione actus: *DEE* 108; omnis defectibilitas rerum provenit ratione potentie: *DEE* 312; entia prohibita sive entia in potentia (quod idem est): *DEE* 142; in actu/in habitu: *DEE* 116; potentia subiectiva/effectiva: *DMF* 9ff.; 19; quod est potentiale obiective, secundum aliam et aliam intentionem est in potentia et in actu: *DEE* 39; potentia activa/passiva: *DEE* 312f.; potentia sciri et significari habet per analogiam ad actum: *DEE* 143; forma generis est media inter potentiam et actum: *DEE* 68; esse educi de potestate essentie: *DEE* 31; 78; 279; 302; educi de potentia materie: *DEE* 266; 269; 279; forma educibilis de potentia materie: *DEE* 65ff.; 253ff.; potentia informativa et receptiva: *DEE* 279; dupliciter dicitur forma educi de potentia materie: *DEE* 266ff.; nichil aliud requiritur enti cum est in potentia nisi motor: *DEE* 53; 'potentiam autem obedientialem' voco subiectum acceptum sine habitudine ad tale disponens secundum quod sine eis ab agente divino est transmutabile, sicut quando ex trunco statim fit viticulus:

DEE 78; 269; 277f.; plurium potentiarum non est una sola operatio: *DEE* 235; unumquodque est defectibile ratione potentie et est permanens ratione actus: *DEE* 108
potentialis
esse actuale (*opp*. esse potentiale): *DEE* 19; potentiale quod est genus, differt a suo actuali quod est differentia: *DEE* 14; potentiale in creatura: *DEE* 17; de duplici potentiali, sc. subiective et obiective: *DEE* 20-22; quod est potentiale obiective, secundum aliam et aliam intentionem est in potentia et in actu: *DEE* 39; materia est potentiale subiective, essentia vero est potentiale obiective: *DEE* 42
potentialitas
objective (sive terminative) vs. subjective potentiality: *INT* 6.2.2; 6.3, n. 101; 8.8.3; defectibilitas inest rebus ex potentialitate: *DEE* 108; potentiality issue and the cration problem: *INT* 3.1.2
practicus
intellectus speculativus/practicus in Deo: *DEE* 324ff.
pragma
to pragma (Greek) = 'state of affairs': *INT* 6.3.1, n. 102; see s.v. *res*
predicamentalis
'predicamentum' duo importat, sc. ipsum ordinem predicamentalem et ipsas res que ordini predicamentali substernuntur: *DEE* 156; ordo predicamentalis est ens rationis: *DEE* 156; ordo predicamentalis sequitur rem secundum quod est obiective in intellectu: *DEE* 156; predicamental order: *INT* 8.1.1
predicamentum
two senses of 'predicamentum': *INT* 8.3; decem predicamenta: *DEE* 17; analogus decem predicamentis: *DEE* 48; 'predicamentum' duo importat, sc. ipsum ordinem predicamentalem et ipsas res que ordini predicamentali substernuntur: *DEE* 156 decem predicamenta prout actu existunt extra animam: *DEE* 48; septima predicamenta ultima nullam realitatem absolutam addunt super tria prima: *DEE* 228; ens quod est commune essentiale ad decem predicamenta: *INT* 6.1.3
predicare
nota predicandi quam omne verbum ex suo modo significandi importat: *DEE* 143ff.
predicatio
differentia formali predicatione predicatur de genere: *DEE* 220
preexistere
preexistere ordine nature: *DEE* 255ff.
preintelligere:
productio preintelligitur: *DEE* 256
presupponere
DEE 255ff.; 'nichil presupponere' in creatione non dicit habitudinem ad terminum a quo, sed negat habitudinem ad materiam presuppositam: *DEE* 273
principium
esse [Greek *to einai*] as First Principle: *INT* 1.2; 8.1.2; esse non potest dici principium generis nisi sit principium rei secundum quod est in genere: *DEE* 103; esse est in genere Substantie per reductionem sicut principium eius: *DEE* 25; 103; 306; 308; philosophorum opinio qui ponunt quod ex quadam necessitate nature creature procedant a Primo Principio: *INT* 6.2.5
privatio
sicut genus se habet ad oppositas differentias et materia ad formam et privationem, ita essentia ad esse et non esse: *DEE* 14; materia re differt a forma et privatione: *DEE* 14
privativus
'non sapere' privative accipitur pro 'desipere'; 'non sapere' negative accipitur pro non habere actualem existentiam sapiendi: *DEE* 12; 201
prohibere
entia prohibita sive entia in potentia (quod idem est): *DEE* 142
propositio
diversitas secundum intentionem et rationem variat veritatem propositionum: *DEE* 85

punctum, punctus
punctum quodammodo est in genere Quantitatis: *DEE* 25; punctus suo fluxu facit lineam esse lineam: *DEE* 103
purus
esse purum: *DEE* 2

Qualitas
genera absoluta, sicut Substantia, Qualitas, Quantitas: *DEE* 330
quantitas
genera absoluta, sicut Substantia, Qualitas, Quantitas: *DEE* 330; unitas est principium numeri, quia sua replicatione facit numerum esse quantitatem: *DEE* 103; punctum quodammodo est in genere Quantitatis: *DEE* 25; partibilitas sive extensio qua et materia et quantitas sunt partibiles: *DEE* 250; minus potest materia esse sine forma quam quantitas sine figura: *DMF* 17; quantitas infinita esse non potest: *DMF* 17
quid
secundum quid (*opp*. simpliciter): *DEE* passim; quid illimitatum: *DEE* 1; quid intelligibile: *DEE* 100ff.; quid subsistens: *DEE* 1; *quod quid est* [= Greek *to ti estin*] quod scitur est *quod quid est*: *DEE* 8; *quod quid est* or quiddity: *INT* 3.1
quidam
use of adjectival 'quidam' to qualify the proper meaning of the substantive: *INT* 3.2, n. 26
quiditas
essentia sive quiditas rei: *DEE* 8; *quod quid est* or quiddity: *INT* 3.1; essentia et quiditas rei qua est *id quod est*: *INT* 7.4.3, n. 140; Deus est ipsa quiditas et suum esse: *DEE* 165; esse exponi potest pro ipsa subsistentia sive quiditate rei: *DEE* 43
quod
quod est vs. *quo est*: *INT* 3.2; essentia ut *ex quo est* et *quod est*: *DEE* 48; --- 'quod' used in periphrastic constructions, e.g. 'in eo quod est' [= Greek *hêi on*]: *INT* 6.1.4; 'participat eo quod est esse' [Greek *metechei tou einai*]: *INT* 6.1.4; 6.1.5; 'secundum quod' used in reduplicative constructions, e.g. 'homo secundum quod homo' = 'homo qua homo': *DEE* passim; see also s.v. *reduplicatio*
quodlibet
the Proclean adage 'quodlibet in quolibet': *INT* 5.2

Ratio
'ratio' qua faculty: ratio modos invenit: *DEE* 90; 'ratio', i.e. 'conceptus': de ratione 'creationis': *DEE* 73; ratio 'participationis': *DEE* 180ff.; ratio essendi: *DEE* 10; nulla relatio est de ratione vel integritate entis absoluti: *DEE* 122; idem potest dici participare seipsum secundum diversos modos significandi vel secundum diversas rationes acceptum: *DEE* 232; differre ratione, see s.v. *differre*; esse rationis: *DEE* 201, passim; esse in intellectu, quod vocatur 'esse rationis': *DEE* 201; ens rationis non est de integritate entis realis extra animam existentis: *DEE* 123; 'ens rationis' = 'rationate being': *INT* 7.3.2; 7.4.2; 'relatio rationis' = 'rationate or conceptual relation(ship)': *DEE* 124; --- triple distinction, 'realis'('secundum rem'), 'ratione'('secundum rationem'),'intentione' ('secundum intentionem'): *INT* 5.2; 5.4; 6.1; 6.2.3; 6.4; 7;7.3; 7.3.1; 7.3.1, n. 123; 7.3.2, 7.3.2, n. 127; separare realiter, ratione, intentione: *INT* 6.3.2; 'ratio' as used in 'secundum rationem': *INT* 7.3.2
rationalis
intellectus rationalis vel intellectualis: *INT* 7.4
rationate
'rationate being' = 'ens rationis' or 'conceptual being'
ratus
'esse ratum' vs. 'esse reatum': *INT* 8.9.6, n. 184
realis
res habet duplex esse reale: esse in suis causis et esse in seipso: *INT* 7.4.6, n. 146; differre realiter: *DEE* 1-7 and

passim; triple distinction, 'realis'('secundum rem'), 'ratione'('secundum rationem'), 'intentione' ('secundum intentionem'): *INT* 6.1; 6.2.3; 6.4; 7;7.3; 7.3.1; 7.3.1, n. 123; 7.3.2, 7.3.2, n. 127; separare realiter, ratione, intentione: *INT* 6.3.2; distinctio realis inter esse et essentiam: *DEE* 14ff., passim; Aegidian real distinction: *INT* 7; 7.3.1, n. 118; 7.6; Henry of Ghent's rejection of it: *INT* 8.4; Avicenna's real distinction as applied by Giles of Rome: *INT* 8.9.6; esse et non esse non communicant in aliquo reali extra intellectum: *DEE* 14; ens rationis non est de integritate entis realis extra animam existentis: *DEE* 123; ad hoc quod scibile referat ad scientiam, non requiritur quod aliquid reale fiat in eo de novo: *DEE* 87

realitas
septima predicamenta ultima nullam realitatem absolutam addunt super tria prima: *DEE* 228

reatus
'esse ratum' vs. 'esse reatum': *INT* 8.9.6, n. 184

receptivus
potentia informativa et receptiva: *DEE* 279

recipere
esse creature est esse receptum: *DEE* 97; 'esse receptum' non dicit speciale esse, sed modum essendi: *DEE* 305

reduplicatio
unitas est principium numeri, quia sua reduplicatione facit numerum esse quantitatem: *DEE* 103; nulla res accepta cum reduplicatione alterius oppositorum est indifferens ad utrumque oppositorum: *DEE* 191

relatio
relatio est extra rationem sui fundamenti: *DEE* 125; nulla relatio est de ratione vel integritate entis absoluti: *DEE* 122; omne esse fundatur in essentia ex relatione ad Deum: *DEE* 61; relatio representati ad representans et cognoscibilis ad rationem cognoscendi vel ad cognitionem ipsam est tantum relatio rationis: *DEE* 124; (see also s.v. *respectus*); si accipiatur 'esse relatum' pro relatione esse subsistentie quo subsistit Persona divina, non est esse relativum nisi quatinus essentia est relatio, immo est esse absolutum, sed si accipiatur 'esse relatum' pro esse absoluto determinato per relationem facientem illud cuius est formaliter incommunicabile, sic est esse relativum: *DEE* 248

relativus
relative (*opp*. absolute): *DEE* 122

relatus
sicut opponitur ratio 'substantie' et 'accidentis', ita opponitur ratio 'absoluti' et 'relati'; si accipiatur 'esse relatum' pro relatione esse subsistentie quo subsistit Persona divina, non est esse relativum nisi quatinus essentia est relatio, immo est esse absolutum, sed si accipiatur 'esse relatum' pro esse absoluto determinato per relationem facientem illud cuius est formaliter incommunicabile, sic est esse relativum: *DEE* 248

replicatio
replicatio adversarii soluta est: *DEE* 230; unitas est principium numeri, quia sua re<du>plicatione facit numerum esse quantitatem: *DEE* 103

representare
illud quod representat rem cognitam cognoscenti: *DEE* 135; relatio representati ad representans et cognoscibilis ad rationem cognoscendi vel ad cognitionem ipsam est tantum relatio rationis: *DEE* 124

representativus
'exemplar' nichil plus importat nisi quod est representativum alicuius conductivi in cognitionem eius sive ratio cognoscendi ipsum: *DEE* 124;

reri (reor, ratus sum)
'esse ratum' vs. 'esse reatum': *INT* 8.9.6, n. 184

res
the term 'res': *INT* 6.1.1; 7.3.2; 7.3.2, n. 134; res quedam proprie dicta et non

figmentum: *DEE* 48; non est curandum de verbis ubi constat de re: *DEE* 277; hoc nomen 'res' dupliciter potest accipi: 7.3.1, n. 118; res quedam proprie dicta et non figmentum: *DEE* 48; 'res' = Greek *pragma*, i.e. the asserted state of affairs concerning the outside thing: *INT* 6.3.1, n. 102; res secundum quod cognita vs. res secundum quod est in intellectu: *INT* 8.5.5, n. 166; penes ipsas res intellectas: *DEE* 324; nulla res accepta cum reduplicatione alterius oppositorum est indifferens ad utrumque oppositorum: *DEE* 191; ordo predicamentalis sequitur rem secundum quod est obiective in intellectu: *DEE* 156; res habet duplex esse reale: esse in suis causis et esse in seipso: *INT* 7.4.6, n. 146; in intellectu/in re extra: *DEE* 9, passim; nulla res est suum esse: *DEE* 1; 46: unius rei unum est esse: *DEE* 46; essentia et quiditas rei qua est *id quod est*: *INT* 7.4.3, n. 140; secundum philosophos Intelligentie sunt cause aliarum rerum que sunt post eas: *DEE* 280; 'predicamentum' duo importat, sc. ipsum ordinem predicamentalem et ipsas res que ordini predicamentali substernuntur: *DEE* 156; res materiales non determinantur ad formam per materiam, sed per formam: *DMF* 28; sicut 'chimera', ita nec 'animal' significat rem veram sed figmentum, rebus non existentibus: *DEE* 157; res non sunt simpliciter in genere nisi quando existunt: *DEE* 207; de pluribus causis eiusdem rei: *DMF* 27ff.; illud quod representat rem cognitam cognoscenti: *DEE* 135; scientia habetur de rebus creatis sive sint sive non sint: *DEE* 8; a thing's be-ing (*esse*) = its essence in its relationship to its subject-substrate: *INT* 8.9.7; see also s.v. *thing*;

--- differre re, differre inter rem et rem: *INT* 2.2; 7.3.1, n. 118; see also s.vv. *differre*, *realis*

respectus

in divinis suppositum solo respectu differt a natura: *DEE* 117; --- respectus ad Creatorem: *INT* 6.1; 6.1.3; 6.2.4; 6.2.5; 6.3; 6.3.3; 6.3.4; 6.3.4, n. 110; 6.4; 7; 7.4.2; 7.5; 8.1.1; 8.6.3; 8.6.7; the ambivalence of the respectus doctrine: *INT* 7.5; respectus ad Deum (ut exemplar): 18; 24; 26ff.; 30ff.; 61; 69; 87; 107; 110ff.; 121-127; 212ff.; 221; 251; 285ff.; 314ff.; 330ff.; respectus fantasticus quem ponit (sc. Henricus): *DEE* 212; see also s.v. *creatio*

reversio

Neoplatonic reversio [Greek *epistrophê*]: *INT* 4.2, n. 40

rosa

licet rosa sit pulcherrima florum, una tamen rosa est pulchrior alia: *DEE* 238

Salvare

salvare creationem: *DEE* 13ff.; 30ff.; 109; 118; 205-232; 261ff.; 314ff.

sapere

accipiendo 'sapientiam' pro habitu et 'sapere' pro actu: *DEE* 234; sicut sapientia ad sapere, ita essentia ad esse: *DEE* 8; *INT* 5.2; de sapere creato et increato: *DEE* 12; 'non sapere' privative accipitur pro 'desipere'; 'non sapere' negative accipitur pro non habere actualem existentiam sapiendi: *DEE* 12; 201

sapientia

sicut sapientia ad sapere, ita essentia ad esse: *DEE* 8; *INT* 5.2; accipiendo sapientiam pro habitu et sapere pro actu: *DEE* 234; actus considerandi differt re ab habitu qui est sapientia, sicut est in quolibet alio habitu: *DEE* 204

scibilis

ad hoc quod scibile referat ad scientiam, non requiritur quod aliquid reale fiat in eo de novo: *DEE* 87; licet enim scibile referatur de novo ad aliquem scientem, scibili non mutato, hoc tamen impossibile est fieri, nulla mutatione facta in sciente secundum absolutum quod est scientia: *DEE* 294

scientia

scientia habetur de rebus creatis sive sint sive non sint: *DEE* 8; ad hoc quod

scibile referat ad scientiam, non requiritur quod aliquid reale fiat in eo de novo: *DEE* 87; licet enim scibile referatur de novo ad aliquem scientem, scibili non mutato, hoc tamen impossibile est fieri, nulla mutatione facta in sciente secundum absolutum quod est scientia: *DEE* 294

scire
quod scitur est *quod quid est*: *DEE* 8; potentia sciri et significari habet per analogiam ad actum: *DEE* 143; licet enim scibile referatur de novo ad aliquem scientem, scibili non mutato, hoc tamen impossibile est fieri, nulla mutatione facta in sciente secundum absolutum quod est scientia: *DEE* 294

scope
scope distinction in Proclus: *INT* 4.3; in Neoplatonism: *INT* 4.3; Giles of Rome's use of Proclean scope distinction: *INT* 5.4

secundum
li 'secundum' importat habitudinem subiecti manentis in utroque opposito: *DEE* 203; li 'secundum' importat habitudinem eorum que acquiruntur per motum sive mutationem: *DEE* 262; res accepta cum reduplicatione (e.g. 'animal secundum quod animal'): DEE 191; see also s.v. *reduplicatio*

sensitivus
quod quidam ponunt, scilicet sensitivum secundum rem educi de vegetativo, ita quod illud quod est a principio solum anima vegetativa, actione nature pertingit ad hoc quod sit sensitiva successive: *DEE* 32

separare
esse separatum: *INT* 3.2; 3.3; Forme separate in Plato: *INT* 5.5; separare realiter, ratione, intentione: *INT* 6.3.2

signatus
singulare signatum: *DEE* 201

significare
sicut 'chimera', ita nec 'animal' significat rem veram sed figmentum, rebus non existentibus: *DEE* 157; potentia sciri et significari habet per analogiam ad actum: *DEE* 143; concretive significare: *DEE* 164; omnis terminus concretus, sive sit substantivus sive adiectivus [...] tam implicite quam explicite significat: *DEE* 164; idem potest dici participare seipsum secundum diversos modos significandi vel secundum diversas rationes acceptum: *DEE* 232; 238f.; ex suo modo significandi implicite (explicite) importare: *DEE* 164f.; nota predicandi quam omne verbum ex suo modo significandi importat: *DEE* 143ff.; differre penes modum significandi: *DEE* 5; 145ff.; 158ff.; 232; 239; quandoque ipsum verbum infinitivi modi (sicut 'esse', 'vivere' et talia) indirecte ex suo modo significandi significant hoc quod est habere talem actum (puta vitam vel essentiam), aliquando accipiuntur pro ipso actu habito: *DEE* 146

signum
de tribus signis in instanti creationis: *DEE* 227;

sillogismus
sillogismus expositorius: *DEE* 93

similitudo
creatura est similitudo divine nature ex natura sua, non tamen ex natura sua est similitudo Dei agentis: *DEE* 115; similitudo divini esse: *DEE* 2;

simplex
unum simpliciter/unum per accidens: *DEE* 51;

singularis
singulare signatum: *DEE* 201

sol
sol causat lumen in aere: *DEE* 255; 267

specialis
'esse' et 'essentia' non nominant aliquod speciale: *DEE* 243; 'esse receptum' non dicit speciale esse, sed modum essendi: *DEE* 305

species
compositio generis, speciei, differentie: *DEE* 119; sola species diffinitur: *DEE* 129; intelligible species: *INT* 8.9.7, n. 186; species mundi per quam intelligit formam: *DMF* 2

speculativus
intellectus speculativus/practicus in Deo: *DEE* 324ff.
subiectivus
de duplici potentiali, sc. subiective et obiective (vel terminative): *INT* 8.8.3; *DEE* 20-22; potentia subiectiva/obiectiva: *DEE*: 22; 33; 39ff.; 45; 82; 84ff.; 178; 229; 288; 290f.; potentia subiectiva ad esse simpliciter: *DMF* 8ff.; potentia subiectiva / effectiva: *DMF* 9ff.; 19
subiectum (*logice*)
INT passim
subiectum (*ontologice*)
subiectum = substratum ('subject-substrate'): *INT* passim; *DEE* passim; *DMF* passim; subiectum substratum: *DEE* 35; de esse essentie subiecti et accidentis: *DEE* 233; 259; whether a subject-substrate's existential being does coincide with its accident's: *INT* 8.9.4; non est simile de materia et forma substantiali et de subiecto et accidente: *DEE* 246; subiectum motus non est idem re cum termino eius: *DEE* 37; li 'secundum' importat habitudinem subiecti manentis in utroque opposito: *DEE* 203; mutari est idem subiectum manens in pluribus nunc aliter se habere in uno et aliter in alio: *DEE* 262; li 'secundum' importat habitudinem subiecti manentis in utroque opposito: *DEE* 203; subiectum licet quantum ad id quod est non dependeat a forma accidentali, dependet tamen ab ea quantum ad hoc quod est esse informatum ea: *DMF* 32; accidens virtute divina potest existere per se sine subiecto: *DMF* 12
subsistentia
esse essentie quod est commune et esse subsistentie et esse existentie: *DEE* 251; esse existentie et esse subsistentie, quod quidem est unum: *DEE* 233; esse exponi potest pro ipsa subsistentia sive quiditate rei: *DEE* 43; si accipiatur 'esse relatum' pro relatione esse subsistentie quo subsistit Persona divina, non est esse relativum nisi quatinus essentia est relatio, immo est esse absolutum, sed si accipiatur 'esse relatum' pro esse absoluto determinato per relationem facientem illud cuius est formaliter incommunicabile, sic est esse relativum: *DEE* 248;
subsistere
vocando 'subsistere' 'per se existere': *DMF* 21; esse subsistens: *DEE* 1; forma substantialis subsistens: *DEE* 4; quid subsistens: *DEE* 1; quod in eo in quo sunt plures forme, adveniente ultima forma, precedentes desinant dare esse (subsistens): *DEE* 252; si accipiatur 'esse relatum' pro relatione esse subsistentie quo subsistit Persona divina, non est esse relativum nisi quatinus essentia est relatio, immo est esse absolutum, sed si accipiatur 'esse relatum' pro esse absoluto determinato per relationem facientem illud cuius est formaliter incommunicabile, sic est esse relativum: *DEE* 248;
substantia
esse est in genere Substantie per reductionem sicut principium eius: *DEE* 25; 103; 306; 308; substantia et accidens analogiantur: *DEE* 210; genera absoluta, sicut Substantia, Qualitas, Quantitas: *DEE* 330; in eadem substantia, quotquot ponantur accidentia vel forme, non est nisi unicum esse: *DEE* 47; sicut ex forma substantiali et materia fit unum simpliciter, ita ex forma accidentali et substantia fit unum per accidens: *DEE* 51; in materialibus substantia composita differt a forma, materia et accidentibus: *DEE* 150ff.; sicut opponitur ratio 'substantie' et 'accidentis', ita opponitur ratio 'absoluti' et 'relati'; in una substantia est nisi una extensio: *DEE* 47; substantia completa: *DEE* 150; 186; substantia separata: *DEE* 272; collection of created substances as 'numbers': *INT* 5.3
substantialis
forma substantialis subsistens: *DEE* 4; see also s.v. *forma*; substantial/coincidental being: *INT* 8.7.3; esse substantiale

completum: *DMF* 6; esse substantiale actuale/esse accidentale actuale: *DMF* 7; difference between existential and substantial being: *INT* 8.7.2; 8.7.4; see also s.vv. *ens, esse, essentia*
substantivus
omnis terminus concretus, sive sit substantivus sive adiectivus [...] tam implicite quam explicite significat: *DEE* 164; *INT* 8.3.1; non consuevit 'existens' dici masculine vel feminine nisi de substantivo: *DEE* 244
substernere
'predicamentum' duo importat, sc. ipsum ordinem predicamentalem et ipsas res que ordini predicamentali substernuntur: *DEE* 156; subiectum substratum: DEE 35; see also s.v. *subiectum*
supernaturalis
generatio supernaturalis: *DEE* 78; 276; supernaturalis obedo: *DMF* 4; supernatural intervention: *INT* 9
suppositum
in divinis suppositum solo respectu differt a natura: *DEE* 117 forma materialis dependet a materia ut a potentia in qua recipitur et sustentatur: *DMF* 16

Tempus
ex tempore creature a Deo procedunt: *DEE* 109 dicere quod simplicia componentia sint facta a quodam alio ab eterno et quod coniunctio eorum fieret a Deo ex tempore esset hereticum: *DEE* 118; quid intelligibile et abstractum a tempore: *DEE* 100
terminare
de ratione 'factionis' est terminari ad aliquod ens actu per eam productum: *DEE* 256;
terminus
DEE 35ff.; 87; 113; 139; 149; 177; 197; 213; 226; 228; 321; motus est idem re cum termino per motum acquisito: *DEE* 37; terminus motus non est idem re cum motu: *DEE* 228; subiectum motus non est idem re cum termino eius: *DEE* 37; in creatis idem est subiectum et terminus: *DEE* 32; non est mutatio habens terminum a quo et ad quem secundum rei veritatem, sed solum secundum falsam ymaginationem: *DEE* 177; 'nichil presupponere' in creatione non dicit habitudinem ad terminum a quo, sed negat habitudinem ad materiam presuppositam: *DEE* 273; transmutatio que est a termino in terminum: *DEE* 177; terminus a quo/ad quem: *DEE* 77; 81; 177; 273
terminus (*logice*)
abstract/concrete terms: *INT* 8.3.1; terminus denominative acceptus: *DEE* 220; nichil proprie est in potentia ad seipsum eodem modo per terminum ipsum significantem importatum: *DEE* 172; de termino concreto et abstracto: *DEE* 164; omnis terminus concretus, sive sit substantivus sive adiectivus [...] tam implicite quam explicite significat: *DEE* 164; semantics of terms and conceptual engineering: *INT* 8.9.7; autonymous use of terms: *INT* 6.14, n. 82; 7.4.3
theology
the theological and philosophical interpretations of 'esse': *INT* 8.6.9, n. 172
thing
a thing's be-ing (*esse*) = its essence in its relationship to its subject-substrate: *INT* 8.9.7; a thing's being in existence by extrinsic participation vs. by its proper nature: *INT* 8.8.3; the compositional structure of things explained in terms of the diversity of intentions: *INT* 7.4.2, n. 136 essences of things exist from eternity in their cause, God: *INT* 8.1.1
totus
totum in parte vs. totum ex partibus: *INT* 5.4; forma partis vs. forma totius: *INT* 2.3; 3.1.2; 3.2, n. 27
tragedia
magna tragedia verborum: *DMF* 26
transcendens
threefold status of forms: transcendent, immannent, and mental: *INT* 5.1; ontological status of transcendent Forms: *INT* 3.3;

transmutabilis
‘potentiam autem obedientialem’ voco subiectum acceptum sine habitudine ad tale disponens secundum quod sine eis ab agente divino est transmutabile, sicut quando ex trunco statim fit vitulus: *DEE* 269
transmutatio
de duplici transmutatione in generatione, scilicet materie ad formam et compositi ad esse: *DEE* 212; transmutatio que est a termino in terminum: *DEE* 177; transmutatio naturalis: *DEE* 16; 35
truffa
DEE 35; 218; truffa mirabilis: *DEE* 222
truncus
ex trunco statim fit vitulus: *DEE* 269
truth
Aristotle’s definition of truth: *INT* 6.3.1, n. 102

Umbra
umbra a corpore necessitate nature procedit: *DEE* 109
unde
‘unde’ = ‘qua’ (‘in its capacity of’’), e.g. non unde essentia, sed unde est effectus Dei: *DEE* 77; 99; 103; 112; 139; 256; 304
unicus
in eadem substantia, quotquot ponantur accidentia vel forme, non est nisi unicum esse: *DEE* 47;
unitas (*mathematice*)
unitas est principium numeri, quia sua re<du>plicatione facit numerum esse quantitatem: *DEE* 103
unitas (*metaphysice*)
veritas, bonitas, unitas nichil addunt super essentiam rei: *DEE* 23; 94; omne quod est, ideo est quia unum est et suum esse consistit in unitate: *DEE* 46; difficultates circa unitatem esse et essentie apparentes: *DEE* 206; being and unity: *INT* 5.2; trancendent notions of ‘being’ and ‘one’: *INT* 6.2.3
universalis
particularis/universalis: *DEE* 9; Henry of Ghent’s definition of ‘universal’: *INT* 6.3.2
univocus
(*opp*. analogus): *DEE* 143
unus (*mathematice*)
unum est principium numeri, quia sua re<du>plicatione facit numerum esse quantitatem: *INT; DEE* 103; eorum que simpliciter sunt unum numero, est unum esse: *DEE* 241
unus (*metaphysice*)
esse verum, bonum, unum: *DEE* 3; ens et unum sola ratione differunt: *DEE* 85; unius rei unum est esse: *DEE* 46; omne quod est, ideo est quia unum est et suum esse consistit in unitate: *DEE* 46; sicut ex forma substantiali et materia fit unum simpliciter, ita ex forma accidentali et substantia fit unum per accidens: *DEE* 51; ‘unum’ significat indivisionem: *INT* 6.3.1

Vadere
vadere ad intentionem auctoris: *DEE* 282; vadere ad mentem alicuius: *DEE* 305
vegetativus
quod quidam ponunt, scilicet sensitivum secundum rem educi de vegetativo, ita quod illud quod est a principio solum anima vegetativa, actione nature pertingit ad hoc quod sit sensitiva successive: *DEE* 32
verbosity: Henry’s (supposed) verbosity: *INT* 7.3.2, n. 128; 9; Giles’s verbosity: *INT* 7.2.2; multa verba inutilia dicit: *DMF* 2
verbum
nota predicandi quam omne verbum ex suo modo significandi importat: *DEE* 143ff.; verbum aliquando accipitur ut verbum, aliquando modo nominis: *DEE* 146; quandoque ipsum verbum infinitivi modi (sicut ‘esse’, ‘vivere’ et talia) indirecte ex suo modo significandi significant hoc quod est habere talem

actum (puta vitam vel essentiam), aliquando accipiuntur pro ipso actu habito: *DEE* 146; --- magna tragedia verborum: *DMF* 26; multa verba inutilia dicit: *DMF* 2; non est curandum de verbis ubi constat de re: *DEE* 277
verificatio
de verificatione 'Hoc non est illud': *DEE* 169
veritas
veritas, bonitas, unitas nichil addunt super essentiam rei: *DEE* 23; 94; secundum rei veritatem: *DEE* 177, passim; diversitas secundum intentionem et rationem variat veritatem propositionum: *DEE* 85
verus
esse verum, bonum, unum: *DEE* 3
vita
per operationem vite vel anime (quod idem est): *DEE* 185
vitulus
'ex trunco statim fit vitulus': *DEE* 78; 269; 277f.; *INT* 8.9.5, n. 177
vivere
de operatione que dicitur 'vivere': *DEE* 185; accipiendo 'vivere' pro vivere essentiali (*opp.* pro actu existendi viventis): *DEE* 248; vivere et intelligere: *INT* 5.2; in Christo (non) sunt duo *vivere*: *DEE* 56
voluntas
mera Dei voluntas: *DEE* 109

Ydea
ydea sive exemplar: *DEE* 5; 109; ydee Platonis: *DMF* 20
ydemptitas
quomodo esse et essentia se habeant secundum ydemptitatem et diversitatem: *DEE* 120ff.
ymaginatio
secundum falsam ymaginationem: *DEE* 177; 304; secundum ymaginationem istius hominis: *DMF* 24; 32
ymago
ymago a facie necessitate nature procedit: *DEE* 109.